Showing posts with label Subject-Object. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Subject-Object. Show all posts

Thursday, August 3, 2023

Fragmentary Notes §46—§47

§46

Objects “appear” and manifest themselves perspectivally; however, an Object’s various “appearance-patterns” do not themselves “appear” or manifest themselves perspectivally, rather they are the “appearings” of the Object. Fleeting and transitory, an “appearance-pattern” is ideal—it is essentially incomplete and fragmentary. It passes beyond itself and strives for completion and stability in what lies beyond itself.

§47

In referring to myself as “I”, I consciously determine myself as a being of which I am conscious; I posit myself as knowing, and knowing myself as such—thus, I establish myself as an identity of Subject and Object. As Object, I am enveloped within my own knowledge; as Subject, I am the enveloping.

Wednesday, February 22, 2023

A Question Concerning Schopenhauer’s Conception of the Principium Individuationis

“Basically, Schopenhauer holds that the multiplicity that we see is something constructed by our cognition. My question is this: Fair enough—multiplicity as we experience it is a product of our cognition. But how can we rule out that in the “Thing-in-itself” there’s some non-cognitive process that individuates things?”
This is an interesting question. I’ll try to clarify Schopenhauer’s (sometimes inconsistent) views on the issue and provide what I think would be his answer to your question.

For Schopenhauer, all “oneness” and “manyness,” “unity” and “multiplicity,” are features made possible by the principium individuations; and this, Schopenhauer maintained, was Space-Time. Thus, the categories or determinations of “oneness” and “manyness,” “unity” and “multiplicity,” all, in some way or another, invoke Space-Time. Now, Space-Time, as Schopenhauer points out, has its being (i.e., “realizes” or “manifests” itself) in and through its “operations” as spatio-temporal relations (or spatio-temporal “relatings”) holding good of, and within, Substance (i.e., “matter” and its affections—or “causality”). Thus, the principium individuationis has its being only through Substance. Indeed, this principle has no being apart from its manifestation, and this manifestation just is the differentiating of Substance.
  
Schopenhauer held to an idiosyncratic form of an empiricist criterion of meaning—which explains why he believed that the predicates of “oneness” and “manyness,” “unity” and “multiplicity,” could only be sensibly ascribed to Substance (i.e., “matter”).
 
Now, Schopenhauer maintained that Substance (i.e., “matter”) is a function (or correlate) of the Understanding—just as much as the Understanding is a function (or correlate) of Substance. This correlativity entails that Space-Time (i.e., the principium individuationis) is inextricably tied to the Understanding: the two stand and fall together, and the predicates of “oneness” and “manyness,” “unity” and “multiplicity,” cannot be sensibly ascribed to anything that was not itself a mode or modification of matter—the sensible correlative of the Understanding (i.e., cognition). 

Furthermore, since Schopenhauer reserves the features of “oneness” and “manyness,” “unity” and “multiplicity,” for Substance (which itself has no being apart from Space-Time), he would reject the notion that “The Will” or “Thing-in-itself” is a “One” or a “Unity.” Indeed, Schopenhauer mentions (in some place, I can’t remember where exactly) that “oneness” or “unity” cannot be predicated of “The Will” or “Thing-in-itself” in any but a metaphorical sense. “The Will” or “Thing-in-itself” is the ground of “oneness” and “manyness,” “unity” and “multiplicity.” If anything, “The Will” or “Thing-in-itself” ought to be grasped as a “one-in-many” and as a “unity-in-multiplicity” (expressions which Schopenhauer would likely find objectionable because of its “Hegelian” tones).

Monday, January 30, 2023

Fragmentary Notes §42—§45

§42
We frequently speak of “loving” and “cherishing” photographs. But what do we mean by this? What are we really expressing our “love” for? What is the genuine object of our “cherishment”? As soon as we begin to reflect upon the nature of photographs, we uncover webs of subtle and unconscious knots—confusions resulting not only from the haziness of common expressions and causal parlance, but also from the enigmatic relationship between what a thing “is” and what it is “of”—a relation of identity-in-difference.
§43
A photograph both is, and is not, itself. Indeed, a photograph is a photograph only insofar as it vanishes into what is “other” than itself—a hilly landscape, a blooming flower, a colorful bowl of fruit, etc. The visual medium “discloses” a message; and in disclosing the message, it must, in some respect, be in contact with it through a point of shared identity. The identity of every photograph is dependent upon its own self-abasement and self-denial as a stand-alone, self-dependent, and self-contained being. Mere “likeness” or “similarity” fails to capture the essence of the relationship between a photograph and its subject matter. And understanding this relationship is essential for grasping what we really mean when we speak of “loving” and “cherishing” photographs.
§44 
A photograph’s meaning, subject-matter, and value is determined by the person who comes into contact with it (physically or digitally). A photograph–by itself–is rarely the object of sentimental attachment. We treasure a photograph because of an object, event, or scene that lies outside or beyond the photograph—the photograph being a digital or chemical “representation” of said object, event, or scene. We “cherish” a photograph only insofar as we “love” what is “represented” by means of it or what is “disclosed” through it. We “treasure” and protect a photograph because it puts us into contact with an object of love and concern–and in most cases, this object has long since vanished.
§45
Unlike a photographic print, a digital photograph is, almost always, something “transparent”—like a glass window. If I am inside my house, I may see an object or event that is occurring outside “by means of” a glass window, or “through” a glass window. The glass window facilitates my view of the object or event without itself becoming the object of my attention or concern. 

