A Critical Examination of Illusionism

Whether or not Illusionism is growing in acceptance, I do not know; however, it does appear that Illusionism is receiving more and more attention in the contemporary philosophical scene. The following essay is a brief analysis of an assumption that lies at the heart of Illusionism. When discussing their views, Illusionists usually invoke the terms “qualia,” “phenomenal qualities,” “phenomenal characters,” “phenomenal feels,” “phenomenal properties,” “what-it’s-likenesses” and “sensory-qualities.” For the sake of clarity and uniformity, I am going to use “sensory-qualities” as a catch-all for these terms. The “programme and platform” of Illusionism is summarized in the following passages by its most active proponent, Keith Frankish:

“Illusionists believe that consciousness [and/or objects of consciousness] involve no properties that are not detectable and fully describable by third-person science. Any other properties we think are involved are illusory….[Sensory-qualities] are illusory.” (Frankish, Illusion or Identity, 1-2)

“[Illusionism] holds that [sensory-qualities are] an illusion and aims to explain why it seems [that sensory-qualities] exist….I shall refer to the problem of explaining why experiences [and/or objects of experiences] seem to have [sensory-qualities] as the illusion problem….Illusionists deny that experiences [and/or objects of experiences] have [sensory-qualities] and focus on explaining why they seem to have them. They typically allow that we are introspectively aware of our sensory states but argue that this awareness is partial and distorted, leading us to misrepresent the states [and/or objects of those states] as having [sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 1-3)

Nothing—whether it be an object or an experience—has sensory-qualities. If an object (or experience) seems to have sensory-qualities, it is because our brain’s introspective mechanisms have “misrepresented” the object (or experience) as having them. So much then for Illusionism.

In defending Illusionism, Keith Frankish makes heavy use of “representations.” But what is a “representation”? In cognitive science, a representation is understood as being a structure that stands for something by virtue of relations such as similarity, causal history, and connections with other representations. Frankish uses the term “representation” in a similar way:

“First, how do I use the term “representation”? I use it in its standard sense in cognitive science for a brain state (a pattern of neuron firing) that serves as a proxy for something else, producing psychological effects appropriate to the presence of the thing....[They are] part of the neural machinery that makes us aware of the things they represent.” (Frankish, Illusionism and its Place in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, 304)

I’ll accept this account of “representations” for the sake of argument. 

Frankish’s Illusionism cannot get off the ground unless it can establish the truth or plausibility of the following proposition: There exist “representations of sensory-qualities” (e.g., a “representation of a red sensory-quality”) that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. This is a very strong claim, and Frankish must adequately defend it without recourse to faith, intuition, or revelation. This is how Frankish defends Illusionism’s foundation stone: 

“It is true that cognitive scientists talk of there being representations in the brain. Representations in this sense are...parts of the machinery that makes us aware of things…Such representations need not share properties with the things they represent. The mental representation of redness need not be red, any more than the word ‘red’ or the numeral that denotes red in a painting-by-numbers kit…These representations [of sensory-qualities] don’t have [sensory-qualities], of course…Rather, they are patterns of neuron-firing that signal the presence of [sensory-qualities] in much the same way that written words signal the presence of things.” (Frankish, What if your Consciousness is an Illusion Created by your Brain?, 5)¹

“When illusionists say that [sensory-qualities] are illusory, they mean that we have introspective representations like those that we would have if our experiences had [sensory-qualities]. And we can have such representations even if our experiences don’t have [sensory-qualities]. Of course, [Illusionism requires] that the [introspective] representations [of sensory-qualities] don’t have [sensory-qualities]. But, as I noted, representations needn’t possess the properties they represent. Representations of redness needn’t be red, and representations of [sensory-qualities] needn’t [have sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, What if your Consciousness is an Illusion Created by your Brain?, 10) 

“A representation of a [sensory-quality] needn’t be qualitative, just as the word ‘red’ needn’t be red.” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Sep 27th, 2019)

“Representations needn’t possess the properties they represent. A representation of redness needn’t be red, and a representation of phenomenal redness needn’t be phenomenally red.” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Jan 2^nd, 2020)

“It implies some representation of the illusory thing—[sensory-qualities] in this case. But that representation needn’t itself have the properties of the illusory thing. A representation of [sensory-qualities] needn’t itself have [sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Feb 8^th, 2021)

“A representation of F needn’t itself be F. A representation of a square needn’t be a square, a representation of worldly green needn’t be green, and a representation of phenomenal green needn’t be phenomenally green.” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Mar 15^th, 2018)

Frankish’s line of reasoning can be summarized as follows:

P1) If there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent. 

P2) If  “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. 

C1) Therefore, if there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. [From P1—P2] 

P3) There have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent. 

C2) Therefore, there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. [From P1—C1, P3]

Such reasoning is clearly fallacious. The consequent in P2 does not at all follow from the antecedent. Indeed, it is a complete non sequitur—as well as an example of hasty generalization. Before I dive into a thorough analysis of Frankish’s reasoning, I think it will be most helpful if we do a bit of phenomenology. 

In many (if not all) of our observational activities, we direct our attention to an object, and this object is immersed within a multeity of objects. We observe the object of our attention as having or as consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds; likewise, the multeity of objects (in the periphery) are observed as having or as consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. Not only do these sensory-qualities constitute the “what” (i.e., the “content” or characteristica) we appeal to whenever we say that This observed (or observable) object is different from That observed (or observable) object, they also differentiate the object of our attention from the multeity of objects (in the periphery) and the multeity of objects (in the periphery) from the object of our attention. Objects (“representations” included) totally devoid of sensory-qualities would be nothing to us (observationally speaking); it is only by means of their apparent sensory-qualities that said observable objects have actual or possible significance for us.^2,3,4 Regardless of whether or not the sensory-qualities that the objects are observed as having or as consisting of are “real,” it is clear that it is only by means of them that we are able to  single out an object (in observation) from a field of objects—singling it out as a particular This among other Thises.

