Showing posts with label Experience. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Experience. Show all posts

Monday, October 7, 2024

The Structure of Experience: A Hegelian Reading of Leibniz’s Mill

In §17 of The Monadology, there is an elegant, notorious, and, to my dismay, all too often misunderstood, gedankenexperiment—Leibniz’s Mill:

“It must be confessed, however, that Perception, and that which depends upon it, are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is to say, by figures and motions. Supposing that there were a machine whose structure produced thought, sensation, and perception, we could conceive of it as increased in size with the same proportions until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would into a mill. Now, on going into it he would find only pieces working upon one another, but never would he find anything to explain Perception. It is accordingly in the simple substance, and not in the composite nor in a machine that the Perception is to be sought. Furthermore, there is nothing besides perceptions and their changes to be found in the simple substance. And it is in these alone that all the internal activities of the simple substances can consist.” (Leibniz, The Monadology, §17)

To better understand Leibniz’s Mill, let’s consult the previous sections of The Monadology where Leibniz emphasizes the fact that the “self-differentiated” structure of Experience (i.e., “perception”) is a “multiplicity-in-unity”—it is “internally-differentiated.”

“Now besides this principle of change there must also be in the Monad a manifoldness which changes. This manifoldness constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and the variety of the simple substances….This manifoldness must involve multiplicity in the unity or in that which is simple….The passing condition which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unity, or in the simple substance, is nothing else than what is called Perception….We, ourselves, experience a multiplicity in a simple substance, when we find that the most trifling thought of which we are conscious involves a variety in the object.” (Leibniz, The Monadology, §12-§16)
Before continuing, it is necessary to sketch the nature of Experience and Matter. Now, there is an important likeness between Experience and Matter: both are “self-differentiated.” However, there are distinctive characteristics peculiar to Experience and Matter’s respective “self-differentiations.” Experience must be conceived as a particular unity-of-the-manifold. Indeed, as F.H. Bradley once put it, Experience is “a unity of the manifold in which the externality of the manifold has utterly ceased.” Experience is exhaustively self-differentiated “into-itself” (i.e.., “Partes intra partes”), whereas Matter is exhaustively self-differentiated “out-of-itself” (i.e.., “Partes extra partes”). Hegel elegantly presents a concise illustration of this in his Introduction to the Philosophy of History and Philosophy of Mind:
“The nature of Spirit [i.e., Experience] may be understood by a glance at its direct opposite—Matter. As the essence of Matter is Gravity, so, on the other hand, we may affirm that the substance, the essence of Spirit is Freedom….Matter possesses gravity in virtue of its tendency toward a central point. It is essentially composite; consisting of parts that exclude each other. It seeks its Unity; and therefore exhibits itself as self-destructive, as verging toward its opposite [an indivisible point]. If it could attain this, it would be Matter no longer, it would have perished. It strives after the realization of its Idea; for in Unity it exists ideally. Spirit, on the contrary, may be defined as that which has its center in itself. It has not a unity outside itself, but has already found it; it exists in and with itself. Matter has its essence out of itself; Spirit is self-contained existence….This self-contained existence of Spirit is none other than self-consciousness—consciousness of one’s own being. Two things must be distinguished in consciousness; first, the fact that I know; secondly, what I know. In self-consciousness these are merged in one; for Spirit knows itself. It involves an appreciation of its own nature, as also an energy enabling it to realize itself; to make itself actually that which it is potentially.” (Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, 18)
“Mind is…pure activity…not abstractly simple but, in its simplicity, at the same time a distinguishing of itself from itself…an essence which is truly actual only through the specific forms of its necessary self-manifestation.” (Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §378)
“[Mind] immanently differentiates itself and returns out of its differences into unity with itself.” (Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §379)
“[Mind] in spite of its simplicity is distinguished within itself; for the ‘I’ sets itself over against itself, makes itself its own object and returns from this difference…into unity with itself. This being-with-itself of the ‘I’ in its difference from itself is the ‘I’s infinitude or ideality.” (Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §381)
“Already in finite mind, ideality has the meaning of a movement returning into its beginning, by which mind, moving onward from its undifferentiated stage, its first position, to an Other, to the negation of that position, and by means of this negation of this negation returning to itself, demonstrates itself to be absolute negativity, infinite self-affirmation…” (Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §381)
“The substance of mind is freedom, i.e., the absence of dependence on an Other, the relating of self to self. Mind...attains actuality not by fleeing from the Other but by overcoming it. Mind can step out of its abstract, self-existent universality...[and] can posit within itself a determinate, actual difference, something other than the simple, “I,” and hence a negative; and this relation to the Other is...necessary, because it is through the Other and by the triumph over it, that mind...returns to itself out of its otherness...[and comes to be] the self-differentiating universal which in its difference is at home with itself and for itself. The Other...therefore also belongs to the nature of mind....In the Other, therefore, mind manifests only itself, its own nature; but this consists in self-manifestation. The manifestation of itself to itself is therefore itself the content of mind and not, as it were, only a form externally added to the content....In mind, therefore, form and content are identical with each other….[Mind] as such only is, in so far as it manifests itself to itself.” (Hegel, The Philosophy of Mind, §382-§383) 
Echoing Hegel, the British Idealist philosopher Edward Caird writes:

“We must, indeed, think of [Experience] as having life in itself and therefore as differentiating itself from itself; but this differentiation is held within the limit of its unity, it is a separation of movements which are separated only as they are united.” (Caird, Metaphysic, 434)

Whereas Experience “has its center in itself,” Matter, by contrast, has its center “out of itself.” For, Matter is exhausted by the reciprocal exclusion and repulsion of its composite parts. All parts of Matter exemplify nothing other than flatness, out-spreadedness, and side-by-sidedness. Matter is never at home with itself; indeed, Matter is neither “transparent-to-itself,” nor does it return “into-itself” or “into-its-parts.” Matter is “opaque-to-itself.” Indeed, Matter is “simple” in all of its dimensions: the entirety of its character is determined by what lies “outside” it. 