Thursday, September 15, 2022

Edmund Hollands’ “Neo-Realism and Idealism” (1907)

The following hand-written notes outline Edmund H. Hollands’ “Neo-Realism and Idealism.” The article was delivered as an address to the American Philosophical Association on December 27th, 1907 at Cornell University. Hollands was an Objective Idealist who gallantly defended Idealism from the attacks of the British and American Neo-Realists. 








Sunday, February 13, 2022

Fragmentary Notes §26—§28

§26
Experience is neither mere “Subjectivity” (i.e., a barren, isolated, private “I”), nor mere “Objectivity” (i.e., a mere fulguration of an ordered sequence or pattern of “sensa” or “percepta”); rather, Experience is, strictly speaking, a concrete, living Substance—in the Spinozistic sense of the term—it is a Substance within which Subjectivity and Objectivity are abstractly-distinguishable, coordinate factors or determinations. 
§27
Experience is neither the “presence” of “qualia”, nor again is it the mere “having” of “qualia.” Qualia are merely qualitative, sensuous determinations of either the Objective aspect or the non-Objectified margins of Experience (e.g. the “redness” of a speeding car, the “blueness” of the clear sky, the “sweetness” of a tasty fruit, the “sting” of a feeling of pain, the “warmth” of a wool coat, etc.) Qualia are Experiential; however, they do not exhaust the “filling” of Experience. 
§28
Experience is not the mere “togetherness” or “compresence” of Subject and Object; for, there is always a relatively determinable margin of Experience which, despite being present, falls outside the radius of explicit attention; this subliminal “surplus” wades in the margins of any given Experience and always “coats” or “qualifies” each moment of Experience with a unique “aura” or “tone.”

Wednesday, December 22, 2021

Fragmentary Notes §19—§25

§19

All the rays of conscious activity emanate from a lone, aperspectival locus, an apperceptive unity, a kernel of self-determining and self-bestowing meaning, a being who is inclusive of all that is lived and known; this is the “I”—the knowing Subject—that being for whom, and to whom, all is Object.
§20
A fragmented, makeshift patchwork of discrete and discontinuous atomic qualities is not to be found in Experience. Indeed, a genuine pluralism is, strictly speaking, inconceivable—to think of Many is to think of Many-in-and-for-One. Just as a single, lone sound is heard from the moment of birth and rounds off at the time of death, so too is there but One Experience—the World of Experience. This sound, like Experience, may flicker and oscillate in tone, quality, shape, and definition, but its permanent essence remains invariant and One.
§21
Being is but the ribbons of feeling that dance on the winds of knowledge.
§22
All lies before the silent, stationary, and eternal “I”. The “I” cannot be brought into the light of consciousness, for it constitutes the limit of consciousness.
§23
Experience is immaterial, and Consciousness is immaterial activity poured out in time.  
§24
In the act of self-reflection, the one “I” becomes acquainted with the sublimity of its inner sense—that scrolling canvas which collects the showers of colored-meanings bestowed upon it in and through the gaze of the knowing Subject, the “I”.  The inner sense is a sandy beach which memorializes each unique bead of rain with an ephemeral crater, only to be filled again by the tide’s mighty arm—a crashing wing whose foaming feathers sweep the shoreline and prepare the canvas to be mottled anew with heaven’s tears.

§25
The present is a durationless sliver wedged in the heart of Being, crushed between the arms of eternity. The present is a rocky islet whose towering spire emerges from the roaring waves of ceaseless change and punctures the static vault of heaven.  Stretching into the infinite past and infinite future, the wings of time shelter the whole of Being.  If one were to climb that lone, crumbling mound, and reach its misty peak, one would find the “I”. However, the “I” cannot be seen, for it sees everything; the “I” cannot be heard, for it hears everything; the “I” cannot be known, for it knows everything. Apart from this seeing, hearing, and knowing being—there is nothing.1

Wednesday, July 28, 2021

Why Materialism Cannot Genuinely Explain Experience

“The terms Subject and Object (Subjective and Objective) denote complementary ‘moments’ of a concrete fact—‘moments’ which necessarily emerge as correlated opposites within any and every ‘actual’ cognizant experience when that is raised (or raises itself) to the reflective level; or when (as I expressed it less accurately before) it is subjected to philosophical (‘critical’) analysis. The terms mean nothing, except when applied to ‘moments’ within their ‘concrete fact’—within some specific form or individual type of ‘actual’ knowledge; and, when thus applied, each means precisely that which, within the concretum, is not (is the contrasted correlative of) that which is meant by the other. Nothing, in short, is a subject or subjective, an object or objective, as such and per se. There is no activity of knowing—no act or process, for example, of perceiving, judging, or inferring—which when abstracted from the concrete fact of knowledge (from, for example, the perception, judgment, inference) has any character at all. The activity of knowing (perceiving, judging, inferring, &c.) is one of two ‘moments’ inseparable within, and presupposing, a concretum; and, within that concretum both ‘moments’ deserve, and receive, their respective appellation (viz. subjective and objective) precisely because the one is not, and can never be or become, the other.” (Joachim, Logical Studies, 151-152) 

Experience is that which is exhaustively self-differentiated, to, through, and for itself; and, in conceiving any actual “piece” of Reality, one is bound, by necessity, to conceive of an Experience, or a determination thereof. No actuality is conceivable otherwise; for all sensible and thinkable actualities are unities of meaning, saturated and sustained in-and-through a continuous atmosphere of Experience; an Experience within which said unities of meaning have their respective places as beings of an intentional-constitution—moments of actual or possible appreciation and contemplation for that Experience itself—the Subject. Experience is a Many-felt-in-One; a Multiplicity-in-Unity; a world of interpenetrating microcosms of meaning and ideal content, enveloped within a richer, all-embracing macrocosm; a boundless, internally-differentiated nebula of feeling; a continuous sphere wherein Subjectivity and Objectivity live and move together as distinguishable factors participating in a single, organic unity—a unity that does not exclude or negate differences, but embraces and preserves them. 


