Showing posts with label Arguments for Idealism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Arguments for Idealism. Show all posts

Monday, July 10, 2023

My Adaptation of G.F. Stout’s Argument for Idealism

In 1919 and 1921, the British philosopher and psychologist, G.F. Stout, delivered the prestigious Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh. The audience in attendance, still weary from the chaos and destruction of The Great War, would have found some relief in Stout’s Idealistic Weltanschauung. In 1931, the first-half of Stout’s Gifford Lectures was published under the title, Mind & Matter; and, in 1952, eight long and eventful years after Stout’s passing, the second-half of his Gifford Lectures, entitled God & Nature, was also immortalized in print. Unfortunately, in the 71 years since its publication, God & Nature has received little more than a few passing glances and a handful of cursory reviews. This neglect, however, is understandable. The British and American philosophical landscape was in a bad way in 1952; and, in the many decades since, there have not been many signs of genuine improvement. Anglophone philosophy has been suffering from the pangs of ahistoricity and rootlessness—it drifts, like a lost continent, deeper and deeper into the turbid, briny waters of an amnestic sea—making terra firma few and far between.

In the following article, I will be diving into what I take to be the most suggestive and original argument for Idealism found in God & Nature—an argument that has taken me several years to fully grasp, decipher, and reconstruct. The overall argument is long and drawn out—spanning the entirety of Chapters XVII and XVIII. Rather than tackling the entire chapter as a whole, I will be focusing on Stout’s abbreviated version of the argument:
“When a finite individual comes to know what he did not know before, what he comes to know is not altered in any of the characters or relations which belongs to it as unknown. If any of these characters or relations were transformed in the process, he could not be said to know what he previously did not know, but something else instead. It follows that if knowledge does not pre-exist, there is no possible change or transformation of what does pre-exist by which it can become known. No modification in the qualities of pre-existing beings in their relations or interactions, or the forms of unity in which they are combined will give the required result. In a universe of absolutely unknown being, nothing could change into a known being. It follows that since there are knowing minds now, there must always have been knowing minds, or at least one knowing mind.” (Stout, God & Nature, 285)
When I first read the above passage, I was at an immediate loss. Stout’s conclusion, “It follows that since there are knowing minds now, there must always have been knowing minds, or at least one knowing mind,” seemed to me to be a non sequitur. Indeed, back in 1953, a reviewer of God & Nature found Stout’s argument to be just as opaque:
“The last sections of the book…argue that the unity of the mind implies the unity of the universe. This is argued first…in connexion with cognition. The unity of the mind in knowing presupposes the systematic unity of the universe known. This Kantian argument is combined…with the non-Kantian view that the knowing mind does not determine the structure of what is known. The argument is that ignorance is always partial. What we do not know we always to some extent do know as connected with what we know already…..Knowing and being then are essentially and inseparably united aspects of the whole universe. [Stout is here, I think, converting the proposition, which he has so far proved, that the unity of the mind implies the unity of the universe, and suggesting that the unity of the universe implies a single universal mind. But this conversion is undefended.] It follows that there must always have been knowing minds or mind.”  (Mabbot, Review of G.F. Stout’s God and Nature, 533-534)
Now, I think Mabbot seriously misunderstands and depreciates Stout’s argument. Surely it would be uncharitable to suppose that Stout’s reasoning amounts to nothing more than a fallacious jump from the proposition that “The unity of the mind implies the unity of the universe,” to the conclusion that “There must always have been knowing minds or mind.” Indeed, if Stout committed such a blunder, then, we may employ the following words of C.D. Broad: 
“Charity bids us avert our eyes from the pitiable spectacle of a great philosopher using an argument which would disgrace a child or a savage.” (Broad, Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy (Vol. I), 85)
Thankfully, I am not alone in advocating a more sympathetic reading of Stout’s argument. In J.N. Wright’s review of God & Nature, Write briefly summarizes what he takes to be the gist of Stout’s argument, and he goes on to stress the significance of Stout’s Lectures as a whole:
“Chapters XVII-XX [of God & Nature] deal with the nature of mind and the light that this throws on the nature of knowledge and the universe. Its argument is that mind knows (inadequately), explores, and desires. It is a unity with a correlate, the Unity of the Universe—imperfectly known and an object of desire. There is no cognitive act; knowing is a logical precondition of all subjective acts or states: nor is there a pure Ego; the mind has the “unity of a complex”. Its object is “formal” being which can become “objective being”. He argues that this is impossible without positing either that there were always finite minds or a Universal Mind (p. 285) and he holds that the first entails the second, but as the correlate of mind is the unity of the object, mind is not an accidental feature in the Universe and “Knowing and being are inseparably united as alternate and co-essential aspects of the Universe as a Whole”. He thus calls himself an Idealist, but sharply distinguished from those Idealists who argue that mind is creative. I can only comment that if we are going to write of mind and knowledge, will and desire, and not substitute for it writing about noises and scribbling, much of Stout’s analysis must be taken seriously and the standard of philosophical writing in the Chapters XVII and XIX seems to me to be very high indeed….But how to sum up the book? First let me say that through the whole topic of the two volumes of Gifford Lectures, Stout moves with the firmness of a master over the entire field. He is at ease in the immense complexity and richness of European thought, with all its subtlety, variety, and fecundity. He uses the great mass of European thinkers and turns them into a system of his own, with imagination, skill, and restraint. He writes lucidly, with dignity and with leisurely grace. Philosophy has altered since 1920 in its theme and method. Natural Theology is unfashionable; some say nonsensical. A review is not a commentary and many of Stout’s tenets stand in need of detailed comment: but I believe that on some points most philosophers would find some enlightenment and that very few philosophers could have undertaken this theme with so much success. As to Natural Theology, individual philosophers may choose to do what they will. Human nature being what it is, it is preposterous to assume its demise.” (Wright, G.F. Stout, 80-81)
The following argument for Idealism is my humble attempt at streamlining Stout’s line of reasoning. I hope that my adaptation does justice to the insight and vision of the original.
P1) If an unknown thing becomes known to one or more knowing minds, then the unknown thing could not have undergone changes in any of its qualities or relations in becoming known. 

P2) If an unknown thing could not have undergone changes in any of its qualities or relations in becoming known, then an unknown thing’s becoming known cannot be the result of changes in any of the qualities or relations which belonged to the thing as unknown.

P3) If an unknown thing’s becoming known cannot be the result of changes in any of the qualities or relations which belonged to the thing as unknown, then no changes in any of the qualities or relations of an unknown thing could result in the unknown thing’s becoming known.
P4) If no changes in any of the qualities or relations of an unknown thing could result in the unknown thing’s becoming known, then, if there had been a time in our universe when it consisted solely of unknown beings, no changes in any of the qualities or relations of those unknown beings could result in any of them becoming a known being.

P5) If there had been a time in our universe when it consisted solely of unknown beings, no changes in any of the qualities or relations of those unknown beings could result in any of them becoming a known being, then if there are currently knowing minds in our universe, there must have always been one or more knowing minds in our universe.

P6) An unknown thing becomes known to one or more knowing minds.

C1) Therefore, if there are currently one or more knowing minds in our universe, there must have always been one or more knowing minds in our universe. [From P1—P6]

P7) There are currently one or more knowing minds in our universe.

C2) Therefore, there must have always been one or more knowing minds in our universe. [From C1 and P7]

Tuesday, June 13, 2023

G.F. Stout’s God & Nature Chapter XVII—“Cognitive Unity as Implying the Unity of the Universe”