Suppose that we were to observe an object, X, and X is a “representation of a red sensory-quality.” Now, it does not necessarily follow that we will observe X as having or consisting of the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality which it represents (i.e., the red sensory-quality); indeed, we may observe X as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities that do not even fall under the heading of “color”—e.g., X may be observed as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of a tactile, gustatory, auditory, or olfactory kind. Nevertheless—and this point is essential—we have never observed objects (“representations” included) as neither having nor consisting of sensory-qualities; on the contrary, we have always observed objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds.⁴ The following scenario will help make this point more concrete:

Suppose that John is observing a cup on a table, and he observes the cup as having a determinate (or determinable) blue sensory-quality. Whenever John observes the cup as having a blue sensory-quality, he has a “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality.” John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” is localized to a particular chunk or region of his brain, and we can observe this particular chunk or region of John’s brain whenever he observes the cup as having a blue sensory-quality. Now, if we were to observe John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” (i.e., a particular chunk or region of John’s brain) as he observes the cup as having a blue sensory-quality, it is almost certain that we will not observe it as having a blue sensory-quality; however, we can be certain that we would observe it as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds; indeed, we would observe it as having or consisting of sensory-qualities, e.g., pinkness, warmth, smoothness, sliminess, etc. Although John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” is not observed as having a blue sensory-quality, it is nevertheless observed as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. Indeed, both the cup (i.e., the cup which John observes as having a blue sensory-quality) and John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” are both observed as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. In light of this illustration, what evidence is there for the following cornerstone of Illusionism:

There can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind.^{5, 6}

If Illusionism is to be held to its own standards, it cannot be allowed to defend the above claim by appealing to ‘intuitions’. Illusionism must appeal to the ‘empirical’. But what ‘empirical’ evidence is there? Or, rather, what is sample of available evidence is there for the Illusionist to appeal to in order to support the above-mentioned premise? (Whether or not the evidence does in fact support it). The following:

• We have had many instances of observation wherein we have observed a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality it represents.

• We have never had any instances of observation wherein a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) is observed as being totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind.

• We have always observed objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds.

• We have never had any instances of observation wherein the observed objects (“representations” included) are observed as neither having nor consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds.

Does the ‘empirical’ evidence support the consequent featured in P2 of Illusionism’s argument? Indeed, based on the bullet-points, can the Illusionist he validly conclude that there can exist (let alone that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable? No, he cannot do so. From these facts, it is clear that the Illusionist cannot validly infer (or posit) that there can exist (let alone that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind from instances of empirical observation.

I'll conclude the first part of this shrill shout of mine with a brief argument:

P1) If we cannot validly infer (or empirically verify) that “there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind” from the fact of there being instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent,” then we are not justified in believing an essential premise in all arguments for Illusionism.

P2) If we are not justified in believing an essential premise in all arguments for Illusionism, then we are not justified in believing Illusionism to be true. 

C1) Therefore, if we cannot validly infer (or empirically verify) that “there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind” from the fact of there being instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent,” then we are not justified in believing Illusionism to be true.  [From P1 and P2]  

P3) We cannot validly infer (or empirically verify) that “there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind” from the fact of there being instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent.” 

C2) Therefore, we are not justified in believing Illusionism to be true. [From P1 and P2] 

Thus, Illusionism’s foundation-stone is an arbitrary and unwarranted assumption. Far from being a viable option, the “coherent research programme” of Illusionism has the structural integrity of a castle in the air...

Addressing a Possible Objection:

I will attempt to address a potential objection, but before doing so, I think it would be best to outline the Illusionist’s argument in full and highlight the fallacy at its heart:

P1) If there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent. 

P2) If  “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. 

C1) Therefore, if there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. [From P1 and P2]

P3) If there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, then it is possible for us to “misrepresent” objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of sensory-qualities even though sensory-qualities do not exist and are not instantiated in the world (i.e., sensory-qualities only “seem” to exist and only “seem” to be instantiated in the world). 

C2) Therefore, if there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, then it is possible that sensory-qualities do not exist (i.e., it is possible that they are not instantiated in the world) even though we observe objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of sensory-qualities. [From C1 and P3] 

P4) If it is possible that sensory-qualities do not exist (i.e., if it is possible that they are not instantiated in the world) even though we observe objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of sensory-qualities, then it is possible that Illusionism is true. 

C3) Therefore, if there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, then it is possible that Illusionism is true. [From C2 and P4] 

P5) There have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent.  

C4) Therefore, it is possible that Illusionism is true. [From P1—C3, P5]

Now that we have standardized the Illusionist’s argument, we can examine it in detail. The move from P1 to P2 is fallacious—it is, as I have said, a non sequitur and involves an instance of hasty generalization (among other fallacies). As I have shown, the Illusionist cannot validly infer (or posit) that there can exist (let alone that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, from the fact that we have had many instances of observation wherein we have observed a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality it represents; the reason being that we have always observed objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. 

Now, throughout his work, Frankish continually addresses common criticisms of Illusionism. I think it would be helpful to include one of these criticisms (and Frankish’s response) here: 

“Another common objection to Illusionism is that in the case of [sensory-qualities] there is no gap between illusion and reality. [According to this objection] something can look like a Penrose triangle without being a Penrose triangle, but an experience that seems to have a greenish [sensory-quality] really does have a greenish [sensory-quality]….This is often presented as a crushing objection to Illusionism, but it is far from compelling. It turns on what we mean by [an experience] seeming to have a greenish [sensory-quality]. If we mean having an introspective experience with the same [sensory-quality] as [an experience that has] a greenish [sensory-quality], then, trivially, there is no distinction between seeming and reality. But of course this is not what Illusionists mean. [Illusionists] mean introspectively representing oneself as having [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality], and one can do this without having [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality]. The objector may reply that, in order to create the illusion of [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality], the introspective representation would have to employ a greenish [sensory-quality] mode of presentation, which would itself have an introspectable greenish [sensory-quality]. However, Illusionists will simply deny this, arguing that the content of introspective representations is determined by [non-sensory-qualities], causal or functional factors. [Footnote: Alternatively, Illusionists might concede that introspection employs modes of presentation that appear to have [sensory-qualities], but argue that this too is an illusion—that introspection misrepresents the modes of presentation as having [sensory-qualities] they lack. For a defense of this option and an argument that it does not generate an infinite regress, see Pereboom (Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, 27-28)]….The Illusionist claims that when we think we are having [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality (or when we think we are observing an object with a greenish sensory-quality] we are in fact merely misrepresenting ourselves as having [an experience with a greenish sensory-quality (or misrepresenting ourselves as observing an object with a greenish sensory-quality)]. This claim may be false, but the no-gap objection does not anything to the case against it.” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 16-17)

