Showing posts with label Truth. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Truth. Show all posts

Friday, May 24, 2024

Faith and the “Diamond Net” of Reason

Only when reason has been uplifted by faith may it spread its wings and ascend towards reality and truth. To sever the power of reason from the agency of faith is to render reason idle—it is to condemn reason to a state of dormancy and impotence. Far from being opposing and mutually exclusive faculties or departments of human experience, reason and faith reinforce each other—they are abstractly distinguishable factors of a single process that gradually unfolds throughout the course of conscious development on an individual and collective level. Indeed, reason runs on the rails of faith and revelation: a faith in reason’s own efficacy, and reason’s revelation to itself, and through itself, as efficacious. Now, the notion that reason and faith are compatible and not hostile foes demands explanation. Our purpose in this brief essay is to illustrate how these two factors are complementary and mutually reinforcing movements in the life of mind.

Before presenting a case for why reason and faith are in harmony, it is necessary to examine how they relate to ourselves as conscious beings. Augustine writes that “we both are, and know that we are, and take delight in our being and knowing;”1 and these are hallmarks of our conscious life. They are evidenced by our insatiable thirst for knowledge and understanding. It is a restless impulse that resonates throughout our minds and drives us onwards towards the fulfillment of an ideal end: the knowledge and understanding of what is real and true. The journey is certainly long, and the path is undoubtably treacherous; however, the mind is not alone on this ‘pilgrim’s progress’. The “two-fold force”2 of reason and faith—to use Augustine’s expression—accompany him along the way.

How, then, are we to understand reason?”3 Strictly speaking, reason is the power or activity of the mind concerned with the principles of structure, universality, and order. Reason is neither a matter of merely observing and perceiving the world, nor again is reason merely the act of reporting what one observes or perceives; rather, it is the mind’s capacity for determining and grasping relations; it is an intellectual activity by means of which the mind organizes its conception of the world (e.g., its judgments, thoughts, beliefs, etc.) in a way that exhibits universality, systematicity, coherence, and explicability. Reason seeks to establish a system of necessary connections; a system wherein the impulse of thought can glide smoothly without interruption. Reason’s ideal is to spin a coherent, all-encompassing arras of ideas: an intelligible fabric wherein each element is threaded to every other—every junction and knot opening itself up to further analysis and explanation in light of the whole.

Abstractly considered, reason seems to distance itself from anything reminiscent of faith—an innocent seeming which disposes us to judge faith as hostile to reason. Furthermore, this judgment can quickly solidify into an unspoken conscious attitude—an explicit rejection of the possibility of any interpenetration or ecumenism between the two. So understood, any eirenicon between reason and faith threatens to introduce stains, discolorations, and abrasions into the systematic tapestry that reason has crafted for itself.  

Again, at first glance, reason appears to get along just fine without recourse to leaps of faith, ungrounded revelations, or any authorities other than itself. Indeed, reason affects us so deeply that we are left with the impression that it is an all-seeing arbitrator—being the one, lone standard by means of which all authorities are weighed and measured. Nevertheless, these seemings, appearances, and impressions are, upon thorough analysis, delusive—all being products of vicious abstraction. The light of reason and the agency of faith are, in fact, the systolic and diastolic beats of a single pulse in the life of mind. Indeed, as John Scotus Eriugena reminds us, “there can be no doubt that both spring from a common source…”4

We began this essay with the assertion that “reason runs on the rails of faith.” This idea has been disputed and challenged by many. In order to better understand reason’s indebtedness to faith, it is necessary to penetrate into the heart of reason’s claim to be the “measure of all things”—requiring neither assistance, nor supplementation, from anything other than itself. This can be done with help from the following illustration:

Take, for instance, a Geiger counter, a thermometer, and a clock. How are we to determine whether or not the measurements of these diverse instruments are accurate as opposed to delusive? The answer is that we must compare the readings, and calibrate the instruments, in relation to a standard. The question then becomes what this standard is. Usually, the calibration of these instruments involves comparing and correlating their respective readings to those of another instrument of the same respective type. Thus, the Geiger counter’s readings are adjusted and corrected in light of the readings of another Geiger counter; the thermometer’s readings in light of the readings of another thermometer; and the clock’s readings (e.g., the position of the hour, minute, and second hand) in light of the readings of another clock (e.g., a digital watch). However, a problem arises as soon as we ask if the instruments belonging to the second set give us accurate measurements of radioactivity, outside temperature, and time of day. There are three possible options available: (a) compare and calibrate the second set of instruments in relation to the first set—thereby treating the first set as the standard, (b) compare and calibrate the second set of instruments in relation to a third set—thereby treating the third set of instruments as the standard, and (c) compare and calibrate the second set of instruments in relation to a standard that has been arbitrarily determined and whose accuracy cannot itself be called into question. Now, (a) entangles us in a vicious circle, and (b) launches us into a vicious regress.5 The only option that we have left is (c). To answer our question, “How do we know that the instruments belonging to the second set give us accurate measurements of radioactivity, outside temperature, and time of day,” we would have to expose the Geiger counter to a known and well-defined quantity of radioactive matter, introduce the thermometer into an environment with a known and controlled temperature, and synchronize the hands of the clock with signals from an atomic clock.

These examples illustrate reason’s capacity for “rising above” and “enveloping” the measurement-situation. Reason “transcends” the instruments, their respective readings, the measurable quantities, and the respective standards in terms of which the instrument readings are compared. Without this power, reason would be unable to either recognize, evaluate, or determine whether or not the instruments were providing accurate or delusive measurements.

In light of this vignette, suppose that reason asks the following question: “Is reason capable of knowing and understanding what is real and true?” How can reason go about answering this question? What appropriate steps, methods, or tools does reason have at its disposal? For consider, when reason asked itself whether the Geiger counter, thermometer, and clock were delivering accurate measurements of radioactivity, outside temperature, and time of day, reason could arrive at an answer by comparing and evaluating the instruments’ respective measurements in relation to an independent and predefined standard of reference. In all three cases, the “authoritative” standard, or reference point, is one that reason has defined for its own purpose: this purpose being reason’s attainment of a universalizable, systematic, coherent, and explicable account of innumerable things and processes (e.g., radioactive, thermal, and temporal phenomena, etc.). Furthermore, reason could evaluate the reliability of the three instruments only insofar as the instruments, their readings, the measurable quantities, and the “authoritative” standards were all given together on a level; or, to use a metaphor, all of these phenomena were circumscribed within reason’s “visual field.” However, just as the bodily eye cannot see itself, it seems that the relation between reason and the world (i.e., a relation in virtue of which reason has the capacity to know the world), will forever evade the “diamond net” of reason.

On the one hand, reason cannot prove its own efficacy—reason cannot argue its way to the conclusion that it is capable of knowing and understanding what is real and true. Reason cannot make its case by means of deductive, inductive, or abductive inferences. Indeed, if reason were to do such a thing, it would be arguing in a circle—pointing to instances of its own past and present activity (i.e., hand-picked instances having been evaluated, and deemed appropriate, by reason itself) and appealing to them as demonstrative evidence of reason’s own competence (or lack thereof). This circularity is no different from the attempt to determine the accuracy of the second Geiger counter, the second thermometer, and the second clock by comparing their respective readings to the first Geiger counter, the first thermometer, and the first clock—the first”6 set of instruments being the “authoritative” standard in relation to which the accuracy or inaccuracy of the second set of instruments are judged.   