G.F. Stout’s God & Nature
Chapter XVII—“Cognitive Unity as Implying the Unity of the Universe”
(I) The Unity of the Mind-Complex 
“A material thing contains parts which are themselves material things in the same sense as the whole to which they belong, and as such retain their identity when separated from the whole. The fragments of a broken cup, for instance, pre-exist as parts of the unbroken cup, and continue to exist as distinct parcels of matter when the cup has be shattered. But mind does not contain other minds as its parts. It has therefore a peculiar unity which does not and cannot belong to matter. Just in so far as a mind has this peculiar unity, it is what we call an individual self. It is not divisible into other units of the same sort.” (Stout, God & Nature, 264) 
“What is implied in this unity? It is clear that whatever else it implies, it at least involves the interconnexion of different cognitions, feelings and conations with each other as entering into a complex unity of an altogether unique kind. But it may also be held, and is very frequently taken for granted, that as the indispensable condition of this complex unity there must also be a simple being, distinct from it and all its various cognitions, feelings and conations, which serves to connect them with each other. This simple being itself is known only through a “that-which” definition. It is “that which” owns, and in owning connects, the various modes and phases of knowledge and interest. So conceived, it is called the “pure subject” or “transcendental self,” and is contrasted with the empirical or historical self—the more or less unified complex which passes through various vicissitudes in the life of the individual. A distinction of this sort is not due merely to the subtlety of metaphysicians, but is found in a vague form in our ordinary uncritical thought. We naturally tend to represent the mind as if it were a circle or sphere, the circumference corresponding to the objects minded by it, the radii to its various ways of minding them, and the punctual simplicity of the center to the pure subject. Some such diagrammatic representation is for the practical purposes of ordinary daily life highly convenient, and for these purposes not seriously misleading. But we must not precipitately translate it into a hard and fast metaphysical theory.” (Stout, God & Nature, 264-265) 
“Whether there is a pure subject or not, at any rate there is a complex mental life—a mind-complex; and we are justified in asserting the existence of a pure subject only if the complex unity of mental life can be shown to presuppose it as an indispensable condition. We must then analyze the mind-complex, so as to determine wherein its unity consists, and what is and is not included in the unity of the manifold. We have first to note that there are two sides to our mental life, distinct though inseparable, which are broadly distinguishable as (1) knowledge of objects, and (2) interest in them. In discussing the unity of the mind-complex, it is necessary for the sake of clearness to deal first with cognitive unity and then with unity of interest. (For reasons which will appear as we proceed, it would be impossible to reverse this order).” (Stout, God & Nature, 265)  
(II) Cognitive Unity and its Objective Correlate 
“What is unity of knowledge? If we consider this question just as it stands, and do not mix it with others arising out of it, the answer is simple and direct. Unity of knowledge is identical with knowledge of unity. It is actual or potentially present if and so far as items in any way diverse are or can be known or thought of as in any way connected or related, or as partial features or aspects of any kind of whole. Suppose that a sound is perceived and then another sound after it; if the second is apprehended as succeeding the first, or louder than the first, or different from the first, or otherwise related to it, to this extent both are known in one undivided knowledge. If such relations are not actually known or thought of, yet, in so far as it is possible that they may be so, the cognitive unity is potential. On the other hand, where distinct items are severally apprehended but without any cognisance, actual or potential, of relation between them, there is no cognitive unity. This happens, for instance, when two successive sounds, one known only to A and the other only to B. When this is so, there cannot be any known relation between them either in the mind of A or in that of B. It is just discontinuities of this sort which constitute A and B as distinct cognitive individuals.” (Stout, God & Nature, 265-266) 
“Assuming that this analysis is correct as far as it goes, it is yet in one respect fundamentally inadequate. It fails to account for cognitive unity, actual or potential, as coextensive with the unity of the individual “I” or “self.” For anything we have hitherto said, it might occur, so to speak in patches isolated from each other, according as objects happened to present themselves each with an internal unity of its own, but self-complete in detachment from the others. We have, then, still to account for cognitive unity as necessarily pervading and connecting, potentially or actually, all stages and phases in the life-history of an individual mind. In other words, we have to account for the motive which has led, rightly or wrongly, to the theory of a pure subject. We can do this only in one way. There must be for the knowing individual, one all-inclusive object, comprehending all other objects—whether particular or universal, actual, possible or impossible—as its partial and essentially incomplete features and aspects. It follows that whatever else the individual knows he must in some measure and degree, however rudimentary, be cognisant of the universe in its unity. But how? In very different ways and degrees, varying with the special conditions of individual existence and stages of mental development: different for us, at the level of the present philosophical discussion, and for the cat watching a mouse-hole. Yet the cat’s knowledge, just as much as ours, presupposes the unity of the universe: otherwise it could never go beyond the content of its own immediate experience, and could not even know this. What we require is a general view applying to all stages of mental development—to animals as well as to human beings.” (Stout, God & Nature, 266-267) 
(III) Cognitive Unity Includes Ignorance 
“The first and most important step is to recognize that cognitive unity includes not only what is commonly called knowledge, but also what is commonly called ignorance. This would be impossible if the ignorance consisted in the absolute absence of all cognitive relation between the mind and what it is ignorant of. But this is not so. We may indeed, by straining the use of language, say that a stone is absolutely ignorant in this sense. It is so because it is also incapable of knowledge. The stone does not know what is happening at the center of the earth; neither do I. But the stone’s ignorance, if we may use the word at all, is essentially different from mine. What I say that I am ignorant of, I at least know as being unknown to me, and as connected with what I do know. In this sense my ignorance has an object, and the stone’s has none. In this sense it is equally true to say that the stone is ignorant of everything, and that it is ignorant of nothing. But if I said that I was ignorant of nothing, I could only mean that I know everything. Now we have seen that the cognitive unity of the individual, as pervading, potentially or actually, all phases of his life-history, implies the unity of the universe as the form of all his knowledge. But if this be so, all ignorance on the part of an individual knower must be of the relative type, and not at all comparable with the nescience of a stone. He must at least refer to what he is ignorant of as belonging to the domain of the unknown, and as connected with what he otherwise knows. Thus his cognitive unity will include both his knowledge and his ignorance.” (Stout, God & Nature, 267-268) 
“This is plain enough when we consider the mental attitude of questioning or inquiring, of seeking to know what we do not know already. When we raise a question, we do not, indeed, know what the answer is. None the less, in the very act of questioning, we define what it is that we are ignorant of. We define it as related in a more or less determinate way to what is presupposed in the question itself. What is thus presupposed is apprehended as essentially incomplete, and the answer is apprehended as what is required to complete it. But if knowledge of the unknown, as such, is implied in the ignorance which takes shape in actual questions, it must also be implied in the ignorance which does not. It is implied in the mere possibility of asking questions, so far as this depends on the nature of the object, and not on the subjective interest or other special conditions of individual existence. There must be a field for inquiry offered to the cognitive subject—a field apprehended as unknown, an object therefore of relative and not absolute ignorance. But what we know and what, in this relative sense, we do not know, constitute together one universe of being, which is the correlate and counterpart of the unity of knowledge.” (Stout, God & Nature, 268) 
(IV) Degrees of Cognitive Unity 
“The unity of knowledge is essential to the unity and identity of every cognitive individual. Each, as Leibniz said, represents the universe from his own point of view. In different individuals the unity is present in very different ways and degrees, according to the diverse conditions and circumstances of their finite existence. It may be complete, though in a manner incomprehensible to us, in the Universal Mind. In finite individuals it is variously restricted by the limitations of their immediate experience, by the special constitution of their bodies and the environment in which they are placed, and by their limited power of forming mental dispositions through which reacquired knowledge is retained and reproduced as the basis of subsequent developments.” (Stout, God & Nature, 268-269) 
“Of these conditions, the limitations of interest and retentiveness are most fundamental. We may illustrate the way in which they operate by considering in broad outline the typical contrast between the mental life of man and that of animals. Human beings are capable of a progressive development which is impossible under the conditions of animal life. They penetrate the region of the unknown by a process in which the answers to previous questions open out new lines of inquiry, and in which the answers to different questions are made to through light on each other. Knowledge thus becomes at once wider in range and more completely unified. This of course holds in very varying degrees for different men and different groups of men. But, in the main, capacity for such development marks off distinctively human reason from animal intelligence. Its highest stage is reached when the unity of the universe, which even in animals is the logical form of knowledge, becomes itself more or less clearly and explicitly an object of though and inquiry. I occupy this position in the present volume; but it is also equally occupied by the sceptics, such as Mr. Russell, who doubt or deny that the universe is a unity. For if it were not a unity, I do not see how the question whether it is so could even be raised at all.” (Stout, God & Nature, 269)  