Experience is neither mere Subjectivity, or a barren, isolated, private “I”, nor is Experience mere Objectivity, or a mere fulguration of an ordered sequence or pattern of “sensa” or “percepta”; rather, Experience is, strictly speaking, a concrete, living Substance—it is a Substance within which Subjectivity and Objectivity are abstractly-distinguishable, coordinate factors, aspects, or or determinations. Experience is not the mere “togetherness” or “compresence” of Subject and Object; for, there is always a relatively determinable margin of Experience which, despite being present, falls outside the radius of explicit attention; this subliminal “surplus” wades in the margins of any given Experience and always “coats” or “qualifies” each moment of Experience with a unique “aura” or “tone.”


The Empire of Experience is without circumference or margin; its Kingdom is infinite. Its infinitude is evidenced by its all-embracing inclusivity and self-transcendency. Indeed, there is nothing beyond its scope; for, to reach beyond the pale of Experience is to disclose that which hath already lied within its grasp. Unfortunately, the sovereignty of Experience has not always been respected, let alone acknowledged. Time and again, Experience has been threatened by an ancient force that has sought to dissolve it into a storm of illusive material and physical factors. This ancient creed is none other than Materialism. Materialism stands or falls with its ability to explain Experience. Indeed, rather than treating Experience as the principle of explanation and discovery, the Materialist, “from defect of nature or of education, or probably both,” is led by an untutored instinct to explain the fact of Experience in terms of the abstract and unreal.  Let us follow the Materialist along this dreary path and see how he fares. 

Now, in explaining Experience, the Materialist starts off by making two fundamental mistakes—two missteps that are characteristic of all Materialistic explanations of Experience. Firstly, the Materialist fails to recognize two crucial facts that live and move within Experience: (i) the fact that, within Experience, the Subject of Consciousness and the Object of Consciousness are mutually implicative of each other, and (ii) the non-Objectified margin of Experience works to shape the character of the Object of Consciousness. The fatal consequences of the Materialist’s negligence of these facts will lurk in the background and haunt the entirety of his explanation. Indeed, the Materialist’s uncanny affinity for abstraction and division leads him to treat the Subjective and Objective factors within Experience as isolated, independent, and externally related units—forgetting that, within Experience, we find the Subject of Consciousness and Object of Consciousness to be two, abstract, mutually-implying determinations, aspects, or moments, of that “Many-felt-in-One” that the Materialist so desperately seeks to explain. Secondly, before anyone even has time to blink, the Materialist makes another blunder: he mistakenly identifies Experience with either (i) the Subject of Consciousness, (ii) the Object of Consciousness, or (iii) certain sensuous, qualitative determinations (e.g., qualia) of the Object of Consciousness (or the non-Objectified margin of Experience).

Let us illustrate this miserable mistake with help from a “part-whole” analogy. The Materialist mistakenly identifies a “whole” with one of its isolated “proper parts”—said “proper part” most evidently being less than that “whole” of which it is a constituent “proper part.” Furthermore, said “whole” (i.e., Experience) is not only richer in content than said isolated “proper part,” but also has a unique, qualitative, multi-dimensional structure (i.e., a Subject-dimension, a non-Perspectival-dimension, and a Perspectival-dimension) that is non-isomorphic to that of any of its “proper parts” taken singly. How on earth can a “proper part” of a “whole” give rise to that “whole” of which it is but a “proper part?” If you are a Materialist, and you wish to explain the fact of Experience, I only ask that you do justice to Experience by actually keeping in mind what Experience actually is.

Now, it doesn’t matter whether the Materialist mistakes Experience for the Subject of Consciousness, the Object of Consciousness, or certain sensuous, qualitative determinations of the Object of Consciousness; for, all three options are ultimately failures—but the Materialist doesn’t realize this. Indeed, he pushes even further by performing a biopsy on the Object of Consciousness.  The Materialist, forgetting that the Object of Consciousness’s determinate character is contributed in part by the Subject of Consciousness and that determinable, non-Objectified margin of Experience, attempts to strip the Object of Consciousness of any and all Subject-implying determinations and any and all Experience-implying determinations.  The biopsic operation destroys the datum upon which the Materialist was ravaging for answers, leaving him with a contentless, intangible, abstract, hypothetical, and unreal X. The Materialist divines this X to be an independent and self-subsisting “thing-in-itself” with causal efficacy. The Materialist cherishes this meager shadow of a reality as the answer to all of his difficulties. However, he soon realizes that his precious X has only a hypothetical existence—an existence “only in the understanding,” rather than an existence in reality. With the help of a bastardized form of the ontological proof, the Materialist establishes the unconditioned existence and reality of X by virtue of the fact that X would be much greater for his explanation if X actually existed in reality rather than as a mere concept “in the understanding.”

