Showing posts with label Content. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Content. Show all posts

Friday, March 8, 2024

A Critical Examination of Illusionism

Whether or not Illusionism is growing in acceptance, I do not know; however, it does appear that Illusionism is receiving more and more attention in the contemporary philosophical scene. The following essay is a brief analysis of an assumption that lies at the heart of Illusionism. When discussing their views, Illusionists usually invoke the terms “qualia,” “phenomenal qualities,” “phenomenal characters,” “phenomenal feels,” “phenomenal properties,” “what-it’s-likenesses” and “sensory-qualities.” For the sake of clarity and uniformity, I am going to use “sensory-qualities” as a catch-all for these terms. The “programme and platform” of Illusionism is summarized in the following passages by its most active proponent, Keith Frankish:

“Illusionists believe that consciousness [and/or objects of consciousness] involve no properties that are not detectable and fully describable by third-person science. Any other properties we think are involved are illusory….[Sensory-qualities] are illusory.” (Frankish, Illusion or Identity, 1-2)

“[Illusionism] holds that [sensory-qualities are] an illusion and aims to explain why it seems [that sensory-qualities] exist….I shall refer to the problem of explaining why experiences [and/or objects of experiences] seem to have [sensory-qualities] as the illusion problem….Illusionists deny that experiences [and/or objects of experiences] have [sensory-qualities] and focus on explaining why they seem to have them. They typically allow that we are introspectively aware of our sensory states but argue that this awareness is partial and distorted, leading us to misrepresent the states [and/or objects of those states] as having [sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 1-3)

Nothing—whether it be an object or an experience—has sensory-qualities. If an object (or experience) seems to have sensory-qualities, it is because our brain’s introspective mechanisms have “misrepresented” the object (or experience) as having them. So much then for Illusionism.

In defending Illusionism, Keith Frankish makes heavy use of “representations.” But what is a “representation”? In cognitive science, a representation is understood as being a structure that stands for something by virtue of relations such as similarity, causal history, and connections with other representations. Frankish uses the term “representation” in a similar way:

“First, how do I use the term “representation”? I use it in its standard sense in cognitive science for a brain state (a pattern of neuron firing) that serves as a proxy for something else, producing psychological effects appropriate to the presence of the thing....[They are] part of the neural machinery that makes us aware of the things they represent.” (Frankish, Illusionism and its Place in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, 304)

I’ll accept this account of “representations” for the sake of argument. 

Frankish’s Illusionism cannot get off the ground unless it can establish the truth or plausibility of the following proposition: There exist “representations of sensory-qualities” (e.g., a “representation of a red sensory-quality”) that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. This is a very strong claim, and Frankish must adequately defend it without recourse to faith, intuition, or revelation. This is how Frankish defends Illusionism’s foundation stone: 

“It is true that cognitive scientists talk of there being representations in the brain. Representations in this sense are...parts of the machinery that makes us aware of things…Such representations need not share properties with the things they represent. The mental representation of redness need not be red, any more than the word ‘red’ or the numeral that denotes red in a painting-by-numbers kit…These representations [of sensory-qualities] don’t have [sensory-qualities], of course…Rather, they are patterns of neuron-firing that signal the presence of [sensory-qualities] in much the same way that written words signal the presence of things.” (Frankish, What if your Consciousness is an Illusion Created by your Brain?, 5)1

“When illusionists say that [sensory-qualities] are illusory, they mean that we have introspective representations like those that we would have if our experiences had [sensory-qualities]. And we can have such representations even if our experiences don’t have [sensory-qualities]. Of course, [Illusionism requires] that the [introspective] representations [of sensory-qualities] don’t have [sensory-qualities]. But, as I noted, representations needn’t possess the properties they represent. Representations of redness needn’t be red, and representations of [sensory-qualities] needn’t [have sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, What if your Consciousness is an Illusion Created by your Brain?, 10) 

“A representation of a [sensory-quality] needn’t be qualitative, just as the word ‘red’ needn’t be red.” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Sep 27th, 2019)

“Representations needn’t possess the properties they represent. A representation of redness needn’t be red, and a representation of phenomenal redness needn’t be phenomenally red.” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Jan 2nd, 2020)

“It implies some representation of the illusory thing—[sensory-qualities] in this case. But that representation needn’t itself have the properties of the illusory thing. A representation of [sensory-qualities] needn’t itself have [sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Feb 8th, 2021)

“A representation of F needn’t itself be F. A representation of a square needn’t be a square, a representation of worldly green needn’t be green, and a representation of phenomenal green needn’t be phenomenally green.” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Mar 15th, 2018)

Frankish’s line of reasoning can be summarized as follows:

P1) If there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent. 

P2) If  “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. 

C1) Therefore, if there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. [From P1—P2] 

P3) There have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent. 

C2) Therefore, there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. [From P1—C1, P3]

Such reasoning is clearly fallacious. The consequent in P2 does not at all follow from the antecedent. Indeed, it is a complete non sequitur—as well as an example of hasty generalization. Before I dive into a thorough analysis of Frankish’s reasoning, I think it will be most helpful if we do a bit of phenomenology. 

In many (if not all) of our observational activities, we direct our attention to an object, and this object is immersed within a multeity of objects. We observe the object of our attention as having or as consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds; likewise, the multeity of objects (in the periphery) are observed as having or as consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. Not only do these sensory-qualities constitute the “what” (i.e., the “content” or characteristica) we appeal to whenever we say that This observed (or observable) object is different from That observed (or observable) object, they also differentiate the object of our attention from the multeity of objects (in the periphery) and the multeity of objects (in the periphery) from the object of our attention. Objects (“representations” included) totally devoid of sensory-qualities would be nothing to us (observationally speaking); it is only by means of their apparent sensory-qualities that said observable objects have actual or possible significance for us.2,3,4 Regardless of whether or not the sensory-qualities that the objects are observed as having or as consisting of are “real,” it is clear that it is only by means of them that we are able to  single out an object (in observation) from a field of objects—singling it out as a particular This among other Thises.

