Materialism and the “First Breath” of Mentality (A Revised Version with Objections (to the Original Argument) and Replies)

According to Materialism, there was, at some point in time, an instant, M, whose “content” was the first-ever mental state; and this instant, M, was preceded in time by a compact series of non-mental instants (i.e., a compact series wherein each instant had a “content” that was exhaustively non-mental in character). How, then, does the Materialist go on to explain the “first breath” of mentality? He invokes an alluring word: “causality.” A reader sympathetic to the Materialist’s case might protest against such a brief statement of his position, so it would only be fair to let the Materialist interject and present his view in his own words:

Modern Materialism holds that mental states are nothing “over and above” physical states; mentality is but a delicate, rare, and ephemeral form of physicality. Old Materialism made an error that Modern Materialism has since corrected; it blundered by declaring a priori that (i) all physical states are non-mental in nature and that (ii) all mental states are non-physical in nature. Despite this supposed categorical difference between mental states (i.e., non-physical states) and physical states (i.e., non-mental states), Old Materialism went on to assert that every mental state located in the series of past, present, and future mental states is the causally-generated “effect,” or the epiphenomenal “by-product,” of a corresponding non-mental state located in the series of past, present, and future non-mental states. Thus, each mental state is causally dependent upon a particular non-mental state located in the total series of non-mental states. Although the total series of mental states was not itself conceived by these Old Materialists as being a “segment” of the total series of non-mental states, it was nevertheless made subordinate to it. While the thread of mental states lacked self-sufficiency, the chain of physical states (i.e., the totality of past, present, and future non-mental states—or the chain of non-mental states ordered in relations of “earlier than” and “later than”) constituted an independent series—resting on nothing other than itself. The Old Materialists recognized the difficulties in their position (e.g., the relationship between the two series), and failed to build an explanatory bridge that could intelligibly, and non-arbitrarily, unite “cause” with “effect.” Modern Materialism, by contrast, rejects the Old Materialist’s dogmatism and refuses to declare a priori that (i) every physical state is non-mental in nature, and that (ii) every mental state is non-physical in nature. Instead of maintaining that the thread of mental states is populated by non-physical, causally-generated “effects” or epiphenomenal “by-products” of an “independent” series that is exhausted by non-mental states, Modern Materialism, by contrast, holds that when a mental state occurs, this occurrence is identical to a particular physical state located in the total series of physical states. Thus, mental states are no longer viewed as “residual excrescences” that supervene upon the “shock of atoms” in the physical order; they are no longer granted a unique series of their own. On the contrary, mental states just are physical states. This is Modern Materialism.

Now, like any other physical state, the first-ever mental state (i.e., the “content” of the first-ever mental instant, M) would have been the effect of a preceding physical state, and this prior physical state would have been a non-mental state (i.e., the “content” of a non-mental instant)—but Modern Materialism assures us that there are no difficulties inherent in such a transition. By assimilating mental states into the physical order by way of “identity,” the Modern Materialist has advanced further than any of his predecessors: he has taken a step forward towards explaining the “first breath” of mentality.

Let’s examine the Materialist’s account in detail. The Materialist postulates two temporally-distinct instants: (i) a definite instant, M, whose “content” was the first-ever mental state, and (ii) a definite instant, Pn, whose “content” was a non-mental state that preceded the “content” of the first-ever mental instant in time. Let’s offer a brief sketch of the nature of the time-series by specifying some of its properties:

“A series is continuous when any term divides the whole series unambiguously into two mutually exclusive parts which between them comprise all the terms of the series, and when every term which so divides the series is itself a term of that series. From this second condition it obviously follows that a number of intermediate terms can always be inserted between any two terms whatever of a continuous series; no term of the series has a next term….The whole series of real numbers is continuous [because] every member of the number-series divides it into two classes, so that every number of one is less than every number of the other, and every number which thus divides the series is itself a term of the number-series....From the continuity of the series of real numbers it follows that any other series which corresponds point for point with the terms of the number series will be continuous. Now one such series is that of the [time series]. Every moment of time divides the whole series of moments into two mutually exclusive classes, the moments before itself and the moments which are not before itself. And whatever thus divides the time-series is itself a moment in that series.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 171-172)

Thus, it follows from time’s continuity that no two instants in the time-series ever “touch.” When this fact and the Materialist’s proposed connection between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M are brought into focus, we find that the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M cannot temporally overlap—i.e., the first-ever mental state (i.e., the “content” of instant M) and the non-mental state (i.e., the “content” of instant Pn) had to be not only not simultaneous with each other, but also had to be in a relation of “earlier than” and “later than” to each other. Indeed, if the “content” of Pn was simultaneous with the “content” of M, then we would have a contradiction on our hands: there would be a moment in time when there was mentality present in a world that, ex hypothesi, was exhausted by non-mentality. In light of this, we must ask the Materialist several questions:

Question (i): Was the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

The Materialist’s theory requires that he answer question (i) in the affirmative. And so, in response to question (i), the Materialist declares the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—to be the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Question (ii): What was it about the “content” of Pn that made it the non-mental state—rather than any preceding non-mental state—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

On pain of inconsistency, the Materialist must respond to question (ii) by asserting that the “content” of Pn was a non-mental state that possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from all prior non-mental states), and that its possession of these “special properties” made the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Question (iii): What were the “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn and absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants, that made the “content” of Pn–rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

In reply to question (iii), the Materialist will likely posit a bunch of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of these “special properties.” Let’s symbolize the identity of these “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn—but absent from all the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants—as C.

At first glance, all seems fine and well; however, there is a puzzle lurking beneath the surface: a puzzle involving (i) the continuous nature of the time-series, (ii) the Materialist’s identification of the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any of the other non-mental instant—as being the possessor of the aforementioned “special properties,” and (iii) the Materialist’s identification of what these “special properties” actually are. Let’s explore this latent puzzle in the Materialist’s theory.

As we have noted above, the “content” of Pn (i.e., a state exhaustively non-mental in character) cannot be simultaneous with the “content” of M (i.e., a state that was not exhaustively non-mental in character)—on pain of contradiction. M must be “later than” Pn because, ex hypothesi, if the “content” of M was simultaneous with (or in any way overlapped with) the “content” of Pn, the time of the first-ever mental state would also be a time when the world was exhausted by solely non-mental states; and this, of course, is contradictory. Therefore, the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M are not simultaneous, but instead are in relations of “earlier than” and “later than” to each other. However, since the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant, it follows that between Pn and M there was another instant, X, distinct from both Pn and M and whose “content” separates the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M in time. This prompts us to ask the Materialist more questions:

Question (iv): Is the “content” of X a non-mental state or a mental state?

The Materialist must answer question (iv) by declaring the “content” of X to be a non-mental state. Since he must hold that the “content” of X is a non-mental state, we can represent X as Pn+1. Now, if the Materialist asserted the “content” of X to be a mental state, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about the “content” of M being the first-ever mental state because the “content” of X would have preceded the “content” of M in time.

However, if the Materialist answers question (iv) by declaring the “content” of Pn+1 (i.e., X) to be a non-mental state, then he either contradicts his answer to question (i) or his explanation becomes muddled in arbitrariness. Indeed, since the “content” of Pn+1 is “later than” the “content” of Pn in time, between the “content” of Pn—the supposed sufficient condition for the occurrence of the “content” of M—and the “content” of M, there would have been the occurrence of the purely non-mental “content” of Pn+1. However, if the identified “content” of the non-mental instant Pn was genuinely sufficient to produce the “content” of M, then the Materialist’s explanation stumbles into a difficulty.