Having established to his liking the unconditioned existence of X, the Materialist now tries to spin the concrete and actual out of the desolate and the barren.  However, as was seen above, both the concept and unconditioned existence of X were arrived at with the help of several blunders and illegitimate inferences.  Further, X, as a concept, had its conceptual content and determinate meaning exhausted by facts “internal to” Experience. But this just means that X is conceptually sense-dependent upon facts “internal to” Experience; in other words, one cannot grasp or understand X without grasping or having a prior understanding of certain facts “internal to” Experience or Experience itself.1 On the other hand, it is clear that one can grasp or understand Experience, and facts “internal to” Experience, without ever grasping or understanding the Materialist’s X.  Now, when the Materialist attempts to explain the existence of Experience in terms of X, or the emergence of Experience from X, he fails to see that the driving force of his explanation not only presupposes, but also depends upon for its meaning and “sense,” the presence of Experience within it. Furthermore, since facts “internal to” Experience exhaust X’s conceptual content and meaning, it follows that Experience cannot be eliminated from any posited X without said posited entity becoming meaningless and “sense-less.” As such, the Materialist’s explanation is self-condemned from the start. Indeed, vicious circularity haunts the Materialist at every turn. The following illustration should help visualize the Materialist’s dilemma. Let E represent Experience, and let (E—X) represent X. The Materialist, as we have seen, must explain E in terms of X; however, this just means that he must explain E in terms of (E—X). However, this cannot be done unless he first explains (E—X) in terms of ((E—X)—X); but this cannot be done unless he first explains ((E—X)—X) in terms of (((E—X)—X)—X); but this cannot be done unless he first explains (((E—X)—X)—X) in terms of ((((E—X)—X)—X)—X). And so on, and so on, ad infinitum. And this circle is clearly vicious.2

The Materialist is forced by his own hand to presuppose at the very beginning of his explanation, the very presence of the phenomenon which he professes to have reached as the final result. Therefore, it is impossible—in principle—for Materialism to genuinely explain Experience.

Footnotes:

[1] Conceptual sense-dependence can be explained in the following way:

“Concept P is sense dependent on concept Q just in case one cannot count as having grasped P unless one counts as grasping Q….A paradigmatic sense dependence claim is Sellars’ classic argument in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind that one cannot master the use of “looks” talk without having mastered the use of “is” talk. The concepts nail and hammer may be related like this: one cannot understand what a nail is—something meant to be driven by a hammer—without understanding what a hammer is….Another example: the property being produced by a reliable belief-forming mechanism is conceptually dependent on that of being a true belief, because to be a reliable belief-forming mechanism is to produce beliefs that are likely to be true.” (Brandom, Holism and Idealism in Hegel’s Phenomenology, 78-79) 
[2] I figured that it would be helpful to include a couple of passages that go into detail about what constitutes a “vicious regress of explanation.”
“Vicious regress of explanation: At each stage, n, an instance of a puzzle is posed an an explanation offered, and this explanation gives rise to a new instance of the puzzle, forming stage n+1; and furthermore, the success of the explanation at stage n depends on the puzzle at stage n+1 being resolved.” (Cameron, The Moving Spotlight: An Essay on Time and Ontology, 60)   
“Here, again, I think Russell clearly right in holding that there is one kind of “regress” which is always fatal to any hypothesis which implies it. No intelligible proposition can be such that an infinite “regress” arises in the very attempt to state its meaning. An apparent proposition P0 which turns out to be such that we cannot state its meaning without first stating as parts of that meaning the infinite series of propositions P1, P2,…, Pn,…, Pω, must be no proposition at all but a mere unmeaning noise. For, as we can never exhaust an infinite series by enumeration of its terms, we could never know definitely what such a P0 means, and every proposition must have a fully determinate meaning. Hence for us, at any rate, P0 is no proposition at all.” (Taylor, Philosophical Studies, 47-48)

Tuesday, July 13, 2021

Fragmentary Notes §15—§16

§15
I would say that I hold to a form of Absolute Idealism. My thinking is heavily influenced by the late-19th and early-20th century American Idealists (e.g. Royce, Calkins, Cunningham, Hollands, and Blanshard) and British Idealists (e.g. Bradley, Bosanquet, Haldane, McTaggart, Ward, Stout, etc.). I am also greatly indebted to the genius insights of Arthur Schopenhauer.
§16
I view Reality as a concrete, all-inclusive, and systematic whole, saturated with meaning and value—it is a unity-in-difference which exhibits a principle of coherence, comprehensiveness, and intelligibility. Furthermore, I hold that Reality (i.e., the Absolute) is genuinely conceivable or thinkable only in terms of “Mind,” “Spirit,” or “Experience.” Indeed, I would say that the Absolute is one with my own center of Experience and other centers of Experience as that concrete and actual system of meanings which rational, purposive agents (as well as non-rational agents) possessive of those centers of Experience, must acknowledge and take into consideration (or conform to) in the pursuit and fulfillment of their respective subjective interests, goals, plans, desires, and fundamental needs. I like to think of myself as maintaining a holistic conception of metaphysics, as well as a synoptic philosophical methodology—a method that is vehemently anti-reductionist in its approach and conclusions.
“Speculative idealism...takes the standpoint of concrete experience, which is also the standpoint of common sense and science.  It begins by viewing mind and the objective system of nature as distinct, and it never dreams of identifying them; they remain distinct to the end.  But speculative idealism does not permit their distinction to blind it to the fact that they are complementary; they are for it what they are in concrete experience, namely inseparably related aspects of that conscious life which is experience.  It also accepts as complementary, and obviously so, the relation of the individual mind to the minds of other individuals. In other words, it accepts as complementary the social relationship between mind and mind.  Thus for speculative idealism there are three moments or coordinates within experience: the self, other selves, and nature.  These are accepted as they present themselves within experience as irreducible and ultimate distinctions.  But, while recognizing their difference, speculative idealism also recognized their complementary nature and relationship.  It does not accept them as discrete existences or entities each with its own independent self-enclosed center; holding on to the standpoint of concrete experience, it accepts them as complementary coordinates within experience.” (Cunningham, The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy, 296)

Monday, June 14, 2021

My Adaptation of Nick Thomas-Brown’s Argument for Idealism

P1) If, at a given time, a true proposition about every Object, at all times, is known relative to one or more Subjects, then every Object, at all times, is of such a nature as to be knowable relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time.