Suppose that we were to observe an object, X, and X is a “representation of a red sensory-quality.” Now, it does not necessarily follow that we will observe X as having or consisting of the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality which it represents (i.e., the red sensory-quality); indeed, we may observe X as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities that do not even fall under the heading of “color”—e.g., X may be observed as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of a tactile, gustatory, auditory, or olfactory kind. Nevertheless—and this point is essential—we have never observed objects (“representations” included) as neither having nor consisting of sensory-qualities; on the contrary, we have always observed objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds.4 The following scenario will help make this point more concrete:

Suppose that John is observing a cup on a table, and he observes the cup as having a determinate (or determinable) blue sensory-quality. Whenever John observes the cup as having a blue sensory-quality, he has a “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality.” John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” is localized to a particular chunk or region of his brain, and we can observe this particular chunk or region of John’s brain whenever he observes the cup as having a blue sensory-quality. Now, if we were to observe John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” (i.e., a particular chunk or region of John’s brain) as he observes the cup as having a blue sensory-quality, it is almost certain that we will not observe it as having a blue sensory-quality; however, we can be certain that we would observe it as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds; indeed, we would observe it as having or consisting of sensory-qualities, e.g., pinkness, warmth, smoothness, sliminess, etc. Although John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” is not observed as having a blue sensory-quality, it is nevertheless observed as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. Indeed, both the cup (i.e., the cup which John observes as having a blue sensory-quality) and John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” are both observed as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. In light of this illustration, what evidence is there for the following cornerstone of Illusionism:

There can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind.5, 6

If Illusionism is to be held to its own standards, it cannot be allowed to defend the above claim by appealing to ‘intuitions’. Illusionism must appeal to the ‘empirical’. But what ‘empirical’ evidence is there? Or, rather, what is sample of available evidence is there for the Illusionist to appeal to in order to support the above-mentioned premise? (Whether or not the evidence does in fact support it). The following:

  • We have had many instances of observation wherein we have observed a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality it represents.

  • We have never had any instances of observation wherein a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) is observed as being totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind.

  • We have always observed objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds.

  • We have never had any instances of observation wherein the observed objects (“representations” included) are observed as neither having nor consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds.

Does the ‘empirical’ evidence support the consequent featured in P2 of Illusionism’s argument? Indeed, based on the bullet-points, can the Illusionist he validly conclude that there can exist (let alone that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable? No, he cannot do so. From these facts, it is clear that the Illusionist cannot validly infer (or posit) that there can exist (let alone that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind from instances of empirical observation.

I'll conclude the first part of this shrill shout of mine with a brief argument:

P1) If we cannot validly infer (or empirically verify) that “there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind” from the fact of there being instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent,” then we are not justified in believing an essential premise in all arguments for Illusionism.

P2) If we are not justified in believing an essential premise in all arguments for Illusionism, then we are not justified in believing Illusionism to be true. 

C1) Therefore, if we cannot validly infer (or empirically verify) that “there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind” from the fact of there being instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent,” then we are not justified in believing Illusionism to be true.  [From P1 and P2]  
P3) We cannot validly infer (or empirically verify) that “there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind” from the fact of there being instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent.” 
C2) Therefore, we are not justified in believing Illusionism to be true. [From P1 and P2] 

Thus, Illusionism’s foundation-stone is an arbitrary and unwarranted assumption. Far from being a viable option, the “coherent research programme” of Illusionism has the structural integrity of a castle in the air...

Addressing a Possible Objection:

I will attempt to address a potential objection, but before doing so, I think it would be best to outline the Illusionist’s argument in full and highlight the fallacy at its heart:

P1) If there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent. 

P2) If  “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. 

C1) Therefore, if there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. [From P1 and P2]

P3) If there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, then it is possible for us to “misrepresent” objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of sensory-qualities even though sensory-qualities do not exist and are not instantiated in the world (i.e., sensory-qualities only “seem” to exist and only “seem” to be instantiated in the world). 

C2) Therefore, if there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, then it is possible that sensory-qualities do not exist (i.e., it is possible that they are not instantiated in the world) even though we observe objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of sensory-qualities. [From C1 and P3] 

P4) If it is possible that sensory-qualities do not exist (i.e., if it is possible that they are not instantiated in the world) even though we observe objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of sensory-qualities, then it is possible that Illusionism is true. 

C3) Therefore, if there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, then it is possible that Illusionism is true. [From C2 and P4] 

P5) There have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent.  

C4) Therefore, it is possible that Illusionism is true. [From P1—C3, P5]

Now that we have standardized the Illusionist’s argument, we can examine it in detail. The move from P1 to P2 is fallacious—it is, as I have said, a non sequitur and involves an instance of hasty generalization (among other fallacies). As I have shown, the Illusionist cannot validly infer (or posit) that there can exist (let alone that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, from the fact that we have had many instances of observation wherein we have observed a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality it represents; the reason being that we have always observed objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. 