If the occurrence of the intervening non-mental “content” of Pn+1 between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M matters causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, this would contradict the sufficiency of the “content” of Pn—rendering the “content” of Pn insufficient to be the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, if the occurrence of the intervening non-mental “content” of Pn+1 between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M does not matter causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, then this makes the timing of the occurrence of the “content” of M arbitrary and inexplicable. Moreover, if the “content” of Pn was sufficient to be the “cause” of the “content” of M, this leads us to ask why the “content” of Pn+1—a “content” that, ex hypothesi, lacked the “special properties” necessary and sufficient for it to be the “cause” of the “content” of M—occurred between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M.

In order to avoid introducing arbitrariness and inexplicability into his explanation of the “first breath” of mentality, the Materialist must revise his answer to question (i). He must now hold that the “content” of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., Pn)—was the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Question (v): What was it about the “content” of Pn+1 that made it the non-mental state—rather than any preceding non-mental state (e.g., the “content” of Pn)—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

On pain of inconsistency, the Materialist must answer question (v) by asserting that the “content” of Pn+1 possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from the “content” of all prior non-mental instants), and that its possession of these “special properties” made the “content” of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., Pn)—the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Question (vi): What were the “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn+1 and absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants (e.g., the “content” of Pn), that made the “content” of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn)—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

The Materialist is forced by his own hand to answer question (vi) by positing a bunch of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of the “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn+1 (i.e., features present in the “content” of Pn+1 but absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants) that made the “content” of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn)—the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Now, the Materialist cannot, on pain of contradiction, supply us with the same list of “special properties” that he provided in his answer to question (iii). If, in response to question (vi), the Materialist simply regurgitated his answer to question (iii), then, ex hypothesi, the “special properties” of the “content” of Pn+1 would have been present in the “content” of an earlier non-mental instant (i.e., the “content” of Pn)—thereby contradicting the Materialist’s answer to question (v). Moreover, the Materialist cannot simply provide his answer to question (iii) in response to question (vi) because he himself has admitted, by implication, that the properties of the “content” of Pn were not of such a nature as to make the “content” of Pn the cause of the “content” of M. Let’s symbolize the Materialist’s revision of these “special properties” as C’.

However, another problem arises. In the same way the “content” of Pn had to be earlier in the time-series than the “content” of M, so too must the “content” of Pn+1 be earlier in the time-series than the “content” of M. If this were not so, and the “content” of Pn+1 was simultaneous with the “content” of M, there would be a moment in time when there was mentality present in a world that, ex hypothesi, was exhausted by non-mentality—and this, of course, is a contradiction. And, as we have seen, since the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant, it follows that between Pn+1 and M, there was another instant, X’, distinct from both Pn+1 and M and whose “content” separated the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of M in time. This prompts us to ask the Materialist more questions:

Question (vii): Is the “content” of X’ a non-mental state or a mental state?

In answer to question (vii), the Materialist must, of course, respond by declaring the “content” of X’, to be a non-mental state. Since the “content” of X’ is a non-mental state, we can represent X’ as Pn+2.

Now, if the Materialist asserted the “content” of X’ to be a mental state, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about the “content” of M being the first-ever mental state because the “content” of X’ would have preceded the “content” of M in time.

However, if the Materialist answers question (iv) by declaring the “content” of X’ to be a non-mental state, then he either contradicts his answers to questions (v) and (vi), or his explanation becomes muddled in arbitrariness. Indeed, since the “content” of Pn+2 is “later than” the “content” of Pn+1 in time, then between the “content” of Pn+1—the supposed sufficient condition for the occurrence of the “content” of M—and the “content” of M, there would have been the occurrence of a the purely non-mental “content” of Pn+2. However, if the identified “content” of the non-mental instant Pn+1 was genuinely sufficient to produce the “content” of M, then the Materialist’s explanation stumbles into a difficulty.

If the occurrence of the intervening non-mental “content” of Pn+2 between the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of M matters causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, this would contradict the sufficiency of the “content” of Pn+1—rendering the “content” of Pn+1 insufficient to be the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, if the occurrence of the intervening non-mental “content” of Pn+2 between the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of M does not matter causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, then this makes the timing of the occurrence of the “content” of M arbitrary and inexplicable. Moreover, if the “content” of Pn+1 was sufficient to be the “cause” of the “content” of M, this leads us to ask why the “content” of Pn+2—a “content” that, ex hypothesi, lacked the “special properties” necessary and sufficient for it to be the “cause” of the “content” of M—occurred between the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of M.

In order to avoid introducing arbitrariness and inexplicability into his explanation of the “first breath” of mentality, the Materialist must revise his answer to question (i). He must now hold that the “content” of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., Pn+1)—was the “cause” of the “content” of M.

In doing so, the Materialist must also revise his answer to question (v) and question (vi). He must assert that the “content” of Pn+2 possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from the “content” of all prior non-mental instants) and that its possession of these “special properties” made the “content” of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn or the “content” of Pn+1)—the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, this is possible only insofar as the Materialist specifies the “special properties” of the “content” of Pn+2. Just as before, the Materialist must list a set of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of the “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn+2 (i.e., features present in the “content” of Pn+2 but absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants) that made the “content” of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn or the “content” of Pn+1)—the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, the Materialist cannot, on pain of contradiction, supply us with the same list of “special properties” that he provided in his original answer to question (vi). If the Materialist did so, then the “special properties” of the “content” of Pn+2 would have been present in the “content” of an earlier non-mental instant (i.e., the “content” of Pn+1); however, he himself has admitted, by implication, that the properties of the “content” of Pn+1 were not of such a nature as to make the “content” of Pn+1 the cause of the “content” of M. Ergo, the Materialist must supply us with a new set of properties that were allegedly present in the “content” of Pn+2, and made the “content” of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M. Let’s symbolize the Materialist’s revision of these “special properties” as C’’.

However, the problem has only been aggravated. As we’ve seen before, the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant; ergo, it follows that between Pn+2 and M there was another instant, X’’, distinct from both Pn+2 and M and whose “content” separates the “content” of Pn+2 and the “content” of M in time. This prompts us to ask the Materialist another question:

Question (viii): Is the “content” of X’’ a non-mental state or a mental state?

The Materialist must answer question (viii) by declaring the “content” of X’’ to be a non-mental state. Since the “content” of X’’ is non-mental, we can represent X’’ as Pn+3. And we know where this will lead us. The Materialist is trapped in a vicious regress; inconsistencies in the Materialist’s responses require that he continually revise his answers ad infinitum. He is unable to consistently identify the non-mental instant whose “content” allegedly gave birth to the “content” of the first-ever mental instant, M, and he is unable to consistently specify the identity of the alleged “special properties” present in the “content” of this non-mental instant that would have made it—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the cause of the “content” of the first-ever mental instant, M.

With every step the Materialist takes towards his first-ever mental state, he is forced to take one step back—he is forever barred from receiving his final reward. The Materialist fails to harmonize the “first breath” of mentality within an asphyxiatingly barren, non-mental world.

Objections to the Original Argument (with Replies)

Issue 1: “It is not clear to me why Pn must have a last instant. An event could occur over an open or half-open interval of time. If t is the time index of the first mental event, then Pn could be an event that occurs on [m, t) for any m < t. In this case there is neither overlap, nor intermediate causes.”