Gyrating patterns of physical particles are, therefore, in toto, pervaded by a self-othering “side-by-sidedness.” Indeed, these events quâ “material happenings” (i.e., processes that “outspread” and “diffuse” themselves across an extended, spatio-temporal manifold) are what they are only insofar as their “unfoldings” are repulsions “out-of-themselves”—no one of these “repulsions” either being, or having, a “moment of return” (i.e., a differentiation or phase wherein there is an “overreaching,” “including,” or “enveloping” of the distinction between “itself” and its “other” within “itself”). For any such “material happening”—regardless of its peculiar kind or character—there is neither an “interpenetration,” nor a “mutual-inclusion,” of its manifold differentiations or phases; on the contrary, we only find its differentiations or phases “withdrawing-towards-Others” (i.e., “passing-out-of-themselves” at the expense of their own self-identity). However, these “Others”—the “beyonds” towards which the differentiations or phases of a “material happening” seek to “withdraw”—are themselves repulsions “out-of-themselves”—prolonging the monotony ad infinitum. 

The only spatial “representation” that might help us illustrate (pictorially) the “Partes intra partes” character of Experience would be a torus undergoing “hyperspace rotation” (i.e., rotating in a poloidal direction). Such a torus would be simultaneously “rotating-out-of-itself” and “rotating-into-itself, “moving-away-from-itself” and “moving-into-itself,” and “diffusing-itself-out-of-itself” and “infusing-itself-into-itself.” It is important to note that it is impossible for a physical object to undergo “hyperspace rotation” in a three-dimensional space without tearing itself apart. Here is an animation that represents what I have in mind:


Now, in order to grasp how the nature of Experience is analogous to a torus engaging in “hyperspace rotation,” we ought to replace the “spatial language” used in our illustration (i.e., the spatial language used in specifying directions of rotation) with expressions that best represent different modes of “differentiation.” Thus, we should understand Experience in its “Unity” as having been represented by the torus as a whole. Now, as mentioned above, Experience is exhaustively self-differentiated. We should understand Experience’s “exhaustive self-differentiation” (or Experience in its “Manyness”) as having been represented by the torus “rotating-out-of-itself.” However, Experience is not a mere “Many;” on the contrary, it is also a “One.” Thus, Experience is not merely “exhaustively self-differentiated,” rather Experience is exhaustively self-differentiated to, through, and for, itself (i.e., A manner or mode of differentiation that is a “differentiation-into-self”). We should understand Experience’s “exhaustive self-differentiation to, through, and for, itself” as having been represented by the torus “rotating-into-itself.”

We are thus able to see how Experience is a Unity of Oneness and Manyness—an identity-in-difference. Spirit (i.e., Experience) is, in J.N. Findlay’s picturesque words, “the mover, the moved, and the motion.” As Experience unfolds and inwardly differentiates itself into Subjectivity and Objectivity, it simultaneously enfolds the products of this “self-fissuring” (i.e., Subject and Object) back into a Unity with itself. Subjectivity is Experience-in-its-Manyness as it “flows” or “converges” into Experience-in-its-Oneness; and Objectivity is Experience-in-its-Oneness as it “diffuses” or “differentiates-itself-out-of-itself” into Experience-in-its-Manyness. This diastolic and systolic process of “self-fissuring” and “self-reconciliation” constitutes the life of Experience. 

With that being said, I’ll conclude this brief essay by presenting my own adaptation of Leibniz’s Mill:

If we were to take infinitely many coplanar geometrical figures of various determinable shapes and sizes, and have them expand, contract, and move about for an infinite time, we can rest assured that no transformation, redistribution, pattern, or collision of said figures will ever yield a new figure with “cubical content”—a figure that not only exhibits a new dimension, but also envelops those aforementioned plane geometrical figures. Indeed, all qualitative changes and transformations in those figures—and patterns thereof—will always be determinate manifestations of a generic character—or determinable—that had hitherto manifested itself in another determinate form. If, after an indefinite period of time, a change in the arrangement of those coplanar geometrical figures resulted in the manifestation of a new figure exhibiting “cubical content” and enveloping those aforementioned coplanar geometrical figures that gave rise to it, then said manifestation would be the manifestation of a new determinable that was itself “inclusive of” the former determinable, without itself being “included under it” as a determinate manifestation of said determinable. Such an incoherent and disparate breach of continuity is paralleled in the idea that—at some point in time—Experience was “birthed” by transformations and redistributions in Matter.

With this Hegelian reading of Leibniz’s Mill, we are left with a powerful and compelling illustration of the fact that qualitative changes and alterations in the structure and arrangement of material objects as such (e.g., transformations such as dilations, expansions, translations, rotations, reflections, etc.) cannot account for what would be the manifestation of a new determinable (hitherto unmanifested) that (i) exhibits an “internally-differentiated” structure (i.e., Or, to use Hegel’s words, is such that it “is distinguished within itself and returns from this difference into unity with itself”), and (ii) is “inclusive of” the mere material objects that are alleged to have given rise to it. This new determinable would be none other than Experience (i.e., Hegel’s Spirit).

Sunday, August 18, 2024

Some Afterthoughts on Illusionism

According to Illusionism, nothing—whether it be an object or an experience—has sensory-qualities; and if an object (or experience) seems to have sensory-qualities, it is because “our brain’s introspective mechanisms” have “misrepresented” the object (or experience) as having them. The Illusionist’s position is “clever” (but only as “clever” as a parlor trick) because it interprets illusions in a way that does not introduce sensory-qualities—it interprets illusions strictly in terms of dispositions (e.g., the disposition to react as if the illusory thing existed; or, again, the disposition to judge/believe that we are aware of sensory-qualities—even though sensory-qualities do not exist, they only “seem” to exist).

As a result, one cannot “refute” Illusionism by saying, “But an experience of sensory-qualities can’t be an illusion because such an illusion would necessarily involve the presence of sensory-qualities.” Nor can one “refute” Illusionism by saying, “If I seem to be experiencing sensory-qualities, then I am experiencing sensory-qualities.” Against such objections, the Illusionist would be correct in saying that the objectors beg the question against the Illusionist position. 