Now, throughout his work, Frankish continually addresses common criticisms of Illusionism. I think it would be helpful to include one of these criticisms (and Frankish’s response) here: 

“Another common objection to Illusionism is that in the case of [sensory-qualities] there is no gap between illusion and reality. [According to this objection] something can look like a Penrose triangle without being a Penrose triangle, but an experience that seems to have a greenish [sensory-quality] really does have a greenish [sensory-quality]….This is often presented as a crushing objection to Illusionism, but it is far from compelling. It turns on what we mean by [an experience] seeming to have a greenish [sensory-quality]. If we mean having an introspective experience with the same [sensory-quality] as [an experience that has] a greenish [sensory-quality], then, trivially, there is no distinction between seeming and reality. But of course this is not what Illusionists mean. [Illusionists] mean introspectively representing oneself as having [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality], and one can do this without having [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality]. The objector may reply that, in order to create the illusion of [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality], the introspective representation would have to employ a greenish [sensory-quality] mode of presentation, which would itself have an introspectable greenish [sensory-quality]. However, Illusionists will simply deny this, arguing that the content of introspective representations is determined by [non-sensory-qualities], causal or functional factors. [Footnote: Alternatively, Illusionists might concede that introspection employs modes of presentation that appear to have [sensory-qualities], but argue that this too is an illusion—that introspection misrepresents the modes of presentation as having [sensory-qualities] they lack. For a defense of this option and an argument that it does not generate an infinite regress, see Pereboom (Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, 27-28)]….The Illusionist claims that when we think we are having [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality (or when we think we are observing an object with a greenish sensory-quality] we are in fact merely misrepresenting ourselves as having [an experience with a greenish sensory-quality (or misrepresenting ourselves as observing an object with a greenish sensory-quality)]. This claim may be false, but the no-gap objection does not anything to the case against it.” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 16-17)

In light of Frankish’s response to his hypothetical objector, suppose Frankish was to reply to our argument by saying:

“John’s “representation of the blue sensory-quality” and my “representation of John’s “representation of the blue sensory-quality” as having sensory-qualities” can both be totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, and still represent their respective content as having or consisting of sensory-qualities because the content of a representation is fixed by the representation’s functional and relational features (i.e., non-sensory-qualities) and not intrinsic ones (e.g., sensory-qualities—if they existed).”

Such a reply would beg the question at issue because it presupposes that there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind—the very thing being disputed; and, as I have shown, the Illusionist has yet to present a valid argument for such a premise. Furthermore, he also begs the question because this premise plays an essential part in the Illusionist’s reasons (and attempted rationalization) for his denial of the existence of sensory-qualities. Unless the Illusionist can establish the premise, he can neither defend his theory, nor his denial of the existence of sensory-qualities, by invoking ideas that presuppose the premise’s truth (i.e., ideas which rest upon the very premise that the Illusionist has yet to establish or render plausible).

Furthermore, the response would be a red herring. It is beside the point to say that “the content of a representation is fixed by the functional and relational features (i.e., non-sensory-qualities) of the representation and not intrinsic ones (e.g., sensory-qualities—if they existed),” because my criticism does not concern how introspective “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” get their content “fixed” in the absence of any determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities being instantiated in the world; rather, my criticism targets Illusionist’s fallacious, non-sequiturial inference from instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, to the conclusion that there can exist (or that there does exist)  “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. Without this premise, Illusionism cannot get off the ground. 

Secondly, it may be true that the content of a representation is fixed by functional and relational features (i.e., non-sensory-qualities), but that doesn’t change the fact that the Illusionist has yet to prove that there can exist (or that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. Until the Illusionist is able to provide a valid and sound argument for that premise, Illusionism succumbs to “vicious circle” and “vicious regress” objections.

But what are these “vicious circle” and “vicious regress” objections? They take the following form:

“Many people think of illusions as involving [sensory-qualities]….If [sensory-qualities] were an illusion in that sense, then Illusionism would be circular. There would have to be another set of [sensory-qualities] in which the [sensory-quality] illusion was rendered, and we’d be no better off.” (Frankish, Illusionism and its Place in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, 301-302) (Cf. Frankish, Like a Rainbow, 1)

In other words, if the “introspective representations” which the Illusionist infers (or posits)—i.e., “representations of experiences/objects as having or consisting of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities”—had or consisted of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds (regardless of whether or not these inferred or (posited) representations had or consisted of, the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent), then Illusionism would be viciously circular. In order to avoid falling into a vicious circle or a vicious regress, the Illusionist must infer (or posit) the existence of introspective “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. Yet, as I have shown, such an inference (or positing) cannot be made (without committing several fallacies). The Illusionist cannot appeal to the premise as being an ‘open possibility’ (i.e., that it is an ‘open possibility’ that there can exist (or that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind). On the contrary, it does not tally (epistemically speaking) with what we have observed and with what we currently observe. The only kinds of representations evidenced by ‘empirical’ observation (i.e., the only available and relevant sample of representations that the Illusionist can validly infer (or posit)—without fallacy) are “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that have been perceived as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds—i.e., instances that do not permit the Illusionist to infer (or posit) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind).

Footnotes:

[1] Contra the Early Wittgenstein, who holds that X cannot be a “representation of Y,” unless X has “something in common” (e.g., a “shared” logical form) with Y. Thus: “The picture is a model of reality.” (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 2.12) “The picture consists in the fact that its elements are combined with one in a definite way.” (2.14) “The picture is a fact.” (2.141) “That the elements of the picture are combined with one another in a definite way, represents that the things are some combined with one another.” (2.15) “According to this view the representing relation which makes it a picture, also belongs to the picture.” (2.1513) “The representing relation consists of the coordinations of the elements of the picture and the things.” (2.1514) “In order to be a picture a fact must have something in common with what it pictures.” (2.16) “In the picture and the pictured there must be something identical in order that the one can be a picture of the other at all.” (2.161) “What the picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it after its manner—rightly or falsely—is its form of representation.” (2.17) “The picture can represent every reality whose form it has. The spatial picture, everything spatial, the coloured, everything coloured, etc.” (2.171) “The picture has the logical form of representation in common with what it pictures.” (2.2) “The gramophone record, the musical thought, the score, the waves of sound, all stand to one another in that pictorial internal relation, which holds between language and the world. To all of them the logical structure is common. (Like the two youths, their two horses and their lilies in the story. They are all in a certain sense one).” (4.014) We find something similar in Nettleship’s Lectures on Logic: “In the first place, we must ask what is a sign or symbol? To say that A is a symbol of B implies, of course, that A is something different from B, but (and this is often forgotten) it also implies that it is in some respect the same as B. The most remote, far-fetched symbol in the world must have something in common with that which it symbolizes; i.e., the person to whom it has the symbolic meaning must have some (however little it may be) of the same feeling or experience when he experiences the symbol, as he has when he experiences that which it symbolizes. In other words, there are such things as symbols just because the most different things in the world have something in common.” (Nettleship, Philosophical Lectures and Remains, Vol. I, 23-24)