In light of Frankish’s response to his hypothetical objector, suppose Frankish was to reply to our argument by saying:

“John’s “representation of the blue sensory-quality” and my “representation of John’s “representation of the blue sensory-quality” as having sensory-qualities” can both be totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, and still represent their respective content as having or consisting of sensory-qualities because the content of a representation is fixed by the representation’s functional and relational features (i.e., non-sensory-qualities) and not intrinsic ones (e.g., sensory-qualities—if they existed).”

Such a reply would beg the question at issue because it presupposes that there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind—the very thing being disputed; and, as I have shown, the Illusionist has yet to present a valid argument for such a premise. Furthermore, he also begs the question because this premise plays an essential part in the Illusionist’s reasons (and attempted rationalization) for his denial of the existence of sensory-qualities. Unless the Illusionist can establish the premise, he can neither defend his theory, nor his denial of the existence of sensory-qualities, by invoking ideas that presuppose the premise’s truth (i.e., ideas which rest upon the very premise that the Illusionist has yet to establish or render plausible).

Furthermore, the response would be a red herring. It is beside the point to say that “the content of a representation is fixed by the functional and relational features (i.e., non-sensory-qualities) of the representation and not intrinsic ones (e.g., sensory-qualities—if they existed),” because my criticism does not concern how introspective “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” get their content “fixed” in the absence of any determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities being instantiated in the world; rather, my criticism targets Illusionist’s fallacious, non-sequiturial inference from instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, to the conclusion that there can exist (or that there does exist)  “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. Without this premise, Illusionism cannot get off the ground. 

Secondly, it may be true that the content of a representation is fixed by functional and relational features (i.e., non-sensory-qualities), but that doesn’t change the fact that the Illusionist has yet to prove that there can exist (or that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. Until the Illusionist is able to provide a valid and sound argument for that premise, Illusionism succumbs to “vicious circle” and “vicious regress” objections.

But what are these “vicious circle” and “vicious regress” objections? They take the following form:

“Many people think of illusions as involving [sensory-qualities]….If [sensory-qualities] were an illusion in that sense, then Illusionism would be circular. There would have to be another set of [sensory-qualities] in which the [sensory-quality] illusion was rendered, and we’d be no better off.” (Frankish, Illusionism and its Place in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, 301-302) (Cf. Frankish, Like a Rainbow, 1)

In other words, if the “introspective representations” which the Illusionist infers (or posits)—i.e., “representations of experiences/objects as having or consisting of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities”—had or consisted of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds (regardless of whether or not these inferred or (posited) representations had or consisted of, the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent), then Illusionism would be viciously circular. In order to avoid falling into a vicious circle or a vicious regress, the Illusionist must infer (or posit) the existence of introspective “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. Yet, as I have shown, such an inference (or positing) cannot be made (without committing several fallacies). The Illusionist cannot appeal to the premise as being an ‘open possibility’ (i.e., that it is an ‘open possibility’ that there can exist (or that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind). On the contrary, it does not tally (epistemically speaking) with what we have observed and with what we currently observe. The only kinds of representations evidenced by ‘empirical’ observation (i.e., the only available and relevant sample of representations that the Illusionist can validly infer (or posit)—without fallacy) are “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that have been perceived as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds—i.e., instances that do not permit the Illusionist to infer (or posit) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind).

Footnotes:

^[1] Contra the Early Wittgenstein, who holds that X cannot be a “representation of Y,” unless X has “something in common” (e.g., a “shared” logical form) with Y. Thus: “The picture is a model of reality.” (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 2.12) “The picture consists in the fact that its elements are combined with one in a definite way.” (2.14) “The picture is a fact.” (2.141) “That the elements of the picture are combined with one another in a definite way, represents that the things are some combined with one another.” (2.15) “According to this view the representing relation which makes it a picture, also belongs to the picture.” (2.1513) “The representing relation consists of the coordinations of the elements of the picture and the things.” (2.1514) “In order to be a picture a fact must have something in common with what it pictures.” (2.16) “In the picture and the pictured there must be something identical in order that the one can be a picture of the other at all.” (2.161) “What the picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it after its manner—rightly or falsely—is its form of representation.” (2.17) “The picture can represent every reality whose form it has. The spatial picture, everything spatial, the coloured, everything coloured, etc.” (2.171) “The picture has the logical form of representation in common with what it pictures.” (2.2) “The gramophone record, the musical thought, the score, the waves of sound, all stand to one another in that pictorial internal relation, which holds between language and the world. To all of them the logical structure is common. (Like the two youths, their two horses and their lilies in the story. They are all in a certain sense one).” (4.014) We find something similar in Nettleship’s Lectures on Logic: “In the first place, we must ask what is a sign or symbol? To say that A is a symbol of B implies, of course, that A is something different from B, but (and this is often forgotten) it also implies that it is in some respect the same as B. The most remote, far-fetched symbol in the world must have something in common with that which it symbolizes; i.e., the person to whom it has the symbolic meaning must have some (however little it may be) of the same feeling or experience when he experiences the symbol, as he has when he experiences that which it symbolizes. In other words, there are such things as symbols just because the most different things in the world have something in common.” (Nettleship, Philosophical Lectures and Remains, Vol. I, 23-24)

^[2] Indeed, in another article, Frankish himself agrees when he says, “When I look at a ripe banana, I seem to be aware of a rich yellow [sensory-quality]….Similarly, with smells, sounds, tastes, pains, and other sensory-qualities.” Likewise, he says, “I agree…that it seems as if [objects of] experiences have [sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, Why Panpsychism Fails to Solve the Mystery of Consciousness, 8). However, he goes on to say, “These [sensory-qualities] are not more present in the world around us than they are in our brains.” (Frankish, What is Illusionism?, 12). 

