Objectivism, Entities, Actions, and Attributes: A Reply to a Critic

A couple of days ago, I received the following anonymous comment on my article, A Critical Examination of the Objectivist Metaphysic:

Your Critique seems to rest on a series of misunderstandings about the nature of entities and attributes as understood in Objectivism.

Objectivism doesn’t claim that only entities can act or have attributes. It claims that actions are performed by entities, but those entities can have properties or attributes that contribute to the nature of their actions. For example, a person (an entity) can think (an action), but the action of thinking is facilitated by the person’s consciousness (an attribute of the person).

Objectivism doesn’t necessarily claim that consciousness or mind is an attribute rather than an entity. Consciousness and mind are aspects or attributes of a human being, but they are also entities in their own right in the sense that they are things which exist and can be identified.

You also appear to be confusing the idea of an entity as a distinct existent with the idea of an entity as a primary, independently existing thing. In Objectivism, an entity is simply something that exists and can be identified. So, consciousness, mind, and a person could all be considered entities in this sense.

The critique also assumes that if something is an attribute, then it cannot have attributes of its own. But in Objectivism, attributes can have attributes. For example, a person’s consciousness (an attribute of the person) can have its own attributes, like being aware, attentive, or distracted.

Essentially, the misunderstanding of the concepts led you to a false conclusion. This is simply put of course, but I can appreciate the thought you put into the critique.

Thanks

While I appreciate your constructive criticism, I must admit that you are mistaken when it comes to certain core aspects of Rand’s metaphysic. For this reason, I think it would only be right for me to address your points and explain where they go astray from the Objectivist perspective. Since I have addressed criticisms that are very similar to yours in the past, I’ll provide links to those posts at the end.

While you are correct in pointing out that Objectivism holds that an entity’s attributes determine or facilitate the kinds of actions the entity performs (cf. ITOE, 93-94), it is not true that Objectivism does not claim that only entities can act. On the contrary, Objectivism explicitly maintains the opposite—indeed, all actions are actions performed by entities:

“All actions are caused by entities. The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act; a thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature.” (For the New Intellectual (FNI), 152) 

“And—especially important in considering the law of cause and effect—there are no floating actions; there are only actions performed by entities….The adult validation of the law of causality consists in stating this relationship [“between the nature of an entity and its mode of action”] explicitly. The validation rests on two points: the fact that action is action of an entity; and the law of identity, A is A. Every entity has a nature; it is specific, noncontradictory, limited; it has certain attributes and no others. Such an entity must act in accordance with its nature. The only alternatives would be for an entity to act apart from its nature or against it; both of these are impossible. A thing cannot act apart from its nature, because existence is identity; apart from its nature, a thing is nothing. A thing cannot act against its nature, i.e., in contradiction to its identity, because A is A and contradictions are impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity. This is the action it will take, the action that is caused and necessitated by its nature….Cause and effect, therefore, is a universal law of reality. Every action has a cause (the cause is the nature of the entity which acts); and the same cause leads to the same effect (the same entity, under the same circumstances, will perform the same action)….Given the facts that action is action of entities, and that every entity has a nature—both of which facts are known simply by observation—it is self-evident that an entity must act in accordance with its nature.” (Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (OPAR), 13-16) 

“Action is the crux of the law of cause and effect: it is action that is caused—by entities. By the same token, the causal link does not relate two actions….Motions do not act, they are actions. It is entities which act—and cause. Speaking literally, it is not the motion of a billiard ball which produces effects; it is the billiard ball, the entity, which does so by a certain means.” (OPAR, 17-18) 

“The law of causality states that entities are the cause of actions—not the every entity, of whatever sort, has a cause, but that every action does; and not that the cause of action is action, but that the cause of action is entities.” (OPAR, 18)

“Entity, as we have seen, is the primary “category.” Only entities can act— and to be an entity is to be an individual.” (OPAR, 196)

“The first concepts man forms are concepts of entities—since entities are the only primary existents. (Attributes cannot exist by themselves, they are merely the characteristics of entities; motions are motions of entities; relationships are relationships among entities.)” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, (ITOE), 12) 

“Actions are caused by entities…” (ITOE, 285) 

“By “action” we mean the action of an entity.” (ITOE, 291)

I think the above passages are enough to establish my point that Objectivism does hold that all actions are actions performed by entities. Let’s continue.

“You also appear to be confusing the idea of an entity as a distinct existent with the idea of an entity as a primary, independently existing thing. In Objectivism, an entity is simply something that exists and can be identified.”

The problem with this criticism is that it rests upon a misunderstanding of Objectivist account of existents and entities. While Objectivism holds that all entities are distinct existents that can be identified, Objectivism does not hold that “an entity is simply [a “distinct”] something that exists and can be identified.” As a matter of fact, we find the opposite view frequently emphasized in Objectivist literature. Here are a few examples: 

“The first concepts man forms are concepts of entities—since entities are the only primary existents. (Attributes cannot exist by themselves, they are merely the characteristics of entities; motions are motions of entities; relationships are relationships among entities.)” (ITOE), 15) 

“An existent is, then, a particular which exists….An existent is a concrete. “Existent” is a very convenient term in that it subsumes entities and attributes and actions and event mental events. They exist….Everything that exists on which you can focus, anything which you can isolate, whether it is an entity, a relationship, an action, or an attribute. The concept “existent” refers to something which exists. And it is wider than the concept “entity,” because it permits you to subsume under that concept, and focus on, attributes or relationships or actions—on that which depends on an entity but can be studied separately. (ITOE, 198-199)

“An entity is that which you perceive and which can exist by itself. Characteristics, qualities, attributes, actions, relationships, do not exist by themselves…attributes and actions cannot exist apart from the entity.” (ITOE, 265) 

“An attribute is something which is not the entity itself.  No one attribute constitutes the whole entity…” (ITOE, 276) 

“An entity means a self-sufficient form of existence—as against a quality, an action, a relationship, etc., which are simply aspects of an entity that we separate out by specialized focus. An entity is a thing.” (The Philosophy of Objectivism Lecture Series, Lecture 3) 

While it is the case that all entities are existents, not all existents are entities. Let us suppose that Objectivism did in fact maintain that “an entity is simply a [“distinct”] something that exists and can be identified.” How would this tally with the rest of the Objectivist metaphysic? Well, if an entity is any [“distinct”] something that exists and can be identified, it necessarily follows that any distinct and identifiable existent is an entity. Now, according to Objectivism, any particular action or attribute of an entity, and any particular relationship between entities, is itself an existent—an existent that is not only identifiable but an existent that is also distinct from other existents (this includes the entity which performs said action, the entity which has said attribute, and the entity which stands in said relationship, etc.). However, if it is the case that “an entity is simply a [“distinct”] something that exists and can be identified,” it would follow that any particular action or attribute of an entity, and any particular relationship between entities, is itself an entity—a conclusion which the Objectivist metaphysic explicitly rejects and repudiates.  Indeed, the passages referenced above make this clear. Note also that Rand explicitly states that no entity is identical to any one attribute. But, if no entity is identical to any one attribute, it follows that no one attribute is identical to any entity.