P2) If every Object, at all times, is of such a nature as to be knowable relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time, then no Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, is of such a nature as to be unknowable relative to one or more Subjects, at all times.
“Let us call something, X, “relatively” unknown when some but not all people fail to know propositional truths about X. Furthermore, we will call X “absolutely” unknown if, and only if, nobody knows any propositional truths concerning X. Now, it is clear that relative unknowns exist. Most people know nothing about the Cynic philosopher Hipparchia, but those who study ancient Greek philosophy surely know of her. Thus, Hipparchia is unknown relative to certain people at certain times. Suppose someone, A, does not know about Hipparchia at a time T. Given this, Hipparchia is unknown relative to A at T. It would, then, be a contradiction for A to know of Hipparchia at T. Hence, once it is admitted that Hipparchia is not known by A at T, it follows that she cannot be known by A at T. So, we can reasonably support the following epistemic theorem: whatever is unknown relative to someone at a certain time, is unknowable relative to her at that time. But, suppose that instead of being relatively unknown, Hipparchia is absolutely unknown. In other words, let us consider that Hipparchia is not known by anyone at any time. We might observe that this can be restated as the following: Hipparchia is unknown relative to any person at any given time. When combined with our discovered theorem, we can infer from this that Hipparchia is unknowable relative to any person at any time. Thus, we have reached a second epistemic theorem: whatever is absolutely unknown, is unknowable by anyone whatsoever.” (Thomas-Brown, Idealism and the Known Unknown, 3) 
C1) Therefore, if at a given time, a true proposition about every Object, at all times, is known relative to one or more Subjects, then no Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, is of such a nature as to be unknowable relative to one or more Subjects, at all times. [From P1 and P2]

P3) If no Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, is of such a nature as to be unknowable relative to one or more Subjects, at all times, then every Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, depends upon its being known relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time.
“Granted our two theorems, we can move to demonstrate that nothing absolutely unknown ever exists. We know as certainly as we can that any given entity is either square or not square, for this is an instance of the law of excluded middle. In grasping this universal truth, we know a truth concerning all things past, present, or future. If an absolute unknown existed, we would have some knowledge of it by way of such universal truths. But, it is a contradiction for an absolute unknown to be known by someone or other. Hence, if we are to have knowledge of universal truths at any time, there can never exist absolute unknowns. Yet, we do, of course, possess such knowledge; and, thus, no absolute unknowns exist, past, present, or future. Whatever exists or comes to exist is, therefore, known by someone or other at some time or other. In other words, to be is to be known and existence implies knowledge. Once we understand that something’s existence entails its being known, we can further see that its existence depends on its being known. However, the presence of knowledge presupposes that of a knower. Hence, the existence of a given object depends on there being an intelligent self or selves.” (Thomas-Brown, Idealism and the Known Unknown, 3-4)
C2) Therefore, if at a given time, a true proposition about every Object, at all times, is known relative to one or more Subjects, then every Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, depends upon its being known relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time. [From C1 and P3]

P4) At a given time, a true proposition about every Object, at all times, is known relative to one or more Subjects.

C3) Therefore, every Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, depends upon its being known relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time. [From C2 and P4]

All credit for the original version of this particular argument goes to Nick Thomas-Brown. Thomas-Brown published the argument in a 2019 paper titled “Idealism and the Known Unknown.”

Friday, May 7, 2021

Fragmentary Notes §7—§10

§7
Experience has a determinate, “qualitatively contentful” structure that is diffused across three dimensions.  Experience has (i) a Subject-dimension, (ii) a marginal-dimension, and (iii) a focal-dimension. Dimensions (i), (ii), and (iii) are “differentiated” structures that converge back into (i). The Subject-dimension, of course, is that dimension of Experience to-which, through-which, and for-which Experience, and all of its dimensions—including the Subject-dimension itself—are “differentiated.” 
§8
“Meaning” is a valuative, qualitative “filling” or “content” that is for a Subject’s actual and/or possible appreciation and/or acknowledgement.
§9
The world of actual and possible “Meaning” is exhaustively saturated by value and feeling. As the “being” of value and feeling are both equally sustained by that Subject, to-which, through-which, and for-which they exist, it follows that the “being” of “Meaning” is incapable of being divorced or separated from the “being” of Subjectivity. 
§10
A purely formal system is no different from Matter. A purely formal system lacks any determinate “Meaning” either “for-itself” or “for” any of its parts; indeed, all “Meaning” which said system has acquired, or will acquire, is “Meaning” that has been bestowed upon it from something Other than the formal system itself—a being that is “outside” of the system. Furthermore, even after this bestowal of “Meaning,” said system is still devoid of “Meaning-for-itself;” its “Meaning” is exhaustively “Meaning-for-another.” Now, that Other which is “outside” the system, and bestows the system with “Meaning,” not only “includes” said system within itself as “content,” but also distinguishes said system from itself—it recognizes the system as its “content,” as its Object, and acknowledges said Object as a being-for-me. Now, this Other is none other than Thought itself.

