Showing posts with label Arguments. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Arguments. Show all posts

Saturday, September 26, 2026

What does “Resistance” actually reveal?

What does “Resistance” actually “disclose”—when it is stripped and isolated from all other modes of sense experience and the qualities present therein? We find that “Resistance” gives us no solid, self-standing physical entity (neither as that which resists, nor as that which is resisted)

“[We] have no miraculous intuition of our body as spatial reality...” (F.H. Bradley, “Appearance and Reality,” 13)

“If we appeal to an immediate experience, which presents me with my body as something extended and solid, we are taking refuge in a world of exploded illusions. No such peculiar intuition can bear the light of a serious psychology. The internal feelings which I experience certainly give nothing of the sort; and again, even if they did, yet for natural science, they are no direct reality, but themselves, the states of a material nervous system. And to fall back on a supposed wholesale revelation of resistance would be surely to seek aid from that which cannot help. [I] For the revelation in the first place (as we have already perceived in Chapter X), is a fiction. [II] And, in the second place, resistance could not present us with a body independently real. [i.e., “Resistance”—by itself—e.g., abstracting it from those sensory modalities and qualities that we nevertheless find infused with that which “Resistance” delivers, discloses, or presents to us] [Resistance] could supply only the relation of one thing to another, where neither thing, as what resists, is a separate body, either apart from, or again in relation to, the other. Resistance could not conceivably tell us what anything is in itself. [Resistance] gives us one thing as qualified by the state of another thing, each within that known relation being only for the other, and, apart from it [i.e., apart from the relation], being unknown and, so far, a nonentity.” (F.H. Bradley, “Appearance and Reality,” 233)

“[If] we separate from extension all other qualities, it is doubtful or rather not doubtful whether it is the object we mean—but apart from that. The extended is not only relative in itself, but it is perceived only by relation to my body….Does touch extension tell us anything of the object? No, it is a reference of the modification of my limb to the object. Pressure and touch give feelings which are referred to object, not in their own quality, but as resisting limits or change of motion; and resistance and motion can (ex hyp.) be known to belong to the object only when perceived, and perception is here (ex hyp.) touch, i.e., relation. Apart from its relation to my body, the object is not extended. Its extension is a mere construction from our body. Nor is my body extended. For one part is known to be extended only in relation to another part, and neither by itself is extended at all.” (F.H. Bradley, “On Knowledge,” 277)

Thus, supposing that we have the occurrence of a felt “resistance,” what is present is the following:

A[Rb]—R—B[Ra]

Insofar as resistance alone is taken to supply a disclosure or revelation of anything as an independently existing physical entity, said disclosure or revelation would—within the situation in question—fail to supply one with a knowledge of “what” either term is apart from the other and the relation. Within the situation, A is specified and qualified by its resisting B, and B is specified and qualified by its resisting A; bare resistance supplies only a qualification by relation and does not disclose (when taken in isolation from all other sensorial and qualitative aspects of experience) “what” either thing—as “what resists”—actually is (and thus cannot serve as a disclosure of the (alleged) independently existing physical constitution of natural objects). We have only one thing which is qualified by a state of another thing; neither of which—when viewed solely from the standpoint of “Resistance”—is given as a solid and independent being; we cannot find here any self-standing physical substantive.

The terms of the relation end up involving contradictions when you try to take resistance as the sole means by which we have access to self-existent & independent “reals.”

Again, mere “resistance” gives us:

A[Rb]—R—B[Ra]

- “A” is that which “resists” “B.”

- “B” is that which “resists” “A.”

- The “what” of A, so far as it is “disclosed” by “resistance,” is exhausted by A’s relation to B.

- The “what” of B, so far as it is “disclosed” by “resistance,” is exhausted by B’s relation to A.

- A’s “what,” as “disclosed” by “resistance,” is A as qualified by its relation to B.

- B’s “what,” as “disclosed” by “resistance,” is B as qualified by its relation to A.

But what is either of the terms apart from their relation? Answer: Unknown. The relation—that of mere resistance—does not give us either term—neither singly nor together—as a solid and independently constituted physical reality. Each term, so far as it is “disclosed” by resistance, is qualified or infected by its relation to the other; on the one hand, the relation falls between the terms, and yet, on the other hand, the relation enters into the very being of the terms. So far from supplying us with immediate access to, or “acquaintance” with, one or more solid, self-standing, and independently constituted physical existents, the “Revelation of Resistance” (i.e., the obtaining of the relation as an occurrence within our experience) supplies us instead with terms whose respective “whats” mutually-condition and mutually-precipitate one another. If one were to ask, “Why doesn’t resistance give us an immediate revelation of an independently existing physical object?”, an answer is readily available: Resistance is a relation, and that relation does not announce (for us) what it is that resists; nor, again, what it is that is resisted; moreover, the relation itself is one in which both terms are qualified by their relation to the other. Additional characteristics must be “introduced” or “disclosed” by means not themselves supplied merely by the relation of resistance before we can ascribe to either term an independently physical and entitative character (or even a merely independent entitative character as such) which is apart from the relation.

My Version of F.H. Bradley’s “Body–Nature” Antinomy

“The word Nature has of course more meanings than one. I am going to use it here in the sense of the bare physical world, that region which forms the object of purely physical science, and appears to fall outside of all mind. Abstract from everything psychical, and then the remainder of existence will be Nature. It will be mere body or the extended, so far as that is not psychical, together with the properties immediately connected with or following from this extension….Our bodies with their organs are taken as the instruments and media, which should convey it as it is, and as it exists apart from them….We endeavoured to show [in our First Book] that it is difficult to take both [primary and secondary qualities] on a level, and impossible to make reality consist of one class in separation from the other. And the unfortunate upholder of a mere physical nature escapes only by blindness from hopeless bewilderment. He is forced to the conclusion that all I know is an affection of my organism, and then my organism itself turns out to be nothing else but such an affection. There is in short no physical thing but that which is a mere state of a physical thing, and perhaps in the end even (it might be contended) a mere state of itself. It will be instructive to consider Nature from this point of view….We may here use the form of what has been called an Antinomy. (a) Nature is only for my body; on the other hand, (b) My body is only for Nature…the outer world is known only as a state of my organism….And yet most emphatically…my organism is nothing but appearance to a body. It itself is only the bare state of a natural object. For my organism, like all else, is but what is experienced, and I can only experience my organism in relation to its own organs. Hence the whole body is a mere state of these; and they are states of one another in indefinite regress….[This] gives us one thing as qualified by the state of another thing, each within that known relation being only for the other, and, apart from it, being unknown and, so far, a nonentity….Nature is the phenomenal relation of the unknown to the unknown; and the terms cannot, because unknown, even be said to be related, since they cannot themselves be said to be anything at all. It is an imperfect way of apprehension, which gives us qualities and relations, each the condition of and yet presupposing the other….Nature has phenomenal reality as a grouping and as laws of sequence and co-existence, holding good within a certain section of that which appears to us. But, if you attempt to make it more, you will re-enter those mazes from which we found no exit. You are led to take the physical world as a mere adjective of my body, and you find that my body, on the other hand, is not one whit more substantival. It is itself forever the state of something further and beyond.” (F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 261-266)

The physical theorist declares that the qualities and characteristics presented as belonging to a natural object—its “what,” as experienced—are conditioned by and dependent upon the material body of a percipient organism. The theorist invokes the physical constitution of an independently existing body to explain why the object is experienced with these qualities and characteristics—professing both to know this account of his to be true and to possess a warrant for it. And so, the physical theorist goes on to say that the qualities and characteristics that he perceives his body and his surrounding environment as having—i.e., the “what” of his body (as experienced by him) and the “what” of his surrounding environment (as experienced by him)—are conditioned by and dependent upon an independently existing physical body—namely, that which he calls “his body.”

Now, it’s important to keep in mind that every perceived “somewhat”—e.g., a natural object—is identified, distinguished, and referred to through the determinate qualities and characteristics under which it is presented. And this equally applies to the body itself. The physical theorist does not first identify an independently existing physical body and then discover that this body conditions the qualities of his surrounding environment; he identifies his body as one perceived “somewhat” through the qualities under which it is experienced. He identifies objects in his surrounding environment in the same way and distinguishes his body from them through the same qualitative field. Therefore, if the qualities and characteristics under which the body and the surrounding objects are experienced are conditioned by and dependent upon the independently existing body, the physical theorist’s identification of the body already depends upon the qualities whose dependence upon that body he is asserting. To explain the experienced qualities as the products of a relation between an independently existing physical body and an independently existing physical environment, the physical theorist would have to identify both relata and their relation independently of the qualities that the relation is supposed to explain, yet the body, the environment, and the relation between them are all identified through those qualities. The theorist must therefore presuppose the independent determination of the body in order to explain the qualities, while relying upon those same qualities to identify and determine the body. The theorist’s account thus contains a vicious circle: it invokes the body to explain the experienced “what,” although the body itself has been identified through that very “what.” And this is only one of many contradictions that the physical theorist encounters.

A fundamental contradiction arises: At one point in time the physical theorist had no conception of bodies, the environment, etc., or even of “appearance.” Moreover, (I) on the one hand, that which, prior to the development of his theory, he learned to identify as his body (and which he continues to denote by the expression “my body” even during and after the construction of his theory) would—as a necessary consequence of his later theory (a consequence whose disregard would render his commitments inconsistent, given the conjunction of his account and his professed knowledge of its truth)—fail to perform the explanatory office of the body in his theory’s explanation. It would fail because, if his theory were true, that which the theorist (having entered the world as an infant) first perceived as his body and later learned to denote by the expression “my body,” could only have been an appearance: a perceived “somewhat” identified through qualities and characteristics conditioned by and dependent upon a body. Since the body is itself among the perceived “somewhats,” the body as first perceived could not already have been the independently determinate body required by the explanation. Yet the theorist cannot—on pain of inconsistency—invoke the aforementioned “body” (i.e., something which, ex hypothesi, his own theory would designate as an appearance) to perform the explanatory office of the independently existing body in his theory’s explanation. (II) On the other hand, the content of the theorist’s explanation, as well as his very construction of it, depends upon his continuing—without consciously recognizing the consequence of his own theory—to take for granted that that which he learned to identify as his body (and which he denotes by the expression “my body”) is already an independently existing physical body and therefore performs the explanatory office of the body in his theory’s explanation. In constructing his theory, he must treat the body as an independently existing physical entity in order to explain the experienced qualities; yet his identification of that entity has already been made through those qualities. And so, as a consequence, we find the theorist’s account oscillating between inconsistent commitments. That which the theorist learned to identify as his body (and which he has denoted by the expression “my body” ever since) must therefore, according to the requirements of his explanation, be—and yet, according to the consequences of his theory, cannot be—that allegedly independently existing physical entity whose constitution figures in his explanation.

