Reading Notes: June 6th, 2025

“[Every] idea is, after all, the experience of a self who is conscious. Even when, as students of the mere idea, we have neglected the self and taken no notice of it, yet all the time we have been dimly conscious of it as underlying all our feelings. In other words, we have realized that a perception, an imagination or an emotion does not exist independently, but that it is my perception, your imagination or his emotion. As James says: “Every ‘state’ or ‘thought’ is part of a personal consciousness….In this lecture room,…there are a multitude of thoughts, yours and mind….They are as little each-for-itself and reciprocally independent as they are all-belonging-together….My thought belongs with my other thoughts, and your thought with your other thoughts. The only states of consciousness that we naturally deal with are found in personal consciousnesses,…selves, concrete particular I’s and you’s.” This means that besides realizing my conscious experiences, or feelings, I am also conscious of my conscious self, as in a sense including, but not as identical with, the perceptions, the emotions or the thoughts of any given moment.” (Calkins, An Introduction to Psychology, 151)

“What, now, is this intimate consciousness of self which underlies and includes, though it does not consist in, the moment-by-moment ideas and experiences? What, in other words, do I mean by the ‘I’ which is conscious or has experiences?” (Calkins, An Introduction to Psychology, 151)

“The self underlying the conscious experiences…is not a single, lonely self, but a self related to a group of selves. Every self is, in other words, a social self, that is, a self in inextricable relation with many other selves, “a chain of linked thought, Of love and might to be divided not.” I, who read this paragraph, for instance, simply cannot be conscious of my own self except as related in the most varying ways to a vast number of other people.” (Calkins, An Introduction to Psychology, 152)

“Experiences may be contrasted as they refer to unparticularized selves, that is, to any or all selves, or as they refer to definite and particular selves. In perceiving, for instance, I am vaguely conscious that other people might see what I am seeing, but in hating I do not hate anybody in general, but some very special and definite person or persons.” (Calkins, An Introduction to Psychology, 154)

“The term ‘element’ is…almost always used of what we have called the structural elements, sensational, attributive, and relational.” (Calkins, An Introduction to Psychology, 151)

“A psychology which considers only psychic events or consciousnesses is, therefore a causal science; whereas psychology, in so far as it studies selves in their relations; does not treat its facts as causally related to each other, because, strictly speaking, only phenomena in time are causally connected, and selves are, to say the least, not primarily regarded as realities in time. Anybody may verify this by his introspection. One thinks of one’s body as beginning and ending at distinct moments; one thinks of one’s ideas and feelings as occurring yesterday or to-day—at a quarter of twelve or half-past three; but one does not primarily regard oneself as ‘in time,’ and one, therefore does not think of selves in causal relations to each other. They are related, of course, by virtue of the imperiousness, the demands, the acknowledgements, and the adoptions which make up, as we have seen, the very nature of a self; but these relations are not the causal ones which connect ideas.” (Calkins, An Introduction to Psychology, 154-155)

My Adaptation of the Causal Closure Argument for Idealism

P1) All events share one and the same irreducible ontological type.

“In the first place a relation, if it is to be a relation at all, must unite some terms. Secondly, most, if not all, kinds of relation presuppose a specific common character, usually or always of the type called by Mr. Johnson a determinable in the related terms, without which the assertion of the specific relation would be not merely false but absurd…” (Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, 128)

“Spatial relations presuppose in this way the common determinable of extension….the relation of similarity presupposes some common determinable in the determinate value of which the objects are said to be similar, the relations of enmity or love the common determinable of emotional capacity, the relation of causality the common character of being events or continuants in time, and perhaps membership in some specific causal system…..[A relation] could not be present at all if its terms were not characterized by a certain determinable and if their determinate qualities within this and other subordinate determinables did not fall within certain limits….” (Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, 129-130)

“There can be no experience of plurality, whether of beings, qualities or events, that are absolutely disparate and disconnected—that is certain. All experienced diversity implies some identity; and, for the matter of that, all experienced identity some diversity. All this is so much logical commonplace. From this it follows that to every known or knowable Many there will be some common term applicable to them all, which logically unifies them all.” (Ward, The Realm of Ends, 222) 

“Every relation implies an identity underlying the manifest difference in the terms…” (Carr, A Theory of Monads, 1) 

“Neither duality nor multiplicity is conceivable without that unity whereby the two engender that whole in which the two units are connected, even though they mutually exclude one another: without that unity which fuses and unifies every multiplicity determined in a number, which correlates among themselves the units which constitute the number. We could strip multiplicity of all unity only by not thinking it. But then in the gloom of what is not thought, multiplicity truly enough would not be unity, but it would not even be multiplicity, because it could not be anything at all. Or, if we prefer, it would be absolutely unthinkable.” (Gentile, The Reform of Education, 107)

P2) There is at least one event that has occurred that is irreducibly “mental” in ontological type. 