(V) Cognitive Unity in Animals 
“This progressive development, which culminates in the system of the sciences, in the higher forms of religion, and in philosophy, is arrested in its initial stages by the conditions of animal as distinct from human existence. One fundamental reason is the specific limitation of the range of animal interests. If a potential question is to be an actual questioning, the individual must feel a need which requires the question to be answered. In human beings the progressive opening out of relatively novel fields for inquiry is in a large measure accompanied by the emergence of relatively new directions of interest and attention. In an animal, on the contrary, interest is circumscribed by what we call animal needs, and consists mainly in instincts, impulses and emotions, more or less modified and specialized by experience. These are concerned primarily with the search for food, self-protection against danger, sexual relations, the care for offspring and the like. Even in these directions they are circumscribed in a peculiar way. They are mainly such that they can be satisfied by immediate bodily action in relation to sensibly present situations as these arise, and do not require the working out of plans in advance of the occasion for putting them into execution. This is made possible in the first instance because the animal has not only congenital interests, excitable under appropriate circumstances, but also another sort of congenital equipment. Its neuro-muscular system is congenitally so organized that in the presence of the appropriate situation which conditions impulse and emotion, it finds itself performing complex movements, useful in the satisfaction of its needs, which it does not have to learn by experience.” (Stout, God & Nature, 269-270) 
“Thus nature does for the animal what human beings have to learn for themselves. When animals are not thus engaged in meeting the practical exigencies of a present situation, they either tend to sink into somnolence, or to gratify in the form of play the same primitive impulses as occupy them in the serious business of their lives. The kitten practices with the fallen leaves the movements of a cat with a mouse. Besides this limitation of interest, and closely connected with it, there is a limitation on the side of retentiveness and reproduction. Animals do indeed learn by experience. They retain knowledge previously acquired in their practical dealings with previous situations, so as to bring it to bear on new situations more or less similar. What is wanting to them, or present only in a comparatively slight degree, is the power of free ideal revival. By this I mean such revival as is involved in occupying the mind more or less persistently with what is not connected with circumstances present to the senses at the time. Under trains of free ideas we have to include not only idea anticipation of the future, but also series of reminiscences of what has happened in the past. A dog may miss his master acutely. But there is no reason to believe that he sits down and calls to mind in successive order past scenes and incidents in which they both shared. Or, to take a less sentimental example from Dr. Ward, one can hardly imagine a retrospective dog “regretting, like one of Punch’s heroes, that he did not have another slice of that mutton.” This contrast between the human and animal mind illustrates in a conspicuous example the way in which cognitive unity may vary in detail, its fundamental nature remains the same. It consists throughout in apprehension of relation and connexion, it embraces the field of what we call ignorance, and is essentially correlated with the unity of the universe.” (Stout, God & Nature, 270-271) 
(VI) Is There an Act or State of Knowing? 
“Must we add that it presupposes a pure subject, distinct from it, on which it depends? The usual argument of those who hold this view is as follows: If A is to be known as related to B, the same being who knows A must also know B. There must therefore be a cognitive subject distinct from both A and B, and equally present to both of them. But this reasoning plainly moves within a vicious circle. It is true that if A can only be known by a pure subject, and if again B can only be known by a pure subject, it must be the same pure subject which knows the relation between them. If, however, neither the knowledge of A nor that of B, taken by itself, presupposes a pure subject, there is no reason why such a subject should be required to account for knowledge of a relation between them. What has to be shown is that, quite apart from reference to cognitive unity, knowledge as such includes (1) a pure subject, set over against an object, (2) a distinct relation of a peculiar kind between the cognitive subject and the object. This analysis raises the further question how we are to conceive the relation between knower and known. The most natural suggestion is that, following the apparent analogy of such processes as desire and will, we should regard knowing as an act or state of the subject, and what is known as the object of this act. Now I entirely deny that there is any subjective act or state which can property be called cognitive. Here I come into violent collision with the neo-realists and especially with Mr. Moore, for whom the fundamental fallacy of idealism consists in an alleged confusion between what is known and the supposed act of knowing it.” (Stout, God & Nature, 270-271) 
“At the outset I have to notice a very important ambiguity. What, strictly speaking, are we to regard as the object of the supposed cognitive act? Is it only what is already being known, or is it also and as well what is as yet unknown? Does the cognitive act bring within our ken what we were previously ignorant of, or does it only begin to exist when ignorance has given place to knowledge? Is there no difference between the knowing of things and the process which makes them known? The question, once definitely raised, seems to answer itself. There must be a difference. Yet those who maintain the theory of cognitive acts do not appear to recognize a distinction. For them knowing is not merely knowing, but also a process whereby things with a being and nature independent of the mind are in the first instance brought into cognitive relation to it. It follows inevitably from this tacit assumption that the mind can only be externally related to its objects, and thus there can be no standing-ground for idealism. The cognitive act is supposed in the first instance to be “directed upon” something quite distinct and separate from the mind whose act it is. This being so, the same mutual externality and independence must remain, when the thing has actually become known. For the act is taken to be the same, whether it is the act of making known what is unknown or the act of knowing it when it is known. It thus becomes impossible to regard what is known as being in the mind or belonging to the mind complex.” (Stout, God & Nature, 272-273)   
 
“To say this would be like saying that when a stone breaks glass, the glass becomes part of the stone which breaks it. Those who regard knowledge as an external relation do, in fact, picture it to themselves as if it were a relation between bodies external to each other in space. Consciously or unconsciously, they confuse it with the relation of the percipient’s body to the thing which he sees and touches. Just as, in looking at a table, the body confronts the table with the eyes turned towards it, so in knowing, the mind is pictured as confronting what it knows, and turning towards this in a cognitive act. From this point of view it is just as great nonsense to say that what is known, just because it is known, is in the mind which knows it, as it is to say that the table seen, just because it is seen, is in the eye used in seeing it. I have no doubt that Professor Alexander’s use of the words “contemplate” and “contemplation” tends to ensnare him in this metaphor. What the words inevitably suggest is the picture of someone gazing at something with his bodily eyes. This bodily attitude being ascribed confusedly to the mind also, the mind is imagined as confronting or standing over against what it knows. It follows from this discussion that we have a twofold question to deal with. (1) Is knowing itself an act? (2) Is it a cognitive act of essentially the same kind as that by which we penetrate the region of ignorance, asking questions and getting answers and, in general, making known what was previously unknown? I am prepared to maintain, first, that knowing itself is not an act, and, secondly, that the process by which we come to know what we did not know before does involve an activity, but that this activity is not itself knowledge.” (Stout, God & Nature, 273-274) 
(VII) Getting to Know, or Attending, is a Mental Activity 
“There is indeed a mental activity which brings, or tends to bring, within the sphere of positive knowledge what was previously outside it. But this always consists in some form of subjective interest, and some phase of conation, with its inseparable feeling, agreeable or disagreeable. The interest is such that it requires for its fulfilment fuller knowledge of what is already known imperfectly. It includes all questioning, inquiry, seeking, searching, watching, waiting, taking notice, being on alert, grappling with a problem, following the thread of an argument, concentration on a topic, etc. We may conveniently comprehend all its various modes and phases under a common term—Attention. Attention always presupposes knowledge, and tends to give rise to fuller knowledge. But in itself is a form of interest and not a cognitive act. There is therefore no subjective act having this function which can be strictly and properly called an act of knowledge.” (Stout, God & Nature, 274) 
(VIII) Is Judgment or Assertion a Cognitive Act? 
“Let us now examine actual knowledge as distinct from the processes which give rise to it. From this point of view it may seem that there is at least one cognitive act, that of judging or mentally asserting. What is this if it is not cognitive? I answer that in so far as it is an act, it is not mere cognition. The word judgment is ambiguous. In its widest application, it covers all knowledge about anything; there is judgment in this sense whenever anything is known as being such and such, or so and so related, or even as existing at all. It is thus coextensive with knowledge in general. But in this sense it by no means implies anything that can be called a mental act of asserting or believing. When we look at a page of print, we apprehend the black letters as being letters and black, and as contrasted with the white paper. But we do not usually go through the act of mentally affirming that there are letters, that they are black, and that as such they are contrasted with the surrounding white. Similarly, when I meet a man in the street, I know him for a man, but I do not usually say to myself “this is a man,” or go through any process akin to the act of judging which would be expressed in this verbal statement. It is no exaggeration to say that by far the greater part of what we know or believe is thus taken for granted, without any acts of asserting or believing. Even what we do assert is picked out from a complex background which is not asserted but merely known.” (Stout, God & Nature, 275)

“If I say, “The sun has dark spots on it”, this presupposes that there is a sun with all the qualities and relation which give the word “sun” meaning and significance for me; yet I am not asserting that there is a sun, and I am not asserting anything of it except that it has dark spots. The distinction is well illustrated by that between the merely attributive and the predicative use of adjectives. In the statement that “The white horse is lame”, whiteness is not affirmed of the horse as lameness is, yet the horse is known or believed to be white. The act of asserting or believing arises only when the thought of alternatives is in some way suggested. When I see a man plainly, I take him for a man without mentally affirming that he is so. But if I see something dimly in the distance, and want to know what it is, then, if on approaching it my curiosity is satisfied, I mentally make the judgment which would be expressed in the words “it’s a man” or “it’s a tree”. Though for the most part I simply see the sun as shining without asserting that it shine, yet if I happen to think of yesterday’s rain and this suggests the thought that it might have been raining now, I acknowledge, with or without words, that “the sun is shining today”. In general, the act of judging is always preconditioned by an interrogative attitude of mind. Alternatives are suggested, so that the question arises: Which is realized? The answer may follow so close on the heels of the question, that the question is, so to speak, suppressed at its birth. I say to a man, “Are you sober?” and he replies at once, “Of course I am”. In his mind, if not in mine, the question is answered as soon as asked. If would never have occurred to him if I had not thrust it upon him.” (Stout, God & Nature, 275-276)

“In what sense then does the act of judgment consist? It consists in concentrating on one alternative as if there were no others. If the discarded alternatives are before the mind at all, they are not so in the same sense. They may be present as alternative answers to the question “What might be or might have been?” not to the question “What is or may be?” There is a close analogy between the act of judging and that of voluntary decision. The difference lies in the nature of the initial question, which is not “What alternative is in fact real?” but “What alternative shall I make real?” The act of deciding, like that of judging, consists in fixing the attention on one alternative and withdrawing it from others. When the thought of something to be done occupies attention, bodily action follows of itself, so far as it is otherwise in our power.” (Stout, God & Nature, 277)