We have seen that Objectivism holds characteristics of entities, attributes of entities, actions of entities, and relationships between entities, to all be existents. We have also seen that although a characteristic of an entity, an attribute of an entity, an action of an entity, or a relationship between entities, is an existent—an existent that is identifiable and distinct from other existents—said existent is not itself an entity. On the contrary, as Rand herself says, unlike entities, “characteristics, qualities, attributes, actions, relationships, do not exist by themselves.” (ITOE, 265, cf. ITOE, 15) Just as it is wrong to conclude that “All mammals are dogs” from the fact that “all dogs are mammals,” so too is it wrong to conclude that “All distinct and identifiable existents are entities” from the fact that “All entities are distinct and identifiable existents.” Let’s continue.

“Objectivism doesn’t necessarily claim that consciousness or mind is an attribute rather than an entity.”

This is false. Objectivism does maintain that consciousness is an attribute rather than an entity. The following passages (among many others) illustrate this core aspect of Rand’s philosophy: 

“Consciousness, unlike existence, is a property: “Consciousness is an attribute of certain living entities, but it is not an attribute of a given state of awareness, it is that state.” (ITOE, 56) 

“Prof. F: Wouldn’t you say that consciousness is itself an attribute of man?...AR: Right, A faculty of man.” (ITOE, 154) 

“Whether he has a soul or is a material being with the attribute of consciousness, in either case his distinctive, essential attribute is consciousness, not matter…” (The Journals of Ayn Rand, 13) 

“Man is a being endowed with consciousness—an attribute which matter does not possess.” (The Letters of Ayn Rand, “The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged Years” (1945-1959), To Nathan Blumenthal, January 13, 1950) 

“A man’s volition is outside the power of other men. What the unalterable basic constituents are to nature, the attribute of a volitional consciousness is to the entity “man”.” (PWNI, 38) 

“Objectivity begins with the realization that man (including his every attribute and faculty, including his consciousness) is an entity of a specific nature who must act accordingly…” (ITOE, 82) 

“All questions presuppose that one has a faculty of knowledge, i.e., the attribute of consciousness. One ignorant of this attribute must perforce be ignorant of the whole field of cognition (and of philosophy).” (OPAR, 5) 

“Consciousness is an attribute of perceived entities here on earth.” (OPAR, 33) 

“The same observations which reveal that consciousness is an attribute of certain living organisms reveal that it belongs to separate organisms.” (OPAR, 196) 

“Since consciousness is not an independent entity, it cannot attain fulfillment within its own domain.” (OPAR, 420) 

“[Man] is, in Ayn Rand’s words, “an indivisible entity, an integrated unit of two attributes: of matter and consciousness.” Consciousness in his case takes the form of mind, i.e., a conceptual faculty; matter, of a certain kind of organic structure. Each of these attributes is indispensable to the other and to the total entity. The mind acquires knowledge and defines goals; the body translates these conclusions into action.” (OPAR, 196) 

“It is one’s recognition of the fact that the mind is an attribute of the individual and that no person can think for another.” (OPAR, 255) 

“Since man is an integration of two attributes, mind and body, every virtue reflects this integration.” (OPAR, 257)

The remainder of my response is going to rely on highly technical aspects of Rand’s metaphysic. 

“Objectivism doesn’t claim that only entities can act or have attributes. It claims that actions are performed by entities, but those entities can have properties or attributes that contribute to the nature of their actions.”

The question of whether or not attributes can have attributes of there own is not essential to the arguments in the original article or in any of the other articles where I critically analyze the Objectivist metaphysic. Nevertheless, the question as to whether attributes can have attributes of their own remains an important one. Firstly, if we suppose that some attributes have attributes of their own (i.e., are themselves a “unities” of attributes), then a pressing question arises: “Why are some “unities” of attributes independently existing primaries (i.e., entities) and other “unities” of attributes (i.e., attributes that have attributes of their own) not independently existing primaries?” What special “ingredient” makes the one, and not the other, a “self-contained” existent? To say that a “unity” of attributes of the former kind has the property of “being a self-contained existent,” while a “unity” of attributes of the latter kind does not have the property of “being a self-contained existent,” is to simply reaffirm the question rather than answer it. Such a response would be as helpful as appealing to opium’s “soporific quality” in an explanation of why opium induces sleep. The circularity is obvious. 

Secondly, another question emerges: “Do only some attributes have attributes of their own? Or do all attributes have attributes of their own?” If only some attributes have attributes of their own, then why do those attributes have attributes of their own while all other attributes do not? It seems that if some attributes are granted the privilege of having attributes of their own, there is no non-arbitrary reason that can be given to justify withholding this privilege from all other attributes.

Thirdly, if some attributes have attributes of their own, then these “privileged” attributes are either identical to, or not identical to, the totality of attributes they possess. If these “privileged” attributes are not identical to the totality of attributes they possess but are instead distinct from, or “over-and-above,” the totality of attributes they possess, this would jar with Rand’s conception of identity (passim. ITOE, OPAR, etc.) On the other hand, if these “privileged” attributes are identical to the totality of attributes they possess, we would have to ask another question: “What is the “essential characteristic” (to use Rand’s expression) of this “privileged” attribute?” In this case, the “privileged” attribute’s “essential characteristic” would be the characteristic that not only makes the greatest number of this “privileged” attribute’s other characteristics possible, but also explains the greatest number of its other characteristics.

Let’s take an entity, such as an apple. This apple is red, round, sweet, smooth, etc. “Redness,” “roundness,” “sweetness,” and “smoothness,” etc. are all attributes or characteristics of the apple. Now, do any of these attributes have attributes of their own? Are “redness,” “roundness,” “sweetness,” and “smoothness” examples of “privileged” attributes? (i.e., attributes that have attributes of their own). If not, then for what reason? If so, then what is the “essential attribute” of each? This question is much more challenging than it may appear to be. For instance, what are we to say of the apple’s attribute of “redness.” Does the apple’s attribute of “redness” have attributes of its own? If so, then what are they? It’s obvious that “redness” is not one of them—indeed, the attribute of “redness” is not itself red. The same is true for the rest of the apple’s attributes. The apple’s attribute of “roundness” is not itself round; the apple’s attribute of “sweetness” is not itself sweet-tasting; the apple’s attribute of “smoothness” is not itself smooth, etc. Furthermore, since the attribute of “redness” is not itself colored, we can’t say that an “essential characteristic” of “redness” is that it is “darker-than” or “brighter-than” something other than itself. We are thus at a loss as to what the “essential characteristic” of redness is. Anything that we can offer as a possible answer would itself be relational properties holding between colorless terms. Lastly, I think it is important to note that Rand maintained that attributes were “indivisible” (cf. ITOE, 276) and it seems that if attributes were to have attributes of their own, attributes would no longer be “indivisible,” but rather “infinitely divisible.” But I digress. 

As mentioned above, I have provided several modified versions of a few of the arguments that I posed in A Critical Examination of the Objectivist Metaphysic. While the following list of arguments is not exhaustive, and a couple of the arguments in the list may appear supererogatory, it is important to note that their soundness does not hinge upon the issue of whether or not attributes can possess attributes of their own. If anyone doubts any of the premises, I recommend that they refer to the original article. In that article, I provide an abundance of passages taken in context, as well as citations that can be used in support of the premises of each argument. 