The physical theorist could avoid such a contradiction only if he possessed, a priori, knowledge—both as an infant and throughout his development, including during and after the construction of his theory—of which aspects of the “what” of that which he came to call “my body” disclosed its allegedly independent physical constitution. Such knowledge would have to provide a principle for distinguishing the aspects of the experienced “what” that disclose the independent physical body from those aspects that are conditioned by and dependent upon the relation between that body and the surrounding environment—not to mention relations between that body and its own organs of sense. [Note: In this context, by a priori knowledge, I mean knowledge in the form of true propositions—e.g., propositions about “his” independently existing physical body—whose content and acquisition by the theorist were in no way already “infected” by his perceptual experience without his already being aware of that “infection”]. Unless the physical theorist possessed such knowledge, he would be unable, given the consequences of his own theory’s being true, to “distill” from that experienced “what” anything that could, without inconsistency or vicious circularity, function as the explanatory body in the account he professes to know to be true and for which he professes to possess a warrant. However, since the physical theorist does not possess such a priori knowledge, it follows that the contradiction remains: That which the physical theorist learned to identify as his body (and which he has denoted by the expression “my body” ever since) must therefore, according to the requirements of his explanation, be—and yet, according to the consequences of his explanation, cannot be—that allegedly independently existing physical entity whose constitution figures in his explanation. Q.E.D.

Monday, March 17, 2025

Materialism and the “First Breath” of Mentality (A Revised Version with Objections (to the Original Argument) and Replies)


According to Materialism, there was, at some point in time, an instant, M, whose “content” was the first-ever mental state; and this instant, M, was preceded in time by a compact series of non-mental instants (i.e., a compact series wherein each instant had a “content” that was exhaustively non-mental in character). How, then, does the Materialist go on to explain the “first breath” of mentality? He invokes an alluring word: “causality.” A reader sympathetic to the Materialist’s case might protest against such a brief statement of his position, so it would only be fair to let the Materialist interject and present his view in his own words:

Modern Materialism holds that mental states are nothing “over and above” physical states; mentality is but a delicate, rare, and ephemeral form of physicality. Old Materialism made an error that Modern Materialism has since corrected; it blundered by declaring a priori that (i) all physical states are non-mental in nature and that (ii) all mental states are non-physical in nature. Despite this supposed categorical difference between mental states (i.e., non-physical states) and physical states (i.e., non-mental states), Old Materialism went on to assert that every mental state located in the series of past, present, and future mental states is the causally-generated “effect,” or the epiphenomenal “by-product,” of a corresponding non-mental state located in the series of past, present, and future non-mental states. Thus, each mental state is causally dependent upon a particular non-mental state located in the total series of non-mental states. Although the total series of mental states was not itself conceived by these Old Materialists as being a “segment” of the total series of non-mental states, it was nevertheless made subordinate to it. While the thread of mental states lacked self-sufficiency, the chain of physical states (i.e., the totality of past, present, and future non-mental states—or the chain of non-mental states ordered in relations of “earlier than” and “later than”) constituted an independent series—resting on nothing other than itself. The Old Materialists recognized the difficulties in their position (e.g., the relationship between the two series), and failed to build an explanatory bridge that could intelligibly, and non-arbitrarily, unite “cause” with “effect.” Modern Materialism, by contrast, rejects the Old Materialist’s dogmatism and refuses to declare a priori that (i) every physical state is non-mental in nature, and that (ii) every mental state is non-physical in nature. Instead of maintaining that the thread of mental states is populated by non-physical, causally-generated “effects” or epiphenomenal “by-products” of an “independent” series that is exhausted by non-mental states, Modern Materialism, by contrast, holds that when a mental state occurs, this occurrence is identical to a particular physical state located in the total series of physical states. Thus, mental states are no longer viewed as “residual excrescences” that supervene upon the “shock of atoms” in the physical order; they are no longer granted a unique series of their own. On the contrary, mental states just are physical states. This is Modern Materialism.

Now, like any other physical state, the first-ever mental state (i.e., the “content” of the first-ever mental instant, M) would have been the effect of a preceding physical state, and this prior physical state would have been a non-mental state (i.e., the “content” of a non-mental instant)—but Modern Materialism assures us that there are no difficulties inherent in such a transition. By assimilating mental states into the physical order by way of “identity,” the Modern Materialist has advanced further than any of his predecessors: he has taken a step forward towards explaining the “first breath” of mentality.

Let’s examine the Materialist’s account in detail. The Materialist postulates two temporally-distinct instants: (i) a definite instant, M, whose “content” was the first-ever mental state, and (ii) a definite instant, Pn, whose “content” was a non-mental state that preceded the “content” of the first-ever mental instant in time. Let’s offer a brief sketch of the nature of the time-series by specifying some of its properties:

“A series is continuous when any term divides the whole series unambiguously into two mutually exclusive parts which between them comprise all the terms of the series, and when every term which so divides the series is itself a term of that series. From this second condition it obviously follows that a number of intermediate terms can always be inserted between any two terms whatever of a continuous series; no term of the series has a next term….The whole series of real numbers is continuous [because] every member of the number-series divides it into two classes, so that every number of one is less than every number of the other, and every number which thus divides the series is itself a term of the number-series....From the continuity of the series of real numbers it follows that any other series which corresponds point for point with the terms of the number series will be continuous. Now one such series is that of the [time series]. Every moment of time divides the whole series of moments into two mutually exclusive classes, the moments before itself and the moments which are not before itself. And whatever thus divides the time-series is itself a moment in that series.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 171-172)

Thus, it follows from time’s continuity that no two instants in the time-series ever “touch.” When this fact and the Materialist’s proposed connection between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M are brought into focus, we find that the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M cannot temporally overlap—i.e., the first-ever mental state (i.e., the “content” of instant M) and the non-mental state (i.e., the “content” of instant Pn) had to be not only not simultaneous with each other, but also had to be in a relation of “earlier than” and “later than” to each other. Indeed, if the “content” of Pn was simultaneous with the “content” of M, then we would have a contradiction on our hands: there would be a moment in time when there was mentality present in a world that, ex hypothesi, was exhausted by non-mentality. In light of this, we must ask the Materialist several questions:

Question (i): Was the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

The Materialist’s theory requires that he answer question (i) in the affirmative. And so, in response to question (i), the Materialist declares the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—to be the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Question (ii): What was it about the “content” of Pn that made it the non-mental state—rather than any preceding non-mental state—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

On pain of inconsistency, the Materialist must respond to question (ii) by asserting that the “content” of Pn was a non-mental state that possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from all prior non-mental states), and that its possession of these “special properties” made the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Question (iii): What were the “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn and absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants, that made the “content” of Pn–rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

In reply to question (iii), the Materialist will likely posit a bunch of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of these “special properties.” Let’s symbolize the identity of these “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn—but absent from all the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants—as C.

At first glance, all seems fine and well; however, there is a puzzle lurking beneath the surface: a puzzle involving (i) the continuous nature of the time-series, (ii) the Materialist’s identification of the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any of the other non-mental instant—as being the possessor of the aforementioned “special properties,” and (iii) the Materialist’s identification of what these “special properties” actually are. Let’s explore this latent puzzle in the Materialist’s theory.

As we have noted above, the “content” of Pn (i.e., a state exhaustively non-mental in character) cannot be simultaneous with the “content” of M (i.e., a state that was not exhaustively non-mental in character)—on pain of contradiction. M must be “later than” Pn because, ex hypothesi, if the “content” of M was simultaneous with (or in any way overlapped with) the “content” of Pn, the time of the first-ever mental state would also be a time when the world was exhausted by solely non-mental states; and this, of course, is contradictory. Therefore, the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M are not simultaneous, but instead are in relations of “earlier than” and “later than” to each other. However, since the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant, it follows that between Pn and M there was another instant, X, distinct from both Pn and M and whose “content” separates the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M in time. This prompts us to ask the Materialist more questions:

Question (iv): Is the “content” of X a non-mental state or a mental state?

The Materialist must answer question (iv) by declaring the “content” of X to be a non-mental state. Since he must hold that the “content” of X is a non-mental state, we can represent X as Pn+1. Now, if the Materialist asserted the “content” of X to be a mental state, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about the “content” of M being the first-ever mental state because the “content” of X would have preceded the “content” of M in time.

However, if the Materialist answers question (iv) by declaring the “content” of Pn+1 (i.e., X) to be a non-mental state, then he either contradicts his answer to question (i) or his explanation becomes muddled in arbitrariness. Indeed, since the “content” of Pn+1 is “later than” the “content” of Pn in time, between the “content” of Pn—the supposed sufficient condition for the occurrence of the “content” of M—and the “content” of M, there would have been the occurrence of the purely non-mental “content” of Pn+1. However, if the identified “content” of the non-mental instant Pn was genuinely sufficient to produce the “content” of M, then the Materialist’s explanation stumbles into a difficulty.

If the occurrence of the intervening non-mental “content” of Pn+1 between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M matters causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, this would contradict the sufficiency of the “content” of Pn—rendering the “content” of Pn insufficient to be the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, if the occurrence of the intervening non-mental “content” of Pn+1 between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M does not matter causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, then this makes the timing of the occurrence of the “content” of M arbitrary and inexplicable. Moreover, if the “content” of Pn was sufficient to be the “cause” of the “content” of M, this leads us to ask why the “content” of Pn+1—a “content” that, ex hypothesi, lacked the “special properties” necessary and sufficient for it to be the “cause” of the “content” of M—occurred between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M.