As mentioned above, the Illusionist thinks that we can “misrepresent” objects (or experiences) as having sensory-qualities even if sensory-qualities don’t exist. The Illusionist tries to make this clear by providing examples the he believes are sufficient to establish the Illusionist’s foundation-stone: (i) the content of a representation need not exist in order for a representation of it to exist, and (ii) we have had many instances of observation wherein we have observed a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality it represents (e.g., “A representation of a [sensory-quality] needn’t be qualitative, just as the word ‘red’ needn’t be red.” (Keith Frankish, Twitter/X, Sep 27th, 2019)

However, Illusionism cannot get off the ground unless it can establish the truth or plausibility of the following proposition:

There exist “representations of sensory-qualities” (e.g., a “representation of a red sensory-quality”) that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind.

Now, as I demonstrate in my essay, A Critical Examination of Illusionism, the aforementioned proposition—a vital premise upholding the entirety of Illusionism—is baseless. Furthermore, I show that the Illusionist cannot argue for the proposition without coming face-to-face with an inescapable, two-horned dilemma: he must choose between a petitio principii or a non-sequiturial inference.

Unfortunately, Keith Frankish has never acknowledged the existence of my paper, despite the fact that I have sent it to him and reached out to him several times about it—surely he has time to read a brief article if he has enough time to pick apart “low hanging fruit” objections on Twitter….But I digress. He is, without a doubt, a busy man and is likely bombarded with countless messages on a daily basis).

I won’t bother writing out the entirety of my argument (and my elaborate defense of it) here, but I’ll present one of its main points. The Illusionist cannot validly infer (or posit) the existence of “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, from the fact that we have had many instances of observation wherein we have observed a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality it represents; the reason being that we have always observed objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. However, “instances of observation wherein we have observed a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality it represents” is the only “empirical evidence” available to the Illusionist (and such evidence cannot be used to support his “foundation stone” without the Illusionist committing several fallacies). 

Thus, Illusionism’s foundation-stone is an arbitrary and unwarranted assumption. Far from being a viable option, the “coherent research programme” of Illusionism has the structural integrity of a castle in the air...

Unfortunately, Keith Frankish—one of the most well-known Illusionists alive today—has never acknowledged the existence of my paper, despite the fact that I have sent it to him and reached out to him about it—surely he has time to read a brief article if he has enough time to pick apart “low hanging fruit” objections on Twitter….But I digress. He is, without a doubt, a busy man and is likely bombarded with countless messages on a daily basis.

To conclude, I can’t help but notice that Illusionists have a bizarre and disquieting “disposition” to portray their opponents as being “bedazzled” and “tricked” by an apparent “inner magic show.” When I read books and essays by Illusionists, the only “theatrical performance” or “slight of hand” that I “seem” to be aware of—nay I “know” I am aware of—is the spectacle unfolding before my eyes.

Friday, March 8, 2024

A Critical Examination of Illusionism

Whether or not Illusionism is growing in acceptance, I do not know; however, it does appear that Illusionism is receiving more and more attention in the contemporary philosophical scene. The following essay is a brief analysis of an assumption that lies at the heart of Illusionism. When discussing their views, Illusionists usually invoke the terms “qualia,” “phenomenal qualities,” “phenomenal characters,” “phenomenal feels,” “phenomenal properties,” “what-it’s-likenesses” and “sensory-qualities.” For the sake of clarity and uniformity, I am going to use “sensory-qualities” as a catch-all for these terms. The “programme and platform” of Illusionism is summarized in the following passages by its most active proponent, Keith Frankish:

“Illusionists believe that consciousness [and/or objects of consciousness] involve no properties that are not detectable and fully describable by third-person science. Any other properties we think are involved are illusory….[Sensory-qualities] are illusory.” (Frankish, Illusion or Identity, 1-2)

“[Illusionism] holds that [sensory-qualities are] an illusion and aims to explain why it seems [that sensory-qualities] exist….I shall refer to the problem of explaining why experiences [and/or objects of experiences] seem to have [sensory-qualities] as the illusion problem….Illusionists deny that experiences [and/or objects of experiences] have [sensory-qualities] and focus on explaining why they seem to have them. They typically allow that we are introspectively aware of our sensory states but argue that this awareness is partial and distorted, leading us to misrepresent the states [and/or objects of those states] as having [sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 1-3)

Nothing—whether it be an object or an experience—has sensory-qualities. If an object (or experience) seems to have sensory-qualities, it is because our brain’s introspective mechanisms have “misrepresented” the object (or experience) as having them. So much then for Illusionism.

In defending Illusionism, Keith Frankish makes heavy use of “representations.” But what is a “representation”? In cognitive science, a representation is understood as being a structure that stands for something by virtue of relations such as similarity, causal history, and connections with other representations. Frankish uses the term “representation” in a similar way:

“First, how do I use the term “representation”? I use it in its standard sense in cognitive science for a brain state (a pattern of neuron firing) that serves as a proxy for something else, producing psychological effects appropriate to the presence of the thing....[They are] part of the neural machinery that makes us aware of the things they represent.” (Frankish, Illusionism and its Place in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, 304)

I’ll accept this account of “representations” for the sake of argument. 

Frankish’s Illusionism cannot get off the ground unless it can establish the truth or plausibility of the following proposition: There exist “representations of sensory-qualities” (e.g., a “representation of a red sensory-quality”) that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. This is a very strong claim, and Frankish must adequately defend it without recourse to faith, intuition, or revelation. This is how Frankish defends Illusionism’s foundation stone: 

“It is true that cognitive scientists talk of there being representations in the brain. Representations in this sense are...parts of the machinery that makes us aware of things…Such representations need not share properties with the things they represent. The mental representation of redness need not be red, any more than the word ‘red’ or the numeral that denotes red in a painting-by-numbers kit…These representations [of sensory-qualities] don’t have [sensory-qualities], of course…Rather, they are patterns of neuron-firing that signal the presence of [sensory-qualities] in much the same way that written words signal the presence of things.” (Frankish, What if your Consciousness is an Illusion Created by your Brain?, 5)1

“When illusionists say that [sensory-qualities] are illusory, they mean that we have introspective representations like those that we would have if our experiences had [sensory-qualities]. And we can have such representations even if our experiences don’t have [sensory-qualities]. Of course, [Illusionism requires] that the [introspective] representations [of sensory-qualities] don’t have [sensory-qualities]. But, as I noted, representations needn’t possess the properties they represent. Representations of redness needn’t be red, and representations of [sensory-qualities] needn’t [have sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, What if your Consciousness is an Illusion Created by your Brain?, 10) 

“A representation of a [sensory-quality] needn’t be qualitative, just as the word ‘red’ needn’t be red.” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Sep 27th, 2019)

“Representations needn’t possess the properties they represent. A representation of redness needn’t be red, and a representation of phenomenal redness needn’t be phenomenally red.” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Jan 2nd, 2020)

“It implies some representation of the illusory thing—[sensory-qualities] in this case. But that representation needn’t itself have the properties of the illusory thing. A representation of [sensory-qualities] needn’t itself have [sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Feb 8th, 2021)

“A representation of F needn’t itself be F. A representation of a square needn’t be a square, a representation of worldly green needn’t be green, and a representation of phenomenal green needn’t be phenomenally green.” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Mar 15th, 2018)

Frankish’s line of reasoning can be summarized as follows:

P1) If there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent. 