(IX) Knowledge, being a Condition of all Subjective Acts, Cannot itself be a Subjective Act 
“We conclude then that acts of judging and supposing, as well as acts of questioning, doubting, inquiring, though they essentially imply cognition as their precondition, are not themselves cognitive. The decision between alternatives in an act of judgment is, like an act of voluntary choice, a phase of conative process; it presupposes knowledge, but the character on account of which we call it an act is conative, not cognitive. When we consider knowledge in abstraction from all such states and processes, it is impossible to detect in it any act of knowing distinct from its object, as, for instance, desire is distinct from what is desired. There can be no subjective act or state of this sort without an object to which it is directed. But the object is an object for a subject only if and so far as it is already known or thought of. Knowledge, then, is a logical pre-condition of all subjective acts or states, and therefore cannot itself be a subjective act or state. To be an object for me, it is not enough that a thing should have being apart from me. As known or thought of it must be, to use the phrase of ordinary language, “in the mind.” Whether I assert or deny, doubt or suppose that pigs have wings, or inquire whether they have them, or desire that they should have them, or am pleased that they do have them, I must already know what is meant by “pigs having wings”.” (Stout, God & Nature, 277) 
“If this analysis is correct, there is no distinction between known and being known at all analogous to that between striking and being struck, or even to that of being above and being below. The difference is only in the point of view from which the same fact is regarded. When I say “I know something” I emphasize the relation which it thereby acquires with my mind-complex as a whole. It is connected with other things known within my cognitive unity. It is an actual or possible object of my subjective states or processes, such as desire and aversion. On the other hand, when I say, “This is known to be,” though all these relations to my mental complex as a whole are implied, they are not especially emphasized. Knowledge is rather considered from the point of view of the thing, and stress is laid on the distinction between being known and being unknown.” (Stout, God & Nature, 277-278) 
(X) “Knownness” is Not a Passing State of What is Known but a Unique Fact 
“What account are we to give of this distinction? Plainly “knownness,” if we may be allowed the word, has no separate existence as a distinct particular by the side of what is known. Knownness is only abstractly distinguishable from what is known. Are we then to regard it as a passing state of what is known, so that the transition from being unknown to being known is like that from what solid to water fluid? The suggested analogy breaks down in essential respects. (1) In the first place, seeing that the same being may be simultaneously known to many distinct individuals, we should have to ascribe to it as many numerically distinct states indistinguishable in kind, existing together. It is as if we were to attribute to the same water several distinct fluidities at once. (2) In the second place, the supposed state of being known involves no change or difference in the qualities and relations which belong to the thing as unknown. There cannot be any alteration in these. Otherwise, it would not be what was previously unknown that became known. It is not a passage from one positive state to another incompatible with it, which ceases to exist in the transition. Being unknown is not such a positive state. It is only the absence of knownness. (3) Clearly connected with this is another essential distinction. Knownness is not merely one character among others. It has the unique peculiarity of qualifying all the other characters, at least potentially.” (Stout, God & Nature, 278-279) 
“When we say that a piece of water is fluid, it is not implied that its transparency, or specific gravity, or bulk or shape is fluid. It is meaningless to assert that its fluidity is itself fluid, or that its previously solid state is fluid, or that the change from this to the fluid state is fluid. Yet all this is capable of being known. Even the character of being known, and the difference between being known and being unknown, and the passage from being known to being unknown are facts of which we are cognizant. As we have seen, even in ignorance, and more definitely in inquiry, we at least know the unknown as such. For these reasons, we must refuse to regard knownness either as a state of what is known or as a relation, whether external or internal, to anything else.  It is a unique and ultimate fact for which all analogies break down when they are pushed too far. But since we must refer to it in some language, we have to select terms for the purpose. The usage of the schoolmen, though not satisfactory, seems on the whole best to supply what is required. The difference between being known and being unknown to this or that individual was described by them as a difference between two ways of being, two manners of existing. The being which belongs to things even when they are unknown is called by them “formal” being. The way of being which consists in being known, is called “objective” being, because through it things are objects for a mind. They are also said to have “intentional” being, inasmuch as the mind is intended or directed towards them. The word “intentional” implies an act, and for the schoolmen it implied that knowledge itself is an act. But we may interpret it as meaning that form of being which is necessary in order that anything may be the object of a subjective state or activity. Whatever is to be the object of attention or desire or hope or fear, must first be an object, i.e., it must be known or thought of.” (Stout, God & Nature, 279-280) 
“This account of knowledge is in no way inconsistent with what is fundamentally true in neo-realism, the position that knowing in no way alters the being of what is known. On the contrary, nothing can be or become known except insofar as it has formal being. There is no being which merely consists in being perceived or thought of. The formal being need not, of course, be actual particular existence. It includes what belongs to universal and logical possibilities or impossibilities. But even impossibilities could not be known as such if they did not exist as such.” (Stout, God & Nature, 280) 
Chapter XVIII—“Idealism and the Universal Mind”
(I) The Idealist Doctrine that there can be no Unknown Being 
“Before turning to unity of interest, there is a problem with which we are now in a position to deal, of central significance in its bearing on the ultimate nature of the whole universe of being. In what precedes I have taken for granted that “formal being” is quite independent of being known within the unity of the mind-complex. This would only be denied by a solipsist who took himself for the sole self-complete being. But it is another question whether anything can have being which is unknown to any mind. This is the vital issue between idealists and their opponents. The idealist contends that unknown being is an impossible abstraction. When he attempts to realize in thought being separate from knowing, he finds the same sort of difficulty as he does in attempting to conceive knowing without anything known. It appears evident to him that absolutely unknown being is an abstraction which cannot subsist by itself. If this is not clear to others, he has ways and means of making them see it. He asks them to consider such entities as universals, possibilities, relations and forms of unity, the past as such and the future as such. Can these, he asks, be supposed to have being apart from any mind which conceives them? From the plain man and from everybody except the modern school of neo-realists he will get the answer which he expects. They will acknowledge that such entities, at least, are nothing apart from thinking minds. Only actual particulars, they will say, can have being without being known or thought of. Many philosophers, the nominalists and conceptualists, would add that only actual particulars can have a being which does not consist in being thought of. Only these have formal reality. Universals and possibilities are, in Locke’s language, “the work of the understanding”. They are, so to speak, merely devices framed by the mind in order to enable it to deal with particulars.” (Stout, God & Nature, 281-282) 
“At this point the idealist steps in and, as I should state his case, argues as follows: It is impossible to regard universals, relations and possibilities as superadded by the knowing mind to an independent reality which in itself is complete without them. On the contrary, the merely particular and actual is an impossible abstraction which cannot have being by itself. It cannot merely exist, it must have a nature. It must have a “whatness” as well as “thatness”. But if particulars have a nature, they must share a general nature. The only reason why we cannot know them except as belonging to sorts and kinds and classes, is that they cannot exist except as belonging to sorts and kinds and classes. It is true that our appreciation of the general nature of things is limited by the limitation of the knowledge and interest due to the conditions of finite existence. But the apprehension of particular existences is limited in the same way. Attention may select certain general aspects and certain particular existences rather than others. But to select is not to create. The same holds for possibilities. These are founded in the general nature of things. The universal has possible as well as actual instances. It holds still more obviously for relations. How could the knowing mind superinduce relations on an initial multiplicity of unrelated particulars? In order to do so, it is a logical precondition that it should first know them in their relation, and then, so to speak, weave a web of relations between them. But it is impossible to see how the relating process could begin. In knowing the absolutely disjointed items, knowledge would itself be split up into as many disjointed cognitions. There could be no unity of knowledge. For this consists of knowledge of unity, and cannot therefore exist where there is no unity to know.” (Stout, God & Nature, 282) 
(II) Two Forms of the Idealist View of the Relation between Knowing and Being, and the Neo-Realist’s Case Against Both 
“It follows that universals and their possible instances and relations belong to the constitution of the universe, just as truly as actually existing particulars. They must therefore be treated on the same footing as regards their dependence on knowledge or independence of it. Now the idealist takes it as an undeniable fact that universals, possibilities and relations owe their being to thought, or at least presuppose it. Hence he maintains that all being depends on a knowing mind, or at least presupposes it. Here there are two alternatives. The connexion may be treated as an essential correlation or interdependence, so that neither can be without the other. Or, again, it may be taken as one-sided dependence, so that the mind is regarded as creating its objects. Many, if not most, idealists seem to favor the second view. I cannot follow them; and if idealism means this, I am not an idealist. T.H. Green, for instance, does not question Locke’s position that universals and ideas of relation, and the possibilities which Locke calls ‘modes’, are the work of the understanding. What he insists on is that, if this be so, the same must be true of all being. But as the universe is plainly not the creation of a finite individual, it must ultimately be due to a universal mind. Hence Green infers that there must be an absolute spiritual principle of unity, which not only unites differences but creates them by its own self-differentiation. Fichte and (at least according to some of his interpreters) Hegel too, teach a similar doctrine.” (Stout, God & Nature, 283) 
“Let us now consider the position of the opponents and critics of both forms of the idealist view. We may take as its most adequate representative the modern school of neo-realists, or at least those of them who show a general understanding of the point at issue. These agree with the idealists that in relation to knowledge all forms of being are to be treated as on the same footing. But instead of holding that they are all equally inseparable from knowledge, they maintain the exact opposite. They maintain that, if there were no cognitive minds in existence, all forms of being might subsist unaltered, except of course the minds themselves, and facts about them. With this reservation they hold that it is quite indifferent to the being of universals and relations, as well as that of particulars, whether they are known to anyone or not. They say the same for possibilities and probabilities, unless indeed they quite unjustifiably regard them as due merely to the imperfection of our knowledge.” (Stout, God & Nature, 283-284)
“The neo-realist’s position is ultimately founded on the principle which we have already recognized as true, the principle that knowing cannot make or modify what is known. This excludes the possibility that the knowing mind in any way generates or produces its own objects. But it does not necessarily follow that anything can have being without being known. For that a further assumption is needed, which does indeed imply the general principle, but is not implied by it. This assumption is contained in the peculiar neo-realist theory of knowledge as an external relation between mutually exclusive entities—on the one side, the mind with its cognitive acts; on the other, what is known to it. On this view it is as absurd to say that nothing can exist unknown to any mind, as it would be to say that a pen cannot exist except when someone is holding it, or that an inkpot cannot exist except when it is placed on some desk. But I have already examined this theory at length, and found it untenable. If idealism is taken to mean that knowledge as such produces or generates what is known, I agree with the neo-realist in rejecting it. But I cannot accept his view that knowledge, being an external relation, it is ultimately accidental to being that it should be known. On the contrary, I am so far an idealist that for me knowing and being are inseparably united as ultimate and coessential aspects of the universe as a whole. Idealism, as thus defined, seems to be a necessary corollary of that view of the nature of knowledge which I reached in my last chapter. It follows from this position, as well as from that of the neo-realist, that knowledge does not produce or alter what is known.” (Stout, God & Nature, 284-285) 
(III) There Must Always Have Been Knowing Minds or a Knowing Mind
“If we set aside as untenable the external relation theory, it remains for us to consider how the ultimate question between idealism and neo-realism is affected by the general principle that knowledge cannot make or modify its objects. This principle, so far from affording support to neo-realism, seems to constitute the strongest ground for rejecting it, and for accepting instead the inseparable unity of knowledge and being in the ultimate constitution of the universe. When a finite individual comes to know what he did not know before, what he comes to know is not altered in any of the characters or relations which belongs to it as unknown. If any of these characters or relations were transformed in the process, he could not be said to know what he previously did not know, but something else instead. It follows that if knowledge does not pre-exist, there is no possible change or transformation of what does pre-exist by which it can become known.  No modification in the qualities of pre-existing beings in their relations or interactions, or the forms of unity in which they are combined will give the required result. In a universe of absolutely unknown being, nothing could change into a known being. It follows that since there are knowing minds now, there must always have been knowing minds, or at least one knowing mind.” (Stout, God & Nature, 285)
When a mind, M, comes to know a thing which it did not know before, what M comes to know is not altered or modified in any of the qualities or relations which belong to the thing as unknown to M. Why is this? It is so, because if any of the qualities or relations of the thing unknown to M were altered or modified in the transition from the thing’s being unknown to M into its being known to M, then the thing M comes to know would not be the thing which was previously unknown to M, but something different. It follows that no alterations or changes in the qualities and relations of what is unknown to any M could result in any M coming to know it. However, this entails that that in a universe where nothing is known to any M, no changes in the qualities or relations in those unknown beings could result in said unknown beings becoming known to any M. And since no alterations or modifications in the qualities and relations of unknown beings could result in said unknown beings becoming known to any M, it follows that in a universe where something is currently known to one or more M, there was never a time when nothing was known to one or more M in that universe. But in a universe wherein there was never a time when nothing was known to one or more M, it follows that there must always have been a knowing M, or at least one knowing M, in that universe. Therefore, since there is something currently known to one or more M in our universe, it follows that there must always have been a knowing M, or at least one knowing M, in our universe.