On the other hand, reason cannot criticize its own efficacy—reason cannot argue its way to the conclusion that it is incapable of knowing and understanding what is real and true:

“To do so would require a second species of thought to sit in judgment upon our first or actual thought, and a third thought to test the validity of the verdict thus obtained, and so on ad infinitum—a species of never-ending appeal as wearisome as fruitless.”7

This regress is no different from the attempt to determine the accuracy or inaccuracy of the second Geiger counter, the second thermometer, and the second clock by comparing their respective readings to a third set of instruments whose accuracy or inaccuracy can be determined only in relation to a fourth set, and so on, ad infinitum—leaving us forever in the dark as to whether or not the second set of instruments deliver accurate measurements of radioactivity, outside temperature, and time of day.

Reason, unlike a Geiger counter, thermometer, or clock, is not a thing among things. Furthermore, reason does not exist in vacuo—it is nothing apart from its content: it requires a substantial “filling.” In a word, reason demands a world—a world that admits of being subject to reason’s various organizing and systematizing activities; and, prima facie, reason’s demand for a world appears to be fulfilled. However, couldn’t this apparent communion be delusive? After all, the abstract, logical scaffolding of reason’s implicative and entailment relations cannot, of themselves, disclose any harmony (or lack thereof) between reason and reality without either rotating round and round in circles, or shooting off into an infinite regress. And, if this is so, it appears that reason can neither prove, nor disprove, that it harbors within itself the capacity for knowing and understanding the real and the true. What, then, is the powerful force moves reason to confidently declare that it is “the eye with which the universe beholds itself and knows itself divine?”8 Indeed, what is the nature of the unfaltering impulse that leads the mind to affirm that reason envelops reality, or, indeed, to exclaim that what is rational is real; and what is real is rational? We must answer that it is a theoretical assumption—an unwavering conviction that cannot be established, justified, or scrutinized by any of the tools that the rational intellect has forged for itself. Although this assumption is of a theoretical sort, it should not be mistaken for a static premise; on the contrary, it is rather a movement—a galvanizing act that is of profound metaphysical significance. As F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet expertly put it:

“You may call the intellect, if you like, a mere tendency to movement, but you must remember that it is a movement of a very special kind....In thought the standard, you may say, amounts merely to “act so”; but then “act so” means “think so,” and “think so” means “it is.” And the psychological origin and base of this movement, and of this inability to act otherwise, may be anything you please; for that is all utterly irrelevant to the metaphysical issue. Thinking is the attempt to satisfy a special impulse, and the attempt implies an assumption about reality. You may avoid the assumption so far as you decline to think, but, if you sit down to the game, there is only one way of playing. In order to think at all you must subject yourself to a standard, a standard which implies an absolute knowledge of reality; and while you doubt this, you accept to, and obey while you rebel.”9 

“Thought will go forward if it possibly can. It will affirm meanings; an order or connexion which is one side of meaning. This might be called a non-formal principle. The laws of logic and other axioms are merely, I suggest, the expression of our elementary experiments in actual thinking at different points of our experience....If we are not allowed to think, we are not allowed to exercise the act which these pervading laws need for their establishment. They are not premises. They are principles evident throughout our thinking as the manners of its self-assertion....But if thought is forbidden to proceed, the principle cannot be established. This is not a “psychological” necessity. It is a necessity of the nature of reality which is thought’s function and character to reveal. How do we know it is thought’s function and character to do so? Because every act of thought says so. Thought, in asserting, does not say “I think so”. It says “it is so”. “I think so” is merely one case of “it is so,” and is as absolute as any other assertion of a fact about reality.”10 

Reason operates through a conviction—a mode of revelation that stands on its own authority and is incapable of being captured within the “diamond net” that reason casts, and cannot help but cast, upon the world. Faith—faith in the affirmation that reality and truth are appreciable by reason—envelops and saturates the entirety of our intellectual life; indeed, it dictates the normative ideal which reason finds itself compelled to follow in its effort to know and understand the world. Augustine writes that “we must first believe whatever great and divine matter we desire to understand. Else would the Prophet have said in error, Except ye believe, ye shall not understand;”11 likewise, we must affirm—through an act of faith—that there is a harmony between reason and the world, in order for us to understand the world.

Footnotes:

[1] Augustine, “Self-Knowledge and the Three-Fold Nature of Mind,” essay, in The Longman Standard History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. Daniel Kolak and Garrett Thompson (New York, NY: Pearson Education Inc., 2008), 28–34, 29.

[2] Augustine, The Essential Augustine, ed. Vernon J. Bourke (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1974), 25.

[3] Cf. Brand Blanshard, Reason and Analysis (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1964), 25-26.

[4] John Scotus Eriugena, Philosophy, Faith, and Reason, n.d., 114.

[5] Since the accuracy, or inaccuracy, of the first set of instruments had been judged by comparing their respective readings to those belonging to the second set, it would be viciously circular to then evaluate the accuracy of the second set of instruments by comparing their respective readings to those belonging to the first set of instruments.

[6] “One cannot in strictness speak of testing a thing by itself.” Cf. Richard Lewis Nettleship, Philosophical Lectures and Remains of Richard Lewis Nettleship, ed. A.C. Bradley and G.R. Benson, vol. I, II vols. (London, England: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1897), 181.

[7] Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, Hegelianism and Personality, 2nd ed. (London, England: William Blackwood and Sons, 1893), 90.

[8] F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 152-153.

[9] Bernard Bosanquet, “‘This or Nothing,’” Mind, New Series, XXXI, no. 122 (April 1922): 178–184, 180-181.

[10] Percy Bysshe Shelley, “Hymn of Apollo,” essay, in The Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, vol. III (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1855), 52–53, 53.

[11] Augustine, The Essential Augustine, 24.

Monday, May 23, 2022

A Brief Outline of Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability

P1) If (i) all truths are knowable, and (ii) there exists an unknown truth, X, then “X & X is unknown” is a truth.

P2) If “X & X is unknown” is a truth, then, ex hypothesi, it is possible to know that “X & X is unknown.”

C1) Therefore, if (i) all truths are knowable, and (ii) there exists an unknown truth X, then it is possible to know that “X & X is unknown.” [From P1 and P2]

P3) It is not possible to know that “X & X is unknown”—on pain of contradiction.

C2) Therefore, if (i) all truths are knowable, then it is not the case that (ii) there exists an unknown truth—on pain of contradiction. [From C1 and P3]

Defense of P3

P1) If it is possible to know that “X & X is unknown,” then it is possible to know that “X” when it is known that “X is unknown.”

P2) If it is known that “X is unknown”, then “X is unknown” is true.

P3) If “X is unknown” is true, then it is the case that “X” is unknown.

P4) If it is the case that “X” is unknown, then it is not the case that it is known that “X”.

C1) Therefore, if it is possible to know that “X & X is unknown,” then it is possible to know that “X” when it is not the case that it is known that “X”. [From P1—P4]

P5) It is not possible to know that “X” when it is not the case that it is known that “X”.

