Materialism and the “First Breath” of Mentality (A Revised Version with Objections (to the Original Argument) and Replies)

According to Materialism, there was, at some point in time, an instant, M, whose “content” was the first-ever mental state; and this instant, M, was preceded in time by a compact series of non-mental instants (i.e., a compact series wherein each instant had a “content” that was exhaustively non-mental in character). How, then, does the Materialist go on to explain the “first breath” of mentality? He invokes an alluring word: “causality.” A reader sympathetic to the Materialist’s case might protest against such a brief statement of his position, so it would only be fair to let the Materialist interject and present his view in his own words:

Modern Materialism holds that mental states are nothing “over and above” physical states; mentality is but a delicate, rare, and ephemeral form of physicality. Old Materialism made an error that Modern Materialism has since corrected; it blundered by declaring a priori that (i) all physical states are non-mental in nature and that (ii) all mental states are non-physical in nature. Despite this supposed categorical difference between mental states (i.e., non-physical states) and physical states (i.e., non-mental states), Old Materialism went on to assert that every mental state located in the series of past, present, and future mental states is the causally-generated “effect,” or the epiphenomenal “by-product,” of a corresponding non-mental state located in the series of past, present, and future non-mental states. Thus, each mental state is causally dependent upon a particular non-mental state located in the total series of non-mental states. Although the total series of mental states was not itself conceived by these Old Materialists as being a “segment” of the total series of non-mental states, it was nevertheless made subordinate to it. While the thread of mental states lacked self-sufficiency, the chain of physical states (i.e., the totality of past, present, and future non-mental states—or the chain of non-mental states ordered in relations of “earlier than” and “later than”) constituted an independent series—resting on nothing other than itself. The Old Materialists recognized the difficulties in their position (e.g., the relationship between the two series), and failed to build an explanatory bridge that could intelligibly, and non-arbitrarily, unite “cause” with “effect.” Modern Materialism, by contrast, rejects the Old Materialist’s dogmatism and refuses to declare a priori that (i) every physical state is non-mental in nature, and that (ii) every mental state is non-physical in nature. Instead of maintaining that the thread of mental states is populated by non-physical, causally-generated “effects” or epiphenomenal “by-products” of an “independent” series that is exhausted by non-mental states, Modern Materialism, by contrast, holds that when a mental state occurs, this occurrence is identical to a particular physical state located in the total series of physical states. Thus, mental states are no longer viewed as “residual excrescences” that supervene upon the “shock of atoms” in the physical order; they are no longer granted a unique series of their own. On the contrary, mental states just are physical states. This is Modern Materialism.

Now, like any other physical state, the first-ever mental state (i.e., the “content” of the first-ever mental instant, M) would have been the effect of a preceding physical state, and this prior physical state would have been a non-mental state (i.e., the “content” of a non-mental instant)—but Modern Materialism assures us that there are no difficulties inherent in such a transition. By assimilating mental states into the physical order by way of “identity,” the Modern Materialist has advanced further than any of his predecessors: he has taken a step forward towards explaining the “first breath” of mentality.

Let’s examine the Materialist’s account in detail. The Materialist postulates two temporally-distinct instants: (i) a definite instant, M, whose “content” was the first-ever mental state, and (ii) a definite instant, Pn, whose “content” was a non-mental state that preceded the “content” of the first-ever mental instant in time. Let’s offer a brief sketch of the nature of the time-series by specifying some of its properties:

“A series is continuous when any term divides the whole series unambiguously into two mutually exclusive parts which between them comprise all the terms of the series, and when every term which so divides the series is itself a term of that series. From this second condition it obviously follows that a number of intermediate terms can always be inserted between any two terms whatever of a continuous series; no term of the series has a next term….The whole series of real numbers is continuous [because] every member of the number-series divides it into two classes, so that every number of one is less than every number of the other, and every number which thus divides the series is itself a term of the number-series....From the continuity of the series of real numbers it follows that any other series which corresponds point for point with the terms of the number series will be continuous. Now one such series is that of the [time series]. Every moment of time divides the whole series of moments into two mutually exclusive classes, the moments before itself and the moments which are not before itself. And whatever thus divides the time-series is itself a moment in that series.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 171-172)

Thus, it follows from time’s continuity that no two instants in the time-series ever “touch.” When this fact and the Materialist’s proposed connection between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M are brought into focus, we find that the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M cannot temporally overlap—i.e., the first-ever mental state (i.e., the “content” of instant M) and the non-mental state (i.e., the “content” of instant Pn) had to be not only not simultaneous with each other, but also had to be in a relation of “earlier than” and “later than” to each other. Indeed, if the “content” of Pn was simultaneous with the “content” of M, then we would have a contradiction on our hands: there would be a moment in time when there was mentality present in a world that, ex hypothesi, was exhausted by non-mentality. In light of this, we must ask the Materialist several questions:

Question (i): Was the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

The Materialist’s theory requires that he answer question (i) in the affirmative. And so, in response to question (i), the Materialist declares the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—to be the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Question (ii): What was it about the “content” of Pn that made it the non-mental state—rather than any preceding non-mental state—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

On pain of inconsistency, the Materialist must respond to question (ii) by asserting that the “content” of Pn was a non-mental state that possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from all prior non-mental states), and that its possession of these “special properties” made the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Question (iii): What were the “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn and absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants, that made the “content” of Pn–rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

In reply to question (iii), the Materialist will likely posit a bunch of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of these “special properties.” Let’s symbolize the identity of these “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn—but absent from all the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants—as C.

At first glance, all seems fine and well; however, there is a puzzle lurking beneath the surface: a puzzle involving (i) the continuous nature of the time-series, (ii) the Materialist’s identification of the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any of the other non-mental instant—as being the possessor of the aforementioned “special properties,” and (iii) the Materialist’s identification of what these “special properties” actually are. Let’s explore this latent puzzle in the Materialist’s theory.

As we have noted above, the “content” of Pn (i.e., a state exhaustively non-mental in character) cannot be simultaneous with the “content” of M (i.e., a state that was not exhaustively non-mental in character)—on pain of contradiction. M must be “later than” Pn because, ex hypothesi, if the “content” of M was simultaneous with (or in any way overlapped with) the “content” of Pn, the time of the first-ever mental state would also be a time when the world was exhausted by solely non-mental states; and this, of course, is contradictory. Therefore, the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M are not simultaneous, but instead are in relations of “earlier than” and “later than” to each other. However, since the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant, it follows that between Pn and M there was another instant, X, distinct from both Pn and M and whose “content” separates the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M in time. This prompts us to ask the Materialist more questions:

Question (iv): Is the “content” of X a non-mental state or a mental state?

The Materialist must answer question (iv) by declaring the “content” of X to be a non-mental state. Since he must hold that the “content” of X is a non-mental state, we can represent X as Pn+1. Now, if the Materialist asserted the “content” of X to be a mental state, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about the “content” of M being the first-ever mental state because the “content” of X would have preceded the “content” of M in time.

However, if the Materialist answers question (iv) by declaring the “content” of Pn+1 (i.e., X) to be a non-mental state, then he either contradicts his answer to question (i) or his explanation becomes muddled in arbitrariness. Indeed, since the “content” of Pn+1 is “later than” the “content” of Pn in time, between the “content” of Pn—the supposed sufficient condition for the occurrence of the “content” of M—and the “content” of M, there would have been the occurrence of the purely non-mental “content” of Pn+1. However, if the identified “content” of the non-mental instant Pn was genuinely sufficient to produce the “content” of M, then the Materialist’s explanation stumbles into a difficulty.

If the occurrence of the intervening non-mental “content” of Pn+1 between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M matters causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, this would contradict the sufficiency of the “content” of Pn—rendering the “content” of Pn insufficient to be the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, if the occurrence of the intervening non-mental “content” of Pn+1 between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M does not matter causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, then this makes the timing of the occurrence of the “content” of M arbitrary and inexplicable. Moreover, if the “content” of Pn was sufficient to be the “cause” of the “content” of M, this leads us to ask why the “content” of Pn+1—a “content” that, ex hypothesi, lacked the “special properties” necessary and sufficient for it to be the “cause” of the “content” of M—occurred between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M.