Friday, April 23, 2021

Fragmentary Notes §1—§6

§1

Experience is an “internally-differentiated” atmosphere; an atmosphere which self-differentiates itself in-and-through froths of meaning; all of which “pour themselves out for” a determination of that atmosphere itself—this locus, or center, to-which and for-which all meanings converge, is none other than the Subject.
§2

Experience’s manifold differentiations all flow “inward” towards the Subject, and for the Subject.  
§3

Experience is like a whirlpool, whose spiraling currents drag ribbons of sea-foam down from its directrix, into its submerged apex, wherein they collapse into a simple point; this very point, this Archimedean point, is the Subject.
§4
Experience is that which is exhaustively self-differentiated, to, through, and for, a determination of itself.
§5
The Subject is that to-which, through-which, and for-which, an Experience is exhaustively self-differentiated.
§6
The Object of Consciousness is that determination or aspect of Experience which is actively attended to by a factor, aspect, or determination of that Experience itself, said determination being that to-which, through-which, and for-which, said Experience is exhaustively self-differentiated.

Monday, February 22, 2021

A Critical Examination of Objectivism and the Concept of an “Unperceived” Reality

“The basic metaphysical issues that [lie] at the root of any system of philosophy [are]: the primacy of existence or the primacy of consciousness. The primacy of existence (of reality) is the axiom that existence exists, i.e., that the universe exists independently of consciousness (of any consciousness), that things are what they are, that they possess a specific nature, an identity. The epistemological corollary is the axiom that consciousness is the faculty of perceiving that which exists—and that man gains knowledge of reality by looking outward. The rejection of these axioms represents a reversal: the primacy of consciousness—the notion that the universe has no independent existence, that it is the product of a consciousness (either human or divine or both). The epistemological corollary is the notion that man gains knowledge of reality by looking inward (either at his own consciousness or at the revelations it receives from another, superior consciousness.” (Philosophy Who Needs It, “The Metaphysical Versus The Man-Made”, 30)

Objectivism maintains that “all concepts are ultimately reducible to their base in perceptual entities, which are the base (the given) of man’s cognitive development.” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (ITOE), 21); and that Reality or Existence is such that it exists independent of its being perceived. However, the concept of a Reality that exists independently of its being perceived, is a concept that could neither have been legitimately arrived at by abstracting from entities “given” in perception, nor could it be “ultimately reduced” to entities “given” in perception. 

Indeed, whenever you perceive an entity, said entity necessarily has the attribute of “being perceived.” You cannot perceive an entity which does not have this attribute; for, it is a contradiction to perceive an entity that does not have the attribute of “being perceived;” nor can you form a de re conception of an entity without conceiving of said entity as “perceived” (e.g., as having a particular shade of color, a figure or shape, a texture, a perspectival character, etc.—all of which are perception-implying characteristics). Furthermore, Objectivism holds that “each of [an entity’s] characteristics has the same metaphysical status: each constitutes a part of the entity’s identity.” (ITOE, 98). But this just means that the attribute of “being perceived,” is equally determinative in constituting the identity of a perceived entity as the attributes of “being extended” and “having mass.” 

Now, whenever I perceive an entity, do I not have the property of “being a perceiver”? And is it not the case that the entity which I perceive has the property of “being a perceived entity”? After all, an entity that is perceived is a perceived entity, and a perceived entity is an entity that is quite different from an unperceived entity. But a perceived entity could only be different from an unperceived entity if they had different attributes. And if “being perceived” and “being unperceived” were not attributes, then it would be impossible to say that there was any difference between a perceived entity and an unperceived entity. So, it seems clear that the entities which we perceive have the attribute of “being perceived.” Indeed, we never perceive an entity that has the attribute of “being unperceived”—for, it would be a contradiction to perceive that which has the attribute of “being unperceived.” However, since all of an entity’s attributes are of the same metaphysical status, and each of the entity’s attributes is equally constitutive of the entity’s identity or nature, it follows that the attribute of “being perceived” is just as constitutive of the identity or nature of the entity we perceive as its other attributes (e.g., “Extension” or “spherical”). However, if the attribute of “being perceived” is just as constitutive of the identity or nature of the entity we perceive as are its other attributes, then it follows that whenever we perceive, the identity and nature of the perceived entity depends upon its “being perceived.” The reason for this is that (1) a perceived entity cannot not have the attribute of “being perceived”, and (2) all of an entity’s attributes are constitutive of its identity or nature. But an entity whose identity and nature depends upon its “being perceived” is an entity that cannot be said to have any existence independent of consciousness. In short, Objectivism’s own theories of perception, entities, and attributes entails that whatever is perceived, has been perceived, will be perceived, or could be perceived, has no existence independent of consciousness.