^[3] In a similar vein, he says, “We experience objects as having a distinctive but ineffable significance for us, which is a marker of their affordances. This is what we call their quality or feel.” (Frankish, Bright Shiny Colours, 1) And again, “As subjects of experience, our interest is in how things seem to us introspectively—the illusion [of sensory-qualities] itself, not the mechanisms that cause it.” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 8) And yet again, “We perceive things as having a certain impact on us, as infused with potent [sensory-qualities]….[Sensory-qualities] are not really anywhere. Thanks to the combination of perceptual and introspective processes in our brains, we experience objects as qualitatively charged. But the [sensory-qualities] don’t correspond to real, intrinsic features either of objects or us. They are potent illusions, an imperative commentary, generated by our brains to express the significance things have for us.” (Frankish, Illusionism and its Place in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, 304)

^[4] In a different context, Frankish discusses this when he describes possible variations of Illusionism (e.g., inward-looking Illusionism and outward-looking Illusionism): “I characterized Illusionism as the view that [sensory-qualities are] an introspective illusion, reflecting the widely held view that [sensory-qualities] are properties of experience. This may be too restrictive, however. Some theorists hold that experience is transparent: when we attend to our experiences, we are aware only of properties of their objects. Thus, redness is experienced as a property of surfaces, pain as a property of parts of our bodies, and so on (e.g., Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995; 2000). This points to the possibility of an outward-looking Illusionism, on which experience misrepresents distal stimuli as having [sensory-qualities]. Vision, for example, would represent objects as having illusory [sensory-qualities of colour] as well as real physical colours (for a view of this kind, see Hall, 2007). This view can be regarded as a variant of standard, inward-looking Illusionism, differing principally on where the illusory [sensory-qualities] are represented as being located. And, like the inward-looking version, it may posit processes of internal monitoring. The illusion of phenomenality may involve a combination of introspection and projection, in which we both misrepresent features of experience as [sensory-qualities] and then re-represent these illusory [sensory-qualities] as properties of the external world, mistaking complex physical properties of our sensory states for simple [sensory-qualities] of external objects (Humphrey, 2011, chapter 7).” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 7)

^[5] Observation is a relation between a person (or a mind) and an object (or a multeity of objects)—not a relation between an object (or a multeity of objects) and a part of a person (e.g., a visual system, an introspective mechanism, a sense-organ, or a brain). Instances of “blind-sight” give us no reason to suppose that we have instances of observation wherein an object is observed as neither having nor consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. For a “blind-sighted” person to correctly guess the identity of some object placed in front of their eyes is not for him to observe it. Indeed, the “blind-sighted” person does not observe the object at all. Similarly, if I am seated in a room and I happen to correctly guess that there is a man lurking in another room a few doors down, I do not thereby observe him. As C.D. Broad says, “For the relation to the organ, whatever it may be, is not the relation of being perceived, since that is a relation to the mind and not to the body.” (Broad, Perception, Physics, and Reality, 189)

^[6] Frankish endorses the view, advanced by Derk Pereboom, that it is an ‘open possibility’ that there exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. (Cf. Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 6). This ‘open possibility’ is subject to devastating criticisms in Torin Atler’s review of Pereboom’s Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. Pereboom’s arguments for this ‘open possibility’ assume a form of Kantianism (regarding the nature of introspection and first-person access]. Furthermore, he attempts to substantiate this ‘open possibility’ by relying upon fragments from John Locke’s epistemology (a ghost laid to rest ages ago by Berkeley, Bradley, etc.). Unfortunately, Pereboom doesn’t take the opportunity to either re-examine the coherence of these appeals to Locke in light of Berkeley’s and Bradley’s crushing objections, or to take a step back and ask himself whether his implicit Kantianism is consistent with his knowledge of the fact of his having such views at all. (Cf. Pereboom, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, 15)

My Adaptation of the “Mary’s Room” Argument Against Physicalism

Mary lives in a room that is purely black and white—there are no achromatic gradients or shades of grey in the room whatsoever. While she is in the room, Mary learns all of the “physical” facts about light and color vision (i.e., All that neuroscience and physics have to say about light and color vision and the relationships between different colors). For example, while Mary is in her room, she learns that the color red is identical to light wavelengths of 625nm to 700nm, the color blue is identical to light wavelengths of 450nm to 485nm, the color green is identical to light wavelengths of 500nm to 565nm, and the color yellow is identical to light wavelengths of 565nm to 590nm. Mary also has memorized the sequence of colors in order of shortest-to-longest wavelengths.

One day Mary leaves the room (which, as we must keep in mind, was purely black and white without any kind of shading or achromatic gradient mediating between the black and white). Mary is then escorted to a table where a couple of fellow scientists are waiting for her. On the surface of the table lies an assortment of colored tiles (which are not in any particular order or arrangement; they are simply “scattered” and “mixed up”). There is one red tile, one blue tile, one green tile, and one yellow tile. Mary (who had learned all of the “physical” facts about light and color vision; indeed, she has even memorized the light wavelengths of red, blue, green, and yellow) is told—on the spot—the following: “Mary, you are in the presence of four colored tiles. Arrange the colored tiles in the order of shortest-to-longest wavelengths.”

It’s clear that Mary would be stumped.

Another scientist interrupts the silence and says, “Mary, with your left hand, pick up the red tile, or the tile whose color is identical to wavelengths of 625nm to 700nm; and, with your right hand, pick up the green tile, or the tile whose color is identical to the wavelengths of 500nm to 565nm.”

It is pretty clear that (i) Mary would not know which four tiles to pick up with her left hand and (ii) Mary would not know which of the four tiles to pick up with her right hand.

Despite her exhaustive knowledge of all the “physical” facts about light and color vision, Mary would not know which of the four colored tiles presented to her was the red tile and which of the four tiles was the green tile.