C2) Therefore, it not is possible to know that “X & X is unknown.” [From C1 and P5]

Wednesday, January 5, 2022

My Adaptation of Josiah Royce’s “Argument from the Possibility of Error”

At the dawn of the 20th century, Josiah Royce was considered to be the greatest representative of Absolute Idealism in the United States. Royce was well-respected for his logical rigor, clarity, and insistence upon the need for a holistic account of the relationship between Knowing and Being. In 1885, Josiah Royce published his groundbreaking work, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, which tackled questions of Morality, Doubt, Religious Truth, and Idealism. In the most famous chapter of the work, “The Possibility of Error,” Royce presents a powerful and unique argument for Absolute Idealism. The argument culminates in the form of a dilemma: “Either there is no such thing as error, which statement is a flat self-contradiction, or else there is an infinite unity of conscious thought to which is presented all possible truth.” Royce’s argument undergoes a variety of alterations throughout his later publications; however, I have decided to adapt the 1885 version because of its clarity as well as the intuitive plausibility of the premises. (Furthermore, it is much easier to visualize than his later renditions of the argument. For this reason, I have included a diagram of the relationship between a finite subject’s erroneous judgments and the Absolute Mind’s true judgments.) What follows is my presentation of Josiah Royce’s “Argument from the Possibility of Error.”
P1) If erroneous judgments are possible, then all of the necessary conditions underlying this possibility exist.
“An unexpected result…springs from the very heart of skepticism itself....[Skepticism and] doubt assume this, namely, that error is possible. And so [skepticism and] doubt assume the actual existence of those conditions that make error possible. The conditions that determine the logical possibility of error must themselves be absolute truth....Since error plainly is possible in some way, we shall have only to inquire: what are the logical conditions that make it possible?” (Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, 385-392)
P2) Erroneous judgments are possible.
If the judgment, “Erroneous judgments are possible,” is true, then erroneous judgments are possible. If the judgment, “Erroneous judgments are possible,” is false, then the judgment, “Erroneous judgments are possible,” is itself an erroneous judgment. Therefore, erroneous judgments are possible.
C1) Therefore, all of the necessary conditions for the possibility of erroneous judgments exist. [From P1 and P2]

P3) A necessary condition for the possibility of an erroneous judgment is for the erroneous judgment to fail to agree with that which the thought making the erroneous judgment has intended for its object.
“Logicians are agreed that single ideas, thoughts viewed apart from judgments, are neither true nor false. Only a judgment can be false....Error is therefore generally defined as a judgment that does not agree with its object. In the erroneous judgment, subject and predicate are so combined as, in the object, the corresponding elements are not combined. And thus the judgment comes to be false....The definition assumes as quite clear that a judgment has an object, wherewith it can agree or not agree….What then is meant by its object? The difficulties involved in this phrase begin to appear as soon as you look closer. First, then, the object of the assertion is as such supposed to be neither the subject nor the predicate thereof. It is external to the judgment. It has a nature of its own. Furthermore, not all judgments have the same object, so that objects are very numerous. But from the infinity of real or of possible objects the judgment somehow picks out its own. Thus, then, for a judgment to have an object, there must be something about the judgment that shows what one of the external objects that are beyond itself this judgment does pick out as its own. But this something that gives the judgment its object can only be the intention wherewith the judgment is accompanied. A judgment has as object only what it intends to have as object.” (Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, 396-397)
“Royce points out that all judgment involves purpose in two essential respects. (a) What it shall select as its object is fixed by the purpose of the knower. Even the realist does not deny that I can within certain limits select whatever I please as the object of my investigation or judge about whatever known truths or matters of opinion I choose, this choice being determined by my purpose, whether the purpose be a mere momentary whim or have as its object the most vital interests of the human race. (b) The way in which my thoughts or cognitions shall correspond to their object and so the standard by which they are to be judged is also fixed by my purpose. A map, a verbal description and a book of photographs of typical scenery all correspond to represent the same country in a different way and so are subject to different standards, and I can choose which I shall produce and so by which standard my production is to be judged. Similarly with any judgment its truth or falsehood must be tested by and so depends on the standard the judger sets himself. When a plank is 2.9999999999999 feet long, to say this line is three feet long may be true if I am talking about carpentry and false it the context of my assertion is to be found in the subject-matter of an exact science. Again I decide whether it is more serviceable to use a mental diagram or to think in mathematical symbols, and if I adopt the latter course I cannot possibly be criticized on the ground that the shape of the symbols is not in the least like that of the real object.” (Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, 149-150)
P4) But that which the thought making the erroneous judgment has intended for its object can only be that which is known to the thought making the erroneous judgment.
“A judgment has as object only what it intends to have as object. It has to conform only to that which it wants to conform. But the essence of an intention is the knowledge of what one intends. One can, for instance, intend a deed or any of its consequences only in so far as he foresees them. I cannot be said to intend the accidental or the remote or even the immediate consequences of anything that I do, unless I foresaw that they would follow; and this is true however much the lawyers and judges may find it practically necessary to hold me responsible for these consequences....Common sense will admit that, unless a man is thinking of the object of which I suppose him to be thinking, he makes no real error by merely failing to agree with the object that I have in mind….So, then, judgments err only by disagreeing with their intended objects, and they can intend an object only in so far forth as this object is known to the thought that makes the judgment. Such, it would seem, is the consequence of the common-sense view. But in this case a judgment can be in error only if it is knowingly in error. That also, as it seems, follows from the common-sense suppositions. Or, if we will have it in syllogistic form:—Everything intended is something known. The object even of an erroneous judgment is intended. Therefore, the object even of an error is something known. Nor can we yet be content with what common sense will at once reply, namely that our syllogism uses known ambiguously, and that the object of an erroneous judgment is known enough to constitute it the object, and not enough to prevent the error about it. This must no doubt be the fact, but it is not of itself clear; on the contrary, just here is the problem. As common sense conceives the matter, the object of a judgment is not as such the whole outside world of common sense, with all its intimate interdependence of facts, with all its unity in the midst of diversity. On the contrary, the object of any judgment is just that portion of the then conceived world, just that fragment, that aspect, that element of a supposed reality, which is seized upon for the purposes of just this judgment. Only such a momentarily grasped fragment of the truth can possibly be present in any one moment of thought as the object of a single assertion. Now, it is hard to say how within this arbitrarily chosen fragment itself there can still be room for the partial knowledge that is sufficient to give to the judgment its object, but insufficient to secure to the judgment its accuracy. If I aim at a mark with my gun, I can fail to hit it, because choosing and hitting the mark are totally distinct acts. But, in the judgment, choosing and knowing the object seem inseparable.” (Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, 397-400) 

C2) Therefore, a necessary condition for the possibility of an erroneous judgment is for the erroneous judgment to fail to agree with that which is known to the thought making the erroneous judgment. [From P3 and P4]