In order to avoid introducing arbitrariness and inexplicability into his explanation of the “first breath” of mentality, the Materialist must revise his answer to question (i). He must now hold that the “content” of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., Pn)—was the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Question (v): What was it about the “content” of Pn+1 that made it the non-mental state—rather than any preceding non-mental state (e.g., the “content” of Pn)—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

On pain of inconsistency, the Materialist must answer question (v) by asserting that the “content” of Pn+1 possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from the “content” of all prior non-mental instants), and that its possession of these “special properties” made the “content” of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., Pn)—the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Question (vi): What were the “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn+1 and absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants (e.g., the “content” of Pn), that made the “content” of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn)—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

The Materialist is forced by his own hand to answer question (vi) by positing a bunch of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of the “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn+1 (i.e., features present in the “content” of Pn+1 but absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants) that made the “content” of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn)—the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Now, the Materialist cannot, on pain of contradiction, supply us with the same list of “special properties” that he provided in his answer to question (iii). If, in response to question (vi), the Materialist simply regurgitated his answer to question (iii), then, ex hypothesi, the “special properties” of the “content” of Pn+1 would have been present in the “content” of an earlier non-mental instant (i.e., the “content” of Pn)—thereby contradicting the Materialist’s answer to question (v). Moreover, the Materialist cannot simply provide his answer to question (iii) in response to question (vi) because he himself has admitted, by implication, that the properties of the “content” of Pn were not of such a nature as to make the “content” of Pn the cause of the “content” of M. Let’s symbolize the Materialist’s revision of these “special properties” as C’.

However, another problem arises. In the same way the “content” of Pn had to be earlier in the time-series than the “content” of M, so too must the “content” of Pn+1 be earlier in the time-series than the “content” of M. If this were not so, and the “content” of Pn+1 was simultaneous with the “content” of M, there would be a moment in time when there was mentality present in a world that, ex hypothesi, was exhausted by non-mentality—and this, of course, is a contradiction. And, as we have seen, since the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant, it follows that between Pn+1 and M, there was another instant, X’, distinct from both Pn+1 and M and whose “content” separated the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of M in time. This prompts us to ask the Materialist more questions:

Question (vii): Is the “content” of X’ a non-mental state or a mental state?

In answer to question (vii), the Materialist must, of course, respond by declaring the “content” of X’, to be a non-mental state. Since the “content” of X’ is a non-mental state, we can represent X’ as Pn+2.

Now, if the Materialist asserted the “content” of X’ to be a mental state, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about the “content” of M being the first-ever mental state because the “content” of X’ would have preceded the “content” of M in time.

However, if the Materialist answers question (iv) by declaring the “content” of X’ to be a non-mental state, then he either contradicts his answers to questions (v) and (vi), or his explanation becomes muddled in arbitrariness. Indeed, since the “content” of Pn+2 is “later than” the “content” of Pn+1 in time, then between the “content” of Pn+1—the supposed sufficient condition for the occurrence of the “content” of M—and the “content” of M, there would have been the occurrence of a the purely non-mental “content” of Pn+2. However, if the identified “content” of the non-mental instant Pn+1 was genuinely sufficient to produce the “content” of M, then the Materialist’s explanation stumbles into a difficulty.

If the occurrence of the intervening non-mental “content” of Pn+2 between the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of M matters causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, this would contradict the sufficiency of the “content” of Pn+1—rendering the “content” of Pn+1 insufficient to be the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, if the occurrence of the intervening non-mental “content” of Pn+2 between the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of M does not matter causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, then this makes the timing of the occurrence of the “content” of M arbitrary and inexplicable. Moreover, if the “content” of Pn+1 was sufficient to be the “cause” of the “content” of M, this leads us to ask why the “content” of Pn+2—a “content” that, ex hypothesi, lacked the “special properties” necessary and sufficient for it to be the “cause” of the “content” of M—occurred between the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of M.

In order to avoid introducing arbitrariness and inexplicability into his explanation of the “first breath” of mentality, the Materialist must revise his answer to question (i). He must now hold that the “content” of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., Pn+1)—was the “cause” of the “content” of M.

In doing so, the Materialist must also revise his answer to question (v) and question (vi). He must assert that the “content” of Pn+2 possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from the “content” of all prior non-mental instants) and that its possession of these “special properties” made the “content” of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn or the “content” of Pn+1)—the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, this is possible only insofar as the Materialist specifies the “special properties” of the “content” of Pn+2. Just as before, the Materialist must list a set of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of the “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn+2 (i.e., features present in the “content” of Pn+2 but absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants) that made the “content” of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn or the “content” of Pn+1)—the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, the Materialist cannot, on pain of contradiction, supply us with the same list of “special properties” that he provided in his original answer to question (vi). If the Materialist did so, then the “special properties” of the “content” of Pn+2 would have been present in the “content” of an earlier non-mental instant (i.e., the “content” of Pn+1); however, he himself has admitted, by implication, that the properties of the “content” of Pn+1 were not of such a nature as to make the “content” of Pn+1 the cause of the “content” of M. Ergo, the Materialist must supply us with a new set of properties that were allegedly present in the “content” of Pn+2, and made the “content” of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M. Let’s symbolize the Materialist’s revision of these “special properties” as C’’.

However, the problem has only been aggravated. As we’ve seen before, the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant; ergo, it follows that between Pn+2 and M there was another instant, X’’, distinct from both Pn+2 and M and whose “content” separates the “content” of Pn+2 and the “content” of M in time. This prompts us to ask the Materialist another question:

Question (viii): Is the “content” of X’’ a non-mental state or a mental state?

The Materialist must answer question (viii) by declaring the “content” of X’’ to be a non-mental state. Since the “content” of X’’ is non-mental, we can represent X’’ as Pn+3. And we know where this will lead us. The Materialist is trapped in a vicious regress; inconsistencies in the Materialist’s responses require that he continually revise his answers ad infinitum. He is unable to consistently identify the non-mental instant whose “content” allegedly gave birth to the “content” of the first-ever mental instant, M, and he is unable to consistently specify the identity of the alleged “special properties” present in the “content” of this non-mental instant that would have made it—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the cause of the “content” of the first-ever mental instant, M.

With every step the Materialist takes towards his first-ever mental state, he is forced to take one step back—he is forever barred from receiving his final reward. The Materialist fails to harmonize the “first breath” of mentality within an asphyxiatingly barren, non-mental world.

Objections to the Original Argument (with Replies)

Issue 1: “It is not clear to me why Pn must have a last instant. An event could occur over an open or half-open interval of time. If t is the time index of the first mental event, then Pn could be an event that occurs on [m, t) for any m < t. In this case there is neither overlap, nor intermediate causes.”

Reply to Issue 1: I have now revised the essay so that it makes a clearer distinction between positions in time and the “contents” that are isochronal to those positions in time. The “content” of an instant Pn is the state (i.e., the non-mental state) that obtains at Pn. By reframing the argument in terms of instants and their “contents,” rather than in terms of intervals and the boundaries of said intervals (e.g., their “first” and “last” instants, if they have a “first” or “last” instant), I think the revised argument avoids the objection that you bring up in “Issue 1.”

Issue 2: I also don't see why the existence of a moment in time between Pn and M implies that [the “content” of] Pn is not the cause of [the “content” of] M. If we identify special properties of [the “content” of] Pn that justify its being the cause of [the “content” of] M, it does not follow that every state between [the “content” of] Pn and [the “content” of] M also has those properties. It seems to me that you have introduced an additional assumption about the nature of causality, that one state can be the cause of another if and only if there is no state between them.

Reply to Issue 2: The second version of the argument does not depend on the assumption that a causal relation can only obtain between “temporally adjacent” “contents.” As mentioned above (in the second version of the argument), as soon as we acknowledge there being a purely non-mental instant (Pn+1) with its own distinct “content” (i.e., the “content” of Pn+1) intervening between the purely non-mental instant Pn and the first-ever mental instant M, we can reasonably ask whether we need to revise our list of “special properties” that we took to be responsible for the “coming into existence” of the “content” of M. For consider, if we assume that the “content” of Pn was the “cause” of the “content” of M, then we have a right to ask what “special properties” were present in the “content” of Pn and absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants that made the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, our only reason for supposing the “content” of Pn to be the cause of the “content” of M was based upon our supposed identification of some properties of Pn as being the “special properties” responsible for its giving rise to the “content” of M. And, by implication, the “content” of Pn had these properties whereas and the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants lacked them. If it turns out that the “content” of Pn+1 intervenes between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M, then our ordinary causal reasoning prompts us to reconsider if the properties of the “content” of Pn which we took to be the “special properties” were in fact the “special properties” responsible for giving rise to the “content” of M, or if we had instead only misidentified those properties as being the “special properties.”