[2] Indeed, in another article, Frankish himself agrees when he says, “When I look at a ripe banana, I seem to be aware of a rich yellow [sensory-quality]….Similarly, with smells, sounds, tastes, pains, and other sensory-qualities.” Likewise, he says, “I agree…that it seems as if [objects of] experiences have [sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, Why Panpsychism Fails to Solve the Mystery of Consciousness, 8). However, he goes on to say, “These [sensory-qualities] are not more present in the world around us than they are in our brains.” (Frankish, What is Illusionism?, 12). 

[3] In a similar vein, he says, “We experience objects as having a distinctive but ineffable significance for us, which is a marker of their affordances. This is what we call their quality or feel.” (Frankish, Bright Shiny Colours, 1) And again, “As subjects of experience, our interest is in how things seem to us introspectively—the illusion [of sensory-qualities] itself, not the mechanisms that cause it.” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 8) And yet again, “We perceive things as having a certain impact on us, as infused with potent [sensory-qualities]….[Sensory-qualities] are not really anywhere. Thanks to the combination of perceptual and introspective processes in our brains, we experience objects as qualitatively charged. But the [sensory-qualities] don’t correspond to real, intrinsic features either of objects or us. They are potent illusions, an imperative commentary, generated by our brains to express the significance things have for us.” (Frankish, Illusionism and its Place in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, 304)

[4] In a different context, Frankish discusses this when he describes possible variations of Illusionism (e.g., inward-looking Illusionism and outward-looking Illusionism): “I characterized Illusionism as the view that [sensory-qualities are] an introspective illusion, reflecting the widely held view that [sensory-qualities] are properties of experience. This may be too restrictive, however. Some theorists hold that experience is transparent: when we attend to our experiences, we are aware only of properties of their objects. Thus, redness is experienced as a property of surfaces, pain as a property of parts of our bodies, and so on (e.g., Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995; 2000). This points to the possibility of an outward-looking Illusionism, on which experience misrepresents distal stimuli as having [sensory-qualities]. Vision, for example, would represent objects as having illusory [sensory-qualities of colour] as well as real physical colours (for a view of this kind, see Hall, 2007). This view can be regarded as a variant of standard, inward-looking Illusionism, differing principally on where the illusory [sensory-qualities] are represented as being located. And, like the inward-looking version, it may posit processes of internal monitoring. The illusion of phenomenality may involve a combination of introspection and projection, in which we both misrepresent features of experience as [sensory-qualities] and then re-represent these illusory [sensory-qualities] as properties of the external world, mistaking complex physical properties of our sensory states for simple [sensory-qualities] of external objects (Humphrey, 2011, chapter 7).” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 7)

[5] Observation is a relation between a person (or a mind) and an object (or a multeity of objects)—not a relation between an object (or a multeity of objects) and a part of a person (e.g., a visual system, an introspective mechanism, a sense-organ, or a brain). Instances of “blind-sight” give us no reason to suppose that we have instances of observation wherein an object is observed as neither having nor consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. For a “blind-sighted” person to correctly guess the identity of some object placed in front of their eyes is not for him to observe it. Indeed, the “blind-sighted” person does not observe the object at all. Similarly, if I am seated in a room and I happen to correctly guess that there is a man lurking in another room a few doors down, I do not thereby observe him. As C.D. Broad says, “For the relation to the organ, whatever it may be, is not the relation of being perceived, since that is a relation to the mind and not to the body.” (Broad, Perception, Physics, and Reality, 189)

[6] Frankish endorses the view, advanced by Derk Pereboom, that it is an ‘open possibility’ that there exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. (Cf. Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 6). This ‘open possibility’ is subject to devastating criticisms in Torin Atler’s review of Pereboom’s Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. Pereboom’s arguments for this ‘open possibility’ assume a form of Kantianism (regarding the nature of introspection and first-person access]. Furthermore, he attempts to substantiate this ‘open possibility’ by relying upon fragments from John Locke’s epistemology (a ghost laid to rest ages ago by Berkeley, Bradley, etc.). Unfortunately, Pereboom doesn’t take the opportunity to either re-examine the coherence of these appeals to Locke in light of Berkeley’s and Bradley’s crushing objections, or to take a step back and ask himself whether his implicit Kantianism is consistent with his knowledge of the fact of his having such views at all. (Cf. Pereboom, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, 15)

Monday, October 31, 2022

Answering a Reply to “Why Materialism Cannot Genuinely Explain Experience”