P5) But an erroneous judgment cannot fail to agree with that which is known to the thought making the erroneous judgment unless the erroneous judgment is known as being in error with respect to its intended object.
“To illustrate here by a familiar case, when we speak of things that are solely matters of personal preference, such as the pleasure of a sleigh-ride, the taste of olives, or the comfort of a given room, and when we only try to tell how these things appear to us, then plainly our judgments, if sincere, cannot be in error. As these things are to us, so they are. We are their measure. But our present question is, How do judgments that can be and that are erroneous differ in nature from these that cannot be erroneous?....Since the judgment chooses its own object, and has it only in so far as it chooses it, how can it be in that partial relation to its object which is implied in the supposition of an erroneous assertion?” (Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, 400) 
“Yet again, to illustrate the difficulty in another aspect, we can note that not only is error impossible about the perfectly well-known, but that error is equally impossible, save in the form of direct self-contradiction, about what is absolutely unknown....[A]bout a really Unknowable nobody could make any sincere and self-consistent assertions that could be errors. For self-consistent assertions about the Unknowable would of necessity be meaningless. And being meaningless, they could not well be false. For instance, one could indeed not say that the Unknowable contemplates war with France, or makes sunspots, or will be the next Presidential candidate, because that would be contradicting one’s self. For if the Unknowable did any of these things, it would no longer be the Unknowable, but would become either the known or the discoverable. But avoid such self-contradiction, and you cannot error about the unknowable....Nonsense is error only when it involves self-contradiction. Avoid that, and nonsense cannot blunder, having no object outside of itself with which it must agree. But all this illustrates from the other side of our difficultly. Is not the object of a judgment, in so far as it is unknown to that judgment, like the Unknowables for that judgment? To be in error about the application of a symbol, you must have a symbol that symbolizes something. But in so far as the thing symbolized is not known through the symbol, how is it symbolized by that symbol? Is it not, like the Unknowable, once for all out of the thought, so that one cannot just then be thinking about it at all, and so cannot, in this thought at least, be making blunders about it?” (Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, 400-402) 
“Truth cannot mean mere conformity of [judgment] to external object; first, because nobody can [determine the truth or falsity of a judgment] merely by asking whether it agrees with this or with that indifferent fact, but only by asking whether it agrees with that with which the knowing subject meant or intended it to agree; secondly, because nobody can look down, as from without, upon a world of wholly external objects on the one hand, and of his [judgments] upon the other, and estimate, as an indifferent spectator, their agreement; and thirdly, because the cognitive process, as itself a part of life, is essentially an effort to give to life unity, self-possession, insight into its own affairs, control of its own enterprises—in a word, wholeness. Cognition does not intend merely to represent its object, but to attain, to possess, and to come into a living unity with it.” (Royce, Logical Essays, 111)

C3) Therefore, a necessary condition for the possibility of an erroneous judgment is for the erroneous judgment to be known as being in error with respect to its intended object. [From C2 and P5]

P6) But an erroneous judgment is known as being in error with respect to its intended object only insofar as the erroneous judgment and its intended object are known to a thought which compares them, and judges the erroneous judgment to be in error with respect to its intended object.
“Thus, then, for a judgment to have an object, there must be something about the judgment that shows what one of the external objects that are beyond itself this judgment does pick out as its own. But this something that gives the judgment its object can only be the intention wherewith the judgment is accompanied. A judgment has as object only what it intends to have as object. It has to conform only to that which it wants to conform. But the essence of an intention is the knowledge of what one intends....[U]nless a man is thinking of the object of which I suppose him to be thinking, he makes no real error by merely failing to agree with the object that I have in mind.” (Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, 396-397)
C4) Therefore, a necessary condition for the possibility of an erroneous judgment is for the erroneous judgment and its intended object to be known to a thought which compares them, and judges the erroneous judgment to be in error with respect to its intended object. [From C3 and P6]

C5) Therefore, for every erroneous judgment that exists, there exists a thought which knows said erroneous judgment and its intended object, compares them, and judges the erroneous judgment to be in error with respect to its intended object. [From C1 and C4]

P7) There exists at least one erroneous judgment that had the Universe as a whole (and every aspect of it) as its intended object.

C6) Therefore, there exists a thought which knows said erroneous judgment and the Universe as a whole (and every aspect of it), compares them, and judges the erroneous judgment to be in error with respect to the Universe as a whole (and every aspect of it). [From C5 and P7]

P8) A thought which knew the aforementioned erroneous judgment and the Universe as a whole (and every aspect of it), compared them, and judged the erroneous judgment to be in error with respect to the Universe as a whole (and every aspect of it) would be an all-knowing, Absolute Thought.

C7) Therefore, there exists an all-knowing, Absolute Thought. [From C6 and P8]