Moreover, if we try and double down on our original assertion that those properties identified in the “content” of Pn were in fact the “special properties,” then we are left with no good reason for why the “content” of M didn’t occur before the “content” of Pn+1 occurred rather than after the “content” of Pn+1 occurred (i.e., why there was a “delay” even though the all the conditions were already present (only to vanish with the occurrence of the “content” of Pn+1)). However, if there was nothing about the intermediary “contents” (in addition to the “special properties” of the “content” of Pn) such that the occurrence of these intermediary “contents” were necessary for the occurrence of the “content” at time M, then we are left with a puzzle as to why the “content” of time M occurred earlier than some of the intermediary “contents” rather than before some of them. Moreover, this means that if the “content” of M could not occur unless the some of the intermediary “contents” occurred, then the occurrence of some of the intermediary “contents” were necessary to the occurrence of the “content” of M; yet if these were necessary to the occurrence of the “content” of M, then it would not be the case that the “content” of Pn was the necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of the “content” at M—thereby conflicting with the assumption that none of the intermediary “contents” mattered causally in the occurrence of the “content” of M. We can illustrate this by means of another argument:

Premise 1: Materialism posits that at some finite point, there occurred the first-ever mental state (i.e., the “content” of instant M), preceded solely by non-mental states.

Premise 2: Any causal explanation for the emergence of a first mental state (i.e., the “content” of instant M) from purely non-mental states (i.e., the “content” of non-mental instants) requires identifying specific non-mental conditions sufficient to produce mentality.

Premise 3: If an identified “content” of a non-mental instant Pn is asserted to be genuinely sufficient, then the occurrence of intervening purely non-mental “content” of instants Pn+1, Pn+2,… between Pn and M either:

(a) Contradicts the supposed sufficiency of the “content” of Pn, if those intermediates matter causally.

(b) Makes the timing of the occurrence of the “content” of M arbitrary and inexplicable, if those intermediates are causally irrelevant.

Premise 4: Both horns—causal contradiction or explanatory arbitrariness—are unacceptable to a coherent causal account. But if the Materialist cannot provide a coherent causal account, then he cannot adequately explain the causal origin of the first-ever mental state from purely non-mental states.

Conclusion: Therefore, the Materialist cannot adequately explain the causal origin of the first-ever mental state from purely non-mental states.

Issue 3: I also think it is possible for Pn and M to share a boundary point t. You argue that this is impossible because it would imply that, at time t, the world contained mental properties (because M is a mental event), but also was exhausted up to and including time t by non-mental events (because Pn is non-mental and contains t). But it does not necessarily follow that because an event has a property that each moment comprising the event has that property. For example, a physical object can have the property of being liquid, and be exhaustively comprised of subatomic particles, yet none of the subatomic particles are liquid. So too the materialist can coherently claim that the instants of time comprising a mental event do not have the property of mentality, but their agglomeration does have that property.

Reply to Issue 3: This objection does not apply to the revised version of the argument. This new version is framed in argument in terms of instants and their “contents,” rather than in terms of intervals and the boundaries of said intervals (e.g., their “first” and “last” instants, if they have a “first” or “last” instant).

Issue 4: I also think, perhaps most importantly, that the materialist simply does not have to agree that there is a first mental event. Because mentality is not metaphysically fundamental in the materialist theory, they don't even need to specify clear boundaries on the concept of “mental,” which could function rather like the notion of a species of animal, where there is a gradient of descent with no clear first member.

Reply to Issue 4: It seems that by denying that there was a “first-ever mental event” you either wade into some form of panpsychism (wherein there was never an instant whose “content” was solely “non-mental” (i.e., that “mentality” featured in the “content” of every past instant in some degree)), or you end up shifting the problem by introducing some form of “proto-mental continuum” (which, ultimately, seems to slip into some form of panpsychism again). Either way, the Materialist cannot give up the position that there was a point in time where the universe was solely non-mental—and it is precisely this position that generates the puzzle.

The Structure of Experience: A Hegelian Reading of Leibniz’s Mill

In §17 of The Monadology, there is an elegant, notorious, and, to my dismay, all too often misunderstood, gedankenexperiment—Leibniz’s Mill:

“It must be confessed, however, that Perception, and that which depends upon it, are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is to say, by figures and motions. Supposing that there were a machine whose structure produced thought, sensation, and perception, we could conceive of it as increased in size with the same proportions until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would into a mill. Now, on going into it he would find only pieces working upon one another, but never would he find anything to explain Perception. It is accordingly in the simple substance, and not in the composite nor in a machine that the Perception is to be sought. Furthermore, there is nothing besides perceptions and their changes to be found in the simple substance. And it is in these alone that all the internal activities of the simple substances can consist.” (Leibniz, The Monadology, §17)

To better understand Leibniz’s Mill, let’s consult the previous sections of The Monadology where Leibniz emphasizes the fact that the “self-differentiated” structure of Experience (i.e., “perception”) is a “multiplicity-in-unity”—it is “internally-differentiated.”

“Now besides this principle of change there must also be in the Monad a manifoldness which changes. This manifoldness constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and the variety of the simple substances….This manifoldness must involve multiplicity in the unity or in that which is simple….The passing condition which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unity, or in the simple substance, is nothing else than what is called Perception….We, ourselves, experience a multiplicity in a simple substance, when we find that the most trifling thought of which we are conscious involves a variety in the object.” (Leibniz, The Monadology, §12-§16)

Before continuing, it is necessary to sketch the nature of Experience and Matter. Now, there is an important likeness between Experience and Matter: both are “self-differentiated.” However, there are distinctive characteristics peculiar to Experience and Matter’s respective “self-differentiations.” Experience must be conceived as a particular unity-of-the-manifold. Indeed, as F.H. Bradley once put it, Experience is “a unity of the manifold in which the externality of the manifold has utterly ceased.” Experience is exhaustively self-differentiated “into-itself” (i.e.., “Partes intra partes”), whereas Matter is exhaustively self-differentiated “out-of-itself” (i.e.., “Partes extra partes”). Hegel elegantly presents a concise illustration of this in his Introduction to the Philosophy of History and Philosophy of Mind:

“The nature of Spirit [i.e., Experience] may be understood by a glance at its direct opposite—Matter. As the essence of Matter is Gravity, so, on the other hand, we may affirm that the substance, the essence of Spirit is Freedom….Matter possesses gravity in virtue of its tendency toward a central point. It is essentially composite; consisting of parts that exclude each other. It seeks its Unity; and therefore exhibits itself as self-destructive, as verging toward its opposite [an indivisible point]. If it could attain this, it would be Matter no longer, it would have perished. It strives after the realization of its Idea; for in Unity it exists ideally. Spirit, on the contrary, may be defined as that which has its center in itself. It has not a unity outside itself, but has already found it; it exists in and with itself. Matter has its essence out of itself; Spirit is self-contained existence….This self-contained existence of Spirit is none other than self-consciousness—consciousness of one’s own being. Two things must be distinguished in consciousness; first, the fact that I know; secondly, what I know. In self-consciousness these are merged in one; for Spirit knows itself. It involves an appreciation of its own nature, as also an energy enabling it to realize itself; to make itself actually that which it is potentially.” (Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, 18)

“Mind is…pure activity…not abstractly simple but, in its simplicity, at the same time a distinguishing of itself from itself…an essence which is truly actual only through the specific forms of its necessary self-manifestation.” (Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §378)

“[Mind] immanently differentiates itself and returns out of its differences into unity with itself.” (Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §379)

“[Mind] in spite of its simplicity is distinguished within itself; for the ‘I’ sets itself over against itself, makes itself its own object and returns from this difference…into unity with itself. This being-with-itself of the ‘I’ in its difference from itself is the ‘I’s infinitude or ideality.” (Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §381)

“Already in finite mind, ideality has the meaning of a movement returning into its beginning, by which mind, moving onward from its undifferentiated stage, its first position, to an Other, to the negation of that position, and by means of this negation of this negation returning to itself, demonstrates itself to be absolute negativity, infinite self-affirmation…” (Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §381)

“The substance of mind is freedom, i.e., the absence of dependence on an Other, the relating of self to self. Mind...attains actuality not by fleeing from the Other but by overcoming it. Mind can step out of its abstract, self-existent universality...[and] can posit within itself a determinate, actual difference, something other than the simple, “I,” and hence a negative; and this relation to the Other is...necessary, because it is through the Other and by the triumph over it, that mind...returns to itself out of its otherness...[and comes to be] the self-differentiating universal which in its difference is at home with itself and for itself. The Other...therefore also belongs to the nature of mind....In the Other, therefore, mind manifests only itself, its own nature; but this consists in self-manifestation. The manifestation of itself to itself is therefore itself the content of mind and not, as it were, only a form externally added to the content....In mind, therefore, form and content are identical with each other….[Mind] as such only is, in so far as it manifests itself to itself.” (Hegel, The Philosophy of Mind, §382-§383) 