Thursday, September 15, 2022

Edmund Hollands’ “Neo-Realism and Idealism” (1907)

The following hand-written notes outline Edmund H. Hollands’ “Neo-Realism and Idealism.” The article was delivered as an address to the American Philosophical Association on December 27th, 1907 at Cornell University. Hollands was an Objective Idealist who gallantly defended Idealism from the attacks of the British and American Neo-Realists. 








Tuesday, June 7, 2022

Reading Notes: June 7th, 2022

“After a study of the possible issues, the Committee presented, as the first of its questions for debate, the following: “In cases where a real (and non-hallucinatory) object is involved, what is the relation between the real and the perceived object with respect (a) to their numerical identity at the moment of perception, (b) with respect to the possibility of the existence of the real object at other moments apart from any perception?” This question was to be understood by all who were to cooperate, as determined by the meanings assigned by the Committee to the terms “object,” “perceived object,” and “real object.” The definitions of these terms, as printed in the Committee’s report, are as follows: “By object in this discussion shall be meant any complex of physical qualities, whether perceived or unperceived and whether real or unreal. By real objects is meant in this discussion such objects as are true parts of the material world. By perceived object is meant in this discussion an object given in some particular actual perception.” It appears, from the context, and from the formulation of the question for debate quoted above, that the Committee very naturally laid some stress upon the fact that what is meant by “some particular actual perception” involved an occurrence at some “moment of time,” called also “the moment of perception”; or, again, involved some determinate set or sequence of such momentary occurrences, “in some particular individuated stream of perceptions,” that is, in the mind or in the experience of some person….The Committee did not define what it meant by the adjective “given,” used in the above-cited definition of “perceived object”….As a fact, however, their definition of the term “perceived object,” taken together with their formulation of their question, and the context in which they used the which they are used the word given, involved a very serious interference with the range of the cooperation which they invited. For what is “given” in a “moment of perception,” and what is not “given at a particular moment,” and the sense in which what is “given” can also be an “object”—all these matters are not topics of a merely pedantic curiosity about words. They are matters which have been lengthily, frequently, and momentously discussed, both in the controversies about perception and in other philosophical inquiries.” (Royce, On Definitions and Debates, 237) 
“In The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (1885), ideas are taken to be representations of real objects. As images of what is perceived or thought, a man’s ideas are all that is present to his mind. These ideas are the only content of his thought, and the objects represented remain outside his thought. To this extent the position of subjective idealism is correct, i.e. “my mind can be concerned only with its own ideas.” But an immediate problem for a subjective idealist is to account for the difference between truth and error. If all I think about will be my ideas, and what they represent are but other ideas of mine, then to assert anything about them must be correct. In that case, sincerity and truth are identical, for when I assert anything there is no reference to anything outside of my own thought. As long as I honestly consult my own ideas, I cannot be in error. The truth of my ideas, however, is commonly taken to be their correspondence to the objects they represent. There is a “commonplace assumption” that error is possible, that an assertion can fail to agree with a real object outside of thought. But how is one to judge if this particular assertion is true or false? To answer that, Royce considers what role the judgment plays in human cognition. It is not an act distinct from that of understanding. That is, the judgment by itself has no intelligible object other than the ideas present to all thought. Royce concludes that the judgment synthesizes my ideas—a position he explicitly avows to be neo-Kantian. But if the judgment reaches no object beyond ideas, the common-sense belief in error must either be abandoned or supplemented. The former course is impossible, for in choosing it one would be admitting the common-sense knowledge had been in error. To state “error is impossible” as a remedy for a mistaken assumption is clearly contradictory. So that latter course alone proves viable. Since no single judgment can be an error (for it reaches no object beyond itself), there must be a higher thought that includes both the judgment and its real object. By comparing the two, this higher thought determines whether the first thought was true or false. Left to itself, the latter remains a fragment “neither true nor false, objectless, no complete act of thought at all.” This is a very brief sketch of Royce’s method of presupposition by denial. He begins with the fact of error in the world, and concludes to an Absolute Thought.” (Zanardi, Idea and Absolute in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce, 10-11) [Underlining is mine]
“What follows is a summarized version of Royce’s more lengthy argument. The fact of error is undeniable; to deny this is to contradict oneself, for how else can this fact be refuted if not by proving it erroneous? Each error implies a judgment whose intended object is other than my ideas and so lies beyond my judgment. Such an object will also be an object of a corresponding true judgment. Since the existence of error implies a higher thought, it will be this thought that contains the object of both the true and false judgments. Since the possibilities of error are infinite, the inclusive thought must be infinite. And since error is possible not only as regards objects but also as regards relations, all possible relations in the world must be present to this infinite thought. Finally, to know all relations at once is to know them in absolute rational unity, i.e. as one single thought….Even if one were to find fault with his argument, the error charged to Royce’s position is alleged to prove the existence of Absolute Thought. It alone knows the real and can compare a judgment with its intended object. Royce offers other arguments for the existence of Absolute Thought. The problem of knowing other minds is an instance of employing the already cited view of human understanding. My idea of another person can only be true or false if there is a third party to compare my idea with the real person. There is also a problem of relating a past idea to a present thought. The past idea was unique in its separate existence and in its view of the future. To determine the identity between its conception of the future and the present thought’s conception of what now has become reality requires an inclusive thought which compare them. How else could my past thought have made any assertion about a future moment? Royce refutes a response that rests on verifying a prediction only upon its fulfillment or failure to occur. My memory of an original thought differs from it and so is still in need of a comparison with that original thought. Again, Royce appeals to a higher thought to make a synthesis of what to the human knower are disparate ideas.” (Zanardi, Idea and Absolute in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce, 11-12) [Underlining is mine] 
Royce’s argument is genius. However, the implicit Neo-Kantianism weakens it greatly. I have attempted to transpose the argument into less “subjectivistic” form that still arrives at Royce’s intended result: 
If erroneous judgments are possible, then all of the necessary conditions underlying this possibility actually exist. Erroneous judgments are possible. Therefore, all of the necessary conditions for the possibility of erroneous judgments actually exist. A necessary condition for the possibility of an erroneous judgment is for the erroneous judgment to fail to agree with that which the thought making the erroneous judgment has intended for its object. But that which the thought making the erroneous judgment has intended for its object can only be that which is known to the thought making the erroneous judgment. Therefore, a necessary condition for the possibility of an erroneous judgment is for the erroneous judgment to fail to agree with that which is known to the thought making the erroneous judgment. But an erroneous judgment cannot fail to agree with that which is known to the thought making the erroneous judgment unless the erroneous judgment is known as being in error with respect to its intended object. Therefore, a necessary condition for the possibility of an erroneous judgment is for the erroneous judgment to be known as being in error with respect to its intended object. But an erroneous judgment is known as being in error with respect to its intended object only insofar as the erroneous judgment and its intended object are known to a thought which compares them, and judges the erroneous judgment to be in error with respect to its intended object. Therefore, a necessary condition for the possibility of an erroneous judgment is for the erroneous judgment and its intended object to be known to a thought which compares them, and judges the erroneous judgment to be in error with respect to its intended object. Therefore, since all of the necessary conditions for the possibility of erroneous judgments actually exist, it follows that for every erroneous judgment that exists, there actually exists a thought which knows said erroneous judgment and its intended object, compares them, and judges the erroneous judgment to be in error with respect to its intended object. There exists at least one erroneous judgment that had the Universe as a whole (and every aspect of it) as its intended object. Therefore, there actually exists a thought which knows said erroneous judgment and the Universe as a whole (and every aspect of it), compares them, and judges the erroneous judgment to be in error with respect to the Universe as a whole (and every aspect of it). A thought which knew the aforementioned erroneous judgment and the Universe as a whole (and every aspect of it), compared them, and judged the erroneous judgment to be in error with respect to the Universe as a whole (and every aspect of it) would be an all-knowing, Absolute Thought. Therefore, since all of the necessary conditions for the possibility of erroneous judgments actually exist, and there exists at least one erroneous judgment that had the Universe as a whole (and every aspect of it) as its intended object, it follows that there actually exists an all-knowing, Absolute Thought. Q.E.D. 