I recently received a reply to my article, “Why Materialism Cannot Genuinely Explain Experience,” and I wanted to provided a detailed answer to the commenter’s questions. He writes: 
“If X is (E—X) then isn’t ((E—X)—X) the same as (X—X)? And what does the notation mean anyways?”
Think of each pair of parentheses as representing a particular concept, and think of whatever is between each pair of parentheses as representing the content of said concept. The “—” symbol is used to make the distinction between certain contents internal to a concept. With regard to your other question, I think the following passage from McTaggart’s Studies in Hegelian Cosmology helps clarify what I am getting at: 
“If…we tried to explain the idea of a parent merely in terms of the idea of a child, we should have fallen into a vicious circle, since we should find that the idea of a child could not be explained except in relation to the idea of a parent.” (McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, §69)
As McTaggart points out, the concept of “Child” cannot be understood or grasped apart from the concept of “Parent;” and so it follows that the concept of “Parent” features in the concept of “Child” as one of its conceptual contents. In other words, the concept of “Child” is conceptually sense-dependent upon the concept of “Parent.” We can represent this with the following notion. Let P represent the concept of “Parent,” and let (P—X) represent the concept of “Child.” (In this particular instance, X serves as a placeholder for conceptual content that is not itself conceptually-sense dependent upon the concept of “Parenthood.” In my original essay, X is not only a placeholder, but also the very concept that the Materialist attempts to explain Experience in terms of). If we were to explain the concept of “Parent” in terms of the concept of “Child,” then we would have to explain P in terms of (P—X). However, this cannot be done unless we first explain (P—X) in terms of ((P—X)—X); but this cannot be done unless we first explain ((P—X)—X) in terms of (((P—X)—X)—X); but this cannot be done unless we first explain (((P—X)—X)—X) in terms of ((((P—X)—X)—X)—X). And so on, and so on, ad infinitum. And this circle is clearly vicious.

Now, just as the concept of “Child” cannot be understood or grasped apart from the concept of “Parent,” so too is it the case that the concept of “Parent” cannot be understood apart from the concept of “Child.” Thus, the concept of “Child” features in the concept of “Parent” as one of its conceptual contents. And so, it follows that the concept of “Parent” is conceptually sense-dependent on the concept of “Child.” We can represent this with the following notion. Let C represent the concept of “Child,” and let (C—X) represent the concept of “Parent.” If we were to explain the concept of “Child” in terms of the concept of “Parent,” then we would have to explain C in terms of (C—X). However, this cannot be done unless we first explain (C—X) in terms of ((C—X)—X); but this cannot be done unless we first explain ((C—X)—X) in terms of (((C—X)—X)—X); but this cannot be done unless we first explain (((C—X)—X)—X) in terms of ((((C—X)—X)—X)—X). And so on, and so on, ad infinitum. And this circle is clearly vicious. 

While it is the case that the concept of “Parent” and the concept of “Child” are reciprocally sense-dependent, it is not the case that the concept of “Experience” and the concept of “Matter” (i.e., the Materialist’s X) are reciprocally sense-dependent. As I say in my article:
“Further, X, as a concept, had its conceptual content and determinate meaning exhausted by facts “internal to” Experience. But this just means that X is conceptually sense-dependent upon facts “internal to” Experience; in other words, one cannot grasp or understand X without grasping or having a prior understanding of certain facts “internal to” Experience or Experience itself. On the other hand, it is clear that one can grasp or understand Experience, and facts “internal to” Experience, without ever grasping or understanding the Materialist’s X.”
In short, since the Materialist’s X is conceptually sense-dependent upon the concept of “Experience,” but the concept of “Experience” is not conceptually sense-dependent upon the Materialist’s X, it follows that Experience cannot be explained in terms of the Materialist’s X without the explanation becoming viciously circular; indeed, “the Materialist is forced by his own hand to presuppose at the very beginning of his explanation, the very presence of the phenomenon which he professes to have reached as the final result.” And so, with these clarifications out of the way, I think it is safe to say that it is impossible—in principle—for Materialism to genuinely explain Experience.

Friday, March 18, 2022

My Adaptation of A.E. Taylor’s Argument for Idealism

P1) If X is a real physical object at T1, then X is perceivable at T1.
Prima facie, it seems that the difference between a “real” physical object and an “unreal” physical object is nothing other than the following: a “real” physical object either is, or could be, the perceptum (i.e., object) of a perceptual state, whilst an “unreal” or merely “imaginary” physical object neither is, nor could be, the perceptum of a perceptual state. Indeed, Kant insisted upon this in his critique of the ontological proof. For Kant, the difference between a “real” physical object and its merely “imagined” or “unreal” counterpart, lied in the fact that the “real” physical object—unlike the merely “imaginary” or “unreal” physical object—is, or could be, the perceptum of a perceptual state. Taking a hundred dollars as his example, Kant pointed out that the “real” hundred dollars are, or could be, something felt, touched, and handled; seen, smelled, and tasted; exchanged for a currency of a different type, used for purchasing goods and services in the market, or simply deposited in a bank for future use. The “imaginary” hundred dollars, on the other hand, neither are, nor could be, felt, touched, and handled; seen, smelled, and tasted; exchanged for a currency of a different type, used for purchasing goods and services in the market, or simply deposited in a bank for future use.
With that being said, it is crucial to recognize that to “imagine” something is not to “perceive” what is being “imagined.”  Whenever I “imagine” anything, there is always a distinction between my psychical act of “imagining” and the “imaginatum” which I am “imagining.” My psychical act of “imagining” the “imaginary” hundred dollars is certainly “real” and not “imaginary,” because the psychical act of “imagining” is one with, and enters into, my Experience, it is something that I am actually doing. On the other hand, the “imaginatum” that I am “imagining” (i.e., the “unreal” or “imaginary” hundred dollars”) neither is, nor can be, something that enters into my Experience. If one muddles the distinction between the “imagining” and the “imaginatum,” then one inevitably falls into one of the following two absurdities: (a) they end up committing themselves to the “reality” of griffins, round-squares, and leprechauns because they collapse the “unreal” “imaginatum” into the “real” psychical act of “imagining;” or (b) they end up committing themselves to the “unreality” of psychical acts of “imagining” because they collapse the psychical act of “imagining” into the “unreal” “imaginatum.” For a further defense of this premise, confer the passages from Taylor’s works below.
P2) If X is perceivable at T1, then all of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 are themselves real at T1.
 
P3) If all of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 are themselves real at T1, then all of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 are themselves perceivable at T1.
 
P4) If all of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 are themselves perceivable at T1, then none of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 are themselves imperceptible at T1.
 