In order to avoid introducing arbitrariness and inexplicability into his explanation of the “first breath” of mentality, the Materialist must revise his answer to question (i). He must now hold that the “content” of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., Pn)—was the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Question (v): What was it about the “content” of Pn+1 that made it the non-mental state—rather than any preceding non-mental state (e.g., the “content” of Pn)—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

On pain of inconsistency, the Materialist must answer question (v) by asserting that the “content” of Pn+1 possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from the “content” of all prior non-mental instants), and that its possession of these “special properties” made the “content” of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., Pn)—the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Question (vi): What were the “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn+1 and absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants (e.g., the “content” of Pn), that made the “content” of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn)—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

The Materialist is forced by his own hand to answer question (vi) by positing a bunch of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of the “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn+1 (i.e., features present in the “content” of Pn+1 but absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants) that made the “content” of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn)—the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Now, the Materialist cannot, on pain of contradiction, supply us with the same list of “special properties” that he provided in his answer to question (iii). If, in response to question (vi), the Materialist simply regurgitated his answer to question (iii), then, ex hypothesi, the “special properties” of the “content” of Pn+1 would have been present in the “content” of an earlier non-mental instant (i.e., the “content” of Pn)—thereby contradicting the Materialist’s answer to question (v). Moreover, the Materialist cannot simply provide his answer to question (iii) in response to question (vi) because he himself has admitted, by implication, that the properties of the “content” of Pn were not of such a nature as to make the “content” of Pn the cause of the “content” of M. Let’s symbolize the Materialist’s revision of these “special properties” as C’.

However, another problem arises. In the same way the “content” of Pn had to be earlier in the time-series than the “content” of M, so too must the “content” of Pn+1 be earlier in the time-series than the “content” of M. If this were not so, and the “content” of Pn+1 was simultaneous with the “content” of M, there would be a moment in time when there was mentality present in a world that, ex hypothesi, was exhausted by non-mentality—and this, of course, is a contradiction. And, as we have seen, since the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant, it follows that between Pn+1 and M, there was another instant, X’, distinct from both Pn+1 and M and whose “content” separated the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of M in time. This prompts us to ask the Materialist more questions:

Question (vii): Is the “content” of X’ a non-mental state or a mental state?

In answer to question (vii), the Materialist must, of course, respond by declaring the “content” of X’, to be a non-mental state. Since the “content” of X’ is a non-mental state, we can represent X’ as Pn+2.

Now, if the Materialist asserted the “content” of X’ to be a mental state, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about the “content” of M being the first-ever mental state because the “content” of X’ would have preceded the “content” of M in time.

However, if the Materialist answers question (iv) by declaring the “content” of X’ to be a non-mental state, then he either contradicts his answers to questions (v) and (vi), or his explanation becomes muddled in arbitrariness. Indeed, since the “content” of Pn+2 is “later than” the “content” of Pn+1 in time, then between the “content” of Pn+1—the supposed sufficient condition for the occurrence of the “content” of M—and the “content” of M, there would have been the occurrence of a the purely non-mental “content” of Pn+2. However, if the identified “content” of the non-mental instant Pn+1 was genuinely sufficient to produce the “content” of M, then the Materialist’s explanation stumbles into a difficulty.

If the occurrence of the intervening non-mental “content” of Pn+2 between the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of M matters causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, this would contradict the sufficiency of the “content” of Pn+1—rendering the “content” of Pn+1 insufficient to be the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, if the occurrence of the intervening non-mental “content” of Pn+2 between the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of M does not matter causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, then this makes the timing of the occurrence of the “content” of M arbitrary and inexplicable. Moreover, if the “content” of Pn+1 was sufficient to be the “cause” of the “content” of M, this leads us to ask why the “content” of Pn+2—a “content” that, ex hypothesi, lacked the “special properties” necessary and sufficient for it to be the “cause” of the “content” of M—occurred between the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of M.

In order to avoid introducing arbitrariness and inexplicability into his explanation of the “first breath” of mentality, the Materialist must revise his answer to question (i). He must now hold that the “content” of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., Pn+1)—was the “cause” of the “content” of M.

In doing so, the Materialist must also revise his answer to question (v) and question (vi). He must assert that the “content” of Pn+2 possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from the “content” of all prior non-mental instants) and that its possession of these “special properties” made the “content” of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn or the “content” of Pn+1)—the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, this is possible only insofar as the Materialist specifies the “special properties” of the “content” of Pn+2. Just as before, the Materialist must list a set of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of the “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn+2 (i.e., features present in the “content” of Pn+2 but absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants) that made the “content” of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn or the “content” of Pn+1)—the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, the Materialist cannot, on pain of contradiction, supply us with the same list of “special properties” that he provided in his original answer to question (vi). If the Materialist did so, then the “special properties” of the “content” of Pn+2 would have been present in the “content” of an earlier non-mental instant (i.e., the “content” of Pn+1); however, he himself has admitted, by implication, that the properties of the “content” of Pn+1 were not of such a nature as to make the “content” of Pn+1 the cause of the “content” of M. Ergo, the Materialist must supply us with a new set of properties that were allegedly present in the “content” of Pn+2, and made the “content” of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M. Let’s symbolize the Materialist’s revision of these “special properties” as C’’.

However, the problem has only been aggravated. As we’ve seen before, the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant; ergo, it follows that between Pn+2 and M there was another instant, X’’, distinct from both Pn+2 and M and whose “content” separates the “content” of Pn+2 and the “content” of M in time. This prompts us to ask the Materialist another question:

Question (viii): Is the “content” of X’’ a non-mental state or a mental state?

The Materialist must answer question (viii) by declaring the “content” of X’’ to be a non-mental state. Since the “content” of X’’ is non-mental, we can represent X’’ as Pn+3. And we know where this will lead us. The Materialist is trapped in a vicious regress; inconsistencies in the Materialist’s responses require that he continually revise his answers ad infinitum. He is unable to consistently identify the non-mental instant whose “content” allegedly gave birth to the “content” of the first-ever mental instant, M, and he is unable to consistently specify the identity of the alleged “special properties” present in the “content” of this non-mental instant that would have made it—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the cause of the “content” of the first-ever mental instant, M.

With every step the Materialist takes towards his first-ever mental state, he is forced to take one step back—he is forever barred from receiving his final reward. The Materialist fails to harmonize the “first breath” of mentality within an asphyxiatingly barren, non-mental world.

Objections to the Original Argument (with Replies)

Issue 1: “It is not clear to me why Pn must have a last instant. An event could occur over an open or half-open interval of time. If t is the time index of the first mental event, then Pn could be an event that occurs on [m, t) for any m < t. In this case there is neither overlap, nor intermediate causes.”

Reply to Issue 1: I have now revised the essay so that it makes a clearer distinction between positions in time and the “contents” that are isochronal to those positions in time. The “content” of an instant Pn is the state (i.e., the non-mental state) that obtains at Pn. By reframing the argument in terms of instants and their “contents,” rather than in terms of intervals and the boundaries of said intervals (e.g., their “first” and “last” instants, if they have a “first” or “last” instant), I think the revised argument avoids the objection that you bring up in “Issue 1.”

Issue 2: I also don't see why the existence of a moment in time between Pn and M implies that [the “content” of] Pn is not the cause of [the “content” of] M. If we identify special properties of [the “content” of] Pn that justify its being the cause of [the “content” of] M, it does not follow that every state between [the “content” of] Pn and [the “content” of] M also has those properties. It seems to me that you have introduced an additional assumption about the nature of causality, that one state can be the cause of another if and only if there is no state between them.

Reply to Issue 2: The second version of the argument does not depend on the assumption that a causal relation can only obtain between “temporally adjacent” “contents.” As mentioned above (in the second version of the argument), as soon as we acknowledge there being a purely non-mental instant (Pn+1) with its own distinct “content” (i.e., the “content” of Pn+1) intervening between the purely non-mental instant Pn and the first-ever mental instant M, we can reasonably ask whether we need to revise our list of “special properties” that we took to be responsible for the “coming into existence” of the “content” of M. For consider, if we assume that the “content” of Pn was the “cause” of the “content” of M, then we have a right to ask what “special properties” were present in the “content” of Pn and absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants that made the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, our only reason for supposing the “content” of Pn to be the cause of the “content” of M was based upon our supposed identification of some properties of Pn as being the “special properties” responsible for its giving rise to the “content” of M. And, by implication, the “content” of Pn had these properties whereas and the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants lacked them. If it turns out that the “content” of Pn+1 intervenes between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M, then our ordinary causal reasoning prompts us to reconsider if the properties of the “content” of Pn which we took to be the “special properties” were in fact the “special properties” responsible for giving rise to the “content” of M, or if we had instead only misidentified those properties as being the “special properties.”

Moreover, if we try and double down on our original assertion that those properties identified in the “content” of Pn were in fact the “special properties,” then we are left with no good reason for why the “content” of M didn’t occur before the “content” of Pn+1 occurred rather than after the “content” of Pn+1 occurred (i.e., why there was a “delay” even though the all the conditions were already present (only to vanish with the occurrence of the “content” of Pn+1)). However, if there was nothing about the intermediary “contents” (in addition to the “special properties” of the “content” of Pn) such that the occurrence of these intermediary “contents” were necessary for the occurrence of the “content” at time M, then we are left with a puzzle as to why the “content” of time M occurred earlier than some of the intermediary “contents” rather than before some of them. Moreover, this means that if the “content” of M could not occur unless the some of the intermediary “contents” occurred, then the occurrence of some of the intermediary “contents” were necessary to the occurrence of the “content” of M; yet if these were necessary to the occurrence of the “content” of M, then it would not be the case that the “content” of Pn was the necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of the “content” at M—thereby conflicting with the assumption that none of the intermediary “contents” mattered causally in the occurrence of the “content” of M. We can illustrate this by means of another argument:

Premise 1: Materialism posits that at some finite point, there occurred the first-ever mental state (i.e., the “content” of instant M), preceded solely by non-mental states.

Premise 2: Any causal explanation for the emergence of a first mental state (i.e., the “content” of instant M) from purely non-mental states (i.e., the “content” of non-mental instants) requires identifying specific non-mental conditions sufficient to produce mentality.

Premise 3: If an identified “content” of a non-mental instant Pn is asserted to be genuinely sufficient, then the occurrence of intervening purely non-mental “content” of instants Pn+1, Pn+2,… between Pn and M either:

(a) Contradicts the supposed sufficiency of the “content” of Pn, if those intermediates matter causally.

(b) Makes the timing of the occurrence of the “content” of M arbitrary and inexplicable, if those intermediates are causally irrelevant.

Premise 4: Both horns—causal contradiction or explanatory arbitrariness—are unacceptable to a coherent causal account. But if the Materialist cannot provide a coherent causal account, then he cannot adequately explain the causal origin of the first-ever mental state from purely non-mental states.

Conclusion: Therefore, the Materialist cannot adequately explain the causal origin of the first-ever mental state from purely non-mental states.