Monday, May 23, 2022

A Brief Outline of Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability

P1) If (i) all truths are knowable, and (ii) there exists an unknown truth, X, then “X & X is unknown” is a truth.

P2) If “X & X is unknown” is a truth, then, ex hypothesi, it is possible to know that “X & X is unknown.”

C1) Therefore, if (i) all truths are knowable, and (ii) there exists an unknown truth X, then it is possible to know that “X & X is unknown.” [From P1 and P2]

P3) It is not possible to know that “X & X is unknown”—on pain of contradiction.

C2) Therefore, if (i) all truths are knowable, then it is not the case that (ii) there exists an unknown truth—on pain of contradiction. [From C1 and P3]

Defense of P3

P1) If it is possible to know that “X & X is unknown,” then it is possible to know that “X” when it is known that “X is unknown.”

P2) If it is known that “X is unknown”, then “X is unknown” is true.

P3) If “X is unknown” is true, then it is the case that “X” is unknown.

P4) If it is the case that “X” is unknown, then it is not the case that it is known that “X”.

C1) Therefore, if it is possible to know that “X & X is unknown,” then it is possible to know that “X” when it is not the case that it is known that “X”. [From P1—P4]

P5) It is not possible to know that “X” when it is not the case that it is known that “X”.

C2) Therefore, it not is possible to know that “X & X is unknown.” [From C1 and P5]

Wednesday, May 4, 2022

My Adaptation of the Causal Closure Argument for Idealism

P1) All events share one and the same irreducible ontological type.

“In the first place a relation, if it is to be a relation at all, must unite some terms. Secondly, most, if not all, kinds of relation presuppose a specific common character, usually or always of the type called by Mr. Johnson a determinable in the related terms, without which the assertion of the specific relation would be not merely false but absurd…” (Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, 128)

“Spatial relations presuppose in this way the common determinable of extension….the relation of similarity presupposes some common determinable in the determinate value of which the objects are said to be similar, the relations of enmity or love the common determinable of emotional capacity, the relation of causality the common character of being events or continuants in time, and perhaps membership in some specific causal system…..[A relation] could not be present at all if its terms were not characterized by a certain determinable and if their determinate qualities within this and other subordinate determinables did not fall within certain limits….” (Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, 129-130)
“There can be no experience of plurality, whether of beings, qualities or events, that are absolutely disparate and disconnected—that is certain. All experienced diversity implies some identity; and, for the matter of that, all experienced identity some diversity. All this is so much logical commonplace. From this it follows that to every known or knowable Many there will be some common term applicable to them all, which logically unifies them all.” (Ward, The Realm of Ends, 222) 
“Every relation implies an identity underlying the manifest difference in the terms…” (Carr, A Theory of Monads, 1) 
“Neither duality nor multiplicity is conceivable without that unity whereby the two engender that whole in which the two units are connected, even though they mutually exclude one another: without that unity which fuses and unifies every multiplicity determined in a number, which correlates among themselves the units which constitute the number. We could strip multiplicity of all unity only by not thinking it. But then in the gloom of what is not thought, multiplicity truly enough would not be unity, but it would not even be multiplicity, because it could not be anything at all. Or, if we prefer, it would be absolutely unthinkable.” (Gentile, The Reform of Education, 107)

P2) There is at least one event that has occurred that is irreducibly “mental” in ontological type. 

C1) Therefore, all events are irreducibly “mental” in ontological type. [From P1 and P2]
This argument is inspired by “The Argument from Mental Causation.” I would like to present several passages which render the premises more plausible:
“For our idea of causation is not derived from without, but from within, and what we call the evidence of physical causation is really only certain wholly mental modifications following one another in definite sequence.  Hence, we can have no evidence of causation proceeding from Object to Subject.  The mind, therefore, cannot prove its own causation from matter or motion, because all evidence of that must itself be mental evidence and nothing but mental, and hence it is as impossible for the mind thus to prove its own causation as it is for water to rise above its source.” (Thomson, Materialism and Modern Physiology of the Nervous System, 3-4) 
“Let us now consider Causality. This cannot, any more than Substantiality, be a sensation. Our senses, no doubt, can give us two sensations in succession, though it does not follow that the senses alone would render us conscious that they were in succession. But causality involves not only that B follows A, but that B is there because A was there before it, and that B would not have been there without A. Now this is not a matter for the senses. Can we see that the smoke which is before us would not be there if there had been no fire? We see what is, but we cannot see what is not, or what might have been. If we saw causality, then causality, like all other objects of sight, must be an extended and colored surface, which it is not. Nor would it be more possible to hear, or touch, or smell, or taste it. Causality, then, like Substantiality, is not a sensation but an idea. Whenever we say that A is the cause of B, the mind makes a judgment, and it is only through such judgment that we get the idea of causality at all. If the mind confined itself to receiving what the sensations bring it, causality would be unknown to it. And the conception of matter would be meaningless if causality were withdrawn. If the movement of one piece of matter did not cause the movement of another, if matter did not cause sensations in us, the whole of science would be upset. And with it would go all our reasons for believing in matter, since the justification of our belief in matter is the success of science in explaining the world by means of it. In particular, the attempt to explain spirit as a form of the activity of matter clearly implies causality. For it explains the transformation of activity into the form of consciousness as due to the particular conditions which it meets within in the human body, and thus makes those circumstances the cause of the transformation.” (McTaggart, Some Considerations Relating to Human Immortality, 160-161) 
“Causality is not an external relation—that is, a relation existing independently of consciousness….Now, if causality be mental, the facts connected by causality must be mental facts; in other words, the causal relation, being through and through mental, cannot extend beyond mind….If causality is a purely mental connection, it surely cannot be a bridge between the mental and the non-mental....Objects inferred to exist are…none the less objects of consciousness, objects “present to the mind.” But nothing which is present to the mind can possess an existence independent of mind. It is then a contradiction in terms to teach that the mind must infer (whatever be the principle of inference) the existence of external objects; for it is the nature of such objects to be independent of consciousness….Descartes and the other dualists had taught that matter, namely, reality independent of consciousness, must exist as cause of our perceptions. In reply to this…causality is a relation within consciousness and consequently cannot assure us of the reality of anything outside consciousness; and second, whatever the basis of the inference, inferred objects must be known objects, objects present to the mind, and cannot therefore be possessed of independent existence….Causality is no character or relation of things independent of consciousness, and that, on the contrary, causality is a transition of the mind, a mental connection…this mental transition [is] “thought”….Unity and causality are mental activities, ways in which we think.” (Calkins, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 170-219) 
“What, it will be asked, is a whole? It is defined ordinarily in some such fashion: the sum of the relations of distinct yet connected parts. What, then, is a relation? It cannot, in the first place, be external to the parts which it relates, else it would still be another reality and would itself need to be related with all the rest; and the new relation would again need relating, and so on ad infinitum. A relation external to the terms related would, in a word, be useless to them: it could not be their relation. As Hegel says, in “a unity of differents…, a composite, an aggregate…, the objects remain independent and…external to each other.” And yet, though a relation cannot be external to the terms which it relates, neither can it be a quality inherent in any or in every one of them. For the quality, or attribute, or function, which is in a particular reality, cannot be the bond between that particular and some other. In other words, if ultimate reality were a composite of completely related terms, and if the relations between the terms were qualities of the terms, each for each, then the relations would themselves need relating with each other, for each would belong to some particular reality. There is no escape from this difficulty except by the abandonment of the conception of ultimate reality as a composite, and the alternative conception of it as a whole which is also a singular, an absolute reality whose unique nature is manifested in the particular realities which form its parts. These parts, therefore, need no external relation; they are related in that they are alike expressions of the one reality.” (Calkins, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 380-381) 
“We ordinarily employ the category of causality to relate one part of experience to another, a change to an antecedent change. Thus in its very form causality presupposes distinction within experience, and accordingly this relativity within experience ceases the very moment that the part coincides with the whole.” (Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, 410) 
“Among the chief categories which are commonly regarded as applicable to experience, is the category of causality….The true meaning which causality has for us is rooted in the realization of our own efficiency, as active individuals. The active individual is the “cause.” The end which his (generally purposive) activity accomplishes is the “effect.” The scientific method, however, takes the sequences which occur in experience as they stand and determines what may truly be said of them per se. In the first place, it finds that sequences continually recur sufficiently similar in nature to admit of a considerable degree of general characterization. Secondly, it follows that a general proposition may be affirmed with regard to each recurring sequence, whereby the occurrence of one event may be inferred from the occurrence of another event. Thirdly, there is no guarantee (except the rather doubtful one of probability) that such propositions will continue to hold in the future. Finally, it is seen that we can go no further than this from the objective standpoint of science. It might also be pointed out that, strictly speaking, the term  “causal law” ought not to be applied at all to such propositions as we have been considering. For, in view of the concrete meaning which “cause” has for us, the word “causal” implies that the sequences to which the propositions refer, have their ground in the activity of individuals.” (Richardson, Spiritual Pluralism, 30-37)