Reply to Issue 1: I have now revised the essay so that it makes a clearer distinction between positions in time and the “contents” that are isochronal to those positions in time. The “content” of an instant Pn is the state (i.e., the non-mental state) that obtains at Pn. By reframing the argument in terms of instants and their “contents,” rather than in terms of intervals and the boundaries of said intervals (e.g., their “first” and “last” instants, if they have a “first” or “last” instant), I think the revised argument avoids the objection that you bring up in “Issue 1.”

Issue 2: I also don't see why the existence of a moment in time between Pn and M implies that [the “content” of] Pn is not the cause of [the “content” of] M. If we identify special properties of [the “content” of] Pn that justify its being the cause of [the “content” of] M, it does not follow that every state between [the “content” of] Pn and [the “content” of] M also has those properties. It seems to me that you have introduced an additional assumption about the nature of causality, that one state can be the cause of another if and only if there is no state between them.

Reply to Issue 2: The second version of the argument does not depend on the assumption that a causal relation can only obtain between “temporally adjacent” “contents.” As mentioned above (in the second version of the argument), as soon as we acknowledge there being a purely non-mental instant (Pn+1) with its own distinct “content” (i.e., the “content” of Pn+1) intervening between the purely non-mental instant Pn and the first-ever mental instant M, we can reasonably ask whether we need to revise our list of “special properties” that we took to be responsible for the “coming into existence” of the “content” of M. For consider, if we assume that the “content” of Pn was the “cause” of the “content” of M, then we have a right to ask what “special properties” were present in the “content” of Pn and absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants that made the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, our only reason for supposing the “content” of Pn to be the cause of the “content” of M was based upon our supposed identification of some properties of Pn as being the “special properties” responsible for its giving rise to the “content” of M. And, by implication, the “content” of Pn had these properties whereas and the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants lacked them. If it turns out that the “content” of Pn+1 intervenes between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M, then our ordinary causal reasoning prompts us to reconsider if the properties of the “content” of Pn which we took to be the “special properties” were in fact the “special properties” responsible for giving rise to the “content” of M, or if we had instead only misidentified those properties as being the “special properties.”

Moreover, if we try and double down on our original assertion that those properties identified in the “content” of Pn were in fact the “special properties,” then we are left with no good reason for why the “content” of M didn’t occur before the “content” of Pn+1 occurred rather than after the “content” of Pn+1 occurred (i.e., why there was a “delay” even though the all the conditions were already present (only to vanish with the occurrence of the “content” of Pn+1)). However, if there was nothing about the intermediary “contents” (in addition to the “special properties” of the “content” of Pn) such that the occurrence of these intermediary “contents” were necessary for the occurrence of the “content” at time M, then we are left with a puzzle as to why the “content” of time M occurred earlier than some of the intermediary “contents” rather than before some of them. Moreover, this means that if the “content” of M could not occur unless the some of the intermediary “contents” occurred, then the occurrence of some of the intermediary “contents” were necessary to the occurrence of the “content” of M; yet if these were necessary to the occurrence of the “content” of M, then it would not be the case that the “content” of Pn was the necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of the “content” at M—thereby conflicting with the assumption that none of the intermediary “contents” mattered causally in the occurrence of the “content” of M. We can illustrate this by means of another argument:

Premise 1: Materialism posits that at some finite point, there occurred the first-ever mental state (i.e., the “content” of instant M), preceded solely by non-mental states.

Premise 2: Any causal explanation for the emergence of a first mental state (i.e., the “content” of instant M) from purely non-mental states (i.e., the “content” of non-mental instants) requires identifying specific non-mental conditions sufficient to produce mentality.

Premise 3: If an identified “content” of a non-mental instant Pn is asserted to be genuinely sufficient, then the occurrence of intervening purely non-mental “content” of instants Pn+1, Pn+2,… between Pn and M either:

(a) Contradicts the supposed sufficiency of the “content” of Pn, if those intermediates matter causally.

(b) Makes the timing of the occurrence of the “content” of M arbitrary and inexplicable, if those intermediates are causally irrelevant.

Premise 4: Both horns—causal contradiction or explanatory arbitrariness—are unacceptable to a coherent causal account. But if the Materialist cannot provide a coherent causal account, then he cannot adequately explain the causal origin of the first-ever mental state from purely non-mental states.

Conclusion: Therefore, the Materialist cannot adequately explain the causal origin of the first-ever mental state from purely non-mental states.

Issue 3: I also think it is possible for Pn and M to share a boundary point t. You argue that this is impossible because it would imply that, at time t, the world contained mental properties (because M is a mental event), but also was exhausted up to and including time t by non-mental events (because Pn is non-mental and contains t). But it does not necessarily follow that because an event has a property that each moment comprising the event has that property. For example, a physical object can have the property of being liquid, and be exhaustively comprised of subatomic particles, yet none of the subatomic particles are liquid. So too the materialist can coherently claim that the instants of time comprising a mental event do not have the property of mentality, but their agglomeration does have that property.

Reply to Issue 3: This objection does not apply to the revised version of the argument. This new version is framed in argument in terms of instants and their “contents,” rather than in terms of intervals and the boundaries of said intervals (e.g., their “first” and “last” instants, if they have a “first” or “last” instant).

Issue 4: I also think, perhaps most importantly, that the materialist simply does not have to agree that there is a first mental event. Because mentality is not metaphysically fundamental in the materialist theory, they don't even need to specify clear boundaries on the concept of “mental,” which could function rather like the notion of a species of animal, where there is a gradient of descent with no clear first member.

Reply to Issue 4: It seems that by denying that there was a “first-ever mental event” you either wade into some form of panpsychism (wherein there was never an instant whose “content” was solely “non-mental” (i.e., that “mentality” featured in the “content” of every past instant in some degree)), or you end up shifting the problem by introducing some form of “proto-mental continuum” (which, ultimately, seems to slip into some form of panpsychism again). Either way, the Materialist cannot give up the position that there was a point in time where the universe was solely non-mental—and it is precisely this position that generates the puzzle.

Materialism and the “First Breath” of Mentality (Old Version)

The following essay is an outdated version of an argument that I developed a couple years ago. Nevertheless, I figured that it would be helpful to preserve the original version of the argument. The most up-to-date version of the essay can be found at the following link: Materialism and the “First Breath” of Mentality (A Revised Version with Objections (to the Original Argument) and Replies).

According to Materialism, there was, at some point in time, a first-ever mental event. This event was preceded in time solely by non-mental events. How, then, does the Materialist go on to explain the “first breath” of mentality? He invokes an alluring word: “causality.” A reader sympathetic to the Materialist’s case might protest against such a brief statement of his position, so it would only be fair to let the Materialist interject and present his view in his own words:

Modern Materialism holds that mental events are nothing “over and above” physical events; mentality is but a delicate, rare, and ephemeral form of physicality. Old Materialism made an error that Modern Materialism has since corrected; it blundered by declaring a priori that (i) all physical events are non-mental in nature and that (ii) all mental events are non-physical in nature. Despite this categorial difference between mental events (i.e., non-physical events) and physical events (i.e., non-mental events), Old Materialism went on to assert that every mental event located in the series of past, present, and future mental events is the causally-generated “effect,” or the epiphenomenal “by-product,” of a corresponding non-mental event located in the series of past, present, and future non-mental events. Thus, each mental event is causally dependent upon a particular non-mental event located in the total series of non-mental events. Although the total series of mental events was not itself conceived by these Old Materialists as being a “segment” of the total series of non-mental events, it was nevertheless made subordinate to it. While the thread of mental events lacked self-sufficiency, the chain of physical events (i.e., the totality of past, present, and future non-mental events) constituted an independent series—resting on nothing other than itself. The Old Materialists recognized the difficulties in their position (e.g., the relationship between the two series of events), and failed to build a bridge that could intelligibly unite “cause” and “effect.” Modern Materialism, by contrast, rejects the Old Materialist’s dogmatism and refuses to declare a priori that (i) all physical events are non-mental in nature, and that (ii) all mental events are non-physical in nature. Instead of maintaining that the thread of mental events is populated by causally-generated “effects” or epiphenomenal “by-products” of an “independent” series that is exhausted by non-mental events, Modern Materialism holds that when a mental event occurs, this occurrence is identical to a particular physical event located in the totality of physical events. Thus, mental events are no longer viewed as “residual excrescences” that supervene upon the “shock of atoms” in the physical order; they are no longer granted a unique series of their own (e.g., a non-physical series populated by events caused by antecedent or contemporaneous events in a subvening series of physical events). On the contrary, mental events are physical events. This is Modern Materialism. Although Modern Materialism holds that there was, at some point in time, a first-ever mental event, this event was itself a physical event—there being no categorial difference severing said event from any non-mental event that happened to be simultaneous with, or precedent to it, in time. Now, like any other physical event, the first-ever mental event would have been the effect of a preceding physical event, and this prior physical event would have been a non-mental event—but Modern Materialism assures us that there are no difficulties inherent in such a transition. By assimilating mental events into the physical order by way of “identity,” the Modern Materialist has advanced further than any of his predecessors: he has taken a step forward towards explaining the “first breath” of mentality.

Let’s examine the Materialist’s account in detail. The Materialist postulates two temporally-distinct events: (i) a definite, first-ever mental event, M, and (ii) a definite, non-mental event, Pn, that preceded M in time. How, then, are we to conceive the time-series of which these two events, Pn and M, are  occupants? Let’s offer a brief sketch the nature of the time-series by specifying some of its properties:

“A series is continuous when any term divides the whole series unambiguously into two mutually exclusive parts which between them comprise all the terms of the series, and when every term which so divides the series is itself a term of that series. From this second condition it obviously follows that a number of intermediate terms can always be inserted between any two terms whatever of a continuous series; no term of the series has a next term….The whole series of real numbers us continuous [because] every member of the number-series divides it into two classes, so that every number of one is less than every number of the other, and every number which thus divides the series is itself a term of the number-series....From the continuity of the series of real numbers it follows that any other series which corresponds point for point with the terms of the number series will be continuous. Now one such series is that of the successive parts of time. Every moment of time divides the whole series of moments into two mutually exclusive classes, the moments before itself and the moments which are not before itself. And whatever thus divides the time-series is itself a moment in that series.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 171-172) 

Thus, it follows from time’s continuity that no two instants in the time-series ever “touch”.¹ When this fact and the Materialist’s proposed connection between Pn and M are brought into focus, we find that Pn and M cannot share an extremital boundary. In other words, the last instant of Pn cannot be simultaneous with the first instant of M. Indeed, if the last instant of Pn was simultaneous with the first instant of M, then we would have a contradiction on our hands: there would be a moment in time when there was mentality present in a world that, ex hypothesi, was exhausted by non-mentality. In light of this, we must ask the Materialist several questions:

Question (i): Was Pn—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M?

The Materialist’s theory requires that he answer question (i) in the affirmative. And so, in response to question (i), the Materialist declares Pn—rather than any preceding non-mental event—to be the “cause” of M.

Question (ii): What was it about Pn that made this particular non-mental event—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M? 

On pain of inconsistency, the Materialist must respond to question (ii) by asserting that Pn possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from all prior non-mental events), and that Pn’s possession of these “special properties” made Pn—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M.

Question (iii): What were the “special properties” present in Pn and absent from all preceding non-mental events, that made Pn–rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M?

In reply to question (iii), the Materialist will likely posit a bunch of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of these “special properties.” Let’s symbolize the identity of these “special properties” present in Pn—but absent from all preceding non-mental events—as C.

At first glance, all seems fine and well; however, there is a puzzle lurking beneath the surface: a puzzle involving (i) the continuous nature of the time-series, (ii) the Materialist’s identification of Pn—rather than any of the other non-mental events which preceded it—as being the possessor of the aforementioned “special properties,” and (iii) the Materialist’s identification of what these “special properties” actually are. Let’s explore this latent puzzle in the Materialist’s theory.

As we have noted above, the final instant of Pn cannot be simultaneous with the first instant of M—on pain of contradiction. The first instant of mentality in the world must be “later than” any instant during which the Materialist’s world was “exhaustively non-mental.” However, since the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant, it follows that between Pn and M (or, rather, between the last instant of Pn and the first instant of M) there was another event, X, distinct from both Pn and M and separating the two events. This prompts us to ask the Materialist more questions:

Question (iv): Is X a non-mental event or a mental event?

The Materialist must answer question (iv) by declaring X to be a non-mental event, Pn+1. For consider, if the Materialist asserted X to be a mental event, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about M being the first-ever mental event because X would have preceded M in time. 

However, if the Materialist answers question (iv) by declaring X to be a non-mental event, Pn+1, then he contradicts his answer to question (i); in other words, since Pn+1 is later than Pn in time, it would not be true that Pn was the “cause” of M. And so, the Materialist must now revise his answer to question (i) and state that Pn+1—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn)—was the “cause” of M.

Question (v): What was it about Pn+1 that made this particular non-mental event—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn)—the “cause” of M?

On pain of inconsistency, the Materialist must answer question (v) by asserting that Pn+1 possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from all prior non-mental events), and that Pn+1’s possession of these “special properties” made Pn+1—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn)—the “cause” of M.

Question (vi): What were the “special properties” present in Pn+1 and absent from all preceding non-mental events, that made Pn+1—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M?

The Materialist is forced by his own hand to answer question (vi) by positing a bunch of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of the “special properties” present in Pn+1 (i.e., features present in Pn+1 but absent from all preceding non-mental events) that made Pn+1—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn)—the “cause” of M. Now, the Materialist cannot, on pain of contradiction, supply us with the same list of “special properties” that he provided in his answer to question (iii). If, in response to question (vi), the Materialist simply regurgitated his answer to question (iii), then, ex hypothesi, the “special properties” of Pn+1 would have been present in an earlier non-mental event (i.e., Pn)—thereby contradicting the Materialist’s answer to question (v). Moreover, the Materialist cannot simply provide his answer to question (iii) in response to question (vi) because he himself has admitted, by implication, that the properties of Pn were not of such a nature as to make Pn the cause of M. Let’s symbolize the Materialist’s revision of these “special properties” as C’.

However, another problem arises. In the same way the last instant of Pn had to be earlier in the time-series than the first instant of M, so too must the last instant of Pn+1 be earlier in the time-series than the first instant of M. If this were not so, and the last instant of Pn+1 was simultaneous with the first instant of M, then there would be a moment in time when there was mentality present in a world that, ex hypothesi, was exhausted by non-mentality—and this, of course, is a contradiction. And, as we have seen, since the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant, it follows that between Pn+1 and M (or, rather, between the last instant of Pn+1 and the first instant of M) there was another event, X’, distinct from both Pn+1 and M and separating the two events. This prompts us to ask the Materialist more questions:

Question (vii): Is X’ a non-mental event or a mental event?

In answer to question (vii), the Materialist must, of course, respond by declaring this particular event, X’, to be a non-mental event, Pn+2. If the Materialist answered by declaring X’ to be a mental event, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about M being the first-ever mental event since, ex hypothesi, X’ would have preceded M in time. 