Argument 1B

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by entities and that only entities are causally efficacious. 

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind performs actions and that my consciousness is causally efficacious. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an entity. [From P1 and P2] 

P3) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is not an entity. 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind both is, and is not, an entity. [From C1 and P3]

Argument 2B 

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) and that only independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) are causally efficacious.  

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind performs actions and that my consciousness is causally efficacious. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). [From P1 and P2] 

P3) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is not an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind both is, and is not, an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). [From C1 and P3]

Argument 3B

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by entities and that only entities are causally efficacious. 

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is not an entity. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind does not perform actions and that my consciousness/mind is not causally efficacious. [From P1 and P2] 

P3) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind performs actions and that my consciousness/mind is causally efficacious. 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind both does, and does not, perform actions, and that my consciousness/mind is, and is not, causally efficacious. [From C1 and P3]

Argument 4B

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) and that only independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) are causally efficacious. 

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind performs actions and that my consciousness is causally efficacious. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). [From P1 and P2] 

P3) Objectivism is committed to the position that an attribute of an entity is not an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is not an attribute of an entity. [From C1 and P3] 

P4) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an attribute of an entity. 

C3) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is, and is not, an attribute of an entity. [From C2 and P4]

Argument 5B

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) and that only independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) are causally efficacious. 

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that I perform actions and that I am causally efficacious. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). [From P1 and P2] 

P3) Objectivism is committed to the position that an attribute of an entity is not an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent).  

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am not an attribute of an entity. [From C1 and P3] 

P4) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an attribute of an entity.  

C3) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am not my consciousness/mind. [From C2 and P4] 

P5) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am my consciousness/mind.

C4) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am, and I am not, my consciousness/mind. [From C3 and P5]

Argument 6B

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that an attribute is always possessed by something that is not the attribute itself. 

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an attribute which I, and I alone possess. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am not my consciousness/mind. [From P1 and P2] 

P3) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am my consciousness/mind. 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am, and I am not, my consciousness/mind. [From C1 and P3]

Argument 7B

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that an attribute is always possessed by something that is not the attribute itself. 

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an attribute. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is possessed by something that is not my consciousness/mind. [From P1 and P2] 

P3) Objectivism is committed to the position my consciousness/mind is an attribute which I, and I alone, possess. 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am not my consciousness/mind. [From C1 and P3] 

P4) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am my consciousness/mind. 

C3) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is possessed by something that is not me. [From C2 and P4]

Argument 8B

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that an attribute is always possessed by something that is not the attribute itself. 

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an attribute. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is possessed by something that is not my consciousness. [From P1 and P2] 

P3) Objectivism is committed to the position that I am my consciousness/mind. 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am possessed by something that is not me. [From C1 and P3]

To conclude, I think it would be best to provide links to my other writings where I analyze the Objectivist metaphysic. I hope that my critic might find these interesting or helpful:

A Defense of Ayn Rand’s Objectivism

A Critical Examination of Objectivism’s Account of Parts and Attributes of Entities, and How it Pertains to Objectivism’s Account of Consciousness 

A Critical Examination of Objectivism’s Account of Change, Activity, Motion, and Time 

A Critical Examination of Objectivism and the Concept of an “Unperceived” Reality

A Defense of Ayn Rand’s Objectivism

A couple of weeks ago, an article was published concerning the place of consciousness in the Objectivist metaphysic. As far as I can ascertain, the article was written with the supplementary intention of rebutting my investigations into Objectivism. While reading the article, I stumbled across several mistakes that not only misrepresent, but also clash with, the very weltanschauung that the author had hoped to explain and defend. The following post is an attempt to set right those mistakes.

“In Objectivism, an entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents. An entity is a specific, concrete, and indivisible thing that possesses a distinct identity and exists independently of the observer’s consciousness. Entities can be either physical or abstract, and they can range in size and complexity from subatomic particles to entire galaxies. An entity can be anything that exists, whether it is a material object or an abstract concept, such as a mathematical equation or a moral principle. Objectivism holds that entities are not simply subjective creations of the human mind but rather are objective, existing independently of human consciousness.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity)

The above passage is, allegedly, the Objectivist answer to the question, “What is an entity?”. Unfortunately, the passage ends up (unintentionally) misrepresenting the Objectivist view in several significant respects. Furthermore, the answer is inconsistent with what is written later on in the article. To save on space, and to eliminate tedious repetition, I’ll examine each line individually and supply passages from Objectivist literature to substantiate my remarks.

“In Objectivism, an entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity)

Objectivism does not hold that “an entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents.” Such a view would contradict many crucial aspects of the Objectivist metaphysic. I’ll attempt to illustrate this as clearly as possible:

Suppose for a brief moment, that Objectivism did in fact maintain that “an entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents.” How would this tally with the rest of the Objectivist metaphysic? Well, if an entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents, it necessarily follows that any existent which can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents is itself an entity. Now, according to Objectivism, any particular action or attribute of an entity, and any particular relationship between entities, is itself an existent—an existent which can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents (this includes the entity which performs said action, the entity which has said attribute, and the entity which stands in said relationship, etc.). However, if, as we have supposed, “an entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents,” it would follow that any particular action or attribute of an entity, and any particular relationship between entities, would itself be an entity—a conclusion which the Objectivist metaphysic explicitly rejects and repudiates. 

According to Ayn Rand, “an existent is a concrete. “Existent” is a very convenient term in that it subsumes entities and attributes and actions and even mental events. They exist.” (ITOE, 208) When asked whether relationships are existents, Rand replies, “Yes—everything that exists on which you can focus, anything which you can isolate [is an existent], whether it is an entity, a relationship, an action, or an attribute.” (ITOE, 208) Now that we have understood the Objectivist view of existents, it is important to point out that not all existents are entities, even though all entities are existents. For Rand, “an entity is that which you perceive and which can exist by itself.  Characteristics, qualities, attributes, actions, relationships, do not exist by themselves…attributes and actions cannot exist apart from the entity [which has them].” (ITOE, 265)

We have seen that Objectivism holds characteristics of entities, qualities of entities, attributes of entities, actions of entities, and relationships between entities, to all be existents. We have also seen that although a particular quality, attribute, or action of an entity, and a particular relationship between entities, is an existent—an existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents—said existent is not itself an entity. On the contrary, as Rand herself says, unlike entities, “characteristics, qualities, attributes, actions, relationships, do not exist by themselves.” (ITOE, 265) And so, the very first sentence of the article mischaracterizes Objectivism; it is not the case that “an entity is existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents.” Let’s continue. 