Issue 3: I also think it is possible for Pn and M to share a boundary point t. You argue that this is impossible because it would imply that, at time t, the world contained mental properties (because M is a mental event), but also was exhausted up to and including time t by non-mental events (because Pn is non-mental and contains t). But it does not necessarily follow that because an event has a property that each moment comprising the event has that property. For example, a physical object can have the property of being liquid, and be exhaustively comprised of subatomic particles, yet none of the subatomic particles are liquid. So too the materialist can coherently claim that the instants of time comprising a mental event do not have the property of mentality, but their agglomeration does have that property.

Reply to Issue 3: This objection does not apply to the revised version of the argument. This new version is framed in argument in terms of instants and their “contents,” rather than in terms of intervals and the boundaries of said intervals (e.g., their “first” and “last” instants, if they have a “first” or “last” instant).

Issue 4: I also think, perhaps most importantly, that the materialist simply does not have to agree that there is a first mental event. Because mentality is not metaphysically fundamental in the materialist theory, they don't even need to specify clear boundaries on the concept of “mental,” which could function rather like the notion of a species of animal, where there is a gradient of descent with no clear first member.

Reply to Issue 4: It seems that by denying that there was a “first-ever mental event” you either wade into some form of panpsychism (wherein there was never an instant whose “content” was solely “non-mental” (i.e., that “mentality” featured in the “content” of every past instant in some degree)), or you end up shifting the problem by introducing some form of “proto-mental continuum” (which, ultimately, seems to slip into some form of panpsychism again). Either way, the Materialist cannot give up the position that there was a point in time where the universe was solely non-mental—and it is precisely this position that generates the puzzle.


Monday, October 28, 2024

A Question Concerning Bernard Lonergan’s “Questions for Intelligence” and “Questions for Reflection”

According to Bernard Lonergan, “questions fall into two main classes. There are “questions for reflection,” and they may be met by answering ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. There are “questions for intelligence,” and they may not be met by answering ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.” (Lonergan, Insight, 271-272) A “question for intelligence” asks ‘What?’, ‘Why?’, ‘How?’, and ‘What for?’. A “question for reflection” asks “whether our answers to the previous type of question are true or false, certain or only probable.” (Lonergan, Reality, Myth, Symbol, 1) With this distinction in mind, we can proceed by asking whether the following question is itself a “question for reflection” or a “question for intelligence”:

“Is the answer to this question, ‘No’?”

The above question is a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ question, and so it appears to be a “question for reflection” and not a “question for intelligence.” Indeed, as Lonergan says, it is incoherent to answer a “question for intelligence” with a mere ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. By contrast, “questions for reflection” are those questions which are met by answering ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. Indeed, “questions for reflection” can only be answered with ‘Yes’ or ‘No’; they involve phrases like, “Is it so?” and “Is it probably so?”. However, if we declare the question, “Is the answer to this question, ‘No’?” to be a “question for reflection,” we find that it cannot be met by answering ‘Yes’ or ‘No’—on pain of contradiction—and this contradicts our assertion that such a question is a “question for reflection.” We can illustrate this by examining the question in detail: 

“Is the answer to this question, ‘No’?”

If the answer to the question is ‘Yes’, then the answer to the question is ‘No’. But if the answer to the question is ‘No’, then the answer to the question is ‘Yes’. Since the question, “Is the answer to this question, ‘No’?”, cannot be met by ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ without contradiction, it follows that it is not a “question for reflection.” If it is objected that a question cannot refer to itself, we can reply that there are many questions that refer to themselves and are perfectly meaningful. Take, for example, the following question.

“Is the answer to this question, ‘Yes’?”

The above question is a “question for reflection” that not only references itself, but also can be answered without contradiction—it can be met by a simple ‘Yes’. We can also illustrate the same paradox that we outlined above by invoking two distinct questions rather than just one:

“Is the answer to the following question, ‘No’?”

“Is the answer to the preceding question, ‘Yes’?”

Let’s label the top question with the letter, A, and let’s label the bottom question with the letter, B. On the one hand, if the answer to A is ‘Yes’, then the answer to B must be ‘No’; however, if the answer to B is ‘No’, then the answer to A must be ‘No’—and this contradicts the original answer to A as being ‘Yes’. On the other hand, if the answer to A is ‘No’, then the answer to B must be ‘Yes’; however, if the answer to B is ‘Yes’, then the answer to A must be ‘Yes’—and this contradicts the original answer to A as being ‘No’. If it is objected that A and B are not “questions for reflection” at all since each has its meaning only in relation to the other, we can provide an instance of two more questions: 

“Is the answer to the following question, ‘Yes?”

“Is the answer to the preceding question, ‘Yes’?”

The above questions have their respective meanings only in relation to the other and can be answered without contradiction—both can be met by a simple ‘Yes’.

Tuesday, August 6, 2024

Materialism and the “First Breath” of Mentality (Old Version)

The following essay is an outdated version of an argument that I developed a couple years ago. Nevertheless, I figured that it would be helpful to preserve the original version of the argument. The most up-to-date version of the essay can be found at the following link: Materialism and the “First Breath” of Mentality (A Revised Version with Objections (to the Original Argument) and Replies).


According to Materialism, there was, at some point in time, a first-ever mental event. This event was preceded in time solely by non-mental events. How, then, does the Materialist go on to explain the “first breath” of mentality? He invokes an alluring word: “causality.” A reader sympathetic to the Materialist’s case might protest against such a brief statement of his position, so it would only be fair to let the Materialist interject and present his view in his own words:

Modern Materialism holds that mental events are nothing “over and above” physical events; mentality is but a delicate, rare, and ephemeral form of physicality. Old Materialism made an error that Modern Materialism has since corrected; it blundered by declaring a priori that (i) all physical events are non-mental in nature and that (ii) all mental events are non-physical in nature. Despite this categorial difference between mental events (i.e., non-physical events) and physical events (i.e., non-mental events), Old Materialism went on to assert that every mental event located in the series of past, present, and future mental events is the causally-generated “effect,” or the epiphenomenal “by-product,” of a corresponding non-mental event located in the series of past, present, and future non-mental events. Thus, each mental event is causally dependent upon a particular non-mental event located in the total series of non-mental events. Although the total series of mental events was not itself conceived by these Old Materialists as being a “segment” of the total series of non-mental events, it was nevertheless made subordinate to it. While the thread of mental events lacked self-sufficiency, the chain of physical events (i.e., the totality of past, present, and future non-mental events) constituted an independent series—resting on nothing other than itself. The Old Materialists recognized the difficulties in their position (e.g., the relationship between the two series of events), and failed to build a bridge that could intelligibly unite “cause” and “effect.” Modern Materialism, by contrast, rejects the Old Materialist’s dogmatism and refuses to declare a priori that (i) all physical events are non-mental in nature, and that (ii) all mental events are non-physical in nature. Instead of maintaining that the thread of mental events is populated by causally-generated “effects” or epiphenomenal “by-products” of an “independent” series that is exhausted by non-mental events, Modern Materialism holds that when a mental event occurs, this occurrence is identical to a particular physical event located in the totality of physical events. Thus, mental events are no longer viewed as “residual excrescences” that supervene upon the “shock of atoms” in the physical order; they are no longer granted a unique series of their own (e.g., a non-physical series populated by events caused by antecedent or contemporaneous events in a subvening series of physical events). On the contrary, mental events are physical events. This is Modern Materialism. Although Modern Materialism holds that there was, at some point in time, a first-ever mental event, this event was itself a physical event—there being no categorial difference severing said event from any non-mental event that happened to be simultaneous with, or precedent to it, in time. Now, like any other physical event, the first-ever mental event would have been the effect of a preceding physical event, and this prior physical event would have been a non-mental event—but Modern Materialism assures us that there are no difficulties inherent in such a transition. By assimilating mental events into the physical order by way of “identity,” the Modern Materialist has advanced further than any of his predecessors: he has taken a step forward towards explaining the “first breath” of mentality.

Let’s examine the Materialist’s account in detail. The Materialist postulates two temporally-distinct events: (i) a definite, first-ever mental event, M, and (ii) a definite, non-mental event, Pn, that preceded M in time. How, then, are we to conceive the time-series of which these two events, Pn and M, are  occupants? Let’s offer a brief sketch the nature of the time-series by specifying some of its properties:
“A series is continuous when any term divides the whole series unambiguously into two mutually exclusive parts which between them comprise all the terms of the series, and when every term which so divides the series is itself a term of that series. From this second condition it obviously follows that a number of intermediate terms can always be inserted between any two terms whatever of a continuous series; no term of the series has a next term….The whole series of real numbers us continuous [because] every member of the number-series divides it into two classes, so that every number of one is less than every number of the other, and every number which thus divides the series is itself a term of the number-series....From the continuity of the series of real numbers it follows that any other series which corresponds point for point with the terms of the number series will be continuous. Now one such series is that of the successive parts of time. Every moment of time divides the whole series of moments into two mutually exclusive classes, the moments before itself and the moments which are not before itself. And whatever thus divides the time-series is itself a moment in that series.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 171-172) 
Thus, it follows from time’s continuity that no two instants in the time-series ever “touch”.1 When this fact and the Materialist’s proposed connection between Pn and M are brought into focus, we find that Pn and M cannot share an extremital boundary. In other words, the last instant of Pn cannot be simultaneous with the first instant of M. Indeed, if the last instant of Pn was simultaneous with the first instant of M, then we would have a contradiction on our hands: there would be a moment in time when there was mentality present in a world that, ex hypothesi, was exhausted by non-mentality. In light of this, we must ask the Materialist several questions:

Question (i): Was Pn—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M?

The Materialist’s theory requires that he answer question (i) in the affirmative. And so, in response to question (i), the Materialist declares Pn—rather than any preceding non-mental event—to be the “cause” of M.

Question (ii): What was it about Pn that made this particular non-mental event—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M? 

On pain of inconsistency, the Materialist must respond to question (ii) by asserting that Pn possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from all prior non-mental events), and that Pn’s possession of these “special properties” made Pn—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M.

Question (iii): What were the “special properties” present in Pn and absent from all preceding non-mental events, that made Pn–rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M?

In reply to question (iii), the Materialist will likely posit a bunch of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of these “special properties.” Let’s symbolize the identity of these “special properties” present in Pn—but absent from all preceding non-mental events—as C.

At first glance, all seems fine and well; however, there is a puzzle lurking beneath the surface: a puzzle involving (i) the continuous nature of the time-series, (ii) the Materialist’s identification of Pn—rather than any of the other non-mental events which preceded it—as being the possessor of the aforementioned “special properties,” and (iii) the Materialist’s identification of what these “special properties” actually are. Let’s explore this latent puzzle in the Materialist’s theory.