The Materialist must answer question (vii) by declaring X’ to be a non-mental event, Pn+2. For consider, if the Materialist asserted X’ to be a mental event, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about M being the first-ever mental event because X’ would have preceded M in time. However, by declaring X’  to be a non-mental event, Pn+2, the Materialist contradicts his “revised” answer to question (i)—(i.e., that Pn+1 rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn) was the “cause” of M). As a result, the Materialist must “revise” his already “revised” answer to question (i) and declare Pn+2—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn or Pn+1)—to be the “cause” of M. In doing so, the Materialist must also revise his answer to question (v) and question (vi). He must assert that Pn+2 possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from all prior non-mental events) and that Pn+2’s possession of these “special properties” made Pn+2—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn or Pn+1)—the “cause” of M. However, in doing so, the Materialist must specify these “special properties” of Pn+2. Just like before, the Materialist must list a set of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of the “special properties” present in Pn+2 (i.e., features present in Pn+2 but absent from all preceding non-mental events) that made Pn+2—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn or Pn+1)—the “cause” of M. However, the Materialist cannot, on pain of contradiction, supply us with the same list of “special properties” that he provided in his answer to question (vi). If the Materialist did so, then the “special properties” of Pn+2 would have been present in an earlier non-mental event (i.e., Pn+1); however, he himself has admitted, by implication, that the properties of Pn+1 were not of such a nature as to make Pn+1 the cause of M.  Ergo, the Materialist must supply us with a new set of properties that were allegedly present in Pn+2, and made Pn+2—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M. Let’s symbolize the Materialist’s revision of these “special properties” as C’’.

However, the problem has only been aggravated. As we’ve seen before, the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant; ergo, it follows that between Pn+2 and M (or, rather, between the last instant of Pn+2 and the first instant of M) there was another event, X’’, distinct from both Pn+2 and M and separating the two events. This prompts us to ask the Materialist another question:

Question (viii): Is X’’ a non-mental event or a mental event?

The Materialist must answer question (viii) by declaring this particular event, X’’, to be a non-mental event, Pn+3. And we know where this will lead us. The Materialist is trapped in a vicious regress; for, inconsistencies in the Materialist’s responses require that he continually revise his answers ad infinitum. He is unable to consistently identify the non-mental event that allegedly gave birth to the first-ever mental event, and he is unable to consistently specify the identity of the alleged “special properties” that would have made this non-mental event—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the cause of the first-ever mental event.

With every step the Materialist takes towards his first-ever mental event, he is forced to take one step back—he is forever barred from receiving his final reward. The Materialist fails to harmonize the “first breath” of mentality within an asphyxiatingly barren, non-mental world.

“However far we pursue the course of the sense-excitation through the nerve, in however many ways we suppose its form changed and converted into ever finer and more delicate movements, we can never prove that it is in the nature of any movement so produced to cease as movement of its own accord, and to reappear as a bright color, as a tone, as a sweet taste. The chasm is never bridged over between the last state of the material elements within our reach and the first rise of the sensation; and scarce anyone will cherish the vain hope that at a higher stage of development science will find a mysterious bridge in a case where it is the impossibility of any sure crossing-over that forces itself on us with the most evident distinctness.” (Lotze, Mikrokosmus, Vol. I, 148)

Footnotes:

^[1] “For it follows from the structure of the time-series (I) that there are an indefinite number of terms of the series between any two members, between which there is a finite interval, and (II) that there is also an indefinite number of terms before or after any given member of the series. Like the series of real numbers, the time-series, because it satisfies the definition of a continuous infinite series, can have neither a first nor a last term, nor can any member of it have a next term. Applying this to the case of Causation, we may reason as follows: The same reasons which lead us to demand a cause A for any event B, and to find that cause in an assemblage of antecedent events, require that A should be similarly determined by another assemblage of antecedent events, and that this cause of A should itself have its own antecedent cause, and so on indefinitely. Thus, the causal principle, logically applied, never yields an intelligible explanation of any event Instead of exhibiting the transition A—B as the logical expression of a coherent principle, it refers us for the explanation of this transition to a previous instance of the same kind of transition, and then to another, and so forth without end. But it is impossible that what is not intelligible in one instance should become intelligible by the mere multiplication of similar unintelligibilities. (II) Similarly, if we look within the transition A—B. This transition, being continuous, must have its intermediate stages. A becomes B because it has already become C, and the transition A—C—B is again “explained” by showing that A became D which became C which became E which became B. And each of these stages, A—D, D—C, C—E, E—B can be once more submitted to the same sort of analysis. But in all this interpolation of immediate stages there is nothing to show the nature of the common principle in virtue of which the stages form a single process. We are, in fact, trying to do what we try to do wherever we establish a relation between terms, to answer a question by repeating it.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 177-178) 

Common-Sense and the Perceptible World

Whenever we perceive a part of the perceptible world, we perceive it as “having” or “consisting of” qualities. Furthermore, the qualities we perceive a part of the perceptible world as “having” or “consisting of” are the “what” (i.e., the “content” or characteristica) that we appeal to whenever we say that “this” part of the perceptible world is different from “that” part of the perceptible world. Indeed, without this qualitative “whatness,” every part of the perceptible world we perceive would be indistinguishable from any other. Puzzles regarding the peculiar relationship between a perceived part of the perceptible world and the qualities we perceive that part of the perceptible world as “having” or “consisting of” often leads Common-Sense to maintain that all the qualities we perceive any part of the perceptible world as “having” or “consisting of” are dependent upon and relative to the structure of our sense organs—a view which, when taken to its logical conclusions, leads to contradictions. 

Now, our sense organs—on which the qualities we perceive a part of the perceptible world as “having” or “consisting of” are said to depend—are themselves parts of the perceptible world, and, as such, the qualities we perceive our sense organs (e.g., Our eyes) as “having” or “consisting of” are likewise dependent upon and relative to our sense organs (e.g., Our hands). However, these “second-order” sense organs (e.g., Our hands)—on which the qualities we perceive the “first-order” sense organs (e.g., Our eyes) as “having” or “consisting of” depend—are, in turn, themselves parts of the perceptible world, and so the qualities we perceive the “second-order” sense organs (e.g., Our hands) as “having” or “consisting of” depend upon a “third-order” of sense organs (e.g., Our nose and tongue), or—Heaven forbid—upon the “first-order” sense organs again (e.g., Our eyes). There is no end to the mutual dependence. However, if, as Common-Sense holds, the qualities we perceive a part of the perceptible world as “having” or “consisting of” are themselves actual features of that part of the perceptible world we perceive them as inhering in, then we are either sent off into a vicious regress or entrapped within a vicious circle. In the former case, we are led into an inconsistency: all parts of the perceptible world (including our sense organs) dissolve into “states” of “states” of “states” of an unknown X—a “something-we-know-not-what” never to be found. In the latter case, we are led to an absurd contradiction: our sense organs would have given rise to the whole perceptible world of which our sense organs are proper parts—“into the man’s head the whole world goes, including the head itself.”

The above argument is a refinement of a similar argument from A.E. Taylor’s 1903 work, Elements of Metaphysics, page 198-199.

Addressing a Reply to “An Argument Against the Identity Theory of Mind”

I recently received a reply from Dr. Joshua Rasmussen under my article, An Argument Against the Identity Theory of Mind:

“Looks interesting. I wondered why one couldn't perceive the contents of perception at different times. Like maybe when a tree image is a content of a visual perception (brain state B), I could later have a new perception to be aware of brain state B. Then all the brain states would still be perceptible in principle. I also wondered why you would need such an elaborate argument. Here is a simpler one: 

1. A blue image is sometimes the content of a perceptual experience. 

2. A blue image is never the content of a brain state. (Neuroscientists have never found blue images in brains.) 

3. Therefore, a perceptual experience is not a brain state.”

Thank you so much for your reply. To make things easier, I’ll split your comment into two parts and address both parts individually.