Friday, March 18, 2022

My Adaptation of A.E. Taylor’s Argument for Idealism

P1) If X is a real physical object at T1, then X is perceivable at T1.
Prima facie, it seems that the difference between a “real” physical object and an “unreal” physical object is nothing other than the following: a “real” physical object either is, or could be, the perceptum (i.e., object) of a perceptual state, whilst an “unreal” or merely “imaginary” physical object neither is, nor could be, the perceptum of a perceptual state. Indeed, Kant insisted upon this in his critique of the ontological proof. For Kant, the difference between a “real” physical object and its merely “imagined” or “unreal” counterpart, lied in the fact that the “real” physical object—unlike the merely “imaginary” or “unreal” physical object—is, or could be, the perceptum of a perceptual state. Taking a hundred dollars as his example, Kant pointed out that the “real” hundred dollars are, or could be, something felt, touched, and handled; seen, smelled, and tasted; exchanged for a currency of a different type, used for purchasing goods and services in the market, or simply deposited in a bank for future use. The “imaginary” hundred dollars, on the other hand, neither are, nor could be, felt, touched, and handled; seen, smelled, and tasted; exchanged for a currency of a different type, used for purchasing goods and services in the market, or simply deposited in a bank for future use.
With that being said, it is crucial to recognize that to “imagine” something is not to “perceive” what is being “imagined.”  Whenever I “imagine” anything, there is always a distinction between my psychical act of “imagining” and the “imaginatum” which I am “imagining.” My psychical act of “imagining” the “imaginary” hundred dollars is certainly “real” and not “imaginary,” because the psychical act of “imagining” is one with, and enters into, my Experience, it is something that I am actually doing. On the other hand, the “imaginatum” that I am “imagining” (i.e., the “unreal” or “imaginary” hundred dollars”) neither is, nor can be, something that enters into my Experience. If one muddles the distinction between the “imagining” and the “imaginatum,” then one inevitably falls into one of the following two absurdities: (a) they end up committing themselves to the “reality” of griffins, round-squares, and leprechauns because they collapse the “unreal” “imaginatum” into the “real” psychical act of “imagining;” or (b) they end up committing themselves to the “unreality” of psychical acts of “imagining” because they collapse the psychical act of “imagining” into the “unreal” “imaginatum.” For a further defense of this premise, confer the passages from Taylor’s works below.
P2) If X is perceivable at T1, then all of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 are themselves real at T1.
 
P3) If all of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 are themselves real at T1, then all of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 are themselves perceivable at T1.
 
P4) If all of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 are themselves perceivable at T1, then none of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 are themselves imperceptible at T1.
 
P5) If none of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 are themselves imperceptible at T1, then none of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 have the property of “being unperceived at T1.” 
If X has both the property of “being perceivable at T1” and the property of “being unperceived at T1,” that would mean it is possible to perceive X at T1—the time at which X also has the property of being unperceived—but this is a contradiction. Indeed, it is just as contradictory to assert that X, when perceived, is imperceptible. Therefore, if X has the property of “being perceivable at T1,” then X cannot also have the property of “being unperceived at T1.” For a further defense of this premise, confer the passages from Taylor’s works below.
C1) Therefore, if X  is a real physical object at T1, then none of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 have the property of “being unperceived at T1.” [From P1—P5]
 
P6) One of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 is X itself.
 
C2) Therefore, if X is a real physical object at T1, then X  does not have the property of “being unperceived at T1.” [From C1 and P6]
 
P7) If X  does not have the property of “being unperceived at T1,” then X is not unperceived at T1.
 
P8) If X is not unperceived at T1, then X is perceived at T1.
 