“In The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (1885), ideas are taken to be representations of real objects. As images of what is perceived or thought, a man’s ideas are all that is present to his mind. These ideas are the only content of his thought, and the objects represented remain outside his thought. To this extent the position of subjective idealism is correct, i.e., “my mind can be concerned only with its own ideas.” But an immediate problem for a subjective idealist is to account for the difference between truth and error. If all I think about will be my ideas, and what they represent are but other ideas of mine, then to assert anything about them must be correct. In that case, sincerity and truth are identical, for when I assert anything there is no reference to anything outside of my own thought. As long as I honestly consult my own ideas, I cannot be in error. The truth of my ideas, however, is commonly taken to be their correspondence to the objects they represent. There is a “commonplace assumption” that error is possible, that an assertion can fail to agree with a real object outside of thought. But how is one to judge if this particular assertion is true or false? To answer that, Royce considers what role the judgment plays in human cognition. It is not an act distinct from that of understanding. That is, the judgment by itself has no intelligible object other than the ideas present to all thought. Royce concludes that the judgment synthesizes my ideas—a position he explicitly avows to be neo-Kantian. But if the judgment reaches no object beyond ideas, the common-sense belief in error must either be abandoned or supplemented. The former course is impossible, for in choosing it one would be admitting the common-sense knowledge had been in error. To state “error is impossible” as a remedy for a mistaken assumption is clearly contradictory. So that latter course alone proves viable. Since no single judgment can be an error (for it reaches no object beyond itself), there must be a higher thought that includes both the judgment and its real object. By comparing the two, this higher thought determines whether the first thought was true or false. Left to itself, the latter remains a fragment “neither true nor false, objectless, no complete act of thought at all.” This is a very brief sketch of Royce’s method of presupposition by denial. He begins with the fact of error in the world, and concludes to an Absolute Thought.” (Zanardi, Idea and Absolute in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce, 10-11) 
“What follows is a summarized version of Royce’s more lengthy argument. The fact of error is undeniable; to deny this is to contradict oneself, for how else can this fact be refuted if not by proving it erroneous? Each error implies a judgment whose intended object is other than my ideas and so lies beyond my judgment. Such an object will also be an object of a corresponding true judgment. Since the existence of error implies a higher thought, it will be this thought that contains the object of both the true and false judgments. Since the possibilities of error are infinite, the inclusive thought must be infinite. And since error is possible not only as regards objects but also as regards relations, all possible relations in the world must be present to this infinite thought. Finally, to know all relations at once is to know them in absolute rational unity, i.e., as one single thought….Even if one were to find fault with his argument, the error charged to Royce’s position is alleged to prove the existence of Absolute Thought. It alone knows the real and can compare a judgment with its intended object. Royce offers other arguments for the existence of Absolute Thought. The problem of knowing other minds is an instance of employing the already cited view of human understanding. My idea of another person can only be true or false if there is a third party to compare my idea with the real person. There is also a problem of relating a past idea to a present thought. The past idea was unique in its separate existence and in its view of the future. To determine the identity between its conception of the future and the present thought’s conception of what now has become reality requires an inclusive thought which compare them. How else could my past thought have made any assertion about a future moment? Royce refutes a response that rests on verifying a prediction only upon its fulfillment or failure to occur. My memory of an original thought differs from it and so is still in need of a comparison with that original thought. Again, Royce appeals to a higher thought to make a synthesis of what to the human knower are disparate ideas.” (Zanardi, Idea and Absolute in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce, 11-12) 
“In The Religious Aspect of Philosophy in 1885, Royce gave the basic proof of his Idealism. Does error exist?, Royce asked. It must, for consider the statement “There is error.” If the statement is true, there is error. If the statement is false, then there is error. Therefore, there is error. But what is error? A statement is in error if it does not correspond to its object. But what is the object referred to? A statement about a particular tree must correspond to that tree, not just to any tree. In other words, reference is intentional; the statement must correspond to its intended object. But for one to intend a given object, one must already know the object, and how can one be wrong about an object one already knows? Royce’s famous example is the case of John and Thomas, each of whom refers to the other. But when John refers to Thomas, it is to Thomas as John conceives him that he refers, and John can hardly be in error about his own idea of John. For error to be possible in this situation, a third knower is required who can compare John’s idea of Thomas with real Thomas, and Thomas’s idea of John with real John. But then we face a regress, for the third knower can only know his ideas of John and Thomas, and so we would need a forth knower to guarantee the third knower’s ideas, and so on. The solution, Royce held, is that John and Thomas are both ideas in the mind of the third knower, for about his own ideas the third knower cannot be in error. John and Thomas are therefore ideal; the third knower is the Absolute who knows not only what John and Thomas think but what they intended—namely, the real John and Thomas. This is possible in the same sense in which one can intend to recall a name one knows but cannot bring to mind. John and Thomas can intend each other as they really are, yet only be able to think of each other erroneously. But the Absolute, whose ideas John and Thomas are, knows their unconscious intentions, and so can compare the two. This argument led Royce to conclude that whatever we can be wrong about, and so whatever we can make true statements about, must be ideas in the mind of the Absolute. The world is therefore Ideal.” (Murphey, C.I. Lewis: The Last Great Pragmatist, 12-13) 
“For my next example I want to move forward only a few years and consider an argument from the existence of error put forward by the young Josiah Royce, in his book The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. That error occurs is undeniable, points out Royce, for if we deny it we commit at least to the erroneous belief that it does. But what is error? Error occurs when the thing we refer to is other than we say it is, when our judgement fails to agree with its intended object. It implies that there is a gap between what we judge about the world and what is actually the case. If they are to be in error ideas call for something other than themselves about which they err. And yet matters become more complex if we ask ourselves how this might come about, for on closer reflection it is hard to see how this gap might open up. How can our judgement fail to agree with its object if the only object it has it that which it describes? A paradox appears. By definition we are in error about what we don’t know, but how can we even speak about or refer to the unknown? “About a really Unknowable [writes Royce] nobody could make any sincere and self-consistent assertions that could be errors. For self-consistent assertions about the Unknowable would of necessity be meaningless. And being meaningless, they could not well be false.” He proposes an ingenious solution. If all reality is present to a single infinite thought in which, in our very limited and incomplete ways, we participate, then error may be explained as the phenomena in which, in our imperfect consciousness, we partially intend that which a wider thought successfully articulates. Our object of reference is given in the perfectly organized experience that completes it and which characterises the reality we meant, for if there is reference beyond our ideas there is no reference beyond ideas themselves. Reality just is ‘perfectly organised experience’. But Royce’s point is not merely that another sees fully what I grasp only in part, rather he is suggesting that the divine perspective fixes that which I intend but erroneously put, for it is a view in which I actually participate. The puzzling implication of this, that I somehow both known and do not know what I mean, Royce attempts to elucidate by reference to the familiar experience of finally hitting upon a lost name or idea—‘That’s what I meant all along’ we say.” (Mander, On Arguing for the Existence of God as a Synthesis Between Realism and Anti-Realism, 103)
“The centrality of epistemology in Royce’s work is evident in his earliest deduction of the absolute, the well-known argument from error. Royce developed this argument in The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, published in 1885, and it contains elements that were to reappear in later work. The argument begins with a concern with skepticism and relativism, that either truth is unattainable or that there is no truth independent of a perceiver or someone offering a judgment. Royce makes short work of the “relativity of truth” by asking us to consider the proposition that error exists. If the proposition is false then error exists, and if it is true then error exists. When we ask, however, how error is possible, or what are its logical conditions, an answer is less clear. A mistaken judgment, Royce says, is defined as one that does not agree with its object, in which subject and predicate are combined in a way that does not correspond with the object. On the face of it, this does not seem to present a difficulty, but the situation becomes problematic when we consider the nature of the supposed agreement or correspondence between a judgment and its object. A particular judgment is not about just any object at all, or any one set of similar objects, but rather it has a particular object. A judgment “picks out as its own” a particular object, and it does so by intending that object. A judgment is about an object, has an object, only when the individual making the judgment intends just that object. But to intend a particular object, the individual must to some degree know the object, and here is the dilemma. To judge, one must intend an object; to intend, one must know the object; thus, a false judgment can only be about an object which one knows. Error is only possible about that which is known. One may be tempted to resolve the dilemma by distinguishing between an object as intended by a judgment and the same object as it is independent of the judgment. But a judgment has as its object an intended object, so that the question still arises, how can one be in error about an object as one conceives it? It appears that one cannot be mistaken about an object as conceived, because however it is conceived, so it is. Error, then, must somehow be in the relation between the object as intended or conceived and the object as independent. But a judgment requires intention, so an object unintended bears no relation to a judgment. The only way this dilemma can be resolved, Royce argued, is through the presence of a third term in the relation. The agreement or disagreement of the intended object of a judgment with the independent object requires that both be present to, or observable by, a third, more inclusive consciousness that is able to compare them and to know whether the judgment is true or in error. With this idea in mind, consider the case of a judgment that concerns the future. Here the possibility of a judgment, true or false, seems even more remote because we assume that the future does not exist, which is to say, no object exists for such a judgment to intend. Yet we do make judgments, including false judgments, concerning the future, and they are possible only on the supposition that the judgment and its object, the future, are present to a consciousness that relates them. In the end this implies a single, all-inclusive absolute thought in which all reality, all past, present, and future, is realized as intended object. The existence of error implies, then, the reality of absolute consciousness.” (Ryder, Interpreting America: Russian and Soviet Studies of the History of American Thought, 228-229)

Friday, December 4, 2020

Heidegger and Magnetic Mountain


Surrealism was a radical, revolutionary art movement that sprung into being at the turn of the 20th century and reshaped the nature of aesthetic experience. Kurt Seligmann’s 1948 oil on canvas painting, Magnetic Mountain, is a surrealist work that ensnares its audience in a haunting atmosphere without any means of escape. The work depicts a unique, captivating scene that startles the onlooker, drawing them in, and implanting a seed of mystery and curiosity within the audience’s wandering imagination. The work is best understood in conjunction with the aesthetic theory of the 20th century German phenomenologist, Martin Heidegger. Magnetic Mountain reinforces (a) Heidegger’s concept of Dasein being “thrown” into actuality, (b) Heidegger’s concept of art as a “happening of truth;” and (c) Heidegger’s contrasting between the “thingliness” and “artliness” of a work of art.  When viewed from the standpoint of phenomenology, Magnetic Mountain is a work of art that vindicates Heidegger’s aesthetic theory.