Echoing Hegel, the British Idealist philosopher Edward Caird writes:

“We must, indeed, think of [Experience] as having life in itself and therefore as differentiating itself from itself; but this differentiation is held within the limit of its unity, it is a separation of movements which are separated only as they are united.” (Caird, Metaphysic, 434)

Whereas Experience “has its center in itself,” Matter, by contrast, has its center “out of itself.” For, Matter is exhausted by the reciprocal exclusion and repulsion of its composite parts. All parts of Matter exemplify nothing other than flatness, out-spreadedness, and side-by-sidedness. Matter is never at home with itself; indeed, Matter is neither “transparent-to-itself,” nor does it return “into-itself” or “into-its-parts.” Matter is “opaque-to-itself.” Indeed, Matter is “simple” in all of its dimensions: the entirety of its character is determined by what lies “outside” it. 

Gyrating patterns of physical particles are, therefore, in toto, pervaded by a self-othering “side-by-sidedness.” Indeed, these events quâ “material happenings” (i.e., processes that “outspread” and “diffuse” themselves across an extended, spatio-temporal manifold) are what they are only insofar as their “unfoldings” are repulsions “out-of-themselves”—no one of these “repulsions” either being, or having, a “moment of return” (i.e., a differentiation or phase wherein there is an “overreaching,” “including,” or “enveloping” of the distinction between “itself” and its “other” within “itself”). For any such “material happening”—regardless of its peculiar kind or character—there is neither an “interpenetration,” nor a “mutual-inclusion,” of its manifold differentiations or phases; on the contrary, we only find its differentiations or phases “withdrawing-towards-Others” (i.e., “passing-out-of-themselves” at the expense of their own self-identity). However, these “Others”—the “beyonds” towards which the differentiations or phases of a “material happening” seek to “withdraw”—are themselves repulsions “out-of-themselves”—prolonging the monotony ad infinitum. 

The only spatial “representation” that might help us illustrate (pictorially) the “Partes intra partes” character of Experience would be a torus undergoing “hyperspace rotation” (i.e., rotating in a poloidal direction). Such a torus would be simultaneously “rotating-out-of-itself” and “rotating-into-itself, “moving-away-from-itself” and “moving-into-itself,” and “diffusing-itself-out-of-itself” and “infusing-itself-into-itself.” It is important to note that it is impossible for a physical object to undergo “hyperspace rotation” in a three-dimensional space without tearing itself apart. Here is an animation that represents what I have in mind:

Now, in order to grasp how the nature of Experience is analogous to a torus engaging in “hyperspace rotation,” we ought to replace the “spatial language” used in our illustration (i.e., the spatial language used in specifying directions of rotation) with expressions that best represent different modes of “differentiation.” Thus, we should understand Experience in its “Unity” as having been represented by the torus as a whole. Now, as mentioned above, Experience is exhaustively self-differentiated. We should understand Experience’s “exhaustive self-differentiation” (or Experience in its “Manyness”) as having been represented by the torus “rotating-out-of-itself.” However, Experience is not a mere “Many;” on the contrary, it is also a “One.” Thus, Experience is not merely “exhaustively self-differentiated,” rather Experience is exhaustively self-differentiated to, through, and for, itself (i.e., A manner or mode of differentiation that is a “differentiation-into-self”). We should understand Experience’s “exhaustive self-differentiation to, through, and for, itself” as having been represented by the torus “rotating-into-itself.”

We are thus able to see how Experience is a Unity of Oneness and Manyness—an identity-in-difference. Spirit (i.e., Experience) is, in J.N. Findlay’s picturesque words, “the mover, the moved, and the motion.” As Experience unfolds and inwardly differentiates itself into Subjectivity and Objectivity, it simultaneously enfolds the products of this “self-fissuring” (i.e., Subject and Object) back into a Unity with itself. Subjectivity is Experience-in-its-Manyness as it “flows” or “converges” into Experience-in-its-Oneness; and Objectivity is Experience-in-its-Oneness as it “diffuses” or “differentiates-itself-out-of-itself” into Experience-in-its-Manyness. This diastolic and systolic process of “self-fissuring” and “self-reconciliation” constitutes the life of Experience. 

With that being said, I’ll conclude this brief essay by presenting my own adaptation of Leibniz’s Mill:

If we were to take infinitely many coplanar geometrical figures of various determinable shapes and sizes, and have them expand, contract, and move about for an infinite time, we can rest assured that no transformation, redistribution, pattern, or collision of said figures will ever yield a new figure with “cubical content”—a figure that not only exhibits a new dimension, but also envelops those aforementioned plane geometrical figures. Indeed, all qualitative changes and transformations in those figures—and patterns thereof—will always be determinate manifestations of a generic character—or determinable—that had hitherto manifested itself in another determinate form. If, after an indefinite period of time, a change in the arrangement of those coplanar geometrical figures resulted in the manifestation of a new figure exhibiting “cubical content” and enveloping those aforementioned coplanar geometrical figures that gave rise to it, then said manifestation would be the manifestation of a new determinable that was itself “inclusive of” the former determinable, without itself being “included under it” as a determinate manifestation of said determinable. Such an incoherent and disparate breach of continuity is paralleled in the idea that—at some point in time—Experience was “birthed” by transformations and redistributions in Matter.

With this Hegelian reading of Leibniz’s Mill, we are left with a powerful and compelling illustration of the fact that qualitative changes and alterations in the structure and arrangement of material objects as such (e.g., transformations such as dilations, expansions, translations, rotations, reflections, etc.) cannot account for what would be the manifestation of a new determinable (hitherto unmanifested) that (i) exhibits an “internally-differentiated” structure (i.e., Or, to use Hegel’s words, is such that it “is distinguished within itself and returns from this difference into unity with itself”), and (ii) is “inclusive of” the mere material objects that are alleged to have given rise to it. This new determinable would be none other than Experience (i.e., Hegel’s Spirit).

Materialism and the “First Breath” of Mentality (Old Version)

The following essay is an outdated version of an argument that I developed a couple years ago. Nevertheless, I figured that it would be helpful to preserve the original version of the argument. The most up-to-date version of the essay can be found at the following link: Materialism and the “First Breath” of Mentality (A Revised Version with Objections (to the Original Argument) and Replies).

According to Materialism, there was, at some point in time, a first-ever mental event. This event was preceded in time solely by non-mental events. How, then, does the Materialist go on to explain the “first breath” of mentality? He invokes an alluring word: “causality.” A reader sympathetic to the Materialist’s case might protest against such a brief statement of his position, so it would only be fair to let the Materialist interject and present his view in his own words:

Modern Materialism holds that mental events are nothing “over and above” physical events; mentality is but a delicate, rare, and ephemeral form of physicality. Old Materialism made an error that Modern Materialism has since corrected; it blundered by declaring a priori that (i) all physical events are non-mental in nature and that (ii) all mental events are non-physical in nature. Despite this categorial difference between mental events (i.e., non-physical events) and physical events (i.e., non-mental events), Old Materialism went on to assert that every mental event located in the series of past, present, and future mental events is the causally-generated “effect,” or the epiphenomenal “by-product,” of a corresponding non-mental event located in the series of past, present, and future non-mental events. Thus, each mental event is causally dependent upon a particular non-mental event located in the total series of non-mental events. Although the total series of mental events was not itself conceived by these Old Materialists as being a “segment” of the total series of non-mental events, it was nevertheless made subordinate to it. While the thread of mental events lacked self-sufficiency, the chain of physical events (i.e., the totality of past, present, and future non-mental events) constituted an independent series—resting on nothing other than itself. The Old Materialists recognized the difficulties in their position (e.g., the relationship between the two series of events), and failed to build a bridge that could intelligibly unite “cause” and “effect.” Modern Materialism, by contrast, rejects the Old Materialist’s dogmatism and refuses to declare a priori that (i) all physical events are non-mental in nature, and that (ii) all mental events are non-physical in nature. Instead of maintaining that the thread of mental events is populated by causally-generated “effects” or epiphenomenal “by-products” of an “independent” series that is exhausted by non-mental events, Modern Materialism holds that when a mental event occurs, this occurrence is identical to a particular physical event located in the totality of physical events. Thus, mental events are no longer viewed as “residual excrescences” that supervene upon the “shock of atoms” in the physical order; they are no longer granted a unique series of their own (e.g., a non-physical series populated by events caused by antecedent or contemporaneous events in a subvening series of physical events). On the contrary, mental events are physical events. This is Modern Materialism. Although Modern Materialism holds that there was, at some point in time, a first-ever mental event, this event was itself a physical event—there being no categorial difference severing said event from any non-mental event that happened to be simultaneous with, or precedent to it, in time. Now, like any other physical event, the first-ever mental event would have been the effect of a preceding physical event, and this prior physical event would have been a non-mental event—but Modern Materialism assures us that there are no difficulties inherent in such a transition. By assimilating mental events into the physical order by way of “identity,” the Modern Materialist has advanced further than any of his predecessors: he has taken a step forward towards explaining the “first breath” of mentality.