“Looks interesting. I wondered why one couldn't perceive the contents of perception at different times. Like maybe when a tree image is a content of a visual perception (brain state B), I could later have a new perception to be aware of brain state B. Then all the brain states would still be perceptible in principle.”

My concern with your proposed solution is that it faces the same dilemma that would arise if the perceptual states were simultaneous. Let me try to illustrate the issue:

If a perceptual state A was the “perception of a perceptual state, B,” and B was a perceptual state that had existed or occurred prior to perceptual state A, then A could have neither been the perceptum of B (since A hadn’t even existed yet to be the perceptum of perceptual state B), nor could A have been the perceptum of perceptual state A. For, if A was the perceptum of perceptual state A, then the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion would have been violated. However, it immediately follows from this that perceptual state A would have been imperceptible—in principle—unless it was the perceptum of another perceptual state, C,—a perceptual state that was itself different from perceptual state A and perceptual state B. Now, it is clear that if perceptual state C was a perceptual state that was existing or occurring later than perceptual state A and perceptual state B, then C could have neither been the perceptum of A, nor the perceptum of B (the reason being that C hadn’t even existed yet to be the perceptum of either perceptual state A or perceptual state B), nor the perceptum of perceptual state C. For, if C was the perceptum of perceptual state C, then the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion would have been violated. However, it immediately follows from this that perceptual state C would have been imperceptible—in principle—unless it was the perceptum of another perceptual state, D,—a perceptual state that was different from perceptual state A, perceptual state B, and perceptual state C. And so on, ad infinitum.

Every “new” perceptual state that we introduced to account for the earlier perceptual state would itself be imperceptible—in principle—unless we introduced another perceptual state to account for it; and that “new” perceptual state would itself be imperceptible—in principle—unless we introduced another perceptual state to account for it—and so on, ad infinitum. In short, no matter how many perceptual states we posit, we will always get stuck with a “imperceptible” remainder left unaccounted for.

“I also wondered why you would need such an elaborate argument. Here is a simpler one: 

1. A blue image is sometimes the content of a perceptual experience. 

2. A blue image is never the content of a brain state. (Neuroscientists have never found blue images in brains.) 

3. Therefore, a perceptual experience is not a brain state.”

Personally, I am very sympathetic to this argument. However, my concern is that the identity theorist can accuse it of committing the so-called “phenomenological fallacy.” Indeed, in his article, Materialism, J.J.C. Smart addresses a very similar argument to the one you bring up:

“But what about consciousness? Can we interpret the having of an after-image or of a painful sensation as something material, namely, a brain state or brain process? We seem to be immediately aware of pains and after-images, and we seem to be immediately aware of them as something different from a neurophysiological state or process. For example, the after-image may be green speckled with red, whereas the neurophysiologist looking into our brains would be unlikely to see something green speckled with red. However, if we object to materialism in this way we are victims of a confusion which U.T. Place has called “the phenomenological fallacy.” To say that an image or sense datum is green is not to say that the conscious experience of having the image or sense datum is green. It is to say that it is the sort of experience we have when in normal conditions we look at a green apple, form example. Apples and unripe bananas can be green, but not the experiences of seeing them. An image or a sense datum can be green in a derivative sense, but this need not cause any worry, because, on the view I am defending, images and sense data are not constituents of the world, though the processes of having an image or a sense datum are actual processes in the world. The experience of having a green sense datum is not itself green; it is a process occurring in grey matter. The world contains plumbers, but does not contain the average plumber; it also contains the having of a sense datum, but does not contain the sense datum.” (Smart, Materialism, 653)

Now, I think Smart would respond to your argument by saying that the Materialist is not identifying the brain state with the “blue image,” rather he is identifying the brain state with the “having of a blue image;” and since the “having of a blue image” is not identical to the “blue image,” Smart would conclude that the argument in question was an ignoratio elenchi. Another unrelated concern of mine is that the “blue image” being “had” by me seems, prima facie, to be something entirely private to myself, and is not something that other people can “have.” If this be the case, then the Materialist might respond to your argument by saying that it would be expected that neuroscientists have never found “blue images” in brains, since those images would be private to their owners and inaccessible to anyone else—such as the neuroscientists. 

The argument that I give in An Argument Against the Identity Theory of Mind is indeed long and elaborate (and—I must admit—tedious), but I think it is able to avoid accusations of begging the question or involving the phenomenological fallacy. Indeed, I try to exploit Smart’s insistence on the distinction between the “perceiving of X” or the “experiencing of X” and X itself. I try to provide as many independent arguments as I can to show the impossibility of identifying the two. Furthermore, if we accept the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion and the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability (both of which I attempt to argue for a priori), and if we also accept the idea that all brain states are—in principle—perceptible, it immediately follows that not all perceptual states are identical to some brain states (On pain of violating the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion and the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability); and this entails that the identity theory is false.

My Adaptation of A.E. Taylor’s Argument for Idealism

P1) If X is a real physical object at T1, then X is perceivable at T1.

Prima facie, it seems that the difference between a “real” physical object and an “unreal” physical object is nothing other than the following: a “real” physical object either is, or could be, the perceptum (i.e., object) of a perceptual state, whilst an “unreal” or merely “imaginary” physical object neither is, nor could be, the perceptum of a perceptual state. Indeed, Kant insisted upon this in his critique of the ontological proof. For Kant, the difference between a “real” physical object and its merely “imagined” or “unreal” counterpart, lied in the fact that the “real” physical object—unlike the merely “imaginary” or “unreal” physical object—is, or could be, the perceptum of a perceptual state. Taking a hundred dollars as his example, Kant pointed out that the “real” hundred dollars are, or could be, something felt, touched, and handled; seen, smelled, and tasted; exchanged for a currency of a different type, used for purchasing goods and services in the market, or simply deposited in a bank for future use. The “imaginary” hundred dollars, on the other hand, neither are, nor could be, felt, touched, and handled; seen, smelled, and tasted; exchanged for a currency of a different type, used for purchasing goods and services in the market, or simply deposited in a bank for future use.

With that being said, it is crucial to recognize that to “imagine” something is not to “perceive” what is being “imagined.”  Whenever I “imagine” anything, there is always a distinction between my psychical act of “imagining” and the “imaginatum” which I am “imagining.” My psychical act of “imagining” the “imaginary” hundred dollars is certainly “real” and not “imaginary,” because the psychical act of “imagining” is one with, and enters into, my Experience, it is something that I am actually doing. On the other hand, the “imaginatum” that I am “imagining” (i.e., the “unreal” or “imaginary” hundred dollars”) neither is, nor can be, something that enters into my Experience. If one muddles the distinction between the “imagining” and the “imaginatum,” then one inevitably falls into one of the following two absurdities: (a) they end up committing themselves to the “reality” of griffins, round-squares, and leprechauns because they collapse the “unreal” “imaginatum” into the “real” psychical act of “imagining;” or (b) they end up committing themselves to the “unreality” of psychical acts of “imagining” because they collapse the psychical act of “imagining” into the “unreal” “imaginatum.” For a further defense of this premise, confer the passages from Taylor’s works below.

P2) If X is perceivable at T1, then all of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 are themselves real at T1.

 

P3) If all of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 are themselves real at T1, then all of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 are themselves perceivable at T1.