Kurt Seligmann’s Magnetic Mountain is an abstract, disorienting, and haunting landscape weaved together by bright, colorful organic figures juxtaposed with sharp, piercing geometrical shapes. The shapes and figures hover over layers of intersecting, crooked, planimetric surfaces, which, in turn, appear to be either “collapsing-into” a central, unextended point on the canvas, or “bursting out” of this central point with tremendous fury. When first encountering this painting, the audience is unsure as to what they are exactly looking at. They are taken aback, uncertain, and disoriented. The onlooker experiences what Heidegger calls “thrownness;” i.e., he is tossed into a world without knowing whence or wither; and is tasked with making sense of his situation in and through that which appears to him in consciousness. He must approach the artwork with an “artly consciousness” in order for it to speak to him.  

The painting, as it initially appears in consciousness, is, prima facie, something without order—a chaotic, unpleasant, and unruly work. However, upon closer examination, the work’s “thingliness” transitions into a vehicle that reveals the work’s “artliness.” The painting pulls the onlooker’s consciousness towards the burst of energy effervescing at the center of the canvas. At this explosive point, emerging out of the jumble of shapes, and figures, a knight on horseback charges out from the center of the piece—disclosing itself to the audience. However, paradoxically, the exact reversal of this is also disclosed! It is equally the case that the knight appears as being forced back into the compact center of the painting; like a genie being forced back into a lamp. A dragon’s wing flaps mid-air, and hovers next to the knight. Could the knight be fighting a dragon? All of these bursts of creative possibility and meaning are hallmarks of the disclosure of truth. This “happening of truth” is just what Heidegger defines as the core tenant of art; writing, “Thus art is: the creative preserving of truth in the work. Art then is the becoming and happening of truth.”1 Indeed, the work’s truth manifests itself in and through its disclosure to Dasein as stories. As Heidegger writes, “Truth, as the clearing and concealing of what is, happens in being composed, as a poet composes a poem. All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, essentially poetry.”2 The amount of truth that the painting discloses is, in essence, unbounded and unlimited.

Magnetic Mountain is internally differentiated into discrete and continuous elements that compliment and play off each other. Interestingly, each element has its own “thingly” character, just as the painting itself has its own “thingly” character. Indeed, there is a recursion here. The painting is a “thing” with a “thingly” character and is internally differentiated into “things” that have their own “thingly” character, and so on and so on.  Like a line of dominoes being knocked down, as soon as the painting becomes an object of “artly” consciousness, its internally differentiated elements take on an “artly” character, and so on and so on without end. This “fractal-like” pattern that results in the work being a medium whereby truth is disclosed to the audience.

Kurt Seligmann’s Magnetic Mountain is a painting that challenges the audience with a winding stream of twists and turns. Its complexity, originality, and hypnotic, surrealist verve come together into a masterful work of art. With the help of Heidegger’s aesthetic theory, Magnetic Mountain is able to be appreciated, understood, and experienced in a way that reveals the power of art as a vehicle for disclosing truth.

Footnotes

[1] Heidegger, Martin. “The Origin of the Work of Art.” Art and Its Significance: An Anthology of Aesthetic Theory. Ed. Stephen David. Ross. Albany: State U of New York, 1987. 258-87. Print. 284.
[2] Ibid, 285.

Sunday, November 1, 2020

The Aesthetic Theories of Schopenhauer and Hegel

One of the most famous and uncompromising rivalries in the history of Western Philosophy was the feud between the two 19th-century German thinkers: Arthur Schopenhauer and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Despite their differences, both thinkers shared a deep appreciation for aesthetics and the philosophy of art. Both Schopenhauer’s and Hegel’s aesthetic theories were shaped by their divergent conceptions of reality. I will first provide a brief overview of the meaning each philosopher attached to “aesthetics” and “art,” then I will provide background information that is necessary to understand the place of aesthetics in each philosopher’s Weltanschauung. I will then analyze the major components of Schopenhauer’s and Hegel’s account of art and the aesthetic experience, as well as their similarities and differences. Finally, I will conclude with an overview of Schopenhauer’s and Hegel’s philosophy of art as a whole. 

Schopenhauer’s and Hegel’s understanding of the meaning, significance, and nature of art are deeply influenced by their idiosyncratic metaphysical doctrines. Despite being idealists, and influenced by the writings of Kant, both Schopenhauer and Hegel viewed the nature of art and its relation to experience differently. For Schopenhauer, “the object of art, the depiction of which is the aim of the artist…is an Idea, in Plato’s sense, and absolutely nothing else; not the particular thing, the object of common apprehension, and not the concept, the object of rational thought and science.”1 For him, the artist endeavors to translate “objective perception” into a medium that retains the hallmark of perceptual immediacy. Likewise, the apprehension of art is characterized by “intuitive apprehension.” For Hegel, on the other hand, art is sensuous, but is also conceptual, intellectual, and fused with self-conscious thought. He writes that “art and its works as generated and created by the mind (spirit), are themselves of a spiritual nature, even if their mode of representation admits into itself the semblance of sensuous being, and pervades what is sensuous with mind. In this respect art is, to begin with, nearer to mind and its thinking activity than is mere external unintelligent nature; in works of art, mind has to do but with its own.”2 To better grasp the essence of Schopenhauer’s and Hegel’s approach to art, one must examine their aesthetic theories in light of their respective metaphysical frameworks.

In order to understand Schopenhauer’s general attitude regarding the nature of aesthetic theory, it is essential to review his metaphysic and theory of knowledge. Schopenhauer’s magnum opus, The World as Will and Idea, published in late 1818, is a work that expands upon Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” in philosophy, and undertakes to show that the world, in and through which we live and move, is of a two-fold nature: it is our idea (or Vorstellung), and our will. Like Virgil, Schopenhauer takes the reader by the hand, and opens his eyes to the endless, miserable strivings of the empirical world, and dives deep into its nature as it is in itself to find that the blind, relentless strife of empirical nature is, at bottom, grounded in the very same thing: an eternal, insatiable, and blind will. The cosmic Will, the “thing-in-itself,” is indivisibly present as the core and kernel of each and every one of its “objectifications” in idea; manifesting as the fundamental forces of nature (e.g., gravity and electromagnetism, etc.), up through unorganized matter (e.g., minerals); into organic, non-human beings (e.g., plants, aquatic life, animals, etc.); and, culminating at the apex, the highest grade of the “Objectification” of the Will: the human being. This “great chain of Being” or “pyramid” of the Will’s “Objectifications” possesses an infinite series of degrees, yet no grade is any less a manifestation of the Will than another. Schopenhauer calls the “adequate Objectification of the Will” the Platonic Idea, i.e., the genuine object of all artistic endeavors, and the object of aesthetic experience.