P2) If  “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. 

C1) Therefore, if there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. [From P1—P2] 

P3) There have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent. 

C2) Therefore, there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. [From P1—C1, P3]

Such reasoning is clearly fallacious. The consequent in P2 does not at all follow from the antecedent. Indeed, it is a complete non sequitur—as well as an example of hasty generalization. Before I dive into a thorough analysis of Frankish’s reasoning, I think it will be most helpful if we do a bit of phenomenology. 

In many (if not all) of our observational activities, we direct our attention to an object, and this object is immersed within a multeity of objects. We observe the object of our attention as having or as consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds; likewise, the multeity of objects (in the periphery) are observed as having or as consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. Not only do these sensory-qualities constitute the “what” (i.e., the “content” or characteristica) we appeal to whenever we say that This observed (or observable) object is different from That observed (or observable) object, they also differentiate the object of our attention from the multeity of objects (in the periphery) and the multeity of objects (in the periphery) from the object of our attention. Objects (“representations” included) totally devoid of sensory-qualities would be nothing to us (observationally speaking); it is only by means of their apparent sensory-qualities that said observable objects have actual or possible significance for us.2,3,4 Regardless of whether or not the sensory-qualities that the objects are observed as having or as consisting of are “real,” it is clear that it is only by means of them that we are able to  single out an object (in observation) from a field of objects—singling it out as a particular This among other Thises.

Suppose that we were to observe an object, X, and X is a “representation of a red sensory-quality.” Now, it does not necessarily follow that we will observe X as having or consisting of the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality which it represents (i.e., the red sensory-quality); indeed, we may observe X as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities that do not even fall under the heading of “color”—e.g., X may be observed as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of a tactile, gustatory, auditory, or olfactory kind. Nevertheless—and this point is essential—we have never observed objects (“representations” included) as neither having nor consisting of sensory-qualities; on the contrary, we have always observed objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds.4 The following scenario will help make this point more concrete:

Suppose that John is observing a cup on a table, and he observes the cup as having a determinate (or determinable) blue sensory-quality. Whenever John observes the cup as having a blue sensory-quality, he has a “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality.” John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” is localized to a particular chunk or region of his brain, and we can observe this particular chunk or region of John’s brain whenever he observes the cup as having a blue sensory-quality. Now, if we were to observe John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” (i.e., a particular chunk or region of John’s brain) as he observes the cup as having a blue sensory-quality, it is almost certain that we will not observe it as having a blue sensory-quality; however, we can be certain that we would observe it as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds; indeed, we would observe it as having or consisting of sensory-qualities, e.g., pinkness, warmth, smoothness, sliminess, etc. Although John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” is not observed as having a blue sensory-quality, it is nevertheless observed as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. Indeed, both the cup (i.e., the cup which John observes as having a blue sensory-quality) and John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” are both observed as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. In light of this illustration, what evidence is there for the following cornerstone of Illusionism:

There can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind.5, 6

If Illusionism is to be held to its own standards, it cannot be allowed to defend the above claim by appealing to ‘intuitions’. Illusionism must appeal to the ‘empirical’. But what ‘empirical’ evidence is there? Or, rather, what is sample of available evidence is there for the Illusionist to appeal to in order to support the above-mentioned premise? (Whether or not the evidence does in fact support it). The following:

  • We have had many instances of observation wherein we have observed a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality it represents.

  • We have never had any instances of observation wherein a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) is observed as being totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind.

  • We have always observed objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds.

  • We have never had any instances of observation wherein the observed objects (“representations” included) are observed as neither having nor consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds.

Does the ‘empirical’ evidence support the consequent featured in P2 of Illusionism’s argument? Indeed, based on the bullet-points, can the Illusionist he validly conclude that there can exist (let alone that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable? No, he cannot do so. From these facts, it is clear that the Illusionist cannot validly infer (or posit) that there can exist (let alone that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind from instances of empirical observation.

I'll conclude the first part of this shrill shout of mine with a brief argument:

P1) If we cannot validly infer (or empirically verify) that “there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind” from the fact of there being instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent,” then we are not justified in believing an essential premise in all arguments for Illusionism.

P2) If we are not justified in believing an essential premise in all arguments for Illusionism, then we are not justified in believing Illusionism to be true. 

C1) Therefore, if we cannot validly infer (or empirically verify) that “there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind” from the fact of there being instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent,” then we are not justified in believing Illusionism to be true.  [From P1 and P2]  
P3) We cannot validly infer (or empirically verify) that “there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind” from the fact of there being instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent.” 
C2) Therefore, we are not justified in believing Illusionism to be true. [From P1 and P2] 

Thus, Illusionism’s foundation-stone is an arbitrary and unwarranted assumption. Far from being a viable option, the “coherent research programme” of Illusionism has the structural integrity of a castle in the air...

Addressing a Possible Objection:

I will attempt to address a potential objection, but before doing so, I think it would be best to outline the Illusionist’s argument in full and highlight the fallacy at its heart:

P1) If there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent. 

P2) If  “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. 

C1) Therefore, if there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. [From P1 and P2]

P3) If there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, then it is possible for us to “misrepresent” objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of sensory-qualities even though sensory-qualities do not exist and are not instantiated in the world (i.e., sensory-qualities only “seem” to exist and only “seem” to be instantiated in the world). 