After a few moments without any answer from Mary, one of the scientists places the red tile in Mary’s left hand and says, “This is red.” The other scientist then places the green tile in Mary’s right hand and says, “This is green.” Upon hearing these statements, Mary learns new facts about light and color vision; namely that there are drastic qualitative differences and similarities between red and green—e.g., they have different sensory characteristics; one is “softer” than the other; one is “warmer” than the other; one is more “vibrant” than the other; and one is less “harsh” and more “mellow” than the other. One of the scientists then picks up the yellow tile and tells Mary, “This is yellow.” Upon hearing this statement, Mary, again, learns another new fact about light and color vision; namely the fact that yellow is more “vibrant” than green—which is “mellower”—and that the qualitative character of yellow is lighter and less “imposing” than red.

Now, suppose, on the other hand, the situation was altered. Suppose that immediately after Mary left her room, one of the scientists placed the red tile in Mary’s left hand and said, “This is green;” and the other scientist placed the green tile in Mary’s right hand and said “This is red.” Clearly, if Mary learned all the “physical” facts about light and color vision, she would immediately respond by saying “You both are wrong. The green tile is in my right hand, and the red tile is in my left.” However, it’s obvious that upon leaving her room, Mary would have no idea that she was being told falsehoods about the colors of the tiles—indeed (after being told that the red tile in her left and was green, and the green tile in her right hand was red) she would think that the red tile was green and the green tile was red. However, red and green have different wavelengths—and Mary would have known this upon her release.

If Mary knew all there is to know about light and color vision, then Mary should have been able to identify the colors of the tiles and arrange them in sequence of shortest-to-longest wavelengths upon her release, without hesitation. And yet, she couldn’t. Thus, since Mary knew all of the “physical” facts about light and color vision before leaving her room (i.e., All that neuroscience and physics have to say about light and color vision and the relationships between different colors), it follows that not all facts are “physical” facts.

Common-Sense and the Perceptible World

Whenever we perceive a part of the perceptible world, we perceive it as “having” or “consisting of” qualities. Furthermore, the qualities we perceive a part of the perceptible world as “having” or “consisting of” are the “what” (i.e., the “content” or characteristica) that we appeal to whenever we say that “this” part of the perceptible world is different from “that” part of the perceptible world. Indeed, without this qualitative “whatness,” every part of the perceptible world we perceive would be indistinguishable from any other. Puzzles regarding the peculiar relationship between a perceived part of the perceptible world and the qualities we perceive that part of the perceptible world as “having” or “consisting of” often leads Common-Sense to maintain that all the qualities we perceive any part of the perceptible world as “having” or “consisting of” are dependent upon and relative to the structure of our sense organs—a view which, when taken to its logical conclusions, leads to contradictions. 

Now, our sense organs—on which the qualities we perceive a part of the perceptible world as “having” or “consisting of” are said to depend—are themselves parts of the perceptible world, and, as such, the qualities we perceive our sense organs (e.g., Our eyes) as “having” or “consisting of” are likewise dependent upon and relative to our sense organs (e.g., Our hands). However, these “second-order” sense organs (e.g., Our hands)—on which the qualities we perceive the “first-order” sense organs (e.g., Our eyes) as “having” or “consisting of” depend—are, in turn, themselves parts of the perceptible world, and so the qualities we perceive the “second-order” sense organs (e.g., Our hands) as “having” or “consisting of” depend upon a “third-order” of sense organs (e.g., Our nose and tongue), or—Heaven forbid—upon the “first-order” sense organs again (e.g., Our eyes). There is no end to the mutual dependence. However, if, as Common-Sense holds, the qualities we perceive a part of the perceptible world as “having” or “consisting of” are themselves actual features of that part of the perceptible world we perceive them as inhering in, then we are either sent off into a vicious regress or entrapped within a vicious circle. In the former case, we are led into an inconsistency: all parts of the perceptible world (including our sense organs) dissolve into “states” of “states” of “states” of an unknown X—a “something-we-know-not-what” never to be found. In the latter case, we are led to an absurd contradiction: our sense organs would have given rise to the whole perceptible world of which our sense organs are proper parts—“into the man’s head the whole world goes, including the head itself.”

The above argument is a refinement of a similar argument from A.E. Taylor’s 1903 work, Elements of Metaphysics, page 198-199.

Materialism and Representationalism

The following article presents a dilemma that takes aim at contemporary Materialism’s recourse to “representationalism”—a ghost which, so far as I can see, has long been laid to rest in the history of philosophy.

According to contemporary Materialism, we cannot arrive at an understanding of any part of Nature unless it is a “content” of our nervous systems’ representations—said representational states being parts or regions of our nervous systems. However, the relationship between a representation and its “content” is perplexing. For, we cannot arrive at an understanding of the “content” of a representation, X, without having an understanding of X as being the “representation of something” (and this involves having an understanding of X and characteristics of X); indeed, (a) both what is, and is not, the “content” of a representation (i.e., What a representation is a “representation of,” and what a representation is not a “representation of”) is determined by the characteristics and relations of said representation, (b) a representation’s “content” need not exist, (c) a representation need not “correspond” to its “content,” and (d) the relation obtaining between a representation and its “content” is not, and cannot be, merely one of “similarity,” “resemblance,” “co-existence,” or “effect” to “cause.” However, since we cannot arrive at an understanding of the “content” of a representation, X, without having an understanding of X as being the “representation of something” (and this involves having an understanding of X and characteristics of X), it follows that if we cannot arrive at an understanding of any part of Nature unless it is a “content” of our nervous systems’ representations, then we cannot arrive at an understanding of any part of Nature without having an understanding of our nervous systems’ representations. However, since our nervous systems’ representations are themselves parts or regions of our nervous systems, it follows that if we cannot arrive at an understanding of any part of Nature unless it is a “content” of our nervous systems’ representations, then we cannot arrive at an understanding of any part of Nature without having an understanding of parts of our nervous systems. This is the first horn of the dilemma.