“An entity is a specific, concrete, and indivisible thing that possesses a distinct identity and exists independently of the observer’s consciousness. Entities can be either physical or abstract, and they can range in size and complexity from subatomic particles to entire galaxies. An entity can be anything that exists, whether it is a material object or an abstract concept, such as a mathematical equation or a moral principle. Objectivism holds that entities are not simply subjective creations of the human mind but rather are objective, existing independently of human consciousness.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity)

To say that an entity “can be anything that exists, whether it is a material object or an abstract concept,” would mean that not only material objects, mathematical equations, and moral principles would be entities, but also that feelings, sensations, emotions, valuations, and mental images (i.e., imaginata) are entities. Indeed, feelings, sensations, emotions, valuations, and mental images all exist—they are all existents; ergo, if an entity “can be anything that exists,” (cf. “An entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents.”) it necessarily follows that feelings, sensations, emotions, valuations, and mental images are all entities. However, if feelings, sensations, emotions, valuations, and mental images are all entities, then they would be self-contained, primary existents. Furthermore, since the article asserts that Objectivism maintains that entities “exist independently of any observer’s consciousness”, the logical conclusion that the article would be committed to is that feelings, sensations, emotions, valuations, and mental images all “exist independently of any observer’s consciousness”. And yet, such a conclusion is at odds with the Objectivist position. 

According to Objectivism, feelings, sensations, emotions, valuations, and mental images do not “exist independent of any observer’s consciousness”; indeed, they are what Rand calls “mental concretes” or “mental entities”. It is absolutely crucial to understand the difference between an entity and a mental entity (i.e., a mental concrete or mental unit). Firstly, it is important to note what Rand means by the expression “mental entities” (or “mental concretes” and “mental units”). Rand’s concept of a “mental entity” refers neither to my consciousness, nor to anyone else’s consciousness; rather, the concept of “mental entity” refers to existents that have no existence apart from, or independent of, my consciousness, or anyone else’s consciousness. The following brief back-and-forth dialogue from ITOE best illustrates Rand’s views as to the differences between an entity and a mental entity:

AR: The referents of the concept “concept” are other concepts.  For instance, let’s say you form the concepts “table,” “chair,” “man,” and a few other concepts of perceptually given concretes.  Then at a certain level you can form the concept of “concept,” the concretes of which are all your other specific, earlier-formed concepts. 

Prof. D: But they aren’t concretes, though. 

AR: They are mental concretes.  You are now discussing an integration of mental entities.  The referents of the concept of “concept” are all the concepts which you have learned [and will ever learn]. 

Prof. D: Then a mental entity is a concrete?  

AR: As a mental entity, yes.  It is a concrete in relation to the wider abstraction which is the concept of “concept.” Take another, similar case: the concept of “emotion.” What are its concretes? The various emotions which you observe introspectively, which you are able to conceptualize.  You would form the concepts “love,” “hate,” “anger,” “fear,” and then you arrive at the concept “emotion,” the units of which will be these various emotions that you have identified. 

Prof. D: I misunderstood, then, something that Professor B said. I thought that he was maintaining that these weren’t really concretes, not even concretes with holes in them so to speak—not even vague concretes.  

Prof. B: No, that was the content of the concept.  The concept as a mental entity would have measurements; it would be a certain mental product.  

AR: A mental entity standing for a certain number of concretes—a concept—is not the same as the concretes in vague form.  Because some schools of philosophy did hold just that—that a concept is a memory of a concrete, only very vague.  You see a concept is not a vague concrete, it is a mental entity—which means an entity of a different kind, bearing a certain specific relationship to the physical concretes.  

Prof. D: But metaphysically, though, the concept is a concrete; it’s a mental entity. You have a concept of “emotion.” The referents are these various mental entities, this particular emotion and that particular one. And then the concept of “emotion” itself is a mental entity in actual being.   

AR: Yes, you can call it that.   

Prof. D: So metaphysically, not epistemologically, all we have here are concretes.   

AR: If you mean: does such a thing as the concept of “emotion” in a mind really exist? Yes, it exists—mentally. And only mentally.  

Prof. E: Would it be fair to say that a concept qua concept is not a concrete but an integration of concretes, but qua existent it is a concrete integration, a specific mental entity in a particular mind?  

AR: That’s right. But I kept saying, incidentally, that we can call them “mental entities” only metaphorically or for convenience. It is a “something.” For instance, before you have a certain concept, that particular something doesn’t exist in your mind. When you have formed the concept of “concept,” that is a mental something; it isn’t a nothing. But anything pertaining to the content of a mind always has to be treated metaphysically not as a separate existent, but only with this precondition, in effect: that it is a mental state, a mental concrete, a mental something. Actually, “mental something” is the nearest to an exact identification. Because “entity” does imply a physical thing. Nevertheless, since “something” is too vague a term, one can use the word “entity,” but only to say that it is a mental something as distinguished from other mental somethings (or from nothing). But it isn’t an entity in the primary, Aristotelian sense in which a primary substance exists. We have to agree here on the terminology, because we are dealing with a very difficult subject for which no clear definitions have been established. I personally would like to have a new word for it, but I am against neologisms. Therefore, I think the term “mental unit” or “mental entity” can be used, provided we understand by that: “a mental something.” (ITOE, 156-159)

Now that we have clarified and explained Rand’s distinction between entities and mental entities, we can continue with our analysis of the article. 

The next section of the article was written as an answer to the question, “Is Consciousness an Entity?”. The author’s answer is puzzling, to say the least, in that it clashes with the (alleged) Objectivist positions outlined in the previous section:

“In Objectivism, consciousness is not considered to be an entity in and of itself. Rather, consciousness is a faculty of the human mind (specific ability or capacity of the mind) that allows us to perceive and understand reality. According to Objectivist philosophy, consciousness is the means by which we identify and integrate sensory information from the world around us, and it is the foundation of our ability to reason and think abstractly. Objectivism holds that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of human nature and that it is distinct from the physical world. However, consciousness is not considered to be a separate entity or force that exists independently of the human mind. Rather, it is an attribute of the mind, which is itself a product of the physical processes that occur in the brain.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity)

As I said above, this answer to the question, “Is Consciousness an Entity?”, is puzzling. If we compare the two sections, one finds that the author’s answer to the question, “Is Consciousness an Entity?”, must be wrong if his answer to the question, “What is an Entity?”, is true, and vice versa. I’ll attempt to illustrate this as explicitly as possible:

According to the author, Objectivism is committed to the position that (a) an entity is “any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents;” (b) an entity “can be either physical or abstract…”; and (c) an entity “can be anything that exists, whether it is a material object or an abstract concept…”. Now, the author also maintains that Objectivism is committed to the position that “consciousness is not considered to be an entity in and of itself…[rather,] it is a faculty of the human mind (specific ability or capacity of the mind)…[and] is not considered to be a separate entity or force that exists independently of the human mind. Rather, it is an attribute of the mind, which is a product of the physical processes that occur in the brain.” There is a clear inconsistency here. When taken together, positions (a), (b), and (c), entail that Objectivism is committed to consciousness being an entity; however, the author tries to block this necessary conclusion by maintaining that Objectivism does not hold that consciousness is an entity, but is instead an “attribute of the mind, which is itself a product of the physical processes that occur in the brain.” This attempt at delaying the inevitable only introduces more inconsistencies into an already inconsistent article.