C2) Therefore, if there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, then it is possible that sensory-qualities do not exist (i.e., it is possible that they are not instantiated in the world) even though we observe objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of sensory-qualities. [From C1 and P3] 

P4) If it is possible that sensory-qualities do not exist (i.e., if it is possible that they are not instantiated in the world) even though we observe objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of sensory-qualities, then it is possible that Illusionism is true. 

C3) Therefore, if there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, then it is possible that Illusionism is true. [From C2 and P4] 

P5) There have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent.  

C4) Therefore, it is possible that Illusionism is true. [From P1—C3, P5]

Now that we have standardized the Illusionist’s argument, we can examine it in detail. The move from P1 to P2 is fallacious—it is, as I have said, a non sequitur and involves an instance of hasty generalization (among other fallacies). As I have shown, the Illusionist cannot validly infer (or posit) that there can exist (let alone that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, from the fact that we have had many instances of observation wherein we have observed a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality it represents; the reason being that we have always observed objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. 

Now, throughout his work, Frankish continually addresses common criticisms of Illusionism. I think it would be helpful to include one of these criticisms (and Frankish’s response) here: 

“Another common objection to Illusionism is that in the case of [sensory-qualities] there is no gap between illusion and reality. [According to this objection] something can look like a Penrose triangle without being a Penrose triangle, but an experience that seems to have a greenish [sensory-quality] really does have a greenish [sensory-quality]….This is often presented as a crushing objection to Illusionism, but it is far from compelling. It turns on what we mean by [an experience] seeming to have a greenish [sensory-quality]. If we mean having an introspective experience with the same [sensory-quality] as [an experience that has] a greenish [sensory-quality], then, trivially, there is no distinction between seeming and reality. But of course this is not what Illusionists mean. [Illusionists] mean introspectively representing oneself as having [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality], and one can do this without having [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality]. The objector may reply that, in order to create the illusion of [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality], the introspective representation would have to employ a greenish [sensory-quality] mode of presentation, which would itself have an introspectable greenish [sensory-quality]. However, Illusionists will simply deny this, arguing that the content of introspective representations is determined by [non-sensory-qualities], causal or functional factors. [Footnote: Alternatively, Illusionists might concede that introspection employs modes of presentation that appear to have [sensory-qualities], but argue that this too is an illusion—that introspection misrepresents the modes of presentation as having [sensory-qualities] they lack. For a defense of this option and an argument that it does not generate an infinite regress, see Pereboom (Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, 27-28)]….The Illusionist claims that when we think we are having [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality (or when we think we are observing an object with a greenish sensory-quality] we are in fact merely misrepresenting ourselves as having [an experience with a greenish sensory-quality (or misrepresenting ourselves as observing an object with a greenish sensory-quality)]. This claim may be false, but the no-gap objection does not anything to the case against it.” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 16-17)

In light of Frankish’s response to his hypothetical objector, suppose Frankish was to reply to our argument by saying:

“John’s “representation of the blue sensory-quality” and my “representation of John’s “representation of the blue sensory-quality” as having sensory-qualities” can both be totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, and still represent their respective content as having or consisting of sensory-qualities because the content of a representation is fixed by the representation’s functional and relational features (i.e., non-sensory-qualities) and not intrinsic ones (e.g., sensory-qualities—if they existed).”

Such a reply would beg the question at issue because it presupposes that there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind—the very thing being disputed; and, as I have shown, the Illusionist has yet to present a valid argument for such a premise. Furthermore, he also begs the question because this premise plays an essential part in the Illusionist’s reasons (and attempted rationalization) for his denial of the existence of sensory-qualities. Unless the Illusionist can establish the premise, he can neither defend his theory, nor his denial of the existence of sensory-qualities, by invoking ideas that presuppose the premise’s truth (i.e., ideas which rest upon the very premise that the Illusionist has yet to establish or render plausible).

Furthermore, the response would be a red herring. It is beside the point to say that “the content of a representation is fixed by the functional and relational features (i.e., non-sensory-qualities) of the representation and not intrinsic ones (e.g., sensory-qualities—if they existed),” because my criticism does not concern how introspective “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” get their content “fixed” in the absence of any determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities being instantiated in the world; rather, my criticism targets Illusionist’s fallacious, non-sequiturial inference from instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, to the conclusion that there can exist (or that there does exist)  “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. Without this premise, Illusionism cannot get off the ground. 

Secondly, it may be true that the content of a representation is fixed by functional and relational features (i.e., non-sensory-qualities), but that doesn’t change the fact that the Illusionist has yet to prove that there can exist (or that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. Until the Illusionist is able to provide a valid and sound argument for that premise, Illusionism succumbs to “vicious circle” and “vicious regress” objections.

But what are these “vicious circle” and “vicious regress” objections? They take the following form:

“Many people think of illusions as involving [sensory-qualities]….If [sensory-qualities] were an illusion in that sense, then Illusionism would be circular. There would have to be another set of [sensory-qualities] in which the [sensory-quality] illusion was rendered, and we’d be no better off.” (Frankish, Illusionism and its Place in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, 301-302) (Cf. Frankish, Like a Rainbow, 1)

In other words, if the “introspective representations” which the Illusionist infers (or posits)—i.e., “representations of experiences/objects as having or consisting of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities”—had or consisted of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds (regardless of whether or not these inferred or (posited) representations had or consisted of, the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent), then Illusionism would be viciously circular. In order to avoid falling into a vicious circle or a vicious regress, the Illusionist must infer (or posit) the existence of introspective “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. Yet, as I have shown, such an inference (or positing) cannot be made (without committing several fallacies). The Illusionist cannot appeal to the premise as being an ‘open possibility’ (i.e., that it is an ‘open possibility’ that there can exist (or that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind). On the contrary, it does not tally (epistemically speaking) with what we have observed and with what we currently observe. The only kinds of representations evidenced by ‘empirical’ observation (i.e., the only available and relevant sample of representations that the Illusionist can validly infer (or posit)—without fallacy) are “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that have been perceived as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds—i.e., instances that do not permit the Illusionist to infer (or posit) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind).