This horn can be defended in several additional ways.  Indeed, in his Gifford Lectures, The World and the Individual, Josiah Royce decisively refutes the view that the relation between a representation and its “content” either is, or could be, merely one of “similarity,” “resemblance,” “co-existence,” or “effect” to “cause.” Rather than including Royce’s entire discussion on the relationship between a representation and its “content,” I’ve include a passage that I found to be particularly germane:

“For consider: An object, as we have seen, has two relations to a [representation]. The one is the relation that constitutes it the object meant by that [representation]. The other is the sort of correspondence that is to obtain between object and [representation]. As to the first of these two: An object is not the object of a given [representation] merely because the object causes the [representation], or impresses itself upon the [representation] as the seal impresses the wax. For there are objects of [representations] that are not causes of the [representations] which refer to these objects, just as there are countless cases where my [representations] are supposed to have causes, say physiological or psychological causes, of which I myself never become conscious at all, as my objects. Nor is the object the object of a given [representation] merely because, from the point of view of an external observer, who looks from without upon [representation] and object, and compares them, the [representation] resembles the object. For the sort of correspondence to be demanded of the [representation] is determined by itself, and this correspondence cannot be judged merely from without. Again, my [representation] of my own past experiences may resemble your past experiences, in case you have felt as I have felt, or have acted in any way as I have acted. Yet when my [representations], in a moment of reminiscence, refer to my own past, and have that for their object, they do not refer to your past, nor to your deeds and sorrows, however like my own these experiences of yours may have been. One who, merely comparing my [representations] and your experiences, said that because of the mere likeness I must be thinking of your past as my object, would, therefore, err, if it was my own past of which I was thinking. Neither such a relation as causal connection nor such a relation as mere similarity is, then, sufficient to identify an object as the object of a given [representation]. Nor yet can any other relation, so far as it is merely supposed to be seen from without, by an external observer, suffice to identify any object as the object of a given [representation].” (Royce, The World and the Individual, Vol. I, 297)

I’ve also included several passages outlining contemporary views as to the relationship between a representation and its “content.”

“[If] awareness of an external object is constituted by having an internal representation of it; [then] the perceiver is not aware of the representation itself, but of what it represents (its content). Thus, one perceives the tomato (the object of awareness) in virtue of possessing an internal representation of it (the vehicle of awareness). This move satisfies some philosophers that perception is direct in the traditional sense, yet on this view, the perceiver experiences the content of a representation rather than the living tomato. The representation must somehow be derived from the visual input by a process that establishes its content….If perceptual awareness consists of having representations, how does the perceptual system determine the environmental entities to which they correspond? Without some independent, extrasensory access to the world, there appears to be no way to establish which internal states indicate which environmental properties, or which representations stand for tomatoes and which for elephants. The perceiver is trapped in a closed universe of sensory phenomena or uninterpretable representations. The indirect solution is inference to the best explanation: The perceptual system infers a representation of the world that best accounts for the order in sensory input....However, as Hermann von Helmholtz understood by the mid-19th century, this inference process presumes that the perceptual system already possesses knowledge about (1) the structure of the world, including the sorts of entities that exist and predicates to describe them, and (2) how the world structures sensory input, such as a theory of image formation and transduction. The trouble is that such prior knowledge must somehow be acquired, again, in an extrasensory manner....The [representationalist] position thus appears to be circular. There is a further problem with treating perception as a process of inference. Inference is a logical relation that holds between conscious mental states (beliefs, thoughts, statements) corresponding to premises and conclusions. But as we have just seen, if we are to avoid the representationalist fallacy, perception cannot be based on conscious awareness of internal states. If the perceptual process is unconscious, then whatever else it may be, it cannot be inferential; the same goes for related terms such as hypothesis, clue, evidence, and assumption. The notion of perception as unconscious inference, originally suggested by Helmholtz, is thus inconsistent. Computational theories seek to avoid this objection by treating perception as a process of computation over representations, but this leaves [the semantic or grounding] problem unresolved.” (Warren, Entry on “Direct Perception” in The Encyclopedia of Perception, Vol. I, 367-368) 

To help illustrate the importance of the above passage. I have included a diagram showing an image projected on the retina of the eye (i.e., the representation) and the infinitely many possible sources (i.e., the “content”) that the projected retinal image can map onto.

 

“The states of a computer can be given many different semantic interpretations; indeed, the same symbolic states are sometimes interpreted as words, sometimes as numbers, chess positions, or weather conditions….What determines what a given (syntactically articulated) state represents? [What] causes certain mental events to have certain contents? [According to some theorists], at least some mental contents represent certain things because they resemble them. An image of X represents X precisely because the conscious mental representations, or images, look like X. Such a view probably is not far from the common notion of visual imagery. If you were to ask a group of people how they know their image of a duck actually represents a duck, rather than, say, a rabbit, they might reply that the image looks like a duck. For several reasons, however, this answer does not explain why the image is a representation of a duck. For example, even in the introspectionist approach, the image need not closely resemble a duck for people to take it as a duck since it is their image, they can take it as virtually anything they wish; after all, the word duck refers to a duck without in any way, resembling a duck. As Wittgenstein points out, the image of a man walking up a hill may look exactly like the image of a man walking backward down a hill; yet, if they were my images, there would be no question of their being indeterminate—I would know what they represented. The relation of resemblance is not well defined. Whether one thing resembles another is not a physically (or geometrically) definable property; resemblance depends on what the viewer knows or believes. To me, most birds closely resemble one another, but to a birdwatcher friend they are as different as ducks and rabbits. Resemblance cannot be specified except in relation to a viewer….Resemblance provides no basis for specifying the semantic content of mental representations.” (Pylyshyn, Computation and Cognition, 40-41) 