 

P4) If all of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 are themselves perceivable at T1, then none of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 are themselves imperceptible at T1.

 

P5) If none of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 are themselves imperceptible at T1, then none of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 have the property of “being unperceived at T1.” 

If X has both the property of “being perceivable at T1” and the property of “being unperceived at T1,” that would mean it is possible to perceive X at T1—the time at which X also has the property of being unperceived—but this is a contradiction. Indeed, it is just as contradictory to assert that X, when perceived, is imperceptible. Therefore, if X has the property of “being perceivable at T1,” then X cannot also have the property of “being unperceived at T1.” For a further defense of this premise, confer the passages from Taylor’s works below.

C1) Therefore, if X  is a real physical object at T1, then none of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 have the property of “being unperceived at T1.” [From P1—P5]

 

P6) One of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 is X itself.

 

C2) Therefore, if X is a real physical object at T1, then X  does not have the property of “being unperceived at T1.” [From C1 and P6]

 

P7) If X  does not have the property of “being unperceived at T1,” then X is not unperceived at T1.

 

P8) If X is not unperceived at T1, then X is perceived at T1.

 

C3) Therefore, if X is a real physical object at T1, then X is perceived at T1. [From C2—P8]

“And, as to the principle of the contention that presence in an experience is the very meaning of existence, it is, to my mind at least, as Mr. Bradley says it is to his, so evident that I should find it impossible to meet anyone who disputes it on common ground. Its full force will perhaps be best brought out by our disregarding the special grounds upon which it is supported by Berkeley, some of them only too insecure, and restating it in the form of a challenge. Produce, we may say to the objector, any piece of fact whatever of which you are prepared to maintain the real existence, and I will undertake to show that what makes it real can be nothing but its presence as an inseparable aspect of a sentient experience. What the special fact you choose for the purpose of the experiment may be, whether a physical quality or process, an artistic effect, or a moral excellence, makes no difference to the principle of the argument. For when you have chosen your fact, and made your assertion, “This fact, A, really exists,” we shall invite you to think, as you always can, of a corresponding A which is not real but merely imaginary, and then to say what it is that makes the difference between the real and the imaginary or unreal A. If you will try the experiment, you will always find, as Kant proved in the historical case of the hundred dollars, that the difference does not lie in the addition of a new predicate to those by which the imaginary A is characterized, but always in the actual presence of the real A to a sentient experience, its entrance into some immediately apprehended whole. Even in the case of an A which, for some reason or other, is wholly inaccessible to human perception you cannot really escape from this conclusion. For, suppose you say, “The ice at the South Pole really exists, though it is impossible for a human eye to behold it,” we shall invite you to explain more precisely what you mean by such a statement. You will then find yourself in a dilemma: either you mean that the Polar ice exists with all its qualities, including those which have no meaning at all except in relation to a perceiving organ, precisely as we should see it if we were there, and in that case the ice with all its qualities must presumably be always present, as such, to an experience which is not ours; or you mean that there really exist certain conditions, such that, on the addition of one further condition, the presence of a human spectator, they would yield a perception of the ice. But, not to insist on the point that the reality of a certain object and the reality of some of its conditions are not the same thing, what do you mean by a really existing condition as distinguished from one which is merely imagined to exist? Any answer to this question will show that the appeal to conditions only puts the difficulty back a stage, without in any way affecting the validity of the Berkeleian contention.” (Taylor, Mind and Nature, 58-59) 

“Reality...is truly known to be a connected and self-consistent, or internally coherent, system; can we with equal confidence say anything of the data of which the system is composed? Reflection should convince us that we can at least say as much as this: all the materials or data of reality consist of experience, experience being provisionally taken to mean psychical matter of fact, what is given in immediate feeling. In other words, whatever forms part of presentation, will, or emotion, must in some sense and to some degree possess reality and be a part of the material of which reality, as a systematic whole, is composed; whatever does not include, as part of its nature, this indissoluble relation to immediate feeling, and therefore does not enter into the presentation, will, and emotion, of which psychical life is composed, is not real. The real is experience, and nothing but experience, and experience consists of “psychical matter of fact.” Proof of this proposition can only be given in the same way as of any other ultimate truth, by making a trial of it; if you doubt it you may be challenged to perform the experiment of thinking of anything whatever, no matter what, as real, and then explaining what you mean by its reality. Thus suppose you say “I can think of A as real,” A being anything in the universe; now think, as you always can, of an imaginary or unreal A, and then try to state the difference between the A which is thought of as real and the A which is thought of as merely imaginary. As Kant proved, in the famous case of the real and the imagined hundred dollars, the difference does not lie in any of the qualities or properties of the two A’s; the qualities of the imagined hundred dollars are precisely the same as those of the real sum, only that they are “imaginary.” Like the real dollars, the imagined dollars are thought of as possessing such and such a size, shape, and weight; stamped with such and such an effigy and inscription; containing such and such a proportion of silver to alloy; having such and such a purchasing power in the present condition of the market, and so forth. The only difference is that the real dollars are, or under specified and known conditions may be, the objects of direct perception, while the imaginary ones, because imaginary, cannot be given in direct perception. You cannot see or handle them; you can only imagine yourself doing so. It is in this connection with immediate psychical fact that the reality of the real coins lies. So with any other instance of the same experiment. Show me, we might say, anything which you regard as real,—no matter what it is, a stone wall, an aesthetic effect, a moral virtue,—and I will ask you to think of an unreal and imaginary counterpart of that same thing, and will undertake to prove to you that what makes the difference between the reality and the imagination is always that the real thing is indissolubly connected with the psychical life of a sentient subject, and, as so connected, is psychical matter of fact.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 23-24) 