Let’s examine the Materialist’s account in detail. The Materialist postulates two temporally-distinct events: (i) a definite, first-ever mental event, M, and (ii) a definite, non-mental event, Pn, that preceded M in time. How, then, are we to conceive the time-series of which these two events, Pn and M, are  occupants? Let’s offer a brief sketch the nature of the time-series by specifying some of its properties:

“A series is continuous when any term divides the whole series unambiguously into two mutually exclusive parts which between them comprise all the terms of the series, and when every term which so divides the series is itself a term of that series. From this second condition it obviously follows that a number of intermediate terms can always be inserted between any two terms whatever of a continuous series; no term of the series has a next term….The whole series of real numbers us continuous [because] every member of the number-series divides it into two classes, so that every number of one is less than every number of the other, and every number which thus divides the series is itself a term of the number-series....From the continuity of the series of real numbers it follows that any other series which corresponds point for point with the terms of the number series will be continuous. Now one such series is that of the successive parts of time. Every moment of time divides the whole series of moments into two mutually exclusive classes, the moments before itself and the moments which are not before itself. And whatever thus divides the time-series is itself a moment in that series.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 171-172) 

Thus, it follows from time’s continuity that no two instants in the time-series ever “touch”.¹ When this fact and the Materialist’s proposed connection between Pn and M are brought into focus, we find that Pn and M cannot share an extremital boundary. In other words, the last instant of Pn cannot be simultaneous with the first instant of M. Indeed, if the last instant of Pn was simultaneous with the first instant of M, then we would have a contradiction on our hands: there would be a moment in time when there was mentality present in a world that, ex hypothesi, was exhausted by non-mentality. In light of this, we must ask the Materialist several questions:

Question (i): Was Pn—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M?

The Materialist’s theory requires that he answer question (i) in the affirmative. And so, in response to question (i), the Materialist declares Pn—rather than any preceding non-mental event—to be the “cause” of M.

Question (ii): What was it about Pn that made this particular non-mental event—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M? 

On pain of inconsistency, the Materialist must respond to question (ii) by asserting that Pn possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from all prior non-mental events), and that Pn’s possession of these “special properties” made Pn—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M.

Question (iii): What were the “special properties” present in Pn and absent from all preceding non-mental events, that made Pn–rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M?

In reply to question (iii), the Materialist will likely posit a bunch of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of these “special properties.” Let’s symbolize the identity of these “special properties” present in Pn—but absent from all preceding non-mental events—as C.

At first glance, all seems fine and well; however, there is a puzzle lurking beneath the surface: a puzzle involving (i) the continuous nature of the time-series, (ii) the Materialist’s identification of Pn—rather than any of the other non-mental events which preceded it—as being the possessor of the aforementioned “special properties,” and (iii) the Materialist’s identification of what these “special properties” actually are. Let’s explore this latent puzzle in the Materialist’s theory.

As we have noted above, the final instant of Pn cannot be simultaneous with the first instant of M—on pain of contradiction. The first instant of mentality in the world must be “later than” any instant during which the Materialist’s world was “exhaustively non-mental.” However, since the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant, it follows that between Pn and M (or, rather, between the last instant of Pn and the first instant of M) there was another event, X, distinct from both Pn and M and separating the two events. This prompts us to ask the Materialist more questions:

Question (iv): Is X a non-mental event or a mental event?

The Materialist must answer question (iv) by declaring X to be a non-mental event, Pn+1. For consider, if the Materialist asserted X to be a mental event, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about M being the first-ever mental event because X would have preceded M in time. 

However, if the Materialist answers question (iv) by declaring X to be a non-mental event, Pn+1, then he contradicts his answer to question (i); in other words, since Pn+1 is later than Pn in time, it would not be true that Pn was the “cause” of M. And so, the Materialist must now revise his answer to question (i) and state that Pn+1—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn)—was the “cause” of M.

Question (v): What was it about Pn+1 that made this particular non-mental event—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn)—the “cause” of M?

On pain of inconsistency, the Materialist must answer question (v) by asserting that Pn+1 possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from all prior non-mental events), and that Pn+1’s possession of these “special properties” made Pn+1—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn)—the “cause” of M.

Question (vi): What were the “special properties” present in Pn+1 and absent from all preceding non-mental events, that made Pn+1—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M?

The Materialist is forced by his own hand to answer question (vi) by positing a bunch of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of the “special properties” present in Pn+1 (i.e., features present in Pn+1 but absent from all preceding non-mental events) that made Pn+1—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn)—the “cause” of M. Now, the Materialist cannot, on pain of contradiction, supply us with the same list of “special properties” that he provided in his answer to question (iii). If, in response to question (vi), the Materialist simply regurgitated his answer to question (iii), then, ex hypothesi, the “special properties” of Pn+1 would have been present in an earlier non-mental event (i.e., Pn)—thereby contradicting the Materialist’s answer to question (v). Moreover, the Materialist cannot simply provide his answer to question (iii) in response to question (vi) because he himself has admitted, by implication, that the properties of Pn were not of such a nature as to make Pn the cause of M. Let’s symbolize the Materialist’s revision of these “special properties” as C’.

However, another problem arises. In the same way the last instant of Pn had to be earlier in the time-series than the first instant of M, so too must the last instant of Pn+1 be earlier in the time-series than the first instant of M. If this were not so, and the last instant of Pn+1 was simultaneous with the first instant of M, then there would be a moment in time when there was mentality present in a world that, ex hypothesi, was exhausted by non-mentality—and this, of course, is a contradiction. And, as we have seen, since the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant, it follows that between Pn+1 and M (or, rather, between the last instant of Pn+1 and the first instant of M) there was another event, X’, distinct from both Pn+1 and M and separating the two events. This prompts us to ask the Materialist more questions:

Question (vii): Is X’ a non-mental event or a mental event?

In answer to question (vii), the Materialist must, of course, respond by declaring this particular event, X’, to be a non-mental event, Pn+2. If the Materialist answered by declaring X’ to be a mental event, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about M being the first-ever mental event since, ex hypothesi, X’ would have preceded M in time. 

The Materialist must answer question (vii) by declaring X’ to be a non-mental event, Pn+2. For consider, if the Materialist asserted X’ to be a mental event, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about M being the first-ever mental event because X’ would have preceded M in time. However, by declaring X’  to be a non-mental event, Pn+2, the Materialist contradicts his “revised” answer to question (i)—(i.e., that Pn+1 rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn) was the “cause” of M). As a result, the Materialist must “revise” his already “revised” answer to question (i) and declare Pn+2—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn or Pn+1)—to be the “cause” of M. In doing so, the Materialist must also revise his answer to question (v) and question (vi). He must assert that Pn+2 possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from all prior non-mental events) and that Pn+2’s possession of these “special properties” made Pn+2—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn or Pn+1)—the “cause” of M. However, in doing so, the Materialist must specify these “special properties” of Pn+2. Just like before, the Materialist must list a set of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of the “special properties” present in Pn+2 (i.e., features present in Pn+2 but absent from all preceding non-mental events) that made Pn+2—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn or Pn+1)—the “cause” of M. However, the Materialist cannot, on pain of contradiction, supply us with the same list of “special properties” that he provided in his answer to question (vi). If the Materialist did so, then the “special properties” of Pn+2 would have been present in an earlier non-mental event (i.e., Pn+1); however, he himself has admitted, by implication, that the properties of Pn+1 were not of such a nature as to make Pn+1 the cause of M.  Ergo, the Materialist must supply us with a new set of properties that were allegedly present in Pn+2, and made Pn+2—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M. Let’s symbolize the Materialist’s revision of these “special properties” as C’’.