C1) Therefore, all events are irreducibly “mental” in ontological type. [From P1 and P2]

This argument is inspired by “The Argument from Mental Causation.” I would like to present several passages which render the premises more plausible:

“For our idea of causation is not derived from without, but from within, and what we call the evidence of physical causation is really only certain wholly mental modifications following one another in definite sequence.  Hence, we can have no evidence of causation proceeding from Object to Subject.  The mind, therefore, cannot prove its own causation from matter or motion, because all evidence of that must itself be mental evidence and nothing but mental, and hence it is as impossible for the mind thus to prove its own causation as it is for water to rise above its source.” (Thomson, Materialism and Modern Physiology of the Nervous System, 3-4) 

“Let us now consider Causality. This cannot, any more than Substantiality, be a sensation. Our senses, no doubt, can give us two sensations in succession, though it does not follow that the senses alone would render us conscious that they were in succession. But causality involves not only that B follows A, but that B is there because A was there before it, and that B would not have been there without A. Now this is not a matter for the senses. Can we see that the smoke which is before us would not be there if there had been no fire? We see what is, but we cannot see what is not, or what might have been. If we saw causality, then causality, like all other objects of sight, must be an extended and colored surface, which it is not. Nor would it be more possible to hear, or touch, or smell, or taste it. Causality, then, like Substantiality, is not a sensation but an idea. Whenever we say that A is the cause of B, the mind makes a judgment, and it is only through such judgment that we get the idea of causality at all. If the mind confined itself to receiving what the sensations bring it, causality would be unknown to it. And the conception of matter would be meaningless if causality were withdrawn. If the movement of one piece of matter did not cause the movement of another, if matter did not cause sensations in us, the whole of science would be upset. And with it would go all our reasons for believing in matter, since the justification of our belief in matter is the success of science in explaining the world by means of it. In particular, the attempt to explain spirit as a form of the activity of matter clearly implies causality. For it explains the transformation of activity into the form of consciousness as due to the particular conditions which it meets within in the human body, and thus makes those circumstances the cause of the transformation.” (McTaggart, Some Considerations Relating to Human Immortality, 160-161) 

“Causality is not an external relation—that is, a relation existing independently of consciousness….Now, if causality be mental, the facts connected by causality must be mental facts; in other words, the causal relation, being through and through mental, cannot extend beyond mind….If causality is a purely mental connection, it surely cannot be a bridge between the mental and the non-mental....Objects inferred to exist are…none the less objects of consciousness, objects “present to the mind.” But nothing which is present to the mind can possess an existence independent of mind. It is then a contradiction in terms to teach that the mind must infer (whatever be the principle of inference) the existence of external objects; for it is the nature of such objects to be independent of consciousness….Descartes and the other dualists had taught that matter, namely, reality independent of consciousness, must exist as cause of our perceptions. In reply to this…causality is a relation within consciousness and consequently cannot assure us of the reality of anything outside consciousness; and second, whatever the basis of the inference, inferred objects must be known objects, objects present to the mind, and cannot therefore be possessed of independent existence….Causality is no character or relation of things independent of consciousness, and that, on the contrary, causality is a transition of the mind, a mental connection…this mental transition [is] “thought”….Unity and causality are mental activities, ways in which we think.” (Calkins, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 170-219) 

“What, it will be asked, is a whole? It is defined ordinarily in some such fashion: the sum of the relations of distinct yet connected parts. What, then, is a relation? It cannot, in the first place, be external to the parts which it relates, else it would still be another reality and would itself need to be related with all the rest; and the new relation would again need relating, and so on ad infinitum. A relation external to the terms related would, in a word, be useless to them: it could not be their relation. As Hegel says, in “a unity of differents…, a composite, an aggregate…, the objects remain independent and…external to each other.” And yet, though a relation cannot be external to the terms which it relates, neither can it be a quality inherent in any or in every one of them. For the quality, or attribute, or function, which is in a particular reality, cannot be the bond between that particular and some other. In other words, if ultimate reality were a composite of completely related terms, and if the relations between the terms were qualities of the terms, each for each, then the relations would themselves need relating with each other, for each would belong to some particular reality. There is no escape from this difficulty except by the abandonment of the conception of ultimate reality as a composite, and the alternative conception of it as a whole which is also a singular, an absolute reality whose unique nature is manifested in the particular realities which form its parts. These parts, therefore, need no external relation; they are related in that they are alike expressions of the one reality.” (Calkins, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 380-381) 