Footnotes:

[1] Contra the Early Wittgenstein, who holds that X cannot be a “representation of Y,” unless X has “something in common” (e.g., a “shared” logical form) with Y. Thus: “The picture is a model of reality.” (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 2.12) “The picture consists in the fact that its elements are combined with one in a definite way.” (2.14) “The picture is a fact.” (2.141) “That the elements of the picture are combined with one another in a definite way, represents that the things are some combined with one another.” (2.15) “According to this view the representing relation which makes it a picture, also belongs to the picture.” (2.1513) “The representing relation consists of the coordinations of the elements of the picture and the things.” (2.1514) “In order to be a picture a fact must have something in common with what it pictures.” (2.16) “In the picture and the pictured there must be something identical in order that the one can be a picture of the other at all.” (2.161) “What the picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it after its manner—rightly or falsely—is its form of representation.” (2.17) “The picture can represent every reality whose form it has. The spatial picture, everything spatial, the coloured, everything coloured, etc.” (2.171) “The picture has the logical form of representation in common with what it pictures.” (2.2) “The gramophone record, the musical thought, the score, the waves of sound, all stand to one another in that pictorial internal relation, which holds between language and the world. To all of them the logical structure is common. (Like the two youths, their two horses and their lilies in the story. They are all in a certain sense one).” (4.014) We find something similar in Nettleship’s Lectures on Logic: “In the first place, we must ask what is a sign or symbol? To say that A is a symbol of B implies, of course, that A is something different from B, but (and this is often forgotten) it also implies that it is in some respect the same as B. The most remote, far-fetched symbol in the world must have something in common with that which it symbolizes; i.e., the person to whom it has the symbolic meaning must have some (however little it may be) of the same feeling or experience when he experiences the symbol, as he has when he experiences that which it symbolizes. In other words, there are such things as symbols just because the most different things in the world have something in common.” (Nettleship, Philosophical Lectures and Remains, Vol. I, 23-24)

[2] Indeed, in another article, Frankish himself agrees when he says, “When I look at a ripe banana, I seem to be aware of a rich yellow [sensory-quality]….Similarly, with smells, sounds, tastes, pains, and other sensory-qualities.” Likewise, he says, “I agree…that it seems as if [objects of] experiences have [sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, Why Panpsychism Fails to Solve the Mystery of Consciousness, 8). However, he goes on to say, “These [sensory-qualities] are not more present in the world around us than they are in our brains.” (Frankish, What is Illusionism?, 12). 

[3] In a similar vein, he says, “We experience objects as having a distinctive but ineffable significance for us, which is a marker of their affordances. This is what we call their quality or feel.” (Frankish, Bright Shiny Colours, 1) And again, “As subjects of experience, our interest is in how things seem to us introspectively—the illusion [of sensory-qualities] itself, not the mechanisms that cause it.” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 8) And yet again, “We perceive things as having a certain impact on us, as infused with potent [sensory-qualities]….[Sensory-qualities] are not really anywhere. Thanks to the combination of perceptual and introspective processes in our brains, we experience objects as qualitatively charged. But the [sensory-qualities] don’t correspond to real, intrinsic features either of objects or us. They are potent illusions, an imperative commentary, generated by our brains to express the significance things have for us.” (Frankish, Illusionism and its Place in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, 304)

[4] In a different context, Frankish discusses this when he describes possible variations of Illusionism (e.g., inward-looking Illusionism and outward-looking Illusionism): “I characterized Illusionism as the view that [sensory-qualities are] an introspective illusion, reflecting the widely held view that [sensory-qualities] are properties of experience. This may be too restrictive, however. Some theorists hold that experience is transparent: when we attend to our experiences, we are aware only of properties of their objects. Thus, redness is experienced as a property of surfaces, pain as a property of parts of our bodies, and so on (e.g., Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995; 2000). This points to the possibility of an outward-looking Illusionism, on which experience misrepresents distal stimuli as having [sensory-qualities]. Vision, for example, would represent objects as having illusory [sensory-qualities of colour] as well as real physical colours (for a view of this kind, see Hall, 2007). This view can be regarded as a variant of standard, inward-looking Illusionism, differing principally on where the illusory [sensory-qualities] are represented as being located. And, like the inward-looking version, it may posit processes of internal monitoring. The illusion of phenomenality may involve a combination of introspection and projection, in which we both misrepresent features of experience as [sensory-qualities] and then re-represent these illusory [sensory-qualities] as properties of the external world, mistaking complex physical properties of our sensory states for simple [sensory-qualities] of external objects (Humphrey, 2011, chapter 7).” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 7)

[5] Observation is a relation between a person (or a mind) and an object (or a multeity of objects)—not a relation between an object (or a multeity of objects) and a part of a person (e.g., a visual system, an introspective mechanism, a sense-organ, or a brain). Instances of “blind-sight” give us no reason to suppose that we have instances of observation wherein an object is observed as neither having nor consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. For a “blind-sighted” person to correctly guess the identity of some object placed in front of their eyes is not for him to observe it. Indeed, the “blind-sighted” person does not observe the object at all. Similarly, if I am seated in a room and I happen to correctly guess that there is a man lurking in another room a few doors down, I do not thereby observe him. As C.D. Broad says, “For the relation to the organ, whatever it may be, is not the relation of being perceived, since that is a relation to the mind and not to the body.” (Broad, Perception, Physics, and Reality, 189)

[6] Frankish endorses the view, advanced by Derk Pereboom, that it is an ‘open possibility’ that there exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. (Cf. Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 6). This ‘open possibility’ is subject to devastating criticisms in Torin Atler’s review of Pereboom’s Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. Pereboom’s arguments for this ‘open possibility’ assume a form of Kantianism (regarding the nature of introspection and first-person access]. Furthermore, he attempts to substantiate this ‘open possibility’ by relying upon fragments from John Locke’s epistemology (a ghost laid to rest ages ago by Berkeley, Bradley, etc.). Unfortunately, Pereboom doesn’t take the opportunity to either re-examine the coherence of these appeals to Locke in light of Berkeley’s and Bradley’s crushing objections, or to take a step back and ask himself whether his implicit Kantianism is consistent with his knowledge of the fact of his having such views at all. (Cf. Pereboom, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, 15)

Thursday, August 3, 2023

Fragmentary Notes §46—§47

§46

Objects “appear” and manifest themselves perspectivally; however, an Object’s various “appearance-patterns” do not themselves “appear” or manifest themselves perspectivally, rather they are the “appearings” of the Object. Fleeting and transitory, an “appearance-pattern” is ideal—it is essentially incomplete and fragmentary. It passes beyond itself and strives for completion and stability in what lies beyond itself.