C3) Therefore, if X is a real physical object at T1, then X is perceived at T1. [From C2—P8]
“And, as to the principle of the contention that presence in an experience is the very meaning of existence, it is, to my mind at least, as Mr. Bradley says it is to his, so evident that I should find it impossible to meet anyone who disputes it on common ground. Its full force will perhaps be best brought out by our disregarding the special grounds upon which it is supported by Berkeley, some of them only too insecure, and restating it in the form of a challenge. Produce, we may say to the objector, any piece of fact whatever of which you are prepared to maintain the real existence, and I will undertake to show that what makes it real can be nothing but its presence as an inseparable aspect of a sentient experience. What the special fact you choose for the purpose of the experiment may be, whether a physical quality or process, an artistic effect, or a moral excellence, makes no difference to the principle of the argument. For when you have chosen your fact, and made your assertion, “This fact, A, really exists,” we shall invite you to think, as you always can, of a corresponding A which is not real but merely imaginary, and then to say what it is that makes the difference between the real and the imaginary or unreal A. If you will try the experiment, you will always find, as Kant proved in the historical case of the hundred dollars, that the difference does not lie in the addition of a new predicate to those by which the imaginary A is characterized, but always in the actual presence of the real A to a sentient experience, its entrance into some immediately apprehended whole. Even in the case of an A which, for some reason or other, is wholly inaccessible to human perception you cannot really escape from this conclusion. For, suppose you say, “The ice at the South Pole really exists, though it is impossible for a human eye to behold it,” we shall invite you to explain more precisely what you mean by such a statement. You will then find yourself in a dilemma: either you mean that the Polar ice exists with all its qualities, including those which have no meaning at all except in relation to a perceiving organ, precisely as we should see it if we were there, and in that case the ice with all its qualities must presumably be always present, as such, to an experience which is not ours; or you mean that there really exist certain conditions, such that, on the addition of one further condition, the presence of a human spectator, they would yield a perception of the ice. But, not to insist on the point that the reality of a certain object and the reality of some of its conditions are not the same thing, what do you mean by a really existing condition as distinguished from one which is merely imagined to exist? Any answer to this question will show that the appeal to conditions only puts the difficulty back a stage, without in any way affecting the validity of the Berkeleian contention.” (Taylor, Mind and Nature, 58-59) 
“Reality...is truly known to be a connected and self-consistent, or internally coherent, system; can we with equal confidence say anything of the data of which the system is composed? Reflection should convince us that we can at least say as much as this: all the materials or data of reality consist of experience, experience being provisionally taken to mean psychical matter of fact, what is given in immediate feeling. In other words, whatever forms part of presentation, will, or emotion, must in some sense and to some degree possess reality and be a part of the material of which reality, as a systematic whole, is composed; whatever does not include, as part of its nature, this indissoluble relation to immediate feeling, and therefore does not enter into the presentation, will, and emotion, of which psychical life is composed, is not real. The real is experience, and nothing but experience, and experience consists of “psychical matter of fact.” Proof of this proposition can only be given in the same way as of any other ultimate truth, by making a trial of it; if you doubt it you may be challenged to perform the experiment of thinking of anything whatever, no matter what, as real, and then explaining what you mean by its reality. Thus suppose you say “I can think of A as real,” A being anything in the universe; now think, as you always can, of an imaginary or unreal A, and then try to state the difference between the A which is thought of as real and the A which is thought of as merely imaginary. As Kant proved, in the famous case of the real and the imagined hundred dollars, the difference does not lie in any of the qualities or properties of the two A’s; the qualities of the imagined hundred dollars are precisely the same as those of the real sum, only that they are “imaginary.” Like the real dollars, the imagined dollars are thought of as possessing such and such a size, shape, and weight; stamped with such and such an effigy and inscription; containing such and such a proportion of silver to alloy; having such and such a purchasing power in the present condition of the market, and so forth. The only difference is that the real dollars are, or under specified and known conditions may be, the objects of direct perception, while the imaginary ones, because imaginary, cannot be given in direct perception. You cannot see or handle them; you can only imagine yourself doing so. It is in this connection with immediate psychical fact that the reality of the real coins lies. So with any other instance of the same experiment. Show me, we might say, anything which you regard as real,—no matter what it is, a stone wall, an aesthetic effect, a moral virtue,—and I will ask you to think of an unreal and imaginary counterpart of that same thing, and will undertake to prove to you that what makes the difference between the reality and the imagination is always that the real thing is indissolubly connected with the psychical life of a sentient subject, and, as so connected, is psychical matter of fact.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 23-24) 
“Two points should be carefully noted if we wish to avoid serious misapprehension. It might be objected, by a disciple of Kant or of Mill, that a thing may be real without ever being given as actual psychical fact in immediate apprehension, so long as its nature is such that it would be psychical fact under known and specified conditions. Many, if not most, of the objects of scientific knowledge, it may be said, are of this kind; they have never entered, possibly never will enter, into the contents of any man’s direct apprehension, yet we rightly call them real, in the sense that they would be apprehended under certain known conditions. Thus I have never seen, and do not expect that any one will ever see, the centre of the earth, or, to take a still stronger case, no one has ever seen his own brain. Yet I call the centre of the earth or my own brain real, in the sense that if I could, without ceasing to live, penetrate to a certain depth below the soil, I should find the centre of the earth; if an opening were made in my skull, and a suitable arrangement of mirrors devised, I should see the reflection of my own brain. A comet may be rushing through unpeopled space entirely unbeheld; yet it does not cease for all that to be real, for if I were there I should see it, and so forth. Hence the Kantian will tell us that reality is constituted by relation to possible experience; the follower of Mill, that it means “a permanent possibility of sensation.” Now, there is, of course, an element of truth in these arguments. It is true that what immediately enters into the course of my own direct perception is but a fragment of the full reality of the universe. It is true, again, that there is much which in its own nature is capable of being perceived by human beings, but will, as far as we can judge, never be perceived, owing to the physical impossibility of placing ourselves under the conditions requisite for perception; there are other things which could only be perceived if some modification could be effected in the structure of our perceptive organs. And it may therefore be quite sufficient for the purposes of some sciences to define these unperceived realities as “possibilities of sensations,” processes which we do not perceive but might perceive under known or knowable conditions. But the definition, it will be seen, is a purely negative one; it takes note of the fact that we do not actually perceive certain things, without telling us anything positive as to their nature. In Metaphysics, where we are concerned to discover the very meaning of reality, we cannot avoid asking whether such a purely negative account of the reality of the greater part of the universe is finally satisfactory. And we can easily see that it is not. For what do we mean when we talk of the “possible”? Not simply “that which is not actual,” for this includes the merely imaginary and the demonstrably impossible. The events of next week, the constitution of Utopia, and the squaring of the circle are all alike in not being actual. Shall we say, then, that the possible differs from the imaginary in being what would, under known conditions, be actual? But again, we may make correct inferences as to what would be actual under conditions suspected, or even known, to be merely imaginary, and no one will maintain that such consequences are realities. If I were at the South Pole I should see the Polar ice, and it is therefore real, you say, though no one actually sees it; but if wishes were horses, beggars would ride, yet you do not say that the riding of beggars is real. Considerations of this kind lead us to modify our first definition of the “possible” which is to be also real. We are driven to say that, in the case of the unperceived real thing, all the conditions of perception except the presence of a percipient with suitable perceptive organs, really exist. Thus the ice at the South Pole really exists, because the only unfulfilled condition for its perception is the presence at the Pole of a being with sense-organs of a certain type. But once more, what do we mean by the distinction between conditions which really exist? We come back once more to our original experiment, and once more, try as we will, we shall find that by the real condition as distinct from the imaginary we can mean nothing but a state of things which is, in the last resort, guaranteed by the evidence of immediate perception. If we take the term “actual” to denote that which is thus indissoluble from immediate apprehension, or is psychical matter of fact, we may sum up our result by saying we have found that the real is also actual, or that there is no reality which is not at the same time an actuality. We shall thus be standing on the same ground as the modern logicians who tell us that there is no possibility outside actual existence, and that statements about the possible, when they have any meaning at all, are always an indirect way of imparting information about actualities. Thus “There really exists ice at the South Pole, though no human eye beholds it,” if it is to mean anything, must mean either that the ice itself, as we should perceive it if we were there, or that certain unknown conditions which, combined with the presence of a human spectator, would yield the perception of the ice, actually exist as part of the contents of an experience which is not our own.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 24-26) 
“What our intellect can accept as finally real, we saw, must be indissolubly one with actual experience, and it must be an internally coherent system….When we say that a thing “is” or “has Being,” we seem primarily to mean that it is an object for the knowing consciousness, that it has its place in the system of objects which coherent thought recognizes. When we call the same object “real” or a “reality,” we lay the emphasis rather on the consideration that it is something of which we categorically must take account, whether we like it or not, if some purpose of our own is to get it fulfilment. Thus again the “non-existent” primarily means that which finds no place in the scheme of objects contemplated by consistent scientific thought; the “unreal,” that with which we have not, for any human purpose, to reckon.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 50-51) 
“Produce any instance you please, we said to the realist, whom we had not then learned to know by that name, of what you personally regard as reality, and we will undertake to show that it derives its reality for you from the very fact that it is not ultimately separable from the experience of a subject. A thing is real for you, and not merely imaginary, precisely because in some aspect of its character it enters into and affects your own experience. Or, what is the same thing in other words, it is real for you because it affects favourably or otherwise some subjective interest of your own. To be sure, the thing as it enters into your experience, as it affects your own subjective interests, is not the thing as it is in its fullness; it only touches your life through some one of its many sides. And this may lead you to argue that the real thing is the unexperienced “condition” of a modification of your experience. But then we had again to ask what you mean by saying that facts which you do not experience are real as “conditions” of what you do experience. And we saw that the only meaning we could attach to the reality of the “condition” was presence to an experience which transcends your own.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 69-70)
“To this general argument we may add two corollaries or supplementary considerations, which, without introducing anything fresh, may help to make its full force more apparent. (1) The argument, as originally presented, was concerned directly with the that of reality, the mere fact of its existence. But we may also state it, if we please, from the side of the what, the nature possessed by the real. You cannot affirm any doctrine about the real existence of anything without at the same time implying a doctrine about its nature. Even if you say “Reality is unknowable,” you are attributing something beyond mere independence of experience to your reality; you are asserting that what is thus independent possesses the further positive quality of transcending cognition. Now what, in logic, must be your ground for attributing this rather than any other quality to your independent reality? It can only be the fact or supposed fact…that our experiences themselves are all found to be self-contradictory. There is no ground for taking the unknowable of Reality to be true unless you mean by it a character which belongs not to something which stands outside all experience, but to experience itself. The same contention applies to any other predicate which the realist affirms as true of his ultimate reality. (2) Again, we may with effect present our argument in a negative form. Try, we may say, to think of the utterly unreal, and see how you will have to conceive it. Can you think of sheer unreality otherwise than as that of which no mind is ever aware, of which no purpose has ever to take account as a condition of its fulfilment? But to think of it thus is to attribute to it, as its definition, precisely that independence in which the realist finds the mark of ultimate reality. And if “independence” constitutes unreality, presence to and union with experience must be what constitutes reality.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 70) 
“The question, so interpreted, is indeed only a special case of the more general question, “Is anything what it is known as being, outside the experience in which it is so known?” To answer this question fully would take us much deeper into metaphysical controversy than we can reasonably desire to go in a work of which metaphysics is neither the only nor the principal subject, but we must, at any rate, briefly indicate the conclusions which would naturally follow from the view which has been enunciated in our opening chapter as to the scope and the methods of metaphysics. If our original conception of the metaphysical problem was a correct one, it is clear that metaphysics can never reveal to us any existence entirely beyond or entirely independent of an experience in which it forms an inseparable aspect. As we have indicated already, the whole problem of metaphysics is to construct a description of the world of experience which shall answer to our ideal of “pure” experience—that is, shall contain no single element which cannot be completely described in terms of experienced fact. Just in so far as metaphysics or any other branch of science departs from this ideal, and employs in its theories concepts which cannot be resolved into descriptions of experienced fact, it ceases to be fully and completely true and becomes infected to an unknown degree with errors and false assumptions, which it is the work of scientific progress to remove. Thus, as against certain forms of philosophic Realism, we feel bound to maintain that metaphysics is incapable of ever transcending that reference to actual or possible experience which is involved in every assertion about existence. What is means for us, as for the plain man, what is or what would, under definitely known conditions, be experienced by a consciousness, and wherever we find science and philosophy apparently transcending these limits, and informing us of the existence of objects which, from their nature, cannot as such be contents of any experience, we expect to detect the presence in scientific theory of “symbolic” and unreal concepts.” (Taylor, The Problem of Conduct: A Study in the Phenomenology of Ethics, 448-449) 
“We maintain, then, that taking existence in the full and proper sense of the terms, nothing ever is, outside the concrete experience in which it is an ingredient, what it is within that experience. The utmost reality that can be conceded to any object of experience outside the experience in which it is known, is the reality of certain conditions which, with the addition of the further condition of certain psychological dispositions in the percipient, will yield the experience of the object in question. And by the reality of these “conditions” we must once more mean, unless we are to play fast and loose with words, their presence as an ingredient in some other experience. We cannot too strongly insist that of “existence,” in any full sense of the word, we can form no notion whatever except as forming the content of an experience. As Mr. Bradley puts it, “being” is indissolubly one with “sentience.” That this truth is so frequently denied by realists and misconceived by idealists is probably to be accounted for by the general prevalence of a most unfortunate error in philosophical order. If, instead of treating experience as a kind of knowing, metaphysicians had treated knowing as a kind of experience, it would have been less easy to mistake the mere symbols of inadequate conceptual thought for transcendently real things existing outside of, and independently of, the experience in which they are thought of.” (Taylor, The Problem of Conduct: A Study in the Phenomenology of Ethics, 450)