However, the problem has only been aggravated. As we’ve seen before, the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant; ergo, it follows that between Pn+2 and M (or, rather, between the last instant of Pn+2 and the first instant of M) there was another event, X’’, distinct from both Pn+2 and M and separating the two events. This prompts us to ask the Materialist another question:

Question (viii): Is X’’ a non-mental event or a mental event?

The Materialist must answer question (viii) by declaring this particular event, X’’, to be a non-mental event, Pn+3. And we know where this will lead us. The Materialist is trapped in a vicious regress; for, inconsistencies in the Materialist’s responses require that he continually revise his answers ad infinitum. He is unable to consistently identify the non-mental event that allegedly gave birth to the first-ever mental event, and he is unable to consistently specify the identity of the alleged “special properties” that would have made this non-mental event—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the cause of the first-ever mental event.

With every step the Materialist takes towards his first-ever mental event, he is forced to take one step back—he is forever barred from receiving his final reward. The Materialist fails to harmonize the “first breath” of mentality within an asphyxiatingly barren, non-mental world.

“However far we pursue the course of the sense-excitation through the nerve, in however many ways we suppose its form changed and converted into ever finer and more delicate movements, we can never prove that it is in the nature of any movement so produced to cease as movement of its own accord, and to reappear as a bright color, as a tone, as a sweet taste. The chasm is never bridged over between the last state of the material elements within our reach and the first rise of the sensation; and scarce anyone will cherish the vain hope that at a higher stage of development science will find a mysterious bridge in a case where it is the impossibility of any sure crossing-over that forces itself on us with the most evident distinctness.” (Lotze, Mikrokosmus, Vol. I, 148)

Footnotes:

^[1] “For it follows from the structure of the time-series (I) that there are an indefinite number of terms of the series between any two members, between which there is a finite interval, and (II) that there is also an indefinite number of terms before or after any given member of the series. Like the series of real numbers, the time-series, because it satisfies the definition of a continuous infinite series, can have neither a first nor a last term, nor can any member of it have a next term. Applying this to the case of Causation, we may reason as follows: The same reasons which lead us to demand a cause A for any event B, and to find that cause in an assemblage of antecedent events, require that A should be similarly determined by another assemblage of antecedent events, and that this cause of A should itself have its own antecedent cause, and so on indefinitely. Thus, the causal principle, logically applied, never yields an intelligible explanation of any event Instead of exhibiting the transition A—B as the logical expression of a coherent principle, it refers us for the explanation of this transition to a previous instance of the same kind of transition, and then to another, and so forth without end. But it is impossible that what is not intelligible in one instance should become intelligible by the mere multiplication of similar unintelligibilities. (II) Similarly, if we look within the transition A—B. This transition, being continuous, must have its intermediate stages. A becomes B because it has already become C, and the transition A—C—B is again “explained” by showing that A became D which became C which became E which became B. And each of these stages, A—D, D—C, C—E, E—B can be once more submitted to the same sort of analysis. But in all this interpolation of immediate stages there is nothing to show the nature of the common principle in virtue of which the stages form a single process. We are, in fact, trying to do what we try to do wherever we establish a relation between terms, to answer a question by repeating it.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 177-178) 

A Critical Examination of Illusionism

Whether or not Illusionism is growing in acceptance, I do not know; however, it does appear that Illusionism is receiving more and more attention in the contemporary philosophical scene. The following essay is a brief analysis of an assumption that lies at the heart of Illusionism. When discussing their views, Illusionists usually invoke the terms “qualia,” “phenomenal qualities,” “phenomenal characters,” “phenomenal feels,” “phenomenal properties,” “what-it’s-likenesses” and “sensory-qualities.” For the sake of clarity and uniformity, I am going to use “sensory-qualities” as a catch-all for these terms. The “programme and platform” of Illusionism is summarized in the following passages by its most active proponent, Keith Frankish:

“Illusionists believe that consciousness [and/or objects of consciousness] involve no properties that are not detectable and fully describable by third-person science. Any other properties we think are involved are illusory….[Sensory-qualities] are illusory.” (Frankish, Illusion or Identity, 1-2)

“[Illusionism] holds that [sensory-qualities are] an illusion and aims to explain why it seems [that sensory-qualities] exist….I shall refer to the problem of explaining why experiences [and/or objects of experiences] seem to have [sensory-qualities] as the illusion problem….Illusionists deny that experiences [and/or objects of experiences] have [sensory-qualities] and focus on explaining why they seem to have them. They typically allow that we are introspectively aware of our sensory states but argue that this awareness is partial and distorted, leading us to misrepresent the states [and/or objects of those states] as having [sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 1-3)

Nothing—whether it be an object or an experience—has sensory-qualities. If an object (or experience) seems to have sensory-qualities, it is because our brain’s introspective mechanisms have “misrepresented” the object (or experience) as having them. So much then for Illusionism.

In defending Illusionism, Keith Frankish makes heavy use of “representations.” But what is a “representation”? In cognitive science, a representation is understood as being a structure that stands for something by virtue of relations such as similarity, causal history, and connections with other representations. Frankish uses the term “representation” in a similar way:

“First, how do I use the term “representation”? I use it in its standard sense in cognitive science for a brain state (a pattern of neuron firing) that serves as a proxy for something else, producing psychological effects appropriate to the presence of the thing....[They are] part of the neural machinery that makes us aware of the things they represent.” (Frankish, Illusionism and its Place in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, 304)

I’ll accept this account of “representations” for the sake of argument. 

Frankish’s Illusionism cannot get off the ground unless it can establish the truth or plausibility of the following proposition: There exist “representations of sensory-qualities” (e.g., a “representation of a red sensory-quality”) that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. This is a very strong claim, and Frankish must adequately defend it without recourse to faith, intuition, or revelation. This is how Frankish defends Illusionism’s foundation stone: 

“It is true that cognitive scientists talk of there being representations in the brain. Representations in this sense are...parts of the machinery that makes us aware of things…Such representations need not share properties with the things they represent. The mental representation of redness need not be red, any more than the word ‘red’ or the numeral that denotes red in a painting-by-numbers kit…These representations [of sensory-qualities] don’t have [sensory-qualities], of course…Rather, they are patterns of neuron-firing that signal the presence of [sensory-qualities] in much the same way that written words signal the presence of things.” (Frankish, What if your Consciousness is an Illusion Created by your Brain?, 5)¹

“When illusionists say that [sensory-qualities] are illusory, they mean that we have introspective representations like those that we would have if our experiences had [sensory-qualities]. And we can have such representations even if our experiences don’t have [sensory-qualities]. Of course, [Illusionism requires] that the [introspective] representations [of sensory-qualities] don’t have [sensory-qualities]. But, as I noted, representations needn’t possess the properties they represent. Representations of redness needn’t be red, and representations of [sensory-qualities] needn’t [have sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, What if your Consciousness is an Illusion Created by your Brain?, 10) 

“A representation of a [sensory-quality] needn’t be qualitative, just as the word ‘red’ needn’t be red.” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Sep 27th, 2019)

“Representations needn’t possess the properties they represent. A representation of redness needn’t be red, and a representation of phenomenal redness needn’t be phenomenally red.” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Jan 2^nd, 2020)

“It implies some representation of the illusory thing—[sensory-qualities] in this case. But that representation needn’t itself have the properties of the illusory thing. A representation of [sensory-qualities] needn’t itself have [sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Feb 8^th, 2021)

“A representation of F needn’t itself be F. A representation of a square needn’t be a square, a representation of worldly green needn’t be green, and a representation of phenomenal green needn’t be phenomenally green.” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Mar 15^th, 2018)

Frankish’s line of reasoning can be summarized as follows:

P1) If there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent. 

P2) If  “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. 

C1) Therefore, if there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. [From P1—P2] 

P3) There have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent. 

C2) Therefore, there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. [From P1—C1, P3]

Such reasoning is clearly fallacious. The consequent in P2 does not at all follow from the antecedent. Indeed, it is a complete non sequitur—as well as an example of hasty generalization. Before I dive into a thorough analysis of Frankish’s reasoning, I think it will be most helpful if we do a bit of phenomenology. 