“Mediational behaviorists and certain speculative neurophysiologists take the position that a brain event can be said to represent something if that event is sufficiently like (possesses a subset of the properties of) the event that takes place when that something actually is perceived. Another, more radically behaviorist version requires that the mediational event evoke an internal “preparatory response” that is sufficiently like the response that would have been evoked by the corresponding stimulus. Neither position is satisfactory, because of the properties of representations we have already noted (for example, we can think about objects we have neither perceived nor have any disposition to behave toward, such as, perhaps, quarks). In any case, the only mechanism behaviorism provides for explicating the representing relation is that of association. Association, in turn, must be established by such principles as contiguity and evoked by the activation of other associated items (otherwise we would not have provided the naturalistic account of the semantics of the functional states sought by behaviorism). A chain of continuous events mediating between a brain state and an object, however, cannot form the basis of representation, for reasons discussed above, namely, that it is neither necessary nor sufficient that the state of an organism be linked by a series of contiguous events to the object that the state represents. Not only can I think of things to which I obviously am not in this sort of relation (for example, nonexistent things), but when I do think of X, I do not thereby think of associates of X; indeed, I need not think of properties that are necessarily coextensive with X, such as shape, size, weight, color, and so on. The basic problem is that representing is a semantic relation, that semantic relations, like logical relations, appear not to be causally definable…” (Pylyshyn, Computation and Cognition, 41-42)

I have also included a diagram from M.D. Vernon’s Psychology of Perception, that illustrates the problem of under-determination. For, two representations may be nearly indistinguishable with respect to their characteristics as “vehicles” and nevertheless have drastically different “content.” 

 

Let’s return to our argument by outlining the second horn of the dilemma:

Our nervous systems—and their parts—are themselves parts of Nature.

The Materialist cannot, on pain of inconsistency, deny or reject the second horn of the dilemma. Taken together, the first and second horns are the following: 

A) We cannot arrive at an understanding of any part of Nature without having an understanding of parts of our nervous systems.

B) Our nervous systems—and their parts—are themselves parts of Nature.

The Materialist is thus caught in a snare : 

We cannot arrive at an understanding of any part of Nature without having an understanding of something that could never be understood by us.

If the dilemma doesn’t make itself explicit at first glance, it can be brought to light in the following way:

We cannot arrive at an understanding of any part of Nature without having an understanding of parts of our nervous systems, N(1). However, our nervous systems, N(1), are themselves parts of Nature; and so we cannot arrive at an understanding of parts of our nervous systems, N(1)—the having of which is necessary for our arriving at an understanding of any part of Nature—without having an understanding of parts of our nervous systems, N(2). However, our nervous systems, N(2), are themselves parts of Nature; and so we cannot arrive at an understanding of parts of our nervous systems, N(2)—the having of which is necessary for our arriving at an understanding of parts of our nervous systems, N(1)—without having an understanding of parts of our nervous systems, N(3). However, our nervous systems, N(3), are themselves parts of Nature; and so we cannot arrive at an understanding of parts of our nervous systems, N(3)—the having of which is necessary for our arriving at an understanding of parts of our nervous systems, N(2)—without having an understanding of parts of our nervous systems, N(4). However, our nervous systems, N(4), are themselves parts of Nature; and so we cannot arrive at an understanding of parts of our nervous systems, N(4)—the having of which is necessary for our arriving at an understanding of parts of our nervous systems, N(3)—without having an understanding of parts of our nervous systems, N(5)…and so on, and so on, ad infinitum. Our arrival at an understanding of any part of Nature is thus thwarted by a vicious, downward spiral of mutually-presupposing terms.

In other words, a vicious regress would render it impossible for us arrive at an understanding of any part of Nature. However, since Materialism asserts that we do have, and indeed have arrived at, an understanding of some parts of Nature, it follows that Materialism is inconsistent with itself. Indeed, the truth of Materialism is incompatible with our knowledge of its truth.

The above argument is inspired by several passages in Chapter 22, “Nature,” of F.H. Bradley’s 1893 magnum opus, Appearance and Reality. Bradley’s argument receives an analysis in W.J. Mander’s article, F.H. Bradley and the Philosophy of Science. I have included Mander’s overview of Bradley’s argument below:

“Bradley has one further objection to physical nature which is rather unusual and worth quoting in his own words. In order to state the problem, says Bradley: 

“We may here use the form of what has been called an Antinomy. (a) Nature is only for my body; on the other hand, (b) My body is only for Nature…the outer world is known only as a state of my organism….And yet most emphatically…my organism is nothing but appearance to a body. It itself is only the bare state of a natural object….[This] gives us one thing as qualified by the state of another thing, each within that known relation being only for the other, and, apart from it, being unknown and, so far, a nonentity….Nature is the phenomenal relation of the unknown to the unknown; and the terms cannot, because unknown, even be said to be related, since they cannot themselves be said to be anything at all.” 

The puzzle is, that nature can only be understood through our sense organs, but our sense organs can only be understood as part of nature, which as before can only be understood through our sense organs. Thus, the physical world turns out to be an unknown relation between two mutually presupposing elements in a vicious downwards spiral. This is a curious argument, which might at first appear to be making a very obvious mistake. Surely Bradley should have referred not to our sense organs, but our experience. Is it not the case that nature, including our sense organs, simply comes to us in experience, in which case where is the circle? But in fact, this objection concedes precisely Bradley’s point. For what he is attacking is the notion of a purely physical world, and experience in order to do the task that it is being given here, must be something more or other than the physical world. His point is that a purely physical world, whatever else it may be able to explain (e.g. facts about us and our behaviour) can never account for its own cognition—that requires something more of a wholly different order. Within that restriction it seems reasonable to say that a knowledge of nature depends on an understanding of our sense organs. Since it is only filtered through them that cognition can take place, we have to understand the sense organs in order to understand what they give us. This is true in the same sense that we have to understand what a Geiger counter is doing in order to understand what it is telling us. But in that case, since our sense organs are part of nature, they too can only be understood in the same way, launching us on a regress. The only solution is to move to something outside of physical nature, like “experience,” for we do not have to understand experience in order to understand what it tells us. Its data comes already interpreted. Thus understood, I would maintain that this argument of Bradley’s is a valid and sound reductio of the idea of a purely physical nature.” (Mander, F.H. Bradley and the Philosophy of Science, 70)

E.E. Harris outlines Bradley’s argument in a similar fashion in his article, Bradley’s Conception of Nature:

“Although the word “Nature,” Bradley tells us (and rightly), has more meanings than one, when he discusses it in Chapter XXII of Appearance and Reality, he takes it in the sense of “the bare physical world.” “Abstract from everything psychical, and then the remainder of existence will be nature.” This forms the object of purely physical science and, we are told, “appears to fall outside of all mind.” It is obvious that such a conception is, as Bradley maintains, a pure abstraction….[We] construct a notion of [the physical world] as independent of our thought, consisting of things with primary and secondary qualities. It is the same for all observers and we regard our bodies with their sense organs as the media of observation which should convey it to us as it is and as it exists apart from them….But this view is full of confusion….Everything revealed to us of such a physical world can be so only as an affection of our own organisms; yet these again are physical things and so must be reduced to affections of themselves. We cannot infer from our affections to the causes which affect us, for to do that would be to conclude to some “thing-in-itself” which is in the nature of the case unknowable and could not therefore help us, nor could it conceivably be related causally to what is knowable so as to validate the inference. Accordingly, the physical world as the complex of relations between physical things turns out to be “the phenomenal relation of the unknown to the unknown.” Bradley develops this paradox at more length, asserting that inevitably the outer world exists only for my organs. If this means only that my perception of the physical world is so dependent, it can hardly be gainsaid; and, of course, my organs can be perceived as physical objects only on the same condition. In these terms any attempt to explain our experience of the world must lead to vicious regress and circularity. But what if we were to say that the world and our organisms are self-existent apart from any affection we may suffer and apart from our perceiving? That could help us in no way at all to comprehend the physical world, to explain what we know of it, or to say how we come to experience it. So, we are brought, Bradley concludes, to an unavoidable result: “The physical world is an appearance; it is phenomenal throughout. It is the relation between two unknowns, which, because they are unknown, we cannot have any right to regard as really two, or as related at all.” But this circular connection and contradictory interrelation between ourselves and nature is no mere mistake to be discounted. It is a necessary and unavoidable feature of our experience giving nature phenomenal reality as a grouping of facts, coexistence of objects and a sequence of events holding good within a section of what appears to us.” (Harris, Bradley’s Conception of Nature, 187-189)

An Interesting Corollary to the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion

In my essay, An Argument Against the Identity Theory of Mind, I argued that the relation between a perceptual state and its perceptum entails the truth of the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion. The Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion, it will be remembered, is the following: For any “perceptual state,” P, P is not a “perception of P.” Or, to put it another way: no existing or occurring perceptual state is identical to its own perceptum. Rather than rehashing the arguments that I provide in An Argument Against the Identity Theory of Mind, I will (for the purposes of this article at least) proceed as if the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion has been successfully established. Now, the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion can be isolated from the context and general argument of my original essay and be transposed in a manner that would strengthen many standard arguments against Materialism. To illustrate this, I will first present the “modified” Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion; I will then include a passage from a philosophy textbook which presents a “standard” argument against Materialism—and the Materialist’s “diffusion” of it; after that, I will show how a “modified” version of the Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion can be used to “diffuse” the Materialist’s “diffusion” of that “standard” argument against Materialism.

We may state the modified version of The Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion in the following way: For any “Object of Consciousness,” O, O is not identical to the “Consciousness of O.” Now, since no “Object of Consciousness,” O, is ever identical to the “Consciousness of O,” it follows that one cannot justify the assertion that the “Consciousness of O” is susceptible to being “masked” by appealing to the fact that certain “Objects of Consciousness,” O, are susceptible to being “masked.” Indeed, no amount of “masked” Morning Stars and Evening Stars will ever serve as grounds for holding that the “Consciousness of O” is susceptible to being “masked.” The reason for this is very simple, and follows immediately from our modified version of The Principle Perceptual Self-Exclusion. The Morning Star and the Evening Star are both “Objects of Consciousness,” O, and we have seen that no “Object of Consciousness,” O, can ever be identical to the “Consciousness of O.”

“Our first objection [to Materialism] derives from Descartes, who deployed a similar argument in support of strong dualism. It runs as follows: (1) I may be completely certain of my own experiences, when I have them. (2) I cannot have the same degree of certainty about the existence of any physical state, including my own brain-states. (C) So (by Leibniz’s Law) my conscious experiences aren’t in fact identical to brain states. Although both the premises in this argument are true, the argument itself commits a fallacy, and is invalid. For as we noted in Chapter 3:1, Leibniz’s Law only operates in contexts which aren’t intentional. It is obvious that the context reacted by the phrase “X is certain that…” is an intentional one. For example, the police may be certain that Mr. Hyde is the murderer, while they have no inkling that Dr. Jekyll is the murderer, despite the fact that Jekyll and Hyde are one and the same man. Oedipus may be certain that Jocasta loves him without believing that his mother loves him, despite the fact that Jocasta is his mother. So, from the fact that I have complete certainty about my own conscious states without having certainty about my own brain-states, it doesn’t follow that my conscious states aren’t brain states. For just as one and the same woman may be presented to Oedipus in two different guises—as Jocasta, and as his mother—so perhaps one and the same brain state may be presented to me under two different aspects: in a third-person way (as a brain-state), and via the qualitative feel of what it is like to be in that state.” (Carruthers, The Nature of the Mind: An Introduction, 67-68) 

Note, all of the examples which Carruthers gives in his reductio of the “Cartesian Certainty” argument (e.g. Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, and Jocasta and Oedipus’ mother) are all examples of “Objects of Consciousness” being “masked.” Not one of Carruthers’ examples are examples of the “Consciousness of Objects” being masked. In short, Carruthers’ has not in any way shown the argument to be invalid. On the contrary, it is Carruthers’ argument which is invalid. Carruthers mistakenly infers that the “Consciousness of Objects” is susceptible to being “masked” based upon the fact that certain “Objects of Consciousness” are susceptible to being masked—and such a move is, as we have seen above, an invalid one. Thus, Carruthers’ “diffusion” of the “Cartesian Certainty” argument has itself been “diffused” by our modified version of The Principle of Perceptual Self-Exclusion.