§47

In referring to myself as “I”, I consciously determine myself as a being of which I am conscious; I posit myself as knowing, and knowing myself as such—thus, I establish myself as an identity of Subject and Object. As Object, I am enveloped within my own knowledge; as Subject, I am the enveloping.

Wednesday, February 22, 2023

A Question Concerning Schopenhauer’s Conception of the Principium Individuationis

“Basically, Schopenhauer holds that the multiplicity that we see is something constructed by our cognition. My question is this: Fair enough—multiplicity as we experience it is a product of our cognition. But how can we rule out that in the “Thing-in-itself” there’s some non-cognitive process that individuates things?”
This is an interesting question. I’ll try to clarify Schopenhauer’s (sometimes inconsistent) views on the issue and provide what I think would be his answer to your question.

For Schopenhauer, all “oneness” and “manyness,” “unity” and “multiplicity,” are features made possible by the principium individuations; and this, Schopenhauer maintained, was Space-Time. Thus, the categories or determinations of “oneness” and “manyness,” “unity” and “multiplicity,” all, in some way or another, invoke Space-Time. Now, Space-Time, as Schopenhauer points out, has its being (i.e., “realizes” or “manifests” itself) in and through its “operations” as spatio-temporal relations (or spatio-temporal “relatings”) holding good of, and within, Substance (i.e., “matter” and its affections—or “causality”). Thus, the principium individuationis has its being only through Substance. Indeed, this principle has no being apart from its manifestation, and this manifestation just is the differentiating of Substance.
  
Schopenhauer held to an idiosyncratic form of an empiricist criterion of meaning—which explains why he believed that the predicates of “oneness” and “manyness,” “unity” and “multiplicity,” could only be sensibly ascribed to Substance (i.e., “matter”).
 
Now, Schopenhauer maintained that Substance (i.e., “matter”) is a function (or correlate) of the Understanding—just as much as the Understanding is a function (or correlate) of Substance. This correlativity entails that Space-Time (i.e., the principium individuationis) is inextricably tied to the Understanding: the two stand and fall together, and the predicates of “oneness” and “manyness,” “unity” and “multiplicity,” cannot be sensibly ascribed to anything that was not itself a mode or modification of matter—the sensible correlative of the Understanding (i.e., cognition). 

Furthermore, since Schopenhauer reserves the features of “oneness” and “manyness,” “unity” and “multiplicity,” for Substance (which itself has no being apart from Space-Time), he would reject the notion that “The Will” or “Thing-in-itself” is a “One” or a “Unity.” Indeed, Schopenhauer mentions (in some place, I can’t remember where exactly) that “oneness” or “unity” cannot be predicated of “The Will” or “Thing-in-itself” in any but a metaphorical sense. “The Will” or “Thing-in-itself” is the ground of “oneness” and “manyness,” “unity” and “multiplicity.” If anything, “The Will” or “Thing-in-itself” ought to be grasped as a “one-in-many” and as a “unity-in-multiplicity” (expressions which Schopenhauer would likely find objectionable because of its “Hegelian” tones).

Monday, October 31, 2022

Answering a Reply to “Why Materialism Cannot Genuinely Explain Experience”

I recently received a reply to my article, “Why Materialism Cannot Genuinely Explain Experience,” and I wanted to provided a detailed answer to the commenter’s questions. He writes: 
“If X is (E—X) then isn’t ((E—X)—X) the same as (X—X)? And what does the notation mean anyways?”
Think of each pair of parentheses as representing a particular concept, and think of whatever is between each pair of parentheses as representing the content of said concept. The “—” symbol is used to make the distinction between certain contents internal to a concept. With regard to your other question, I think the following passage from McTaggart’s Studies in Hegelian Cosmology helps clarify what I am getting at: 
“If…we tried to explain the idea of a parent merely in terms of the idea of a child, we should have fallen into a vicious circle, since we should find that the idea of a child could not be explained except in relation to the idea of a parent.” (McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, §69)
As McTaggart points out, the concept of “Child” cannot be understood or grasped apart from the concept of “Parent;” and so it follows that the concept of “Parent” features in the concept of “Child” as one of its conceptual contents. In other words, the concept of “Child” is conceptually sense-dependent upon the concept of “Parent.” We can represent this with the following notion. Let P represent the concept of “Parent,” and let (P—X) represent the concept of “Child.” (In this particular instance, X serves as a placeholder for conceptual content that is not itself conceptually-sense dependent upon the concept of “Parenthood.” In my original essay, X is not only a placeholder, but also the very concept that the Materialist attempts to explain Experience in terms of). If we were to explain the concept of “Parent” in terms of the concept of “Child,” then we would have to explain P in terms of (P—X). However, this cannot be done unless we first explain (P—X) in terms of ((P—X)—X); but this cannot be done unless we first explain ((P—X)—X) in terms of (((P—X)—X)—X); but this cannot be done unless we first explain (((P—X)—X)—X) in terms of ((((P—X)—X)—X)—X). And so on, and so on, ad infinitum. And this circle is clearly vicious.

Now, just as the concept of “Child” cannot be understood or grasped apart from the concept of “Parent,” so too is it the case that the concept of “Parent” cannot be understood apart from the concept of “Child.” Thus, the concept of “Child” features in the concept of “Parent” as one of its conceptual contents. And so, it follows that the concept of “Parent” is conceptually sense-dependent on the concept of “Child.” We can represent this with the following notion. Let C represent the concept of “Child,” and let (C—X) represent the concept of “Parent.” If we were to explain the concept of “Child” in terms of the concept of “Parent,” then we would have to explain C in terms of (C—X). However, this cannot be done unless we first explain (C—X) in terms of ((C—X)—X); but this cannot be done unless we first explain ((C—X)—X) in terms of (((C—X)—X)—X); but this cannot be done unless we first explain (((C—X)—X)—X) in terms of ((((C—X)—X)—X)—X). And so on, and so on, ad infinitum. And this circle is clearly vicious. 