“We ordinarily employ the category of causality to relate one part of experience to another, a change to an antecedent change. Thus in its very form causality presupposes distinction within experience, and accordingly this relativity within experience ceases the very moment that the part coincides with the whole.” (Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, 410) 

“Among the chief categories which are commonly regarded as applicable to experience, is the category of causality….The true meaning which causality has for us is rooted in the realization of our own efficiency, as active individuals. The active individual is the “cause.” The end which his (generally purposive) activity accomplishes is the “effect.” The scientific method, however, takes the sequences which occur in experience as they stand and determines what may truly be said of them per se. In the first place, it finds that sequences continually recur sufficiently similar in nature to admit of a considerable degree of general characterization. Secondly, it follows that a general proposition may be affirmed with regard to each recurring sequence, whereby the occurrence of one event may be inferred from the occurrence of another event. Thirdly, there is no guarantee (except the rather doubtful one of probability) that such propositions will continue to hold in the future. Finally, it is seen that we can go no further than this from the objective standpoint of science. It might also be pointed out that, strictly speaking, the term  “causal law” ought not to be applied at all to such propositions as we have been considering. For, in view of the concrete meaning which “cause” has for us, the word “causal” implies that the sequences to which the propositions refer, have their ground in the activity of individuals.” (Richardson, Spiritual Pluralism, 30-37)

My Adaptation of One of Mary Whiton Calkins’ Arguments for Idealism

The following argument is my version of one of Mary Whiton Calkins’ arguments for idealism. The essence of Calkins’ argument can be found in her book, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy. My argument expands upon Calkins’ ideas and attempts to solidify her intended conclusions. I am indebted to Kris McDaniel and his essay, The Idealism of Mary Whiton Calkins for influencing the spirit and presentation of my argument. For a further defense of several of the premises, please refer to my other post, My Adaptation of Giovanni Gentile’s “Conceivability Argument” for Idealism.

P1) No relations can obtain between two or more determinates unless there is a qualitative commonality obtaining between them.

“In the first place a relation, if it is to be a relation at all, must unite some terms. Secondly, most, if not all, kinds of relation presuppose a specific common character, usually or always of the type called by Mr. Johnson a determinable in the related terms, without which the assertion of the specific relation would be not merely false but absurd…” (Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, 128) 

“There can be no experience of plurality, whether of beings, qualities or events, that are absolutely disparate and disconnected—that is certain. All experienced diversity implies some identity; and, for the matter of that, all experienced identity some diversity. All this is so much logical commonplace. From this it follows that to every known or knowable Many there will be some common term applicable to them all, which logically unifies them all.” (Ward, The Realm of Ends, 222) 

“Every relation implies an identity underlying the manifest difference in the terms…” (Carr, A Theory of Monads, 1) 

“Neither duality nor multiplicity is conceivable without that unity whereby the two engender that whole in which the two units are connected, even though they mutually exclude one another: without that unity which fuses and unifies every multiplicity determined in a number, which correlates among themselves the units which constitute the number. We could strip multiplicity of all unity only by not thinking it. But then in the gloom of what is not thought, multiplicity truly enough would not be unity, but it would not even be multiplicity, because it could not be anything at all. Or, if we prefer, it would be absolutely unthinkable.” (Gentile, The Reform of Education, 107)

P2) A necessary condition for a qualitative commonality obtaining between two or more determinates is for said determinates to be of the same ontological kind—said ontological kind being none other than that “higher” determinable (or genus) through which said determinates must be conceived in order for their interrelatedness to be conceivable.

“Spatial relations presuppose in this way the common determinable of extension….the relation of similarity presupposes some common determinable in the determinate value of which the objects are said to be similar, the relations of enmity or love the common determinable of emotional capacity, the relation of causality the common character of being events or continuants in time, and perhaps membership in some specific causal system…..[A relation] could not be present at all if its terms were not characterized by a certain determinable and if their determinate qualities within this and other subordinate determinables did not fall within certain limits….” (Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, 129-130) 