P5) If none of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 are themselves imperceptible at T1, then none of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 have the property of “being unperceived at T1.” 
If X has both the property of “being perceivable at T1” and the property of “being unperceived at T1,” that would mean it is possible to perceive X at T1—the time at which X also has the property of being unperceived—but this is a contradiction. Indeed, it is just as contradictory to assert that X, when perceived, is imperceptible. Therefore, if X has the property of “being perceivable at T1,” then X cannot also have the property of “being unperceived at T1.” For a further defense of this premise, confer the passages from Taylor’s works below.
C1) Therefore, if X  is a real physical object at T1, then none of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 have the property of “being unperceived at T1.” [From P1—P5]
 
P6) One of the necessary physical conditions that make X perceivable at T1 is X itself.
 
C2) Therefore, if X is a real physical object at T1, then X  does not have the property of “being unperceived at T1.” [From C1 and P6]
 
P7) If X  does not have the property of “being unperceived at T1,” then X is not unperceived at T1.
 
P8) If X is not unperceived at T1, then X is perceived at T1.
 
C3) Therefore, if X is a real physical object at T1, then X is perceived at T1. [From C2—P8]
“And, as to the principle of the contention that presence in an experience is the very meaning of existence, it is, to my mind at least, as Mr. Bradley says it is to his, so evident that I should find it impossible to meet anyone who disputes it on common ground. Its full force will perhaps be best brought out by our disregarding the special grounds upon which it is supported by Berkeley, some of them only too insecure, and restating it in the form of a challenge. Produce, we may say to the objector, any piece of fact whatever of which you are prepared to maintain the real existence, and I will undertake to show that what makes it real can be nothing but its presence as an inseparable aspect of a sentient experience. What the special fact you choose for the purpose of the experiment may be, whether a physical quality or process, an artistic effect, or a moral excellence, makes no difference to the principle of the argument. For when you have chosen your fact, and made your assertion, “This fact, A, really exists,” we shall invite you to think, as you always can, of a corresponding A which is not real but merely imaginary, and then to say what it is that makes the difference between the real and the imaginary or unreal A. If you will try the experiment, you will always find, as Kant proved in the historical case of the hundred dollars, that the difference does not lie in the addition of a new predicate to those by which the imaginary A is characterized, but always in the actual presence of the real A to a sentient experience, its entrance into some immediately apprehended whole. Even in the case of an A which, for some reason or other, is wholly inaccessible to human perception you cannot really escape from this conclusion. For, suppose you say, “The ice at the South Pole really exists, though it is impossible for a human eye to behold it,” we shall invite you to explain more precisely what you mean by such a statement. You will then find yourself in a dilemma: either you mean that the Polar ice exists with all its qualities, including those which have no meaning at all except in relation to a perceiving organ, precisely as we should see it if we were there, and in that case the ice with all its qualities must presumably be always present, as such, to an experience which is not ours; or you mean that there really exist certain conditions, such that, on the addition of one further condition, the presence of a human spectator, they would yield a perception of the ice. But, not to insist on the point that the reality of a certain object and the reality of some of its conditions are not the same thing, what do you mean by a really existing condition as distinguished from one which is merely imagined to exist? Any answer to this question will show that the appeal to conditions only puts the difficulty back a stage, without in any way affecting the validity of the Berkeleian contention.” (Taylor, Mind and Nature, 58-59) 
“Reality...is truly known to be a connected and self-consistent, or internally coherent, system; can we with equal confidence say anything of the data of which the system is composed? Reflection should convince us that we can at least say as much as this: all the materials or data of reality consist of experience, experience being provisionally taken to mean psychical matter of fact, what is given in immediate feeling. In other words, whatever forms part of presentation, will, or emotion, must in some sense and to some degree possess reality and be a part of the material of which reality, as a systematic whole, is composed; whatever does not include, as part of its nature, this indissoluble relation to immediate feeling, and therefore does not enter into the presentation, will, and emotion, of which psychical life is composed, is not real. The real is experience, and nothing but experience, and experience consists of “psychical matter of fact.” Proof of this proposition can only be given in the same way as of any other ultimate truth, by making a trial of it; if you doubt it you may be challenged to perform the experiment of thinking of anything whatever, no matter what, as real, and then explaining what you mean by its reality. Thus suppose you say “I can think of A as real,” A being anything in the universe; now think, as you always can, of an imaginary or unreal A, and then try to state the difference between the A which is thought of as real and the A which is thought of as merely imaginary. As Kant proved, in the famous case of the real and the imagined hundred dollars, the difference does not lie in any of the qualities or properties of the two A’s; the qualities of the imagined hundred dollars are precisely the same as those of the real sum, only that they are “imaginary.” Like the real dollars, the imagined dollars are thought of as possessing such and such a size, shape, and weight; stamped with such and such an effigy and inscription; containing such and such a proportion of silver to alloy; having such and such a purchasing power in the present condition of the market, and so forth. The only difference is that the real dollars are, or under specified and known conditions may be, the objects of direct perception, while the imaginary ones, because imaginary, cannot be given in direct perception. You cannot see or handle them; you can only imagine yourself doing so. It is in this connection with immediate psychical fact that the reality of the real coins lies. So with any other instance of the same experiment. Show me, we might say, anything which you regard as real,—no matter what it is, a stone wall, an aesthetic effect, a moral virtue,—and I will ask you to think of an unreal and imaginary counterpart of that same thing, and will undertake to prove to you that what makes the difference between the reality and the imagination is always that the real thing is indissolubly connected with the psychical life of a sentient subject, and, as so connected, is psychical matter of fact.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 23-24) 
“Two points should be carefully noted if we wish to avoid serious misapprehension. It might be objected, by a disciple of Kant or of Mill, that a thing may be real without ever being given as actual psychical fact in immediate apprehension, so long as its nature is such that it would be psychical fact under known and specified conditions. Many, if not most, of the objects of scientific knowledge, it may be said, are of this kind; they have never entered, possibly never will enter, into the contents of any man’s direct apprehension, yet we rightly call them real, in the sense that they would be apprehended under certain known conditions. Thus I have never seen, and do not expect that any one will ever see, the centre of the earth, or, to take a still stronger case, no one has ever seen his own brain. Yet I call the centre of the earth or my own brain real, in the sense that if I could, without ceasing to live, penetrate to a certain depth below the soil, I should find the centre of the earth; if an opening were made in my skull, and a suitable arrangement of mirrors devised, I should see the reflection of my own brain. A comet may be rushing through unpeopled space entirely unbeheld; yet it does not cease for all that to be real, for if I were there I should see it, and so forth. Hence the Kantian will tell us that reality is constituted by relation to possible experience; the follower of Mill, that it means “a permanent possibility of sensation.” Now, there is, of course, an element of truth in these arguments. It is true that what immediately enters into the course of my own direct perception is but a fragment of the full reality of the universe. It is true, again, that there is much which in its own nature is capable of being perceived by human beings, but will, as far as we can judge, never be perceived, owing to the physical impossibility of placing ourselves under the conditions requisite for perception; there are other things which could only be perceived if some modification could be effected in the structure of our perceptive organs. And it may therefore be quite sufficient for the purposes of some sciences to define these unperceived realities as “possibilities of sensations,” processes which we do not perceive but might perceive under known or knowable conditions. But the definition, it will be seen, is a purely negative one; it takes note of the fact that we do not actually perceive certain things, without telling us anything positive as to their nature. In Metaphysics, where we are concerned to discover the very meaning of reality, we cannot avoid asking whether such a purely negative account of the reality of the greater part of the universe is finally satisfactory. And we can easily see that it is not. For what do we mean when we talk of the “possible”? Not simply “that which is not actual,” for this includes the merely imaginary