“Objectivism holds that consciousness…is an attribute of the mind, which is itself a product of the physical processes that occur in the brain.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity)

This line is interesting for a couple of reasons. Firstly, it is important to note that Rand frequently used the terms “consciousness” and “mind” interchangeably. Here are several examples:

“His vision, his strength, his courage came from his own spirit. A man’s spirit, however, is his self. That entity which is his consciousness. To think, to feel, to judge, to act are functions of the ego.” (For the New Intellectual (FNI), 90)

“A man’s mind is an attribute of his self, of that entity within him which is his consciousness. That entity can be called spirit. It can be called soul. It remains—no matter what its origin—a man’s self. His “I”. His ego.” (The Journals of Ayn Rand  (JAR), 237) 

“Your consciousness is that which you know—and are alone to know—by direct perception. It is that indivisible unit where knowledge and being are one, it is your “I”, it is the self which distinguishes you from all else in the universe. No consciousness can perceive another consciousness, only the results of its actions in material form, since only matter is an object of perception, and consciousness is the subject, perceivable by its nature only to itself. To perceive the consciousness, the “I”, of another would mean to become that other “I”—a contradiction in terms; to speak of souls perceiving one another is a denial of your “I”, of perception, of consciousness, of matter. The “I” is the irreducible unit of life.” (JAR, 571) 

“That which you call your soul or spirit is your consciousness, the life-keeper of your body. Your body is a machine, your consciousness—your mind—is its driver…” (JAR, 571) 

“Man’s consciousness is not material—but neither is it an element opposed to matter. It is the element by which man controls matter—but the two are part of one entity and one universe—man cannot change matter, he can control it only by understanding it and shaping it to his purpose. (The distinction between “entity” and “action”—between noun and verb. The essence of being.) Man’s soul or spirit is his consciousness—here, now, on earth. The ruling element, the control, the free-will element of his consciousness is his reason. The rest—his emotions, his memory, his desires, his instincts—all are determined by his thinking, by the kind of conclusions he has made and the kind of premises he has accepted. The man of spirit is the man of the mind. He is the man who is not the slave, but the ruler of matter. He is the man who makes it possible for mankind to survive. He is the creative man. The morality of the mind—to be true to truth. The great courage, integrity and responsibility that it requires. The only cardinal sin is the denial or suspension of one’s reason—the refusal to face reality, identify it and make rational connections. No man can go against his own mind—and that is why he cannot submit to force. The greatest field where this morality is needed and expressed is the field of material production. All material production is an achievement of the spirit—of the mind. Every human creation has to start in the mind and be given form in matter—whether it’s a work of art or a commercial gadget. Every spiritual value of man has to be expressed in material form or action. What is a virtue, if man does not practice it or act upon it? The great courage and virtue of the producers.” (JAR, 530)  

“I have stated explicitly (both in The Fountainhead and in Atlas Shrugged) that a man’s self is his consciousness and that the center and motor of his consciousness is his mind. I have discussed, illustrated and proved this point from every relevant aspect known to me. How am I to reconcile that with paragraph 6 of your note, particularly with the words: “some center of their lives, which is NOT THEMSELVES?” Since you rejected, without stating your reasons, the total of my view of what is man’s self—how could I tell what meaning you were assigning to the words “self” and “selfish” in your note?...This is an example of my conflict with modern philosophy: I am incapable of switching the definitions of my concepts to fit each separate occasion and of letting them mean one thing when I use them, but another when Bertrand Russell uses them, and a third when you use them. I am incapable of reading a paper such as your note, by the method of dropping or forgetting all definitions and then, without reference or commitment to any definition, using wide, fundamental concepts…while simultaneously regarding this usage as “non-definitional”.” (The Letters of Ayn Rand (LAR), 535-536) [Her caps and italics, not mine] 

“Man’s soul or spirit is his consciousness; the motor of his consciousness is reason; deprive him of freedom, i.e., the right to use his mind—and what is left of him is only a physical body, ready to be manipulated by the strings of any tribe.” (Rand, “Requiem for Man (Part III),” The Objectivist, Sept 1967)

“First of all, there is no ineffable mystic soul. If we use the term “soul”—and there’s nothing against it—we use it to designate an aspect of man’s consciousness. Similarly, the term “mind” designates an aspect of consciousness, the conceptual faculty.” (Peikoff, Understanding Objectivism, Lecture Nine, “Objectivism Versus Rationalism and Empiricism,” 260) [In this passage, Peikoff refers to one’s mind as being an aspect (or attribute) of one’s consciousness, rather than one’s consciousness being an aspect (or attribute) of one’s mind.] 

Secondly, Rand was very cautious and precise when it came to the relationship between one’s consciousness/mind and one’s brain. For one thing, she never maintained that consciousness or mind is a “product of the physical processes that occur in the brain” [my italics]. Furthermore, she denied that consciousness/mind was material. (cf. “Man’s consciousness is not material...”, etc.).

The next two sections, “Do Faculties have an Identity” and “Can a Faculty have an Attribute and an Identity,” are relatively straightforward. However, there are some lines which are rather opaque:  

“Consciousness (active): The faculty of awareness, perception, and identification of sensory information.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity) 

“Perception (passive): The faculty of recognizing and identifying sensory input from the external world.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity)

The author says that these two faculties (i.e., Consciousness (active) and Perception (passive), etc.) are “not interchangeable or reducible to one another…they are not simply different expressions of the same underlying capacity.” Now, the term “active” in the first line presumably alludes to Rand’s view of the faculty of consciousness as being “epistemologically active” and “metaphysically passive” (cf., “Consciousness is metaphysically passive, but epistemologically active.”). However, the term “passive” in the second line is puzzling. Is the author saying that the faculty of perception is “epistemologically passive” or “metaphysically passive”? More peculiar is the fact that the description of the faculty of consciousness (active) and the description of the faculty of perception (passive) are nearly identical! If they are not identical, but describe two different faculties, then the question that arises is: In what sense (i.e., the metaphysical sense, as opposed to the epistemological sense) is the former faculty “active” and the latter faculty “passive”?

With respect to the question, “Can a faculty have an attribute and an identity?”, it appears that only the latter half of the question is answered. The author does not say whether or not a faculty can have attributes—he only says that a faculty is an attribute, which doesn’t answer the question he set up for himself.

My response to the article has already exceeded its intended length, so I’ll continue my analysis of the article in another essay. The remaining sections of the article include: “Does Consciousness have an Identity Conflict with How Kant Viewed Consciousness,” “What is Intellectual Determinism,” and “What is the Objectivist [Critique] of Kant’s Epistemology.”

Some Replies to Objectivists

“Could you please tell me what ‘abstraction’ is in the Objectivist canon?” (An Objectivist)

“Abstraction” (or “abstracting”) is, for Rand, a volitional activity performed by a conscious mind in relation to existents (e.g., entities, attributes of entities, actions of entities, relations between entities, etc.) which it observes in reality. More specifically, it is a process wherein a mind “selectively” focuses upon, and mentally “isolates,” an existent present within a particular context, “omitting” (or regarding as “unspecified”) observed differences as being different from what is being “isolated,” and ”grasping” observed similarities as being similar to what is being mentally “isolated.” Abstraction is an essential phase of Rand’s account of concept formation, and it is intertwined with what Rand calls “measurement” and its subsidiary aspects (e.g., “unit” “measurement omission,” “commensurable characteristics,” etc.) 