When understanding Hegel’s philosophy, we quickly find that Schopenhauer was his foil. While Schopenhauer held that “The world is just what it is because the will, whose manifestation it is, is what it is, because it so wills;” Hegel elevated reason and thought above all else, writing that “What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational.”3,4 Hegel’s philosophy was founded upon the process of “Spirit” or “Mind” dialectically unfolding itself through history, eventually becoming conscious of itself as “Spirit.” Hegel’s historicism and his notion of the progressive developmental character of reality into higher forms of consciousness can be illustrated in the following passage:
“History [is] a progression in consciousness, from consciousness to self-consciousness and then to self-consciousness of self-consciousness, the giving of law reflexively to oneself as lawgiver. The process of development in consciousness is conceived by Hegel as dialectical opposing moments, conflicting principles, reconciled in a synthesis which supersedes each moment, only to undergo conflict itself and subsequent supersession. The fulfillment of the process is consciousness aware of itself as free cause of itself. This is Absolute Spirit, the Absolute Idea, realizable only through its own history, the Universal in the concrete.”5
This progression of consciousness gradually manifests itself in art; however, art, for Hegel, fails to culminate in the highest expression of Spirit; instead, religion and philosophy sublate the achievements of art and proceed to manifest themselves as the highest forms of consciousness. Hegel points out this shortcoming when he says, “There is, however, a deeper form of truth, in which it is no longer so closely akin and so friendly to sense as to be adequately embraced and expressed by [the artistic] medium…The particular mode to which artistic production and works of art belong no longer satisfies our supreme need…Thought and reflection have taken their flight above fine art.”6 And fine art encounters this “supreme need” and “deeper truth” when “it has taken its place in the same sphere with religion and philosophy.”7

Returning now to Schopenhauer, we can proceed to investigate the core principles that ground his aesthetic theory. Schopenhauer maintains that aesthetic experience has “two inseparable constituent parts—the knowledge of the object, not as individual thing but as Platonic Idea, that is, as the enduring form of this whole species of things; and the self-consciousness of the knowing person, not as individual, but as pure will-less subject of knowledge.”8 The fact that the “Platonic Idea” is the object of aesthetic experience is “due not merely to the fact that art presents things more clearly and characteristically by emphasizing the essential and eliminating the inessential, but just as much to the fact that the absolute silence of the will, required for the purely objective apprehension of the true nature of things, is attained with the greatest certainty.”9  Schopenhauer emphasizes that in the act of aesthetic apprehension, an individual transforms into a “pure will-less subject” and, being released from his own selfhood, is free from personal interests, cravings, desires, and wants. He is liberated from the pangs of his own individual will. He becomes an “eternal world-eye:”
“This eye looks out from all living beings, though with varying different degrees of clearness, and is itself, constantly one and the same, and the supporter of the world of permanent Ideas, i.e., of the adequate objectivity of the will. On the other hand, the individual subject, clouded in his knowledge by the individuality that springs from the will, has as object only particular things, and is as transient and fleeting as these themselves are.”10
For Schopenhauer, the disclosure of the Platonic Ideas of things are not concepts accessed by an individual’s rational and conceptual faculties. On the contrary, conceptual knowledge, “as a rule, remains always subordinate to the service of the will, as indeed it originated for this service, and grew, so to speak, to the will, as the head to the body.”11 However, the knowledge of the Platonic Ideas in aesthetic experience is a form of knowledge that is not subordinate to the will; indeed it is an ephemeral moment of relief wherein “knowledge breaks free from the service of the will...”12 Schopenhauer stresses the importance of genuine art being “non-conceptual;” as opposed to it being a product of abstract concepts which—Schopenhauer condemned as being the result of “will-laden” pursuits. And, since the object of art is “to facilitate knowledge of the Ideas of the world” it follows that conceptual and abstract knowledge cannot be the ground, purpose, or medium of genuine art.13 Schopenhauer provides an elegant illustration of this process:
“If, raised by the power of the mind, a man relinquishes the common way of looking at things, gives up tracing…the where, the when, the why, and the whither of things, and looks simply and solely at the what; if, further, he does not allow abstract thought, the concepts of the reason, to take possession of his consciousness, but, instead of all this, gives the whole power of his mind to perception, sinks himself entirely in this, and lets his whole consciousness be filled with the quiet contemplation of the natural object actually present, whether a landscape, a tree, a mountain, a building, or whatever it may be; inasmuch as he loses himself in this object (to use a pregnant German idiom), i.e., forgets even his individuality, his will, and only continues to exist as the pure subject, the clear mirror of the object, so that it is as if the object alone were there, without any one to perceive it, and he can no longer separate the perceiver from the perception, but both have become one, because the whole consciousness is filled and occupied with one single sensuous picture…”14
On the other hand, man’s “natural attitude” is driven solely by his attention to particular things, how they may be of use to him, where they are from, what is their purpose, etc.—all of which are concerned with the principle of sufficient reason. However, in aesthetic experience, man—now the pure, will-less subject of knowledge—and the work of art—the Platonic Idea—transcend the principle of sufficient reason and cease to be subordinate to the pangs of the Will.

A notable point of intersection between Schopenhauer and Hegel is their common usage of expressions when speaking of the nature of art. For example, Hegel, like Schopenhauer, held that “the content of art is the Idea, while its form is the configuration of sensuous material.”15 We also see a similarity, albeit to a lesser extent, when Hegel writes, “the content of art that it be not anything abstract in itself, but concrete, though not concrete in the sense in which the sensuous is concrete when it is contrasted with everything spiritual and intellectual.”16 We have hitherto seen that Schopenhauer vehemently criticized the impinging of the “will-driven” intellect into the realm of aesthetic production and appreciation, and elevated the clear, purely sensuous image of perception as being the hallmark of fine art. By contrast, Hegel, held that fine art was art insofar as it was impregnated and shaped by the active and transformative power of thought—a feature that Schopenhauer held to be abstract (as opposed to “concrete”) and subordinate to the Will, and incapable of transcending the Will. More importantly, Hegel held that “Art is not, either in content or in form, the supreme and absolute mode of bringing the mind’s genuine interests into consciousness,” and that “religion” and “philosophy” captured the being of art in a truer and richer manner.17 Schopenhauer, an atheist and vehement opponent of religion, would profoundly disagree with the assertion that religion was a better expression of the truths that art sought to articulate, than art itself. On the other hand, Schopenhauer does show signs of agreement—albeit with respect to some art forms (music being an exception)—writing that “the works of poets, sculptors, and pictorial or graphic artists generally contained an acknowledged treasure of profound wisdom…yet only virtualiter or implicite. Philosophy, on the other hand, endeavors to furnish the same wisdom actualiter and explicite; in this sense philosophy is related to these arts as wine is to grapes.”18

In conclusion, the aesthetic theories of Arthur Schopenhauer and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel are the workings of two diametrically opposed thinkers. Beginning from vastly different metaphysical standpoints, both thinkers managed to arrive at a variety of intersections of mutual agreement and reconciliation. Where differences persist, both thinkers work to solidify their theories by appealing to their respective cornerstones: Will and Thought. Overall, Schopenhauer and Hegel provide insightful analyses into the meaning, significance, and richness of art.