and the demonstrably impossible. The events of next week, the constitution of Utopia, and the squaring of the circle are all alike in not being actual. Shall we say, then, that the possible differs from the imaginary in being what would, under known conditions, be actual? But again, we may make correct inferences as to what would be actual under conditions suspected, or even known, to be merely imaginary, and no one will maintain that such consequences are realities. If I were at the South Pole I should see the Polar ice, and it is therefore real, you say, though no one actually sees it; but if wishes were horses, beggars would ride, yet you do not say that the riding of beggars is real. Considerations of this kind lead us to modify our first definition of the “possible” which is to be also real. We are driven to say that, in the case of the unperceived real thing, all the conditions of perception except the presence of a percipient with suitable perceptive organs, really exist. Thus the ice at the South Pole really exists, because the only unfulfilled condition for its perception is the presence at the Pole of a being with sense-organs of a certain type. But once more, what do we mean by the distinction between conditions which really exist? We come back once more to our original experiment, and once more, try as we will, we shall find that by the real condition as distinct from the imaginary we can mean nothing but a state of things which is, in the last resort, guaranteed by the evidence of immediate perception. If we take the term “actual” to denote that which is thus indissoluble from immediate apprehension, or is psychical matter of fact, we may sum up our result by saying we have found that the real is also actual, or that there is no reality which is not at the same time an actuality. We shall thus be standing on the same ground as the modern logicians who tell us that there is no possibility outside actual existence, and that statements about the possible, when they have any meaning at all, are always an indirect way of imparting information about actualities. Thus “There really exists ice at the South Pole, though no human eye beholds it,” if it is to mean anything, must mean either that the ice itself, as we should perceive it if we were there, or that certain unknown conditions which, combined with the presence of a human spectator, would yield the perception of the ice, actually exist as part of the contents of an experience which is not our own.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 24-26) 
“What our intellect can accept as finally real, we saw, must be indissolubly one with actual experience, and it must be an internally coherent system….When we say that a thing “is” or “has Being,” we seem primarily to mean that it is an object for the knowing consciousness, that it has its place in the system of objects which coherent thought recognizes. When we call the same object “real” or a “reality,” we lay the emphasis rather on the consideration that it is something of which we categorically must take account, whether we like it or not, if some purpose of our own is to get it fulfilment. Thus again the “non-existent” primarily means that which finds no place in the scheme of objects contemplated by consistent scientific thought; the “unreal,” that with which we have not, for any human purpose, to reckon.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 50-51) 
“Produce any instance you please, we said to the realist, whom we had not then learned to know by that name, of what you personally regard as reality, and we will undertake to show that it derives its reality for you from the very fact that it is not ultimately separable from the experience of a subject. A thing is real for you, and not merely imaginary, precisely because in some aspect of its character it enters into and affects your own experience. Or, what is the same thing in other words, it is real for you because it affects favourably or otherwise some subjective interest of your own. To be sure, the thing as it enters into your experience, as it affects your own subjective interests, is not the thing as it is in its fullness; it only touches your life through some one of its many sides. And this may lead you to argue that the real thing is the unexperienced “condition” of a modification of your experience. But then we had again to ask what you mean by saying that facts which you do not experience are real as “conditions” of what you do experience. And we saw that the only meaning we could attach to the reality of the “condition” was presence to an experience which transcends your own.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 69-70)
“To this general argument we may add two corollaries or supplementary considerations, which, without introducing anything fresh, may help to make its full force more apparent. (1) The argument, as originally presented, was concerned directly with the that of reality, the mere fact of its existence. But we may also state it, if we please, from the side of the what, the nature possessed by the real. You cannot affirm any doctrine about the real existence of anything without at the same time implying a doctrine about its nature. Even if you say “Reality is unknowable,” you are attributing something beyond mere independence of experience to your reality; you are asserting that what is thus independent possesses the further positive quality of transcending cognition. Now what, in logic, must be your ground for attributing this rather than any other quality to your independent reality? It can only be the fact or supposed fact…that our experiences themselves are all found to be self-contradictory. There is no ground for taking the unknowable of Reality to be true unless you mean by it a character which belongs not to something which stands outside all experience, but to experience itself. The same contention applies to any other predicate which the realist affirms as true of his ultimate reality. (2) Again, we may with effect present our argument in a negative form. Try, we may say, to think of the utterly unreal, and see how you will have to conceive it. Can you think of sheer unreality otherwise than as that of which no mind is ever aware, of which no purpose has ever to take account as a condition of its fulfilment? But to think of it thus is to attribute to it, as its definition, precisely that independence in which the realist finds the mark of ultimate reality. And if “independence” constitutes unreality, presence to and union with experience must be what constitutes reality.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 70) 
“The question, so interpreted, is indeed only a special case of the more general question, “Is anything what it is known as being, outside the experience in which it is so known?” To answer this question fully would take us much deeper into metaphysical controversy than we can reasonably desire to go in a work of which metaphysics is neither the only nor the principal subject, but we must, at any rate, briefly indicate the conclusions which would naturally follow from the view which has been enunciated in our opening chapter as to the scope and the methods of metaphysics. If our original conception of the metaphysical problem was a correct one, it is clear that metaphysics can never reveal to us any existence entirely beyond or entirely independent of an experience in which it forms an inseparable aspect. As we have indicated already, the whole problem of metaphysics is to construct a description of the world of experience which shall answer to our ideal of “pure” experience—that is, shall contain no single element which cannot be completely described in terms of experienced fact. Just in so far as metaphysics or any other branch of science departs from this ideal, and employs in its theories concepts which cannot be resolved into descriptions of experienced fact, it ceases to be fully and completely true and becomes infected to an unknown degree with errors and false assumptions, which it is the work of scientific progress to remove. Thus, as against certain forms of philosophic Realism, we feel bound to maintain that metaphysics is incapable of ever transcending that reference to actual or possible experience which is involved in every assertion about existence. What is means for us, as for the plain man, what is or what would, under definitely known conditions, be experienced by a consciousness, and wherever we find science and philosophy apparently transcending these limits, and informing us of the existence of objects which, from their nature, cannot as such be contents of any experience, we expect to detect the presence in scientific theory of “symbolic” and unreal concepts.” (Taylor, The Problem of Conduct: A Study in the Phenomenology of Ethics, 448-449) 
“We maintain, then, that taking existence in the full and proper sense of the terms, nothing ever is, outside the concrete experience in which it is an ingredient, what it is within that experience. The utmost reality that can be conceded to any object of experience outside the experience in which it is known, is the reality of certain conditions which, with the addition of the further condition of certain psychological dispositions in the percipient, will yield the experience of the object in question. And by the reality of these “conditions” we must once more mean, unless we are to play fast and loose with words, their presence as an ingredient in some other experience. We cannot too strongly insist that of “existence,” in any full sense of the word, we can form no notion whatever except as forming the content of an experience. As Mr. Bradley puts it, “being” is indissolubly one with “sentience.” That this truth is so frequently denied by realists and misconceived by idealists is probably to be accounted for by the general prevalence of a most unfortunate error in philosophical order. If, instead of treating experience as a kind of knowing, metaphysicians had treated knowing as a kind of experience, it would have been less easy to mistake the mere symbols of inadequate conceptual thought for transcendently real things existing outside of, and independently of, the experience in which they are thought of.” (Taylor, The Problem of Conduct: A Study in the Phenomenology of Ethics, 450)