Based upon Objectivism’s own standards of concept formation, Objectivism commits the fallacy of vicious abstraction—rendering the concept of a Reality that exists independently of its being perceived an “invalid” or “stolen” concept.  Nothing “given” in perception harbors the necessary, determinate material for providing valid grounds of the concept of a “Reality” that exists independently of its being perceived. This particular fallacy is best described in the following passage from F.H. Bradley:

“If we find that a—b is true within x, on what ground do we rest for our desperate leap to the assertion that a—b is true without condition? It is one thing specially to notice a member.  It is one thing to say that this member at any rate is certainly here.  It is quite another thing to take the member apart, and assume that, by itself, it remains what it was when it lived in the whole.” (Bradley, The Principles of Logic, 560)

Resources and Evidence:

“Existence and identity are not attributes of existents, they are the existents.” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (ITOE), 56)
“[T]he rules of cognition must be derived from the nature of existence and the nature, the identity, of his cognitive faculty.” (ITOE, 82)
“[T]he rules of cognition must be derived from the nature of existence and the nature, the identity, of his cognitive faculty.” (ITOE, 87)
“Metaphysically, an entity is: all of the things which it is.  Each of its characteristics has the same metaphysical status: each constitutes a part of the entity’s identity.” (ITOE, 98)
“The nature of an entity determines what it can do and, in any given set of circumstances, dictates what it will do.  The Law of Causality is entailed by the Law of Identity.  Entities follow certain laws of action in consequence of their identity, and have no alternative to doing so.  Metaphysically, all facts are inherent in the identities of the entities that exist…” (ITOE, 108-109)
“Now, what is an entity? It is a sum of characteristics. There is no such thing as an entity without its characteristics, and, for that very reason, there is no such thing as a characteristic without an entity…Don’t take “sum” literally…Not in the sense that you would say “sum of its parts. Usually when I write I say the entity is its attributes. To be exact, you’d have to treat them as inseparable…[T]he attributes are the entity, or an entity is its attributes. The attributes are really separable only by abstraction.” (ITOE, 266)
“An attribute is something which is not the entity itself. No one attribute constitutes the whole entity, but all of them together are the entity—not “possessed by” but “are” the entity.” (ITOE, 276)