In many (if not all) of our observational activities, we direct our attention to an object, and this object is immersed within a multeity of objects. We observe the object of our attention as having or as consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds; likewise, the multeity of objects (in the periphery) are observed as having or as consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. Not only do these sensory-qualities constitute the “what” (i.e., the “content” or characteristica) we appeal to whenever we say that This observed (or observable) object is different from That observed (or observable) object, they also differentiate the object of our attention from the multeity of objects (in the periphery) and the multeity of objects (in the periphery) from the object of our attention. Objects (“representations” included) totally devoid of sensory-qualities would be nothing to us (observationally speaking); it is only by means of their apparent sensory-qualities that said observable objects have actual or possible significance for us.^2,3,4 Regardless of whether or not the sensory-qualities that the objects are observed as having or as consisting of are “real,” it is clear that it is only by means of them that we are able to  single out an object (in observation) from a field of objects—singling it out as a particular This among other Thises.

Suppose that we were to observe an object, X, and X is a “representation of a red sensory-quality.” Now, it does not necessarily follow that we will observe X as having or consisting of the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality which it represents (i.e., the red sensory-quality); indeed, we may observe X as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities that do not even fall under the heading of “color”—e.g., X may be observed as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of a tactile, gustatory, auditory, or olfactory kind. Nevertheless—and this point is essential—we have never observed objects (“representations” included) as neither having nor consisting of sensory-qualities; on the contrary, we have always observed objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds.⁴ The following scenario will help make this point more concrete:

Suppose that John is observing a cup on a table, and he observes the cup as having a determinate (or determinable) blue sensory-quality. Whenever John observes the cup as having a blue sensory-quality, he has a “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality.” John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” is localized to a particular chunk or region of his brain, and we can observe this particular chunk or region of John’s brain whenever he observes the cup as having a blue sensory-quality. Now, if we were to observe John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” (i.e., a particular chunk or region of John’s brain) as he observes the cup as having a blue sensory-quality, it is almost certain that we will not observe it as having a blue sensory-quality; however, we can be certain that we would observe it as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds; indeed, we would observe it as having or consisting of sensory-qualities, e.g., pinkness, warmth, smoothness, sliminess, etc. Although John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” is not observed as having a blue sensory-quality, it is nevertheless observed as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. Indeed, both the cup (i.e., the cup which John observes as having a blue sensory-quality) and John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” are both observed as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. In light of this illustration, what evidence is there for the following cornerstone of Illusionism:

There can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind.^{5, 6}

If Illusionism is to be held to its own standards, it cannot be allowed to defend the above claim by appealing to ‘intuitions’. Illusionism must appeal to the ‘empirical’. But what ‘empirical’ evidence is there? Or, rather, what is sample of available evidence is there for the Illusionist to appeal to in order to support the above-mentioned premise? (Whether or not the evidence does in fact support it). The following:

• We have had many instances of observation wherein we have observed a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality it represents.

• We have never had any instances of observation wherein a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) is observed as being totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind.

• We have always observed objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds.

• We have never had any instances of observation wherein the observed objects (“representations” included) are observed as neither having nor consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds.

Does the ‘empirical’ evidence support the consequent featured in P2 of Illusionism’s argument? Indeed, based on the bullet-points, can the Illusionist he validly conclude that there can exist (let alone that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable? No, he cannot do so. From these facts, it is clear that the Illusionist cannot validly infer (or posit) that there can exist (let alone that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind from instances of empirical observation.

I'll conclude the first part of this shrill shout of mine with a brief argument:

P1) If we cannot validly infer (or empirically verify) that “there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind” from the fact of there being instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent,” then we are not justified in believing an essential premise in all arguments for Illusionism.

P2) If we are not justified in believing an essential premise in all arguments for Illusionism, then we are not justified in believing Illusionism to be true. 

C1) Therefore, if we cannot validly infer (or empirically verify) that “there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind” from the fact of there being instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent,” then we are not justified in believing Illusionism to be true.  [From P1 and P2]  

P3) We cannot validly infer (or empirically verify) that “there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind” from the fact of there being instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent.” 

C2) Therefore, we are not justified in believing Illusionism to be true. [From P1 and P2] 

Thus, Illusionism’s foundation-stone is an arbitrary and unwarranted assumption. Far from being a viable option, the “coherent research programme” of Illusionism has the structural integrity of a castle in the air...

Addressing a Possible Objection:

I will attempt to address a potential objection, but before doing so, I think it would be best to outline the Illusionist’s argument in full and highlight the fallacy at its heart:

P1) If there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent. 

P2) If  “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. 

C1) Therefore, if there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. [From P1 and P2]

P3) If there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, then it is possible for us to “misrepresent” objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of sensory-qualities even though sensory-qualities do not exist and are not instantiated in the world (i.e., sensory-qualities only “seem” to exist and only “seem” to be instantiated in the world). 

C2) Therefore, if there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, then it is possible that sensory-qualities do not exist (i.e., it is possible that they are not instantiated in the world) even though we observe objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of sensory-qualities. [From C1 and P3] 

P4) If it is possible that sensory-qualities do not exist (i.e., if it is possible that they are not instantiated in the world) even though we observe objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of sensory-qualities, then it is possible that Illusionism is true. 

C3) Therefore, if there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, then it is possible that Illusionism is true. [From C2 and P4] 

P5) There have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent.  

C4) Therefore, it is possible that Illusionism is true. [From P1—C3, P5]

Now that we have standardized the Illusionist’s argument, we can examine it in detail. The move from P1 to P2 is fallacious—it is, as I have said, a non sequitur and involves an instance of hasty generalization (among other fallacies). As I have shown, the Illusionist cannot validly infer (or posit) that there can exist (let alone that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, from the fact that we have had many instances of observation wherein we have observed a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality it represents; the reason being that we have always observed objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. 

Now, throughout his work, Frankish continually addresses common criticisms of Illusionism. I think it would be helpful to include one of these criticisms (and Frankish’s response) here: 

“Another common objection to Illusionism is that in the case of [sensory-qualities] there is no gap between illusion and reality. [According to this objection] something can look like a Penrose triangle without being a Penrose triangle, but an experience that seems to have a greenish [sensory-quality] really does have a greenish [sensory-quality]….This is often presented as a crushing objection to Illusionism, but it is far from compelling. It turns on what we mean by [an experience] seeming to have a greenish [sensory-quality]. If we mean having an introspective experience with the same [sensory-quality] as [an experience that has] a greenish [sensory-quality], then, trivially, there is no distinction between seeming and reality. But of course this is not what Illusionists mean. [Illusionists] mean introspectively representing oneself as having [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality], and one can do this without having [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality]. The objector may reply that, in order to create the illusion of [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality], the introspective representation would have to employ a greenish [sensory-quality] mode of presentation, which would itself have an introspectable greenish [sensory-quality]. However, Illusionists will simply deny this, arguing that the content of introspective representations is determined by [non-sensory-qualities], causal or functional factors. [Footnote: Alternatively, Illusionists might concede that introspection employs modes of presentation that appear to have [sensory-qualities], but argue that this too is an illusion—that introspection misrepresents the modes of presentation as having [sensory-qualities] they lack. For a defense of this option and an argument that it does not generate an infinite regress, see Pereboom (Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, 27-28)]….The Illusionist claims that when we think we are having [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality (or when we think we are observing an object with a greenish sensory-quality] we are in fact merely misrepresenting ourselves as having [an experience with a greenish sensory-quality (or misrepresenting ourselves as observing an object with a greenish sensory-quality)]. This claim may be false, but the no-gap objection does not anything to the case against it.” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 16-17)

In light of Frankish’s response to his hypothetical objector, suppose Frankish was to reply to our argument by saying:

“John’s “representation of the blue sensory-quality” and my “representation of John’s “representation of the blue sensory-quality” as having sensory-qualities” can both be totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, and still represent their respective content as having or consisting of sensory-qualities because the content of a representation is fixed by the representation’s functional and relational features (i.e., non-sensory-qualities) and not intrinsic ones (e.g., sensory-qualities—if they existed).”

Such a reply would beg the question at issue because it presupposes that there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind—the very thing being disputed; and, as I have shown, the Illusionist has yet to present a valid argument for such a premise. Furthermore, he also begs the question because this premise plays an essential part in the Illusionist’s reasons (and attempted rationalization) for his denial of the existence of sensory-qualities. Unless the Illusionist can establish the premise, he can neither defend his theory, nor his denial of the existence of sensory-qualities, by invoking ideas that presuppose the premise’s truth (i.e., ideas which rest upon the very premise that the Illusionist has yet to establish or render plausible).