“An ‘attribute’ is a mentally isolated element of the structure of an entity.” (An Objectivist)

“‘Attributes’ are not extant ‘things’. They are epistemological abstractions.” (An Objectivist)

This is totally mistaken. Attributes are not entities (or “things”), rather they are existent characteristics or properties of entities. For Rand, attributes and entities are types of existents. (Cf. “The building-block of man’s knowledge is the concept of an “existent”—of something that exists, be it a thing, an attribute or an action.”) Thus, Rand holds that attributes (e.g., the color of a particular book) and entities (e.g., the book which has that particular color) are existents. Although attributes and entities are both extant, only entities are self-subsistent and self-contained existents—attributes are neither self-subsistent nor self-contained existents. 

Although an attribute cannot exist independently of the entity which possesses it, it is nevertheless metaphysically distinct from the entity which possesses it. As evidenced on page 277 of ITOE, Rand makes it clear that attributes of entities are not “epistemological abstractions”—they are not products resulting from our measuring(s) or abstracting(s) from entities. On the contrary, she states that an attribute (e.g., the length of a stick, the shape of a book, the color of a flower, etc.) “does exist in reality, only it doesn’t exist by itself. It is not separable from an entity, but it certainly exists in reality….And therefore if to say it is epistemological rather than metaphysical is to say it exists only in relation to your grasp of it, or it requires your grasp of it in order to acquire existence—it doesn’t. Surely, if anything is metaphysical, attributes are.” 

In a similar vein, the referent of the concept of a particular attribute (e.g., the concept of “red,” the concept of “length,” the concept of “shape,” etc.) is not itself epistemological; on the contrary, the referent of the concept of a particular attribute is the attribute itself (i.e., the referent is the particular attribute possessed by all the entities which happen to possess that attribute). Rand states that although the concept of a particular attribute is the result of an act of “mental isolation” and “abstraction,” the referents of the concept are themselves metaphysical: they exist in reality and constitute the identities of the entities which possess them. The referents of the concept of a particular attribute are not themselves “epistemological abstractions.” As Rand says, on pg. 98 of ITOE, each of an entity’s characteristics (i.e., each of an entity’s attributes) “has the same metaphysical status: each constitutes a part of the entity’s identity”.

“Rand is saying that the attributes yes do exist, but not as a metaphysically distinct thing.” (An Objectivist)

A particular attribute of an entity is not metaphysically separable from the entity which possesses that particular attribute; however, that does not mean that the particular attribute and the entity in question are not metaphysically distinct. On the contrary, a particular attribute of an entity is clearly metaphysically distinct from the entity which possesses that particular attribute. Indeed, if a particular attribute of an entity was not metaphysically distinct (i.e., different) from the entity which possessed it, then the entity in question would be identical to that particular attribute which it possessed—and this is something which Rand rejects (Cf. “An attribute is something which is not the entity itself.” (ITOE, 276)). While Rand holds that an entity is not metaphysically distinct from the totality of its attributes, she holds that the entity is nevertheless metaphysically distinct from anything less than the totality of its attributes. (Cf. “No one attribute constitutes the whole entity, but all of them together are the entity—not “possessed by” but “are” the entity.” (ITOE, 276)) 

Furthermore, absurd contradictions would follow if a particular attribute of an entity was not metaphysically distinct (i.e., different) from the entity which possessed it. To reiterate, if a particular attribute of an entity was not metaphysically distinct (i.e., different) from the entity which possessed it, then the entity in question would be identical to that particular attribute which it possessed. The contradiction can be illustrated with the help of an example. Take, for instance, a book. This book is an entity, and it has many attributes; e.g., a particular shape, a particular color, a particular texture, a particular odor, etc.). If the book’s color (i.e., one of the book’s attributes) was not metaphysically distinct (i.e., different) from the book itself, then the book and the book’s color would be identical—and this is contradictory. Furthermore, if the book’s odor (i.e., one of the book’s attributes) was not metaphysically distinct (i.e., different) from the book itself, then the book and the book’s odor would be identical—and this is also contradictory. However, another contradiction would arise. Since identity is transitive (e.g., If A = B, and B = C, then A = C) it follows that if the book’s color was identical to the book, and the book was identical to the book’s odor, then the book’s color would be identical to the book’s odor—and this is absurd.

Another important point concerns identity. For Rand (and Peikoff), the totality of a thing’s characteristics (attributes) constitutes a thing’s identity because the totality of a thing’s characteristics is the thing’s identity. A thing is identical to the totality of its characteristics (attributes).  Suppose one asks the following question: Why is it the case that an existent apart from its characteristics would be an existent apart from its identity? Rand’s (and Peikoff’s) answer is straightforward and clear: An existent is nothing more than, and nothing less than, the totality of its characteristics. The totality of an existent’s characteristics just is the existent’s identity, and the identity of an existent just is that existent itself. For example:

“Existence and identity are not attributes of existents, they are the existents.” (ITOE, 56)

“Metaphysically, an entity is: all of the things which it is. Each of its characteristics has the same metaphysical status: each constitutes a part of the entity’s identity.” (ITOE, 98)

“A thing is—what it is; its characteristics constitute its identity. An existent apart from its characteristics, would be an existent apart from its identity, which means: a nothing, a non-existent.” (ITOE, 142)

“Now, what is an entity? It is a sum of characteristics. There is no such thing as an entity without its characteristics, and, for that very reason, there is no such thing as a characteristic without an entity….Usually when I write I say the entity is its attributes….The attributes are the entity, or an entity is its attributes.” (ITOE, 266)

“No one attribute constitutes the whole entity, but all of them together are the entity—not “possessed by” but “are” the entity.” (ITOE, 276)

“A thing’s nature is that which it is metaphysically; a thing’s nature is its identity, that which cannot be changed by miracle nor by any wish, whim, or will, God’s or man’s. This is the meaning of “A is A”.” (Letters of Ayn Rand, 528-529)

“A thing is itself; or, in the traditional formula, A is A. The “identity” of an existent means that which it is, the sum of its attributes or characteristics…Ayn Rand offers a new formulation of this axiom: existence is identity. She does not say “existence has identity”—which might suggest that identity is a feature separable from existence (as a coat of paint is separable from the house that has it). The point is that to be is to be something. Existence and identity are indivisible; either implies the other. If something exists, then something exists; and if there is a something, then there is a something. The fundamental fact cannot be broken in two.” (OPAR, 7)

“A thing cannot act apart from its nature, because existence is identity; apart from its nature, a thing is nothing. A thing cannot act against its nature, i.e., in contradiction to its identity, because A is A and contradictions are impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity. This is the action it will take, the action that is caused and necessitated by its nature.” (OPAR, 15)

“The axiom of identity holds that each thing is itself, or, as Rand frequently puts it: “A is A.” The force of this statement is perfectly captured in Bishop Butler’s famous remark, “Every thing is what it is, and not another thing.” “Identity” names the fact that everything that is is something in particular. A given thing’s identity is the sum total of all of its characteristics. Synonyms for something’s “identity” might be its “character” or its “nature,” so long as it is understood that a thing’s identity at any given moment refers to all of its attributes, actions, relations, and so on.” (Blackwell Companion to Rand, 249) 

“The relation of the attributes of an entity to the whole entity; an entity is its attributes and a state of awareness is its aspects.” (Binswanger, How We Know, 57)

Likewise, Rand emphasizes that an existent does not “possess” or “have” the totality of its characteristics because that would imply that the totality of the existent’s characteristics is something distinct or different from the existent “possessive” of said totality of characteristics. It is for this same reason that Rand insists that an existent is identical to its identity, rather than “possess” or “have” its identity. To suppose that an existent “possessed” or “had” its identity would imply that the identity “possessed by” or “had by” the existent was something distinct or different from the existent itself—and this is something which Rand and Peikoff explicitly reject. Indeed, it would be to suppose that an existent was something apart from, distinct from, and different from “itself”—a contradiction. As Rand and Peikoff say: it would be “a nothing, a non-existent.”