As we have noted above, the final instant of Pn cannot be simultaneous with the first instant of M—on pain of contradiction. The first instant of mentality in the world must be “later than” any instant during which the Materialist’s world was “exhaustively non-mental.” However, since the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant, it follows that between Pn and M (or, rather, between the last instant of Pn and the first instant of M) there was another event, X, distinct from both Pn and M and separating the two events. This prompts us to ask the Materialist more questions:

Question (iv): Is X a non-mental event or a mental event?

The Materialist must answer question (iv) by declaring X to be a non-mental event, Pn+1. For consider, if the Materialist asserted X to be a mental event, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about M being the first-ever mental event because X would have preceded M in time. 

However, if the Materialist answers question (iv) by declaring X to be a non-mental event, Pn+1, then he contradicts his answer to question (i); in other words, since Pn+1 is later than Pn in time, it would not be true that Pn was the “cause” of M. And so, the Materialist must now revise his answer to question (i) and state that Pn+1—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn)—was the “cause” of M.

Question (v): What was it about Pn+1 that made this particular non-mental event—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn)—the “cause” of M?

On pain of inconsistency, the Materialist must answer question (v) by asserting that Pn+1 possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from all prior non-mental events), and that Pn+1’s possession of these “special properties” made Pn+1—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn)—the “cause” of M.

Question (vi): What were the “special properties” present in Pn+1 and absent from all preceding non-mental events, that made Pn+1—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M?

The Materialist is forced by his own hand to answer question (vi) by positing a bunch of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of the “special properties” present in Pn+1 (i.e., features present in Pn+1 but absent from all preceding non-mental events) that made Pn+1—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn)—the “cause” of M. Now, the Materialist cannot, on pain of contradiction, supply us with the same list of “special properties” that he provided in his answer to question (iii). If, in response to question (vi), the Materialist simply regurgitated his answer to question (iii), then, ex hypothesi, the “special properties” of Pn+1 would have been present in an earlier non-mental event (i.e., Pn)—thereby contradicting the Materialist’s answer to question (v). Moreover, the Materialist cannot simply provide his answer to question (iii) in response to question (vi) because he himself has admitted, by implication, that the properties of Pn were not of such a nature as to make Pn the cause of M. Let’s symbolize the Materialist’s revision of these “special properties” as C’.

However, another problem arises. In the same way the last instant of Pn had to be earlier in the time-series than the first instant of M, so too must the last instant of Pn+1 be earlier in the time-series than the first instant of M. If this were not so, and the last instant of Pn+1 was simultaneous with the first instant of M, then there would be a moment in time when there was mentality present in a world that, ex hypothesi, was exhausted by non-mentality—and this, of course, is a contradiction. And, as we have seen, since the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant, it follows that between Pn+1 and M (or, rather, between the last instant of Pn+1 and the first instant of M) there was another event, X’, distinct from both Pn+1 and M and separating the two events. This prompts us to ask the Materialist more questions:

Question (vii): Is X’ a non-mental event or a mental event?

In answer to question (vii), the Materialist must, of course, respond by declaring this particular event, X’, to be a non-mental event, Pn+2. If the Materialist answered by declaring X’ to be a mental event, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about M being the first-ever mental event since, ex hypothesi, X’ would have preceded M in time. 

The Materialist must answer question (vii) by declaring X’ to be a non-mental event, Pn+2. For consider, if the Materialist asserted X’ to be a mental event, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about M being the first-ever mental event because X’ would have preceded M in time. However, by declaring X’  to be a non-mental event, Pn+2, the Materialist contradicts his “revised” answer to question (i)—(i.e., that Pn+1 rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn) was the “cause” of M). As a result, the Materialist must “revise” his already “revised” answer to question (i) and declare Pn+2—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn or Pn+1)—to be the “cause” of M. In doing so, the Materialist must also revise his answer to question (v) and question (vi). He must assert that Pn+2 possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from all prior non-mental events) and that Pn+2’s possession of these “special properties” made Pn+2—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn or Pn+1)—the “cause” of M. However, in doing so, the Materialist must specify these “special properties” of Pn+2. Just like before, the Materialist must list a set of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of the “special properties” present in Pn+2 (i.e., features present in Pn+2 but absent from all preceding non-mental events) that made Pn+2—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn or Pn+1)—the “cause” of M. However, the Materialist cannot, on pain of contradiction, supply us with the same list of “special properties” that he provided in his answer to question (vi). If the Materialist did so, then the “special properties” of Pn+2 would have been present in an earlier non-mental event (i.e., Pn+1); however, he himself has admitted, by implication, that the properties of Pn+1 were not of such a nature as to make Pn+1 the cause of M.  Ergo, the Materialist must supply us with a new set of properties that were allegedly present in Pn+2, and made Pn+2—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M. Let’s symbolize the Materialist’s revision of these “special properties” as C’’.

However, the problem has only been aggravated. As we’ve seen before, the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant; ergo, it follows that between Pn+2 and M (or, rather, between the last instant of Pn+2 and the first instant of M) there was another event, X’’, distinct from both Pn+2 and M and separating the two events. This prompts us to ask the Materialist another question:

Question (viii): Is X’’ a non-mental event or a mental event?

The Materialist must answer question (viii) by declaring this particular event, X’’, to be a non-mental event, Pn+3. And we know where this will lead us. The Materialist is trapped in a vicious regress; for, inconsistencies in the Materialist’s responses require that he continually revise his answers ad infinitum. He is unable to consistently identify the non-mental event that allegedly gave birth to the first-ever mental event, and he is unable to consistently specify the identity of the alleged “special properties” that would have made this non-mental event—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the cause of the first-ever mental event.

With every step the Materialist takes towards his first-ever mental event, he is forced to take one step back—he is forever barred from receiving his final reward. The Materialist fails to harmonize the “first breath” of mentality within an asphyxiatingly barren, non-mental world.

“However far we pursue the course of the sense-excitation through the nerve, in however many ways we suppose its form changed and converted into ever finer and more delicate movements, we can never prove that it is in the nature of any movement so produced to cease as movement of its own accord, and to reappear as a bright color, as a tone, as a sweet taste. The chasm is never bridged over between the last state of the material elements within our reach and the first rise of the sensation; and scarce anyone will cherish the vain hope that at a higher stage of development science will find a mysterious bridge in a case where it is the impossibility of any sure crossing-over that forces itself on us with the most evident distinctness.” (Lotze, Mikrokosmus, Vol. I, 148)
Footnotes:

[1] “For it follows from the structure of the time-series (I) that there are an indefinite number of terms of the series between any two members, between which there is a finite interval, and (II) that there is also an indefinite number of terms before or after any given member of the series. Like the series of real numbers, the time-series, because it satisfies the definition of a continuous infinite series, can have neither a first nor a last term, nor can any member of it have a next term. Applying this to the case of Causation, we may reason as follows: The same reasons which lead us to demand a cause A for any event B, and to find that cause in an assemblage of antecedent events, require that A should be similarly determined by another assemblage of antecedent events, and that this cause of A should itself have its own antecedent cause, and so on indefinitely. Thus, the causal principle, logically applied, never yields an intelligible explanation of any event Instead of exhibiting the transition A—B as the logical expression of a coherent principle, it refers us for the explanation of this transition to a previous instance of the same kind of transition, and then to another, and so forth without end. But it is impossible that what is not intelligible in one instance should become intelligible by the mere multiplication of similar unintelligibilities. (II) Similarly, if we look within the transition A—B. This transition, being continuous, must have its intermediate stages. A becomes B because it has already become C, and the transition A—C—B is again “explained” by showing that A became D which became C which became E which became B. And each of these stages, A—D, D—C, C—E, E—B can be once more submitted to the same sort of analysis. But in all this interpolation of immediate stages there is nothing to show the nature of the common principle in virtue of which the stages form a single process. We are, in fact, trying to do what we try to do wherever we establish a relation between terms, to answer a question by repeating it.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 177-178) 

Monday, July 8, 2024

That Which Knows All Things and Is Known by None: An Argument Against the Identity Theory of Mind

 Abstract

“That which knows all things and is known by none is the subject.”1

“He sees, but he can’t be seen, he hears, but he can’t be heard; he perceives, but he can’t be perceived.”2

This essay presents an argument against the Identity Theory of Mind”3 that does not depend upon the apparent epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths, the existence of qualia, or the conceivability of philosophical zombies. The argument begins by establishing three principles: the Principle of Perceptual Determinacy, the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion, and the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability—each identifying a necessary condition underlying the existence, or occurrence, of perceptual states. Next, a contradiction is shown to follow from the three principles and the Identity Theory being jointly true. Since the three principles can be demonstrated a priori, it follows that the Identity Theory is false. Potential objections to the argument are then raised and addressed. 

The Principle of Perceptual Determinacy

“When you perceive you perceive something, and…what you do perceive cannot be the same as the perception of it.”4
The world unfolds itself for us conscious beings through communions of perceivings and perceiveds: perceptual states and their percepta. These distinguishable factors march two abreast, side-by-side, hand-in-hand, as mutually-implying correlates within a subject’s experience. For a subject to “perceive” a tree is for him to “have” a perceptual state that is a “perception of a tree;”5 thus, if a subject has a perceptual state, P, and P is a “perception of a tree,” then P’s perceptum is that tree which the subject perceives—that particular “somewhat” which P is a “perception of.”6

Whenever a subject perceives, the perceptum of his perceptual state is an existing, or occurring, determinate “somewhat.” Moreover, this perceived “somewhat” appears to him, the perceiving subject. If the perceptum of a subject’s perceptual state was not an existing, or occurring, determinate “somewhat,” then the perceptual state in question (i.e., the “perceiving”) would be a “perception of nothing,” and this is absurd. For, no existing, or occurring, perceptual state is a “perception of nothing.” Furthermore, if the perceptum of a subject’s perceptual state was not itself determinate, then the perceptum would be incapable of appearing to and for the perceiving subject—and this, of course, is absurd. Indeed, unlike an existing, or occurring, determinate “somewhat,” an indeterminate would lack any definite characteristics of its own, and, as such, would not admit to being perceived in any particular way, let alone a variety of ways.7 However, a perceptual state is determinate only insofar as it terminates in an existing, or occurring, determinate perceptum. Indeed, a perceptual state is what it is (i.e., is determinate and individuated) in virtue of possessing characteristics that are fixed or determined by what the perceptual state is a “perception of.” If this were not so, then it should be possible to render a perceptual state determinable independent of the perceptual state’s objective reference (i.e., without any reference to what it is a “perception of”); however, such a task is impossible not only in practice but in principle. Since no perceptual state can either exist, or occur, unless it is determinate, and a perceptual state is determinate only insofar as its perceptum either exists, or occurs, and is determinate, we are driven to the following result: The Principle of Perceptual Determinacy. According to this principle, for any perceptual state, P, P can neither exist, nor occur, unless P’s perceptum, O, either exists, or occurs, and is determinate. 

The Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion

“That the subject should become object for itself is the most monstrous contradiction ever thought of...”8
Using the Principle of Perceptual Determinacy, it can be demonstrated that no existing, or occurring, perceptual state either has itself as its own perceptum, or is identical to its own perceptum. In other words, for any existing, or occurring, perceptual state, P, P is not a “perception of P.” I call this the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion. The following argument illustrates how the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion follows a priori from the Principle of Perceptual Determinacy:
If a perceptual state, A, was a “perception of A,” then A could neither exist, nor occur, nor be determinate, unless it was the perceptum of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, B, that was a “perception of a perception of A.” But B could neither exist, nor occur, nor be determinate, unless it was the perceptum of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, C, that was a “perception of a perception of a perception of A.” But C could neither exist, nor occur, nor be determinate, unless it was the perceptum of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, D, that was a “perception of a perception of a perception of A.” But D could neither exist, nor occur, nor be determinate, unless it was the perceptum of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, E, that was a “perception of a perception of a perception of a perception of A.” But E could neither exist, nor occur, nor be determinate, unless it was the perceptum of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, F, that was a “perception of a perception of a perception of a perception of a perception of A.” But F could neither exist, nor occur, nor be determinate, unless it was the perceptum of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, G, that was a “perception of a perception of a perception of a perception of a perception of a perception of A.” But G could neither exist, nor occur, nor be determinate, unless it was the perceptum of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, H, that was a “perception of a perception of a perception of a perception of a perception of a perception of a perception of A.” And so on, ad infinitum. We find that neither A nor any of the other aforementioned perceptual states, could either exist, or occur, or be determinate, unless we had reached the end of a vicious regress of perceptual states—and this, of course, is impossible. Therefore, no existing, or occurring, perceptual state either has itself as its own perceptum, or is identical to its own perceptum. Therefore, the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion is true.

The Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability

“Knowledge that turns inward upon itself creates a current so hot that it burns out the fuse.”9
In a similar vein to the Principle of Perceptual Determinacy and the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion, I will introduce what I call the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability. This principle maintains that no n-number (n ≥ 2) of existing, or occurring, perceptual states form a series of perceptual states and percepta wherein the first state is a “perception of the second,” the second is a “perception of the third,” the third is a “perception of the fourth,” and so on—the last perceptual state in the series being a “perception of the first.” For clarity, I have provided a list of eight examples of perceptual “loops.”

A Digonal Perceptual “Loop”

Any situation wherein two perceptual states are such that the first is a “perception of the second,” and the second is a “perception of the first.”

A Trigonal Perceptual “Loop”

Any situation wherein three perceptual states are such that the first is a “perception of the second,” the second is a “perception of the third,” and the third is a “perception of the first.”

A Tetragonal Perceptual “Loop”

Any situation wherein four perceptual states are such that the first is a “perception of the second,” the second is a “perception of the third,” the third is a “perception of the fourth,” and the fourth is a “perception of the first.”

A Pentagonal Perceptual “Loop”

Any situation wherein five perceptual states are such that the first is a “perception of the second,” the second is a “perception of the third,” the third is a “perception of the fourth,” the fourth is a “perception of the fifth,” and the fifth is a “perception of the first.”

A Hexagonal Perceptual “Loop”

Any situation wherein six perceptual states are such that the first is a “perception of the second,” the second is a “perception of the third,” the third is a “perception of the fourth,” the fourth is a “perception of the fifth,” the fifth is a “perception of the sixth,” and the sixth is a “perception of the first.” 

A Heptagonal Perceptual “Loop”

Any situation wherein seven perceptual states are such that the first is a “perception of the second,” the second is a “perception of the third,” the third is a “perception of the fourth,” the fourth is a “perception of the fifth,” the fifth is a “perception of the sixth,” the sixth is a “perception of the seventh,” and the seventh is a “perception of the first.”

An Octagonal Perceptual “Loop”

Any situation wherein eight perceptual states are such that the first is a “perception of the second,” the second is a “perception of the third,” the third is a “perception of the fourth,” the fourth is a “perception of the fifth,” the fifth is a “perception of the sixth,” the sixth is a “perception of the seventh,” the seventh is a “perception of the eighth,” and the eighth is a “perception of the first.”

And so on, ad indefinitum.

If the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability is true, it would follow that no n-number (n ≥ 2) of existing, or occurring, perceptual states form a series of perceptual states and percepta wherein the first perceptual state in the series is a “perception of the second,” the second is a “perception of the third,” the third is a “perception of the fourth,” and so on—the last perceptual state in the series being a “perception of the first.” Like the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion, the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability follows a priori from the Principle of Perceptual Determinacy. This can be demonstrated by means of the following argument:

If two perceptual states, A and B, were such that A was a “perception of B,” and B was a “perception of A,” then A and B could neither exist, nor occur, nor be determinate, unless A was the perceptum of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, C, that was a “perception of a perception of B,” and B was the perceptum of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, D, that was a “perception of a perception of A.” However, C and D could neither exist, nor occur, nor be determinate, unless C was the perceptum of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, E, that was a “perception of a perception of a perception of B,” and D was the perceptum of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, F, that was a “perception of a perception of a perception of A.” However, E and F could neither exist, nor occur, nor be determinate, unless E was the perceptum of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, G, that was a “perception of a perception of a perception of a perception of B,” and F was the perceptum of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, H, that was a “perception of a perception of perception of a perception of A.” And so on, ad infinitum. We find that neither A, nor B, nor any of the aforementioned perceptual states, could either exist, or occur, or be determinate, unless we had reached the end of a vicious regress of perceptual states—and this, of course, is impossible. Therefore, no two existing, or occurring, perceptual states are such that the first is a “perception of the second,” and the second is a “perception of the first.” Therefore, the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability is true.
One might object by saying that the above argument only demonstrates that a digonal perceptual “loop” can neither exist, nor occur. However, this objection rests on an overlooking the fact that the same conclusion follows if we were to substitute the digonal perceptual “loop” for a trigonal, tetragonal, pentagonal, hexagonal, heptagonal, octagonal (and so on, ad indefinitum) perceptual “loop.” Thus, we can affirm that the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability has been proved.

An Argument Against the Identity Theory of Mind

Let’s imagine two neighbors: John and Thomas. If John were to have a perceptual state, A, and A was a “perception of Thomas’s perceptual state, B,” and if Thomas’s perceptual state, B, was a “perception of John’s perceptual state, A,” then John’s and Thomas’s perceptual states would form a digonal perceptual “loop.” However, since we have proved the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability, it follows that such a digonal perceptual “loop” can neither exist, nor occur. Therefore, if John were to have an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, A, and A was a “perception of Thomas’s existing, or occurring, perceptual state, B,” then Thomas’s existing, or occurring, perceptual state, B, cannot—on pain of contradiction—be a “perception of John’s existing, or occurring, perceptual state, A.”

According to the Identity Theory, all of John’s perceptual states are identical to some of John’s brain states, and all of Thomas’s perceptual states are identical to some of Thomas’s brain states. In other words, if John were to have an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, A, then A would be identical to John’s existing, or occurring, brain state, θ, and if Thomas were to have an existing, or occurring, perceptual state B, then B would be identical to Thomas’s existing, or occurring, brain state, ψ. Furthermore, since the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability is true, we arrive at the following result: 

If the Identity Theory is true, then if John has an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, A, and A is a “perception of Thomas’s existing, or occurring, brain state, ψ,” then Thomas’s existing, or occurring, brain state, ψ, cannot—on pain of contradiction—be a “perception of John’s existing, or occurring, brain state, θ.”

Now, there is nothing absurd or contradictory in the idea that John can perceive (i) any of his own existing, or occurring, brain states, and (ii) any existing, or occurring, state of Thomas’s brain whilst Thomas perceives any existing, or occurring, state of John’s brain. Likewise, there is nothing unintelligible or self-contradictory in the idea that Thomas can perceive (i) any of his own existing, or occurring, brain states, and (ii) any existing, or occurring, state of John’s brain whilst John perceives any existing, or occurring, state of Thomas’s brain. Indeed, we must admit that it is possible—in principle—for John to perceive (i) any of his own existing, or occurring, brain states, and (ii) any existing, or occurring, state of Thomas’s brain whilst Thomas perceives any existing, or occurring, state of John’s brain. Again, we must also admit that it is possible—in principle—for Thomas to perceive (i) any of his own existing, or occurring, brain states, and (ii) any existing, or occurring, state of John’s brain whilst John perceives any existing, or occurring, state of Thomas’s brain. However, if the Identity Theory is true, then it would be a contradiction for John to perceive a certain existing, or occurring, state, ψ, of Thomas’s brain whilst Thomas is perceiving a certain existing, or occurring, state, θ, of John’s brain. Indeed, such a state of affairs would be impossible—in principle. Therefore, since it is possible—in principle—for John to perceive any existing, or occurring, state of Thomas’s brain whilst Thomas perceives any existing, or occurring, state of John’s brain, it follows that the Identity Theory is false. We may put the general argument in the following form:

P1)  If the Identity Theory is true, then John cannot—in principle—perceive any existing, or occurring, state of Thomas’s brain whilst Thomas perceives any existing, or occurring, state of John’s brain.
P2)  John can—in principle—perceive any existing, or occurring, state of Thomas’s brain whilst Thomas perceives any existing, or occurring, state of John’s brain.
C1)  Therefore, the Identity Theory is false. [From P1 and P2]
We may transpose the above argument in a way that focuses solely on John. This variation of the argument relies solely on the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion without relying on the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability. The Identity Theory, as we have seen, is committed to John’s existing, or occurring, perceptual state, P, being identical to one of John’s existing, or occurring, brain states (at the time of John’s having of the perceptual state, P). Since the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion is true, it follows that whenever John has an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, P, P’s perceptum, O, cannot—in principle—be John’s existing, or occurring, perceptual state, P. However, it follows from this that if it is possible—in principle—for John to have an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, P, that is a “perception of” any one of his existing, or occurring, brain states (at the time of John’s having of the perceptual state, P), then John’s existing, or occurring, perceptual state, P, is not identical to any one of his existing, or occurring, brain states (at the time of John’s having of the perceptual state, P). But if John’s existing, or occurring, perceptual state, P, is not identical to any one of his existing, or occurring, brain states (at the time of John’s having of the perceptual state, P), it follows that the Identity Theory is false; for, such a theory is committed to John’s existing, or occurring, perceptual state, P, being identical to one of John’s existing, or occurring, brain states (at the time of John’s having of the perceptual state, P). Since it is possible—in principle—for John to have an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, P, that is a “perception of” any one of his existing, or occurring, brain states (at the time of John’s having of the perceptual state, P), it follows that the Identity Theory is false. We may standardize the argument as follows:

P1)  If the Identity Theory is true, then all of John’s existing, or occurring, perceptual states are identical to some of John’s existing, or occurring, brain states.
P2)  If all of John’s existing, or occurring, perceptual states are identical to some of John’s existing, or occurring, brain states, then some of John’s existing, or occurring, brain states cannot—in principle—be the percepta of John’s existing, or occurring, perceptual states. 
P3)  All of John’s existing, or occurring, brain states can—in principle—be the percepta of John’s existing, or occurring, perceptual states. 
C1)  Therefore, the Identity Theory is false. [From P1—P3]
The Identity Theorist cannot reject the argument’s first premise without giving up the Identity Theory, and the Identity Theorist cannot challenge the second premise without first refuting the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion—something which I take to have been sufficiently proved. Furthermore, the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion follows a priori from the Principle of Perceptual Determinacy—another principle which I take to have been sufficiently proved. Therefore, if the Identity Theorist is to reject the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion, he must also reject the Principle of Perceptual Determinacy. With respect to the third premise, there is clearly nothing absurd or contradictory involved in the idea that John can—in principle—perceive any given existing, or occurring, state of his own brain whilst having an existing, or occurring, perceptual state. Indeed, if John’s optic nerves were lengthened and his eyes positioned correctly, he would certainly be able to perceive his own brain states (Not to mention the possibility of John using an autocerebroscope to perceive his brain states).10 Now, suppose the Identity Theorist were to argue that whenever a perceptual state (or a brain state) is perceived, it cannot be perceived in its entirety, but only partially, thus a perceptual state (or a brain state) having itself as its own perceptum would present no difficulty. Such an objection fails because it would lead to the following contradiction: a proper part of a whole (i.e., the perceived part of the whole perceptual state) would be both less than, and identical to, the whole (i.e., the whole perceptual state) of which it was a proper part.

Now, there is a third argument that we may employ against the Identity Theory that makes use of the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion and the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability—both of which follow a priori from the Principle of Perceptual Determinacy. The argument takes the following form:
P1)  If the Identity Theory is true, then there are some brain states which are—in principle—imperceptible. 
P2)  There are no brain states which are—in principle—imperceptible. 
C1)  Therefore, the Identity Theory is false. [From P1 and P2]
As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, there is nothing at all incoherent or contradictory in the idea that all existing, or occurring, brain states are—in principle—perceptible; indeed, it seems that it is not only possible in theory, but also—eventually—in practice.10 As the force of the argument lies in the first premise, I will concentrate my attention on defending it the most. The first premise is based on the fact that if the Identity Theory is true, then all existing, or occurring, perceptual states are identical to some existing, or occurring, brain states. Supposing that all existing, or occurring, perceptual states are identical to some existing, or occurring, brain states, it can be demonstrated that there are some existing, or occurring, brain states which are—in principle—imperceptible. The argument is as follows:
If an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, A, is a “perception of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, B,” then A is neither the perceptum of B, nor the perceptum of A; because if A was the perceptum of either A or B, then either the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion, or the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability would be violated. However, this entails that A is imperceptible—in principle—unless A was the perceptum of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, C,—a perceptual state that was different from A and B.
Indeed, if A was the perceptum of A, then we would have an existing, or occurring, perceptual state that had itself as its own perceptum—a clear violation of the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion. Furthermore, if A was the perceptum of B, then we would have a digonal perceptual “loop”—a clear violation of the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability. 
However, this entails that C is imperceptible—in principle—unless C was the perceptum of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, D,—a perceptual state that was different from A, B, and C.
Indeed, if C was the perceptum of C, then we would have an existing, or occurring, perceptual state that had itself as its own perceptum—a clear violation of the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion. Furthermore, if C was the perceptum of either A or B, then we would have either a digonal, or trigonal, perceptual “loop”—a clear violation of the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability. 
However, this entails that D is imperceptible—in principle—unless D was the perceptum of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, E,—a perceptual state that was different from A, B, C, and D.
Indeed, if D was the perceptum of D, then we would have an existing or occurring, perceptual state that had itself as its own perceptum—a clear violation of the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion. Furthermore, if D was the perceptum of either A, B, or C, then we would have either a digonal, trigonal, or tetragonal perceptual “loop”—a clear violation of the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability. 
However, this entails that E is imperceptible—in principle—unless E was the perceptum of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, F,—a perceptual state that was different from A, B, C, D, and E.
Indeed, if E was the perceptum of E, then we would have an existing, or occurring, perceptual state that had itself its own perceptum—a clear violation of the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion. Furthermore, if E was the perceptum of either A, B, C, or D, then we would have either a digonal, trigonal, tetragonal, or pentagonal perceptual “loop”—a clear violation of the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability. 
However, this entails that F is imperceptible—in principle—unless F was the perceptum of an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, G,—a perceptual state that was different from A, B, C, D, E, and F.
Indeed, if F was the perceptum of F, then we would have an existing, or occurring, perceptual state that had itself as its own perceptum—a clear violation of the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion. Furthermore, if F was the perceptum of either A, B, C, D, or E, then we would have either a digonal, trigonal, tetragonal, pentagonal, or hexagonal perceptual “loop”—a clear violation of the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability.
And so on, ad infinitum.
We are forced into a vicious, infinite regress. Every new perceptual state being posited (as existing, or occurring) to account for another perceptual state’s imperceptibility would itself be imperceptible—in principle—unless an additional perceptual state was posited (as existing, or occurring); however, this additional perceptual state (posited as existing, or occurring) would itself be imperceptible—in principle—unless a further perceptual state was posited (as existing, or occurring), and so on, ad infinitum. Therefore, since the regress is vicious, it follows that there are some existing, or occurring, perceptual states which are—in principle—imperceptible. However, this means that if all existing, or occurring, perceptual states are identical to some existing, or occurring, brain states, then some existing, or occurring, brain states are—in principle—imperceptible. But, as we saw above, all existing, or occurring, brain states are—in principle—perceptible. Therefore, it follows that some existing, or occurring, perceptual states are not brain states. Since the truth of the Identity Theory rests upon all existing, or occurring, perceptual states being identical to some existing, or occurring, brain states, it follows that the Identity Theory is false.
 
I have provided a diagram illustrating the vicious regress and the two-horned dilemma which follows from it. Each of the circles represent a particular perceptual state (e.g., Perceptual State A, Perceptual State B, Perceptual State C, Perceptual State D, Perceptual State E, and Perceptual State F). If a circle is green, then said perceptual state is the perceptum of another perceptual state (i.e., It is perceived). If a circle is red, then said perceptual state is not the perceptum of another perceptual state (i.e., The perceptual state is imperceptible). A black arrow pointing from one perceptual state to another perceptual state signifies that the former perceptual state is a perception of the latter perceptual state (e.g., The black arrow pointing from Perceptual State A to Perceptual State B signifies that Perceptual State A is a perception of Perceptual State B). A red arrow pointing from one perceptual state to another perceptual state signifies that the former perceptual state is not, and cannot be, a perception of the latter perceptual state—on pain of violating the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion (e.g., The red arrow pointing from Perceptual State B to Perceptual State A signifies that Perceptual State B is not, and cannot be, a perception of Perceptual State A—on pain of violating the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion). Perceptual situations contained in red boxes violate either the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion (e.g., Fig. 1) or the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability (e.g., Fig. 3, Fig. 5, and Fig. 7). Perceptual situations contained in green boxes neither violate the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion, nor the Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability; however, in such perceptual situations, there is always a remaining perceptual state—an imperceptible one—that is left unaccounted for (e.g., Fig. 2, Fig. 4, Fig. 6, and Fig. 8).

Addressing Two Objections

First Objection

“I wondered why one couldn’t perceive the contents of perception at different times. Perhaps when a tree is the perceptum of a perceptual state (brain state B), I could later have a new perceptual state to perceive brain state B. Then all the brain states would still be perceptible in principle.”

My concern with the proposed solution is that it faces the same dilemma that would arise if the perceptual states were simultaneous. Let me try to illustrate the issue:
If an existing, or occurring, perceptual state A was a “perception of a perceptual state, B,” and B had either existed, or occurred, prior to A, then A could have neither been the perceptum of B (since A hadn’t even existed yet to be the perceptum of B), nor could A have been the perceptum of A (without violating the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion). However, it follows from this that A would be imperceptible—in principle—unless it was the perceptum of another existing, or occurring, perceptual state, C,—a perceptual state that was itself different from A and B. Now, it is clear that if C either existed, or occurred, later than A and B, then C could have neither been the perceptum of A, nor the perceptum of B (since C hadn’t even existed yet to be the perceptum of either A or B). However, if C was the perceptum of C, then the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion would have been violated. Thus, C would be imperceptible—in principle—unless it was the perceptum of another existing, or occurring, perceptual state, D,—a perceptual state that was different from A, B, and C. And so on, ad infinitum.
Just as before, every new existing, or occurring, perceptual state needing to be posited to account for another perceptual state’s imperceptibility would itself be imperceptible—in principle—unless another existing, or occurring, perceptual state were posited; however, this existing, or occurring, perceptual state would itself be imperceptible—in principle—unless another existing, or occurring, perceptual state were posited, and so on, ad infinitum. In short, no matter how many perceptual states we posit, we will always get stuck with a “imperceptible” remainder left unaccounted for.