Footnotes

[1] Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. E.F.J Payne, vol. I (New York, N.Y.: Dover Publications Inc., 1969), 233. 
[2] Hegel, Georg. The Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art. trans. Bernard Bosanquet. (London, England: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1886), 58.
[3] Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, trans. R.B. Haldane and J. Kemp, vol. I (London, England: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Company, Limited, 1906), 427.
[4] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Hegel Reader, ed. Stephen Houlgate (Oxford, UK, England: Blackwell Publishers, 2005), 325.
[5] G.W.F. Hegel, “Philosophy of Fine Art,” in Art and Its Significance: an Anthology of Aesthetic Theory, ed. Stephen David. Ross (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1987), pp. 145-162, 145.
[6] Georg Hegel, The Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art, trans. Bernard Bosanquet (London, England: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1886), 53.
[7] Ibid., 48.
[8] Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, trans. R.B. Haldane and J. Kemp, vol. I, 253.
[9] Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. E.F.J Payne, vol. II (New York, N.Y.: Dover Publications Inc., 1966), 370.
[10] Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. E.F.J Payne, vol. II, 371.
[11] Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, trans. R.B. Haldane and J. Kemp, vol. I, 230.
[12] Ibid, 230.
[13] Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. E.F.J Payne, vol. II, 408.
[14] Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, trans. R.B. Haldane and J. Kemp, vol. I, 231.
[15] G.W.F. Hegel, “Philosophy of Fine Art,” in Art and Its Significance: an Anthology of Aesthetic Theory, ed. Stephen David. Ross (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1987), 146.
[16] Ibid., 147.
[17] Georg Hegel, The Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art, trans. Bernard Bosanquet, 52-53.
[18] Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. E.F.J Payne, vol. II (New York, N.Y.: Dover Publications Inc., 1966), 407.

Tuesday, June 2, 2020

The Tragic Question of Being: That Which Explains All Things Except Itself

Perhaps the most agonizing and tragic question of Being is that which is most unanswerable. By voicing the question, the uttered words become unmeaning—for it rests upon that one principle which is applicable to all finite matters, but not to itself. To those who have inferred the identity of the question, they need not ask it. For it is meaningless to ask. It is no different from one reaching into the sky with the hope of grabbing a fistful of air. To subject this aeterna veritas to the rack of intellectual inquiry would only wrench the inquisitor’s heart. Nevertheless, we can’t help but wonder at its mystery. We call out for an answer and are left with silence in reply.

For this very reason, I have refrained from explicitly raising the question. In fact, I have essentially performed an elaborate circumlocution around this immutable pillar of Being; orbiting around the question without coming into contact with the surface below. This immutable principle stretches its arms across boundless space and infinite time. If I were to break free from my orbit and take a chisel and mallet to this cornerstone of Being—coming down upon it with a mighty blow—the chisel would simply pass through the concrete behemoth as if it were nothing but a phantasm. For I have begged the ultimate question. The elusive shade remains untouched, unphased by the inquiring Subject; its essence cannot be grasped, its roots extend into the earth indefinitely.

The only solution is to pierce through this all-explaining principle with the trenchant knife of silence. The principle of all explanation is itself not subject to an explanation.

Sunday, December 15, 2019

“Nature Loves to Hide”

Heraclitus’s marvelous fragment, “Nature loves to hide,” should not be dismissed as mystical or esoteric. While it may be admitted that Heraclitus cloaks its meaning in rather whimsical and abstruse language, his words bear a stamp of inner truth that cannot be ignored. I argue that Heraclitus’ objective is rather straightforward, and his anthropomorphizing of “Nature” is a creative way of articulating his thoughts and capturing his audience’s attention. Apart from its style, the fragment has a twofold interpretation: (i) Heraclitus sought to convey nature as a unified whole that “hides” behind its seemingly infinite manifestations. (ii) Heraclitus wanted to expose the naïve attitude that we approach Nature with and how we fail to appreciate the fact that many of Nature’s fundamental features are never actually perceived in-themselves, but instead “hide” behind something other than what they are.
It is very likely that Plato and Aristotle would have had divergent opinions about Heraclitus’ “Nature loves to hide” remark. Plato would have likely agreed with Heraclitus and would have said that what we experience is not “Nature” proper but merely sensible copies or images of Nature’s contents as they are in themselves. Thus, Nature hides behind its fleeting, imperfect, and transitory manifestations. Aristotle would have disagreed strongly with Heraclitus and would have retaliated by saying that if Nature “loves to hide,” that would entail that Nature is in some degree unintelligible and thus render philosophical inquiry into Nature futile.

There are many examples in Nature which support Heraclitus’ argument that “Nature loves to hide.” Gravity, for instance, is not observable in-and-of-itself. It can only be “observed” as a relation between certain mediums, such as extended, material bodies. No one has ever “seen” gravity because it is invisible. Furthermore, we can come to understand gravity’s effects by observing the pushing and pulling occurring between at least two material bodies. I’ll illustrate this with a concrete example. If I drop a book on the floor, I do not “see” gravity reach out and pull the book towards the floor, rather I see the book fall from my hand and make contact with the floor below. This echoes Heraclitus’ famous fragment, “Nature loves to hide.”

The same applies to all “activity” as well. For example, I do not see the abstract concept of “running” jogging across a road, rather I see a person—a corporeal entity—running. Nobody has ever perceived “activity” without a material or sensible correlative. Activity is nothing in-itself, it is entirely abstract. In fact, one cannot even conceive of pure activity without it being in relation to a sensible medium. With that said, one could say that “activity,” like Nature, loves to hide.

Heraclitus’ words also apply to even more fundamental aspects of Nature, such as space and time. Time is never “seen,” nor can it be touched, smelled, tasted, or heard. Space is, apart from its objects, an empty void that cannot be conceived of as having any boundaries because all boundaries are in space. We perceive the passage of time through the qualitative and quantitative changes of objects. From this, we come to recognize the phenomena of time as “eroding” all sensible objects in nature. Time is the possibility of change, and it is through change that we come to know time. Without time, there can be no succession because all succession is in time. Time can neither have a beginning nor an end because all beginnings and ends are in time. Time having a “beginning” is inconceivable. Space is the possibility of co-extension, and through the relation between extended bodies that we come to understand space. Without space, there can be no position because all positions are in space. Space, like time, can neither have a beginning nor an end, because all beginnings and ends are in space. Space and time can be taken as independent from each other conceptually; however, space and time are intertwined in our experience of them. When taken by themselves, space and time wouldn’t really fall under the ontological class of “objects” proper, because they are not objects in-themselves. In fact, we cannot coherently speak of space and time using the terms that we ascribe to objects. For example, space and time (as they “appear” to us in experience) are infinitely divisible and infinitely extended; thus, we neither do justice to space nor time if we treat them as “wholes.” All “wholes” imply a boundary of sorts which rounds them off, just as a “whole” circle is confined to its area. That which is infinite in extension cannot be taken as a “whole” because all “wholes” are finite. Based on these examples, it is not at all absurd to suggest that space, time, gravity, and activity (in-itself) all “love” to hide.