A Critical Examination of Objectivism’s Account of Change, Motion, and Time

If Objectivism’s account of identity is true, then change, motion, and time are all “unreal.” I will proceed to illustrate this by outlining several key propositions that Objectivism is committed to:

• For any entity, X, X is “identical to” an independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes [a, b, c, d, e,…]. 

• For any independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], if said independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” an entity, X, then a, b, c, d, e, &c. are of the same metaphysical status. 

• For any independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], if said independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” an entity, X, then a, b, c, d, e, &c. are equally determinative in constituting the identity and nature of X.

• For any entity, X, X is “identical to” its identity and nature. 

At time T1, there exists an entity, X. Therefore, at time T1, there exists an independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], and this independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” X. Now, suppose that at time T2, there does not exist an independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…]. It would follow that X does not exist at time T2. Indeed, this is because X is “identical to” the independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], and, as we have said, there does not exist a unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…] at time T2.

Again, let us suppose that at time T2 there exists an independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes [not-a, b, c, d, e,…] that was “identical to” an entity. It would still be the case that X does not exist at time T2, because an entity’s identity or nature is “identical to” the entity itself; and, since the independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes [a, b, c, d, e,…] and the independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes [not-a, b, c, d, e,…] do not consist in the same attributes, it follows that they are not the same entity, but are instead two different entities with two different identities and natures. 

Now, one might object by saying that the entity at T1 and the entity at T2 are one and the same entity, and that the entity has simply lost an attribute which it had at T1.  However, this response is incompatible with the following two Objectivist positions: 

• For any independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], if said independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” an entity, X, then a, b, c, d, e, &c. are of the same “metaphysical status.” 

• For any independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], if said independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” an entity, X, then a, b, c, d, e, &c. are equally determinative in constituting the “identity” and “nature” of X.

However, Objectivism’s “hyper-essentialism” regarding the relationship between entities and attributes entails that change, action (and therefore causality as well), and time are impossible or “unreal.” The reason for this conclusion is the following:

Change and motion both imply that the identity and nature of the changing and moving entity remains “one and the same” throughout its change and motion. In other words, change and  motion are meaningless unless the changing and moving entity is the same entity before, during, and after its change and movement. However, as we have seen, if Objectivism’s views on the matter were true, then no entity would remain the same entity before, during, or after its change or movement. It is for this reason that if the Objectivist account of identity is true, that change and motion are “unreal.”

Furthermore, since Objectivism maintains that time is a “measure of motion,” and since Objectivism’s views as to an entity’s identity and nature prohibit change and motion—it would follow that Objectivism is committed to the “unreality” of time as well. 

On the other hand, we may approach the issue from the other side—the Heraclitan side. Indeed, from the above positions, it would equally follow that no entities ever endure—rather, an entity would come into being and cease to exist at one and the same instant. Thus, having been been engorged by the two horns of Being and Becoming, the Objectivist is faced with an ancient dilemma: he must choose between the changeless and the everchanging.

Resources and Evidence:

“Existence and identity are not attributes of existents, they are the existents.” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (ITOE), 56)

“[T]he rules of cognition must be derived from the nature of existence and the nature, the identity, of his cognitive faculty.” (ITOE, 82)

“[T]he rules of cognition must be derived from the nature of existence and the nature, the identity, of his cognitive faculty.” (ITOE, 87)

“Metaphysically, an entity is: all of the things which it is.  Each of its characteristics has the same metaphysical status: each constitutes a part of the entity’s identity.” (ITOE, 98)

“The nature of an entity determines what it can do and, in any given set of circumstances, dictates what it will do.  The Law of Causality is entailed by the Law of Identity.  Entities follow certain laws of action in consequence of their identity, and have no alternative to doing so.  Metaphysically, all facts are inherent in the identities of the entities that exist…” (ITOE, 108-109)

“Now, what is an entity? It is a sum of characteristics. There is no such thing as an entity without its characteristics, and, for that very reason, there is no such thing as a characteristic without an entity…Don’t take “sum” literally…Not in the sense that you would say “sum of its parts. Usually when I write I say the entity is its attributes. To be exact, you’d have to treat them as inseparable…[T]he attributes are the entity, or an entity is its attributes. The attributes are really separable only by abstraction.” (ITOE, 266)

“An attribute is something which is not the entity itself. No one attribute constitutes the whole entity, but all of them together are the entity—not “possessed by” but “are” the entity.” (ITOE, 276)

“Prof. A: In regard to the concept of an attribute—for example, “length”— since the attribute is something which does not exist separate in reality, is the referent of the concept of an attribute in the category of the epistemological rather than the metaphysical? AR: Oh no, why? Prof. A: Because length doesn’t exist per se in reality. Length is a human form of breaking up the identities of things. AR: Wait a moment, that’s a very, very dangerous statement. Length does exist in reality, only it doesn’t exist by itself. It is not separable from an entity, but it certainly exists in reality. If it didn’t, what would we be doing with our concepts of attributes? They would be pure fantasy then. The only thing that is epistemological and not metaphysical in the concept of “length” is the act of mental separation, of considering this attribute separately as if it were a separate thing. How would you project a physical object which had no length? You couldn’t. And therefore if to say it is epistemological rather than metaphysical is to say it exists only in relation to your grasp of it, or it requires your grasp of it in order to acquire existence—it doesn’t. Surely, if anything is metaphysical, attributes are. Prof. A: If I ask you, then, what is the referent of “length,” would you say “long objects"? AR: Not the objects, the attribute of length in all the objects which possess that attribute. Prof. A: Isn’t the referent something separated? AR: It’s mentally separated, but it is there in those objects.  It doesn’t have to be an entity to be a referent. Prof. A: I don’t understand then why the referent of the concept “red,” say, isn’t all the red concretes. AR: How about the other attributes of all those red concretes? Is the referent of “red” the length and weight of all the red concretes? Prof. A: No. AR: Well then, obviously the concrete itself isn’t the referent of the concept, but a particular aspect of that concrete, an inseparable aspect. Prof. B: You said that the referent must be separated, or something like that. There’s no reason why the referent of the concept should be separable from the object. Prof. A: But in the case of attributes, the referent is not the entity but only an aspect of the entity. And an aspect cannot exist except as an aspect of the whole entity. Prof. B: Can you follow that one step further? You say that the referent of “length” must be an aspect, and an aspect cannot exist separately—what is the next step? Prof. A: The referent is the aspect separated. Is that the wrong premise? Prof. B: The referent is the aspect, not the aspect separated. AR: Exactly.  Prof. B: Otherwise you switch metaphysics and epistemology. AR: That’s right. The aspect, not the separation. That’s very well put.” (ITOE, 277-279)