Second Objection

If I follow, the core point is that a perceptual state’s character is determined by its perceptum—the object of the perceptual state (q.v. The Principle of Perceptual Determinacy); and since a perceptual state’s character is “fixed” or rendered determinate by its perceptum, it follows that the perceptum of a perceptual state must have a character independent of that perceptual state. From this it seems to follow that (i) a perceptual state cannot be a “perception of itself” (q.v. The Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion), (ii) no two perceptual states can be of one another, and (iii) no n-number (n ≥ 2) of perceptual states can form a series of perceptual states and percepta wherein the first perceptual state in the series is a “perception of the second,” the second is a “perception of the third,” the third is a “perception of the fourth,” and so on—the last perceptual state in the series being a “perception of the first.”  (q.v. The Principle of Perceptual Non-Loopability). However, if the Identity Theory is true, and all perceptual states are identical to some brain states, then it is possible—in principle—for a perceptual state to be a “perception of itself”; indeed, it is possible—in principle—for someone to have a perceptual state of any of their brain states. For example, a person can perceive any of their brain states (a) in a mirror, (b) by having their optic nerves surgically extended—a medical operation which, if not capable of being performed with today’s technology, is by no means incapable of being accomplished in the near future, or even (c) by means of Feigl’s hypothetical autocerebroscope. Furthermore, if the Identity Theory is true, and all perceptual states are identical to some brain states, then it is possible—in principle—for two perceptual states to be of one another; indeed, it is possible—in principle—for two craniotomy patients to be positioned in such a way so that they perceive one another’s brain states simultaneously. Likewise, if the Identity Theory is true, then it is possible—in principle—for n-number (n ≥ 2) of perceptual states to form a series of perceptual states and percepta wherein the first perceptual state in the series is a “perception of the second,” the second is a “perception of the third,” the third is a “perception of the fourth,” and so on—the last perceptual state in the series being a “perception of the first.” Indeed, like before with two craniotomy patients, it is possible—in principle—for n-number (n ≥ 2) of craniotomy patients to be arranged in such a way that the first patient in the group perceives any one of the brain states of a second patient, the second perceives any one of the brain states of the third, the third perceives any one of the brain states of the fourth, and so on—the last patient in the group perceiving any one of the first patient’s brain states. Therefore, the Identity Theory is false. It seems that the best reply for an Identity Theorist would be to say that it is not true that a perceptual state’s character is determined by its perceptum. Rather, a perceptual state represents an object/character that may or may not exist. And so, there is no problem with a perceptual state being of itself, any more than there is a problem with other cases of reflective representation (e.g., the novel, Don Quixote, is, in part, about the novel, Don Quixote).”

There appear to be a couple of difficulties entailed by this suggested response. My first concern is that there seems to be a serious dilemma when it comes to the self-representation involved in a perceptual state having itself as its own perceptum. Coincidentally, A.E. Taylor’s criticism of Josiah Royce’s conception of the Absolute as a self-representing system parallels the issues involved in the actual implementation of a perceptual state that had itself as its own perceptum:
“Professor Royce’s own illustration of the map of England executed upon a portion of the surface of the country is really a typical instance of a self-contradictory purpose. He argues that such a map, to be theoretically perfect, must contain a reduced facsimile of itself as part of the country mapped, and this again another, and so on indefinitely. But the whole force of the reasoning depends on overlooking the distinction between the surface of England as it is before the map is made, and the surface of England as altered by the presence of the map. Prof. Royce assumes that you set out to represent in the map a state of things which can in fact have no existence until after the map is made. The previous existence of the map at a certain spot is falsely taken to be one of the conditions to which the map-maker is to conform in executing it. Every one of the supposed “maps within the map” will thus involve distortion and misrepresentation of the district it proposes to map. It is as if Hamlet had chosen “Hamlet” as the subject of the “play within the play.” The professor’s illustration thus does less than justice to his theory.”11
My second concern is that the proposed objection (i.e., that no existing, or occurring, perceptual state has any of its characteristics determined by the characteristics of its perceptum) ends up vindicating the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion—the very principle the objection sought to dissolve. The self-undermining character of the proposed objection can be made more explicit with the help from the following argument (an argument inspired by J.M.E. McTaggart’s conception of “Intrinsic Determination”12 as a relation between characteristics corresponding to (the relation of) implication between propositions):

Let X represent the characteristic of “having the characteristic of ‘neither existing, nor occurring, if perceptual state, P, neither exists, nor occurs’.”  
Let Y represent the characteristic of “neither existing, nor occurring, if perceptual state, P, neither exists, nor occurs.” 
Now, the occurrence of X as a characteristic in a given thing “intrinsically determines” the occurrence of Y as a characteristic in a given thing because the proposition “something has the characteristic X” implies the proposition “something has the characteristic Y.” As a matter of fact, the occurrence of X as a characteristic in a given thing determines the occurrence of Y as a characteristic in that very same thing which possesses X as a characteristic.  
Now, if an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, P, has none of its characteristics determined by any of the characteristics of its perceptum, then it immediately follows that no existing, or occurring, perceptual state, P, has itself as its own perceptum. This can be demonstrated in the following manner: 
If an existing, or occurring, perceptual state, P, had itself as its own perceptum, then P’s perceptum would have the characteristic of “having the characteristic of ‘neither existing, nor occurring, if P neither exists, nor occurs’.” However, the “having” of this characteristic by P’s perceptum would thereby determine the occurrence of the characteristic of “neither existing, nor occurring, if P neither exists, nor occurs,” in P’s perceptum. However, ex hypothesi, P’s perceptum is P itself. Thus, X being a characteristic of P’s perceptum would intrinsically determine Y as a characteristic of P. In other words, if no existing, or occurring, perceptual state, P, has any of its characteristics determined by the characteristics of its perceptum, it follows that no existing, or occurring, perceptual state, P, has itself as its own perceptum. And since the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion holds that no existing, or occurring, perceptual state, P, has itself as its own perceptum, it follows that the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion is true.
The proposed objection to our argument (i.e., that no existing or occurring perceptual state has any of its characteristics determined by the characteristics of its perceptum) has thus ended up vindicating the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion.

Concluding Remarks

“I am not what I see, / And other than the things I touch.”9

If the preceding arguments are sound, then the Identity Theory of Mind has been refuted—not by an appeal to the apparent qualitative character of our subjective life, but through an exploration of the necessary conditions underlying the existence and occurrence of perceptual states and their percepta.

Footnotes

[1] Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, trans. Richard Burdon Haldane and John Kemp, vol. I, III vols. (London, England: Trübner & Co., 1883), 5.

[2] Patrick Olivelle, ed., “Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,” in The Early Upaniṣads: Annotated Text and Translation, trans. Patrick Olivelle (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 29–165, 3.7.23.

[3] John Jamieson Carswell Smart, “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Nouri Zalta and Uri Nodelman, Winter 2022 Edition (Stanford, CA: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2022).

[4] Charlie Dunbar Broad, Perception, Physics, and Reality: An Enquiry Into the Information That Physical Science Can Supply about the Real (London, England: Cambridge University Press, 1914), 5.

[5] The italicized “is” should be interpreted as the “is” of identity. Thus, for any perceptual state, P, P is identical to a “perception of a perceptum, O.”

[6] Just as every perceptual state has a correlative perceptum, so too does every perceptum have a corresponding perceptual state. Thus, for any perceptum, O, there is a particular “somewhat” which is identical to the “perception of” that perceptum, O.

[7] It is vital to insist upon two important points. Firstly, it is for a perceptual state’s perceptum needn’t be perceived accurately for it to be the perceptum of the aforementioned perception state. Suppose that (i) a perceptual state, A, is a “perception of a “somewhat” as having property f,” and (ii) there just so happens to be no existent, or occurrent, “somewhat,” that has property f. Although A’s perceptum is perceived as having properties that it does not, in fact, have (i.e., the property f), it does not follow that A’s perceptum (i.e., the particular “somewhat” which is erroneously perceived as having property f) neither exists, nor occurs, nor is determinate. On the contrary, just as perceptual state A exists, or occurs, and is determinate, A’s perceptum exists, or occurs, and is determinate—the perceptum is simply misperceived or erroneously perceived. Secondly, one may broaden the definition of “perceptum” so that it would be the following: “For any existent, or occurrent, perceptual state, P, a perceptum is whatever serves to render P existent (or occurrent) and determinate as “this” perceptual token rather than indeterminate nothing. In cases of veridical perception, the perceptum of P would be something in the percipient subject’s environment. In cases of illusion or hallucination, the role (of perceptum) is still filled (albeit not necessarily by a worldly object external to the subject’s body), but something must serve to determine P as of something. Moreover, a perceptual state is determinate if and only if it possesses its individuating character sufficient to (type-)identify it as “this” very perceptual (token).

[8] Arthur Schopenhauer, Critical Debates: (1809 – 1818), ed. Arthur Hübscher, trans. Eric Francis John Payne, vol. II, IV vols., of Manuscript Remains (Oxford: Berg, 1988), 349.

[9] Charles Henry Rieber, Footnotes to Formal Logic (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1918), 10.

[10] Now, “perceptible-in-principle” and “imperceptible-in-principle,” like “knowable-in-principle,” are, in fact, genuine or “extensional” properties, rather than merely “intensional” properties. The fact that “perceptible-in-principle” and “imperceptible-in-principle” are extensional properties renders the preceding argument immune from accusations of committing a “masked-man” or “intensional” fallacy.

[11] Alfred Edward Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 12th ed. (London, England: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1961), 150.

[12] Cf. John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, vol. I, II vols. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1921), 111.

[13] Alfred Tennyson, In Memoriam (London, United Kingdom: Henry S. King &amp; Co., 1876), sec. 45, lines 7–8.

Bibliography

Broad, Charlie Dunbar. Perception, Physics, and Reality: An Enquiry Into the Information that Physical Science Can Supply about the Real. London, England: Cambridge University Press, 1914.

McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis. The Nature of Existence. Vol. I. II vols. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1921.

Olivelle, Patrick, ed. “Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.” In The Early Upaniṣads: Annotated Text and Translation, 29–165. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Rieber, Charles Henry. Footnotes to Formal Logic. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1918.

Schopenhauer, Arthur. Critical Debates: (1809 – 1818). Edited by Arthur Hübscher. Translated by Eric Francis John Payne. Vol. II. IV vols. of Manuscript Remains. Oxford: Berg, 1988.

Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Idea. Translated by Richard Burdon Haldane and John Kemp. Vol. I. III vols. London, England: Trübner & Co., 1883.

Smart, James Jamieson Carswell. “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory.” Edited by Uri Nodelman and Edward Nouri Zalta. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2022. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/mind-identity/.

Taylor, Alfred Edward. Elements of Metaphysics. 12th ed. London, England: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1961.

Tennyson, Alfred. In Memoriam. London, United Kingdom: Henry S. King & Co., 1876.