“What, it will be asked, is a whole? It is defined ordinarily in some such fashion: the sum of the relations of distinct yet connected parts. What, then, is a relation? It cannot, in the first place, be external to the parts which it relates, else it would still be another reality and would itself need to be related with all the rest; and the new relation would again need relating, and so on ad infinitum. A relation external to the terms related would, in a word, be useless to them: it could not be their relation. As Hegel says, in “a unity of differents…, a composite, an aggregate…, the objects remain independent and…external to each other.” And yet, though a relation cannot be external to the terms which it relates, neither can it be a quality inherent in any or in every one of them. For the quality, or attribute, or function, which is in a particular reality, cannot be the bond between that particular and some other. In other words, if ultimate reality were a composite of completely related terms, and if the relations between the terms were qualities of the terms, each for each, then the relations would themselves need relating with each other, for each would belong to some particular reality. There is no escape from this difficulty except by the abandonment of the conception of ultimate reality as a composite, and the alternative conception of it as a whole which is also a singular, an absolute reality whose unique nature is manifested in the particular realities which form its parts. These parts, therefore, need no external relation; they are related in that they are alike expressions of the one reality.” (Calkins, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 380-381)

C1) Therefore, no relation can obtain between two or more determinates unless said determinates are of the same ontological kind—said ontological kind being none other than that “higher” determinable (or genus) through which said determinates must be conceived in order for their interrelatedness to be conceivable. [From P1 and P2]

P3) The Subject-dimension of Experience, and that which manifests itself, perspectivally and non-perspectivally, to and for the Subjective-dimension of Experience, are interrelated determinates.

C2) Therefore, the Subject-dimension of Experience, and that which manifests itself, perspectivally and non-perspectivally, to and for the Subject-dimension of Experience, are of the same ontological kind—said ontological kind being none other than that “higher” determinable (or genus) through which said beings must be conceived in order for their interrelatedness to be conceivable. [From C1 and P3]

P4) But the Subject-dimension of Experience, and that which manifests itself, perspectivally and non-perspectivally, to and for the Subject-dimension of Experience, are actual, concrete unities of meaning.

For a defense of this premise, confer my defense of the first premise of My Adaptation of Giovanni Gentile’s “Conceivability Argument” for Idealism.

C3) Therefore, the Subject-dimension of Experience, and that which manifests itself, perspectivally and non-perspectivally, to and for the Subject-dimension of Experience, are of the same ontological kind as actual, concrete unities of meaning—said ontological kind being none other than that “higher” determinable (or genus) through which said actual, concrete unities of meaning must be conceived in order for their interrelatedness to be conceivable. [From C2 and P4]

P5) But actual, concrete unities of meaning are beings that are either one with, or, beings that are determinations of, an Experiential ontological kind—Experience being none other than that ontological kind or “higher” determinable (or genus) through which said actual, concrete unities of meaning must be conceived in order for their interrelatedness to be conceivable.

For a defense of this premise, confer my defense of the second premise of My Adaptation of Giovanni Gentile’s “Conceivability Argument” for Idealism.

C4) Therefore, the Subject-dimension of Experience, and that which manifests itself, perspectivally and non-perspectivally, to and for the Subject-dimension of Experience, are beings that are either one with, or, beings that are determinations of, an Experiential ontological kind—Experience being none other than that ontological kind or “higher” determinable (or genus) through which said beings must be conceived in order for their interrelatedness to be conceivable. [From C3 and P5]

P6) Ultimate Reality is related to the Subject-dimension of Experience, and manifests itself, perspectivally and non-perspectivally, to and for the Subject-dimension of Experience.

C5) Therefore, Ultimate Reality is a being that is either one with, or, a being that is a determination of, an Experiential ontological kind. [From C4 and P6]

P7) But Ultimate Reality is not a determination of anything “higher” than itself; for Ultimate Reality is self-determined, and has all of its determinations “internal” to itself. (But this can only mean that Ultimate Reality is itself an Experience, and not a determination thereof.)

“Ultimate reality [is that] into which all else can be resolved and which cannot itself be resolved into anything beyond, that in terms of which all else can be expressed and which cannot itself be expressed in terms of anything outside itself.” (Haldane, The Pathway to Reality, 19) 

“For Reality…must be a complete individual whole, with the ground of all its differentiations within itself.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 255) 

“The whole…is a self-differentiating system. It is a whole that determines, by the principle of organization that is universal to all its parts and moments, the nature and interrelations of its elements, making them mutually interdependent and constitutive. Accordingly, if their distinction one from another is elevated into a separation, and if they are severally isolated from each other and from the system, as is wont to happen under the influence and operation of the understanding, they contradict themselves and one another, a contradiction symptomatic of defect that is occasioned by their mutual exclusion and the oversight of their mutual complementarity.” (Harris, The Spirit of Hegel, 142-143)

C5) Therefore, Ultimate Reality is an Experience. [From C5 and P7]