While it is the case that the concept of “Parent” and the concept of “Child” are reciprocally sense-dependent, it is not the case that the concept of “Experience” and the concept of “Matter” (i.e., the Materialist’s X) are reciprocally sense-dependent. As I say in my article:
“Further, X, as a concept, had its conceptual content and determinate meaning exhausted by facts “internal to” Experience. But this just means that X is conceptually sense-dependent upon facts “internal to” Experience; in other words, one cannot grasp or understand X without grasping or having a prior understanding of certain facts “internal to” Experience or Experience itself. On the other hand, it is clear that one can grasp or understand Experience, and facts “internal to” Experience, without ever grasping or understanding the Materialist’s X.”
In short, since the Materialist’s X is conceptually sense-dependent upon the concept of “Experience,” but the concept of “Experience” is not conceptually sense-dependent upon the Materialist’s X, it follows that Experience cannot be explained in terms of the Materialist’s X without the explanation becoming viciously circular; indeed, “the Materialist is forced by his own hand to presuppose at the very beginning of his explanation, the very presence of the phenomenon which he professes to have reached as the final result.” And so, with these clarifications out of the way, I think it is safe to say that it is impossible—in principle—for Materialism to genuinely explain Experience.

Wednesday, September 21, 2022

Fragmentary Notes §31—§41

§31
The following collection of fragments were written many years ago (They are not in any particular definitive order). Their style, terminology, and subject-matter jars with my present work and way of thinking. Despite the fact that I now find them to be unsatisfactory (and, in some cases, downright erroneous), I can’t help but feel that there lies a kernel of truth buried within some of them. Apart from making a few grammatical corrections, I have left them as they were initially written.
§32
What is a System?  A System is a tool crafted by Mind for the interpretation and comprehension of itself and its world. A System takes many forms—all of which are dependent on the Mind’s own reflectiveness. A System provides Mind the foundation and substance for its own life and purpose.
§33 
A System is a labyrinthine plane which consolidates Mind into a fixed, yet flexible, network of ordered paths. Upon its entry into the labyrinth, an Object gets dragged through a mechanized assembly line of manipulation, distortion, and eventually complete conformity. The System enslaves the Mind and its Object; indeed, the System ossifies Mind for the sake of the System’s own survival and sustenance. The System, begotten by Mind, repays its creator by enslaving him—Mind’s possibilities become limited, and its agency negated. 
§34
Mind’s development is not a seamless journey. Quite the contrary, Mind’s progression is often thwarted by incomplete systems that entrap and imprison its own self-realization. In response to its entrapment, Mind redirects its inertia and alters its trajectory—only to be caught once more in (i) gravitational forces that bend Mind back upon itself and into the core of its own being, and (ii) tides that propel Mind into the vast regions of ignorance and possibility.
§35
This leads us to the concept of Mind-in-Flight: the process whereby Mind comes to reject its own System. This process is set in motion upon Mind’s encountering an immutable or insurmountable object, perspective, or idea that cannot to be assimilated and harmonized by said System. The System may pull through and withstand the assailing daggers; however, it does not emerge without battle scars. Its recovery begins to amass contradictions—shards of doubt embed themselves within the System’s core. The vestiges of the initial onslaught have extruded a fatal poison into the heart of the System. The System’s collapse is inevitable. After coming to terms with the dire situation at hand, Mind uproots itself—severing the connections that bounded it to the dying System, jettisoning its withering remains into past. Eventually, that fading shadow of how Mind once was—its former home and place of rest and satisfaction—will disintegrate into nothingness. Mind is unable to return to its shell after casting it off—there is no going back. 
§36
Until Mind adopts a new home for itself—another System—it is carried through a sea of novelties and exoticism by the ropes of its own intentionality—swinging from thought to thought, idea to idea. Eventually, the scaffolding of a new System begins to metastasize and acquire mass and form. Mind extracts and absorbs particular elements from the encroaching ideas—features which it considers to be apt for the construction of its new home.
§37
Like the formation of planets, decontextualized ideas drift towards the Mind’s immaterial core. Unwanted and discrepant ideas are ejected back into the void, while others are drawn closer towards a central point until they collide and fuse into a mass of Meaning. The gravitational forces exerted by the ideas themselves alter the motion of surrounding ideas, dragging and tearing elements from each. 
§38
Over time, Mind’s new System transitions from embryo to actuality—unfolding itself into manifold paths of possibility and discovery. 
§39
Mind’s recognition of its own eternal dialectic is the moment at which Mind elevates itself into a higher form of consciousness—a new frame of reference from which Mind obtains a new vantage-point over itself and its world. This realization allows for Mind to burst from its confining linear, geometrical, and rigid designs—Systems that alienate Mind from itself.  Indeed, once Mind becomes conscious of itself as riding its own pulsating current of Thought, Mind unlocks a new species of freedom: He may either continue searching for Systems wherein the form and matter are impenetrable, immovable, and dormant—hostile to itself and its own change; or, Mind can accept itself as pure act—a creative, dynamic process that pours itself out within a regal frame and showers the canvas with a swirling pallet of conscious color: Only the frame is fixed on the wall of actuality; by contrast, the symphony of color presented on the canvas is one that shall forever remain anew, everchanging, and returning upon itself.
§40 
Mind’s current flows out-of-itself and back into-itself, absorbing novel Thoughts and Objects, recognizing its faults, and ever-emerging as a process of greater and greater enrichment.  This is the sole design wherein the Mind has the opportunity to be acquainted with ataraxia. This particular shape through which Mind realizes itself will always be that of a restless tide, a mighty current.  Mind must realize itself that it is its own “becoming” and accept that as its “being.”  
§41 
This conclusion is a both a blessing and a curse to the reflective Mind. Indeed, Mind must come to terms with a life of perpetual motion, and that his Thought and his World will never be granted with either rest or tranquility.

Thursday, September 15, 2022

Edmund Hollands’ “Neo-Realism and Idealism” (1907)

The following hand-written notes outline Edmund H. Hollands’ “Neo-Realism and Idealism.” The article was delivered as an address to the American Philosophical Association on December 27th, 1907 at Cornell University. Hollands was an Objective Idealist who gallantly defended Idealism from the attacks of the British and American Neo-Realists.