“Two points should be carefully noted if we wish to avoid serious misapprehension. It might be objected, by a disciple of Kant or of Mill, that a thing may be real without ever being given as actual psychical fact in immediate apprehension, so long as its nature is such that it would be psychical fact under known and specified conditions. Many, if not most, of the objects of scientific knowledge, it may be said, are of this kind; they have never entered, possibly never will enter, into the contents of any man’s direct apprehension, yet we rightly call them real, in the sense that they would be apprehended under certain known conditions. Thus I have never seen, and do not expect that any one will ever see, the centre of the earth, or, to take a still stronger case, no one has ever seen his own brain. Yet I call the centre of the earth or my own brain real, in the sense that if I could, without ceasing to live, penetrate to a certain depth below the soil, I should find the centre of the earth; if an opening were made in my skull, and a suitable arrangement of mirrors devised, I should see the reflection of my own brain. A comet may be rushing through unpeopled space entirely unbeheld; yet it does not cease for all that to be real, for if I were there I should see it, and so forth. Hence the Kantian will tell us that reality is constituted by relation to possible experience; the follower of Mill, that it means “a permanent possibility of sensation.” Now, there is, of course, an element of truth in these arguments. It is true that what immediately enters into the course of my own direct perception is but a fragment of the full reality of the universe. It is true, again, that there is much which in its own nature is capable of being perceived by human beings, but will, as far as we can judge, never be perceived, owing to the physical impossibility of placing ourselves under the conditions requisite for perception; there are other things which could only be perceived if some modification could be effected in the structure of our perceptive organs. And it may therefore be quite sufficient for the purposes of some sciences to define these unperceived realities as “possibilities of sensations,” processes which we do not perceive but might perceive under known or knowable conditions. But the definition, it will be seen, is a purely negative one; it takes note of the fact that we do not actually perceive certain things, without telling us anything positive as to their nature. In Metaphysics, where we are concerned to discover the very meaning of reality, we cannot avoid asking whether such a purely negative account of the reality of the greater part of the universe is finally satisfactory. And we can easily see that it is not. For what do we mean when we talk of the “possible”? Not simply “that which is not actual,” for this includes the merely imaginary and the demonstrably impossible. The events of next week, the constitution of Utopia, and the squaring of the circle are all alike in not being actual. Shall we say, then, that the possible differs from the imaginary in being what would, under known conditions, be actual? But again, we may make correct inferences as to what would be actual under conditions suspected, or even known, to be merely imaginary, and no one will maintain that such consequences are realities. If I were at the South Pole I should see the Polar ice, and it is therefore real, you say, though no one actually sees it; but if wishes were horses, beggars would ride, yet you do not say that the riding of beggars is real. Considerations of this kind lead us to modify our first definition of the “possible” which is to be also real. We are driven to say that, in the case of the unperceived real thing, all the conditions of perception except the presence of a percipient with suitable perceptive organs, really exist. Thus the ice at the South Pole really exists, because the only unfulfilled condition for its perception is the presence at the Pole of a being with sense-organs of a certain type. But once more, what do we mean by the distinction between conditions which really exist? We come back once more to our original experiment, and once more, try as we will, we shall find that by the real condition as distinct from the imaginary we can mean nothing but a state of things which is, in the last resort, guaranteed by the evidence of immediate perception. If we take the term “actual” to denote that which is thus indissoluble from immediate apprehension, or is psychical matter of fact, we may sum up our result by saying we have found that the real is also actual, or that there is no reality which is not at the same time an actuality. We shall thus be standing on the same ground as the modern logicians who tell us that there is no possibility outside actual existence, and that statements about the possible, when they have any meaning at all, are always an indirect way of imparting information about actualities. Thus “There really exists ice at the South Pole, though no human eye beholds it,” if it is to mean anything, must mean either that the ice itself, as we should perceive it if we were there, or that certain unknown conditions which, combined with the presence of a human spectator, would yield the perception of the ice, actually exist as part of the contents of an experience which is not our own.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 24-26) 

“What our intellect can accept as finally real, we saw, must be indissolubly one with actual experience, and it must be an internally coherent system….When we say that a thing “is” or “has Being,” we seem primarily to mean that it is an object for the knowing consciousness, that it has its place in the system of objects which coherent thought recognizes. When we call the same object “real” or a “reality,” we lay the emphasis rather on the consideration that it is something of which we categorically must take account, whether we like it or not, if some purpose of our own is to get it fulfilment. Thus again the “non-existent” primarily means that which finds no place in the scheme of objects contemplated by consistent scientific thought; the “unreal,” that with which we have not, for any human purpose, to reckon.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 50-51) 

“Produce any instance you please, we said to the realist, whom we had not then learned to know by that name, of what you personally regard as reality, and we will undertake to show that it derives its reality for you from the very fact that it is not ultimately separable from the experience of a subject. A thing is real for you, and not merely imaginary, precisely because in some aspect of its character it enters into and affects your own experience. Or, what is the same thing in other words, it is real for you because it affects favourably or otherwise some subjective interest of your own. To be sure, the thing as it enters into your experience, as it affects your own subjective interests, is not the thing as it is in its fullness; it only touches your life through some one of its many sides. And this may lead you to argue that the real thing is the unexperienced “condition” of a modification of your experience. But then we had again to ask what you mean by saying that facts which you do not experience are real as “conditions” of what you do experience. And we saw that the only meaning we could attach to the reality of the “condition” was presence to an experience which transcends your own.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 69-70)

“To this general argument we may add two corollaries or supplementary considerations, which, without introducing anything fresh, may help to make its full force more apparent. (1) The argument, as originally presented, was concerned directly with the that of reality, the mere fact of its existence. But we may also state it, if we please, from the side of the what, the nature possessed by the real. You cannot affirm any doctrine about the real existence of anything without at the same time implying a doctrine about its nature. Even if you say “Reality is unknowable,” you are attributing something beyond mere independence of experience to your reality; you are asserting that what is thus independent possesses the further positive quality of transcending cognition. Now what, in logic, must be your ground for attributing this rather than any other quality to your independent reality? It can only be the fact or supposed fact…that our experiences themselves are all found to be self-contradictory. There is no ground for taking the unknowable of Reality to be true unless you mean by it a character which belongs not to something which stands outside all experience, but to experience itself. The same contention applies to any other predicate which the realist affirms as true of his ultimate reality. (2) Again, we may with effect present our argument in a negative form. Try, we may say, to think of the utterly unreal, and see how you will have to conceive it. Can you think of sheer unreality otherwise than as that of which no mind is ever aware, of which no purpose has ever to take account as a condition of its fulfilment? But to think of it thus is to attribute to it, as its definition, precisely that independence in which the realist finds the mark of ultimate reality. And if “independence” constitutes unreality, presence to and union with experience must be what constitutes reality.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 70) 

“The question, so interpreted, is indeed only a special case of the more general question, “Is anything what it is known as being, outside the experience in which it is so known?” To answer this question fully would take us much deeper into metaphysical controversy than we can reasonably desire to go in a work of which metaphysics is neither the only nor the principal subject, but we must, at any rate, briefly indicate the conclusions which would naturally follow from the view which has been enunciated in our opening chapter as to the scope and the methods of metaphysics. If our original conception of the metaphysical problem was a correct one, it is clear that metaphysics can never reveal to us any existence entirely beyond or entirely independent of an experience in which it forms an inseparable aspect. As we have indicated already, the whole problem of metaphysics is to construct a description of the world of experience which shall answer to our ideal of “pure” experience—that is, shall contain no single element which cannot be completely described in terms of experienced fact. Just in so far as metaphysics or any other branch of science departs from this ideal, and employs in its theories concepts which cannot be resolved into descriptions of experienced fact, it ceases to be fully and completely true and becomes infected to an unknown degree with errors and false assumptions, which it is the work of scientific progress to remove. Thus, as against certain forms of philosophic Realism, we feel bound to maintain that metaphysics is incapable of ever transcending that reference to actual or possible experience which is involved in every assertion about existence. What is means for us, as for the plain man, what is or what would, under definitely known conditions, be experienced by a consciousness, and wherever we find science and philosophy apparently transcending these limits, and informing us of the existence of objects which, from their nature, cannot as such be contents of any experience, we expect to detect the presence in scientific theory of “symbolic” and unreal concepts.” (Taylor, The Problem of Conduct: A Study in the Phenomenology of Ethics, 448-449) 

“We maintain, then, that taking existence in the full and proper sense of the terms, nothing ever is, outside the concrete experience in which it is an ingredient, what it is within that experience. The utmost reality that can be conceded to any object of experience outside the experience in which it is known, is the reality of certain conditions which, with the addition of the further condition of certain psychological dispositions in the percipient, will yield the experience of the object in question. And by the reality of these “conditions” we must once more mean, unless we are to play fast and loose with words, their presence as an ingredient in some other experience. We cannot too strongly insist that of “existence,” in any full sense of the word, we can form no notion whatever except as forming the content of an experience. As Mr. Bradley puts it, “being” is indissolubly one with “sentience.” That this truth is so frequently denied by realists and misconceived by idealists is probably to be accounted for by the general prevalence of a most unfortunate error in philosophical order. If, instead of treating experience as a kind of knowing, metaphysicians had treated knowing as a kind of experience, it would have been less easy to mistake the mere symbols of inadequate conceptual thought for transcendently real things existing outside of, and independently of, the experience in which they are thought of.” (Taylor, The Problem of Conduct: A Study in the Phenomenology of Ethics, 450)