Wednesday, December 1, 2021

Fragmentary Notes §17—§18

§17
Hegel writes,
“The nature of Spirit may be understood by a glance at its direct opposite—Matter. As the essence of Matter is Gravity, so, on the other hand, we may affirm that the substance, the essence of Spirit is Freedom. All will readily assent to the doctrine that Spirit, among other properties, is also endowed with Freedom; but philosophy teaches that all the qualities of Spirit exist only through Freedom; that all are but means for attaining Freedom; that all seek and produce this and this alone. It is a result of speculative Philosophy that Freedom is the sole truth of Spirit. Matter possesses gravity in virtue of its tendency toward a central point. It is essentially composite; consisting of parts that exclude each other. It seeks its Unity; and therefore exhibits itself as self-destructive, as verging toward its opposite [an indivisible point]. If it could attain this, it would be Matter no longer, it would have perished. It strives after the realization of its Idea; for in Unity it exists ideally.” Spirit, on the contrary, may be defined as that which has its center in itself. It has not a unity outside itself, but has already found it; it exists in and with itself. Matter has its essence out of itself; Spirit is self-contained existence. Now this is Freedom, exactly. For if I am dependent, my being is referred to something else which I am not; I cannot exist independently of something external. I am free, on the contrary, when my existence depends upon myself. This self-contained existence of Spirit is none other than self-consciousness—consciousness of one’s own being. Two things must be distinguished in consciousness; first, the fact that I know; secondly, what I know. In self consciousness these are merged in one; for Spirit knows itself. It involves an appreciation of its own nature, as also an energy enabling it to realize itself; to make itself actually that which it is potentially.” (Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, 18)
As I understand this passage, Hegel is here illustrating something which I have touched upon elsewhere:
(A) Matter is that which is exhaustively differentiated “out-of-itself.” (e.g. “Partes extra partes”) 
(B) Experience is that which is exhaustively differentiated “into-itself.” (e.g. “Partes intra partes”)
§18
Contrary to the nature of Experience, the nature of Matter is exhausted by the reciprocal exclusion and repulsion of its composite parts; for, parts of Matter exemplify nothing other than flatness, out-spreadedness, and side-by-sidedness. Matter is neither “transparent-to-itself,” nor does it return either “into-itself” or “into-its-parts.” Matter, contra Experience, is always “outside-of-itself,” and is never at home with itself. (Cf. Fragmentary Notes §11–§14)