“Prof. F: But now, properties are all constitutive properties, right? AR: Yes.” (ITOE, 286)

“In this regard, the relation of the aspects of a state of awareness to the whole awareness is similar to the relation of the attributes of an entity to the whole entity; an entity is its attributes and a state of awareness is its aspects.” (How We Know (HWK), 57)

“A third and final basic axiom is implicit in the first two. It is the law of identity: to be is to be something, to have a nature, to possess identity. A thing is itself; or, in the traditional formula, A is A. The "identity" of an existent means that which it is, the sum of its attributes or characteristics… Ayn Rand offers a new formulation of this axiom: existence is identity. She does not say "existence has identity"—which might suggest that identity is a feature separable from existence (as a coat of paint is separable from the house that has it). The point is that to be is to be something. Existence and identity are indivisible; either implies the other. If something exists, then something exists; and if there is a something, then there is a something. The fundamental fact cannot be broken in two.” (Objectivism the Philosophy of Ayn Rand (OPAR), 7)

“The adult validation of the law of causality consists in stating this relationship explicitly. The validation rests on two points: the fact that action is action of an entity; and the law of identity, A is A. Every entity has a nature; it is specific, noncontradictory, limited; it has certain attributes and no others. Such an entity must act in accordance with its nature. The only alternatives would be for an entity to act apart from its nature or against it; both of these are impossible. A thing cannot act apart from its nature, because existence is identity; apart from its nature, a thing is nothing. A thing cannot act against its nature, i.e., in contradiction to its identity, because A is A and contradictions are impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity. This is the action it will take, the action that is caused and necessitated by its nature.” (OPAR, 15)

“Entities and their actions are measured by means of their attributes, such as length, weight, velocity. In every case, the primary standard is some easily perceivable concrete that functions as a unit. One measures length in units, say, of feet; weight in pounds; velocity in feet per second.” (OPAR, 82)

“Now let us apply this discussion to another aspect of the theory of concepts: the status of essences (as the term is used in the context of the theory of definition). On the one hand, according to Objectivism, essences are not attributes marked out by nature apart from man. "Essential" is not a metaphysical, but an epistemological term. "Essential" designates characteristics that perform a certain function in connection with human conceptualization. The function is to differentiate and condense various bodies of data, and the characteristics that perform this function in one cognitive context may not do so in another. Since the category of "essence" arises because of a need of man's consciousness, the "essential" in each context has to reflect the state of human knowledge.” (OPAR, 113)

“Definitions are statements of factual data—as condensed by a human consciousness in accordance with the needs of a human method of cognition. Like concepts, therefore, essences are products of a volitional relationship between existence and consciousness; they too (properly formed) are objective. In the traditional (Platonic and Aristotelian) viewpoint, every entity must have an essence or definition. This is not true in the Objectivist viewpoint. Since the designation of essentials arises only as an aid to the conceptualizing process, it is inapplicable apart from that process. Concretes that have not been integrated into a concept have no "essence"; in these cases, there is no need or possibility of a definition.” (OPAR, 113)

“Metaphysically, there is only one universe. This means that everything in reality is interconnected. Every entity is related in some way to the others; each somehow affects and is affected by the others. Nothing is a completely isolated fact, without causes or effects; no aspect of the total can exist ultimately apart from the total. Knowledge, therefore, which seeks to grasp reality, must also be a total; its elements must be interconnected to form a unified whole reflecting the whole which is the universe.” (OPAR, 123)

“The axiom of identity holds that each thing is itself, or, as Rand frequently puts it: “A is A.” The force of this statement is perfectly captured in Bishop Butler’s famous remark, “Every thing is what it is, and not another thing.” “Identity” names the fact that everything that is is something in particular. A given thing’s identity is the sum total of all of its characteristics. Synonyms for something’s “identity” might be its “character” or its “nature,” so long as it is understood that a thing’s identity at any given moment refers to all of its attributes, actions, relations, and so on.” (Blackwell Companion to Ayn Rand (BCAR), 249) 

“In regard to: the Law of Causality. Yes, of course, my formulation of it (“A thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature”) is mine; it is not the usual: “everything that happens has a cause.” Compare the two and decide which is the more fundamental. You say: “But the truth of the statement, in your formulation, is guaranteed by the meaning attached to the word ‘NATURE’.” You bet your life it is! But what shocked me was the fact that you seem to attach no meaning to the concept of “a thing’s nature,” even though it was specified most clearly in the lecture and in Atlas Shrugged. A thing’s nature is that which it is metaphysically; a thing’s nature is its identity, that which cannot be changed by miracle nor by any wish, whim, or will, God’s or man’s. This is the meaning of “A is A”—and you have told me firmly that you accepted it. How, then, could you cite, as an example in this context, such a thing as a man’s “temper-tantrum” and ask whether he “acted contrary to his nature”? On top of which, you assume that we would answer that this is “part of his nature.” (!!!) I will answer: This is what happens to logic (and language) without ontology. (Letters of Ayn Rand, 528-529) 

“To perceive existence, to discover the characteristics or properties (the identities) of the things that exist, means to discover and accept the metaphysically given.” (Philosophy Who Needs It (PWNI), “The Metaphysical Versus The Man-Made”, 30-31) 

“But man exists and his mind exists. Both are part of nature, both possess a specific identity….[M]an is able to initiate and direct his mental action only in accordance with the nature (the identity) of his consciousness.” (PWNI, 32)

“Prof. F: This question has to do with the concept of “property” and its significance for causality. In Galt’s speech, you say every action is caused by the nature of the acting entity. Now, by “the nature of an entity” do you mean the physical properties of an entity—properties like combustible, fragile, corrosive, and so on?  AR: Yes. And also the psychological properties of a consciousness, including free will.”  (ITOE, 282)

“Prof. F: Could you give me an example of a constituent property?  Prof. E: Physical structure.  AR: The arrangement of molecules.” (ITOE, 284) 

“Prof. F: I noticed that Galt does not say, “A thing must act in accordance with its nature”; he says it “cannot act in contradiction to its nature.” I wonder if you had some particular reason for stating it in the negative.  AR: Oh, no, only to make it stronger actually. You could have said “must act in accordance with its nature.” But I wanted to stress that one cannot claim causeless actions, or actions contrary to the nature of the interacting entities. I wanted to stress that actions cannot be inexplicable and causeless. If the cause lies in the nature of an entity, then it cannot do something other than what its nature makes possible.” (ITOE, 286-287) 

“The axiom of identity holds that each thing is itself, or, as Rand frequently puts it: “A is A.” The force of this statement is perfectly captured in Bishop Butler’s famous remark, “Every thing is what it is, and not another thing.” “Identity” names the fact that everything that is, is something in particular. A given thing’s identity is the sum total of all of its characteristics. Synonyms for something’s “identity” might be its “character” or its “nature,” so long as it is understood that a thing’s identity at any given moment refers to all of its attributes, actions, relations, and so on.” (BCAR, 451)