“Prof. A: In regard to the concept of an attribute—for example, “length”— since the attribute is something which does not exist separate in reality, is the referent of the concept of an attribute in the category of the epistemological rather than the metaphysical? AR: Oh no, why? Prof. A: Because length doesn’t exist per se in reality. Length is a human form of breaking up the identities of things. AR: Wait a moment, that’s a very, very dangerous statement. Length does exist in reality, only it doesn’t exist by itself. It is not separable from an entity, but it certainly exists in reality. If it didn’t, what would we be doing with our concepts of attributes? They would be pure fantasy then. The only thing that is epistemological and not metaphysical in the concept of “length” is the act of mental separation, of considering this attribute separately as if it were a separate thing. How would you project a physical object which had no length? You couldn’t. And therefore if to say it is epistemological rather than metaphysical is to say it exists only in relation to your grasp of it, or it requires your grasp of it in order to acquire existence—it doesn’t. Surely, if anything is metaphysical, attributes are. Prof. A: If I ask you, then, what is the referent of “length,” would you say “long objects"? AR: Not the objects, the attribute of length in all the objects which possess that attribute. Prof. A: Isn’t the referent something separated? AR: It’s mentally separated, but it is there in those objects.  It doesn’t have to be an entity to be a referent. Prof. A: I don’t understand then why the referent of the concept “red,” say, isn’t all the red concretes. AR: How about the other attributes of all those red concretes? Is the referent of “red” the length and weight of all the red concretes? Prof. A: No. AR: Well then, obviously the concrete itself isn’t the referent of the concept, but a particular aspect of that concrete, an inseparable aspect. Prof. B: You said that the referent must be separated, or something like that. There’s no reason why the referent of the concept should be separable from the object. Prof. A: But in the case of attributes, the referent is not the entity but only an aspect of the entity. And an aspect cannot exist except as an aspect of the whole entity. Prof. B: Can you follow that one step further? You say that the referent of “length” must be an aspect, and an aspect cannot exist separately—what is the next step? Prof. A: The referent is the aspect separated. Is that the wrong premise? Prof. B: The referent is the aspect, not the aspect separated. AR: Exactly.  Prof. B: Otherwise you switch metaphysics and epistemology. AR: That’s right. The aspect, not the separation. That’s very well put.” (ITOE, 277-279)
“Prof. F: But now, properties are all constitutive properties, right? AR: Yes.” (ITOE, 286)
“In this regard, the relation of the aspects of a state of awareness to the whole awareness is similar to the relation of the attributes of an entity to the whole entity; an entity is its attributes and a state of awareness is its aspects.” (How We Know (HWK), 57)
“A third and final basic axiom is implicit in the first two. It is the law of identity: to be is to be something, to have a nature, to possess identity. A thing is itself; or, in the traditional formula, A is A. The "identity" of an existent means that which it is, the sum of its attributes or characteristics… Ayn Rand offers a new formulation of this axiom: existence is identity. She does not say "existence has identity"—which might suggest that identity is a feature separable from existence (as a coat of paint is separable from the house that has it). The point is that to be is to be something. Existence and identity are indivisible; either implies the other. If something exists, then something exists; and if there is a something, then there is a something. The fundamental fact cannot be broken in two.” (Objectivism the Philosophy of Ayn Rand (OPAR), 7)
“The adult validation of the law of causality consists in stating this relationship explicitly. The validation rests on two points: the fact that action is action of an entity; and the law of identity, A is A. Every entity has a nature; it is specific, noncontradictory, limited; it has certain attributes and no others. Such an entity must act in accordance with its nature. The only alternatives would be for an entity to act apart from its nature or against it; both of these are impossible. A thing cannot act apart from its nature, because existence is identity; apart from its nature, a thing is nothing. A thing cannot act against its nature, i.e., in contradiction to its identity, because A is A and contradictions are impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity. This is the action it will take, the action that is caused and necessitated by its nature.” (OPAR, 15)
“Entities and their actions are measured by means of their attributes, such as length, weight, velocity. In every case, the primary standard is some easily perceivable concrete that functions as a unit. One measures length in units, say, of feet; weight in pounds; velocity in feet per second.” (OPAR, 82)
“Now let us apply this discussion to another aspect of the theory of concepts: the status of essences (as the term is used in the context of the theory of definition). On the one hand, according to Objectivism, essences are not attributes marked out by nature apart from man. "Essential" is not a metaphysical, but an epistemological term. "Essential" designates characteristics that perform a certain function in connection with human conceptualization. The function is to differentiate and condense various bodies of data, and the characteristics that perform this function in one cognitive context may not do so in another. Since the category of "essence" arises because of a need of man's consciousness, the "essential" in each context has to reflect the state of human knowledge.” (OPAR, 113)
“Definitions are statements of factual data—as condensed by a human consciousness in accordance with the needs of a human method of cognition. Like concepts, therefore, essences are products of a volitional relationship between existence and consciousness; they too (properly formed) are objective. In the traditional (Platonic and Aristotelian) viewpoint, every entity must have an essence or definition. This is not true in the Objectivist viewpoint. Since the designation of essentials arises only as an aid to the conceptualizing process, it is inapplicable apart from that process. Concretes that have not been integrated into a concept have no "essence"; in these cases, there is no need or possibility of a definition.” (OPAR, 113)
“Metaphysically, there is only one universe. This means that everything in reality is interconnected. Every entity is related in some way to the others; each somehow affects and is affected by the others. Nothing is a completely isolated fact, without causes or effects; no aspect of the total can exist ultimately apart from the total. Knowledge, therefore, which seeks to grasp reality, must also be a total; its elements must be interconnected to form a unified whole reflecting the whole which is the universe.” (OPAR, 123)
“The axiom of identity holds that each thing is itself, or, as Rand frequently puts it: “A is A.” The force of this statement is perfectly captured in Bishop Butler’s famous remark, “Every thing is what it is, and not another thing.” “Identity” names the fact that everything that is is something in particular. A given thing’s identity is the sum total of all of its characteristics. Synonyms for something’s “identity” might be its “character” or its “nature,” so long as it is understood that a thing’s identity at any given moment refers to all of its attributes, actions, relations, and so on.” (Blackwell Companion to Ayn Rand (BCAR), 249) 
“In regard to: the Law of Causality. Yes, of course, my formulation of it (“A thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature”) is mine; it is not the usual: “everything that happens has a cause.” Compare the two and decide which is the more fundamental. You say: “But the truth of the statement, in your formulation, is guaranteed by the meaning attached to the word ‘NATURE’.” You bet your life it is! But what shocked me was the fact that you seem to attach no meaning to the concept of “a thing’s nature,” even though it was specified most clearly in the lecture and in Atlas Shrugged. A thing’s nature is that which it is metaphysically; a thing’s nature is its identity, that which cannot be changed by miracle nor by any wish, whim, or will, God’s or man’s. This is the meaning of “A is A”—and you have told me firmly that you accepted it. How, then, could you cite, as an example in this context, such a thing as a man’s “temper-tantrum” and ask whether he “acted contrary to his nature”? On top of which, you assume that we would answer that this is “part of his nature.” (!!!) I will answer: This is what happens to logic (and language) without ontology. (Letters of Ayn Rand, 528-529) 
“To perceive existence, to discover the characteristics or properties (the identities) of the things that exist, means to discover and accept the metaphysically given.” (Philosophy Who Needs It (PWNI), “The Metaphysical Versus The Man-Made”, 30-31) 
“But man exists and his mind exists. Both are part of nature, both possess a specific identity….[M]an is able to initiate and direct his mental action only in accordance with the nature (the identity) of his consciousness.” (PWNI, 32)
“Prof. F: This question has to do with the concept of “property” and its significance for causality. In Galt’s speech, you say every action is caused by the nature of the acting entity. Now, by “the nature of an entity” do you mean the physical properties of an entity—properties like combustible, fragile, corrosive, and so on?  AR: Yes. And also the psychological properties of a consciousness, including free will.”  (ITOE, 282)
“Prof. F: Could you give me an example of a constituent property?  Prof. E: Physical structure.  AR: The arrangement of molecules.” (ITOE, 284) 
“Prof. F: I noticed that Galt does not say, “A thing must act in accordance with its nature”; he says it “cannot act in contradiction to its nature.” I wonder if you had some particular reason for stating it in the negative.  AR: Oh, no, only to make it stronger actually. You could have said “must act in accordance with its nature.” But I wanted to stress that one cannot claim causeless actions, or actions contrary to the nature of the interacting entities. I wanted to stress that actions cannot be inexplicable and causeless. If the cause lies in the nature of an entity, then it cannot do something other than what its nature makes possible.” (ITOE, 286-287) 
“The axiom of identity holds that each thing is itself, or, as Rand frequently puts it: “A is A.” The force of this statement is perfectly captured in Bishop Butler’s famous remark, “Every thing is what it is, and not another thing.” “Identity” names the fact that everything that is, is something in particular. A given thing’s identity is the sum total of all of its characteristics. Synonyms for something’s “identity” might be its “character” or its “nature,” so long as it is understood that a thing’s identity at any given moment refers to all of its attributes, actions, relations, and so on.” (BCAR, 451)