Furthermore, the response would be a red herring. It is beside the point to say that “the content of a representation is fixed by the functional and relational features (i.e., non-sensory-qualities) of the representation and not intrinsic ones (e.g., sensory-qualities—if they existed),” because my criticism does not concern how introspective “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” get their content “fixed” in the absence of any determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities being instantiated in the world; rather, my criticism targets Illusionist’s fallacious, non-sequiturial inference from instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, to the conclusion that there can exist (or that there does exist)  “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. Without this premise, Illusionism cannot get off the ground. 

Secondly, it may be true that the content of a representation is fixed by functional and relational features (i.e., non-sensory-qualities), but that doesn’t change the fact that the Illusionist has yet to prove that there can exist (or that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. Until the Illusionist is able to provide a valid and sound argument for that premise, Illusionism succumbs to “vicious circle” and “vicious regress” objections.

But what are these “vicious circle” and “vicious regress” objections? They take the following form:

“Many people think of illusions as involving [sensory-qualities]….If [sensory-qualities] were an illusion in that sense, then Illusionism would be circular. There would have to be another set of [sensory-qualities] in which the [sensory-quality] illusion was rendered, and we’d be no better off.” (Frankish, Illusionism and its Place in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, 301-302) (Cf. Frankish, Like a Rainbow, 1)

In other words, if the “introspective representations” which the Illusionist infers (or posits)—i.e., “representations of experiences/objects as having or consisting of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities”—had or consisted of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds (regardless of whether or not these inferred or (posited) representations had or consisted of, the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent), then Illusionism would be viciously circular. In order to avoid falling into a vicious circle or a vicious regress, the Illusionist must infer (or posit) the existence of introspective “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. Yet, as I have shown, such an inference (or positing) cannot be made (without committing several fallacies). The Illusionist cannot appeal to the premise as being an ‘open possibility’ (i.e., that it is an ‘open possibility’ that there can exist (or that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind). On the contrary, it does not tally (epistemically speaking) with what we have observed and with what we currently observe. The only kinds of representations evidenced by ‘empirical’ observation (i.e., the only available and relevant sample of representations that the Illusionist can validly infer (or posit)—without fallacy) are “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that have been perceived as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds—i.e., instances that do not permit the Illusionist to infer (or posit) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind).

Footnotes:

^[1] Contra the Early Wittgenstein, who holds that X cannot be a “representation of Y,” unless X has “something in common” (e.g., a “shared” logical form) with Y. Thus: “The picture is a model of reality.” (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 2.12) “The picture consists in the fact that its elements are combined with one in a definite way.” (2.14) “The picture is a fact.” (2.141) “That the elements of the picture are combined with one another in a definite way, represents that the things are some combined with one another.” (2.15) “According to this view the representing relation which makes it a picture, also belongs to the picture.” (2.1513) “The representing relation consists of the coordinations of the elements of the picture and the things.” (2.1514) “In order to be a picture a fact must have something in common with what it pictures.” (2.16) “In the picture and the pictured there must be something identical in order that the one can be a picture of the other at all.” (2.161) “What the picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it after its manner—rightly or falsely—is its form of representation.” (2.17) “The picture can represent every reality whose form it has. The spatial picture, everything spatial, the coloured, everything coloured, etc.” (2.171) “The picture has the logical form of representation in common with what it pictures.” (2.2) “The gramophone record, the musical thought, the score, the waves of sound, all stand to one another in that pictorial internal relation, which holds between language and the world. To all of them the logical structure is common. (Like the two youths, their two horses and their lilies in the story. They are all in a certain sense one).” (4.014) We find something similar in Nettleship’s Lectures on Logic: “In the first place, we must ask what is a sign or symbol? To say that A is a symbol of B implies, of course, that A is something different from B, but (and this is often forgotten) it also implies that it is in some respect the same as B. The most remote, far-fetched symbol in the world must have something in common with that which it symbolizes; i.e., the person to whom it has the symbolic meaning must have some (however little it may be) of the same feeling or experience when he experiences the symbol, as he has when he experiences that which it symbolizes. In other words, there are such things as symbols just because the most different things in the world have something in common.” (Nettleship, Philosophical Lectures and Remains, Vol. I, 23-24)

^[2] Indeed, in another article, Frankish himself agrees when he says, “When I look at a ripe banana, I seem to be aware of a rich yellow [sensory-quality]….Similarly, with smells, sounds, tastes, pains, and other sensory-qualities.” Likewise, he says, “I agree…that it seems as if [objects of] experiences have [sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, Why Panpsychism Fails to Solve the Mystery of Consciousness, 8). However, he goes on to say, “These [sensory-qualities] are not more present in the world around us than they are in our brains.” (Frankish, What is Illusionism?, 12). 

^[3] In a similar vein, he says, “We experience objects as having a distinctive but ineffable significance for us, which is a marker of their affordances. This is what we call their quality or feel.” (Frankish, Bright Shiny Colours, 1) And again, “As subjects of experience, our interest is in how things seem to us introspectively—the illusion [of sensory-qualities] itself, not the mechanisms that cause it.” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 8) And yet again, “We perceive things as having a certain impact on us, as infused with potent [sensory-qualities]….[Sensory-qualities] are not really anywhere. Thanks to the combination of perceptual and introspective processes in our brains, we experience objects as qualitatively charged. But the [sensory-qualities] don’t correspond to real, intrinsic features either of objects or us. They are potent illusions, an imperative commentary, generated by our brains to express the significance things have for us.” (Frankish, Illusionism and its Place in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, 304)

^[4] In a different context, Frankish discusses this when he describes possible variations of Illusionism (e.g., inward-looking Illusionism and outward-looking Illusionism): “I characterized Illusionism as the view that [sensory-qualities are] an introspective illusion, reflecting the widely held view that [sensory-qualities] are properties of experience. This may be too restrictive, however. Some theorists hold that experience is transparent: when we attend to our experiences, we are aware only of properties of their objects. Thus, redness is experienced as a property of surfaces, pain as a property of parts of our bodies, and so on (e.g., Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995; 2000). This points to the possibility of an outward-looking Illusionism, on which experience misrepresents distal stimuli as having [sensory-qualities]. Vision, for example, would represent objects as having illusory [sensory-qualities of colour] as well as real physical colours (for a view of this kind, see Hall, 2007). This view can be regarded as a variant of standard, inward-looking Illusionism, differing principally on where the illusory [sensory-qualities] are represented as being located. And, like the inward-looking version, it may posit processes of internal monitoring. The illusion of phenomenality may involve a combination of introspection and projection, in which we both misrepresent features of experience as [sensory-qualities] and then re-represent these illusory [sensory-qualities] as properties of the external world, mistaking complex physical properties of our sensory states for simple [sensory-qualities] of external objects (Humphrey, 2011, chapter 7).” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 7)

^[5] Observation is a relation between a person (or a mind) and an object (or a multeity of objects)—not a relation between an object (or a multeity of objects) and a part of a person (e.g., a visual system, an introspective mechanism, a sense-organ, or a brain). Instances of “blind-sight” give us no reason to suppose that we have instances of observation wherein an object is observed as neither having nor consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. For a “blind-sighted” person to correctly guess the identity of some object placed in front of their eyes is not for him to observe it. Indeed, the “blind-sighted” person does not observe the object at all. Similarly, if I am seated in a room and I happen to correctly guess that there is a man lurking in another room a few doors down, I do not thereby observe him. As C.D. Broad says, “For the relation to the organ, whatever it may be, is not the relation of being perceived, since that is a relation to the mind and not to the body.” (Broad, Perception, Physics, and Reality, 189)

^[6] Frankish endorses the view, advanced by Derk Pereboom, that it is an ‘open possibility’ that there exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. (Cf. Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 6). This ‘open possibility’ is subject to devastating criticisms in Torin Atler’s review of Pereboom’s Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. Pereboom’s arguments for this ‘open possibility’ assume a form of Kantianism (regarding the nature of introspection and first-person access]. Furthermore, he attempts to substantiate this ‘open possibility’ by relying upon fragments from John Locke’s epistemology (a ghost laid to rest ages ago by Berkeley, Bradley, etc.). Unfortunately, Pereboom doesn’t take the opportunity to either re-examine the coherence of these appeals to Locke in light of Berkeley’s and Bradley’s crushing objections, or to take a step back and ask himself whether his implicit Kantianism is consistent with his knowledge of the fact of his having such views at all. (Cf. Pereboom, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, 15)