Materialism and the “First Breath” of Mentality

According to Materialism, there was, at some point in time, a first-ever mental event. This event was preceded in time solely by non-mental events. How, then, does the Materialist go on to explain the “first breath” of mentality? He invokes an alluring word: “causality.” A reader sympathetic to the Materialist’s case might protest against such a brief statement of his position, so it would only be fair to let the Materialist interject and present his view in his own words:

Modern Materialism holds that mental events are nothing “over and above” physical events; mentality is but a delicate, rare, and ephemeral form of physicality. Old Materialism made an error that Modern Materialism has since corrected; it blundered by declaring a priori that (i) all physical events are non-mental in nature and that (ii) all mental events are non-physical in nature. Despite this categorial difference between mental events (i.e., non-physical events) and physical events (i.e., non-mental events), Old Materialism went on to assert that every mental event located in the series of past, present, and future mental events is the causally-generated “effect,” or the epiphenomenal “by-product,” of a corresponding non-mental event located in the series of past, present, and future non-mental events. Thus, each mental event is causally dependent upon a particular non-mental event located in the total series of non-mental events. Although the total series of mental events was not itself conceived by these Old Materialists as being a “segment” of the total series of non-mental events, it was nevertheless made subordinate to it. While the thread of mental events lacked self-sufficiency, the chain of physical events (i.e., the totality of past, present, and future non-mental events) constituted an independent series—resting on nothing other than itself. The Old Materialists recognized the difficulties in their position (e.g., the relationship between the two series of events), and failed to build a bridge that could intelligibly unite “cause” and “effect.” Modern Materialism, by contrast, rejects the Old Materialist’s dogmatism and refuses to declare a priori that (i) all physical events are non-mental in nature, and that (ii) all mental events are non-physical in nature. Instead of maintaining that the thread of mental events is populated by causally-generated “effects” or epiphenomenal “by-products” of an “independent” series that is exhausted by non-mental events, Modern Materialism holds that when a mental event occurs, this occurrence is identical to a particular physical event located in the totality of physical events. Thus, mental events are no longer viewed as “residual excrescences” that supervene upon the “shock of atoms” in the physical order; they are no longer granted a unique series of their own (e.g., a non-physical series populated by events caused by antecedent or contemporaneous events in a subvening series of physical events). On the contrary, mental events are physical events. This is Modern Materialism. Although Modern Materialism holds that there was, at some point in time, a first-ever mental event, this event was itself a physical event—there being no categorial difference severing said event from any non-mental event that happened to be simultaneous with, or precedent to it, in time. Now, like any other physical event, the first-ever mental event would have been the effect of a preceding physical event, and this prior physical event would have been a non-mental event—but Modern Materialism assures us that there are no difficulties inherent in such a transition. By assimilating mental events into the physical order by way of “identity,” the Modern Materialist has advanced further than any of his predecessors: he has taken a step forward towards explaining the “first breath” of mentality.

Let’s examine the Materialist’s account in detail. The Materialist postulates two temporally-distinct events: (i) a definite, first-ever mental event, M, and (ii) a definite, non-mental event, Pn, that preceded M in time. How, then, are we to conceive the time-series of which these two events, Pn and M, are  occupants? Let’s offer a brief sketch the nature of the time-series by specifying some of its properties:

“A series is continuous when any term divides the whole series unambiguously into two mutually exclusive parts which between them comprise all the terms of the series, and when every term which so divides the series is itself a term of that series. From this second condition it obviously follows that a number of intermediate terms can always be inserted between any two terms whatever of a continuous series; no term of the series has a next term….The whole series of real numbers us continuous [because] every member of the number-series divides it into two classes, so that every number of one is less than every number of the other, and every number which thus divides the series is itself a term of the number-series....From the continuity of the series of real numbers it follows that any other series which corresponds point for point with the terms of the number series will be continuous. Now one such series is that of the successive parts of time. Every moment of time divides the whole series of moments into two mutually exclusive classes, the moments before itself and the moments which are not before itself. And whatever thus divides the time-series is itself a moment in that series.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 171-172) 

Thus, it follows from time’s continuity that no two instants in the time-series ever “touch”.¹ When this fact and the Materialist’s proposed connection between Pn and M are brought into focus, we find that Pn and M cannot share an extremital boundary. In other words, the last instant of Pn cannot be simultaneous with the first instant of M. Indeed, if the last instant of Pn was simultaneous with the first instant of M, then we would have a contradiction on our hands: there would be a moment in time when there was mentality present in a world that, ex hypothesi, was exhausted by non-mentality. In light of this, we must ask the Materialist several questions:

Question (i): Was Pn—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M?

The Materialist’s theory requires that he answer question (i) in the affirmative. And so, in response to question (i), the Materialist declares Pn—rather than any preceding non-mental event—to be the “cause” of M.

Question (ii): What was it about Pn that made this particular non-mental event—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M? 

On pain of inconsistency, the Materialist must respond to question (ii) by asserting that Pn possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from all prior non-mental events), and that Pn’s possession of these “special properties” made Pn—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M.

Question (iii): What were the “special properties” present in Pn and absent from all preceding non-mental events, that made Pn–rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M?

In reply to question (iii), the Materialist will likely posit a bunch of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of these “special properties.” Let’s symbolize the identity of these “special properties” present in Pn—but absent from all preceding non-mental events—as C.

At first glance, all seems fine and well; however, there is a puzzle lurking beneath the surface: a puzzle involving (i) the continuous nature of the time-series, (ii) the Materialist’s identification of Pn—rather than any of the other non-mental events which preceded it—as being the possessor of the aforementioned “special properties,” and (iii) the Materialist’s identification of what these “special properties” actually are. Let’s explore this latent puzzle in the Materialist’s theory.

As we have noted above, the final instant of Pn cannot be simultaneous with the first instant of M—on pain of contradiction. The first instant of mentality in the world must be “later than” any instant during which the Materialist’s world was “exhaustively non-mental.” However, since the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant, it follows that between Pn and M (or, rather, between the last instant of Pn and the first instant of M) there was another event, X, distinct from both Pn and M and separating the two events. This prompts us to ask the Materialist more questions:

Question (iv): Is X a non-mental event or a mental event?

The Materialist must answer question (iv) by declaring X to be a non-mental event, Pn+1. For consider, if the Materialist asserted X to be a mental event, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about M being the first-ever mental event because X would have preceded M in time. 

However, if the Materialist answers question (iv) by declaring X to be a non-mental event, Pn+1, then he contradicts his answer to question (i); in other words, since Pn+1 is later than Pn in time, it would not be true that Pn was the “cause” of M. And so, the Materialist must now revise his answer to question (i) and state that Pn+1—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn)—was the “cause” of M.

Question (v): What was it about Pn+1 that made this particular non-mental event—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn)—the “cause” of M?

On pain of inconsistency, the Materialist must answer question (v) by asserting that Pn+1 possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from all prior non-mental events), and that Pn+1’s possession of these “special properties” made Pn+1—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn)—the “cause” of M.

Question (vi): What were the “special properties” present in Pn+1 and absent from all preceding non-mental events, that made Pn+1—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M?

The Materialist is forced by his own hand to answer question (vi) by positing a bunch of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of the “special properties” present in Pn+1 (i.e., features present in Pn+1 but absent from all preceding non-mental events) that made Pn+1—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn)—the “cause” of M. Now, the Materialist cannot, on pain of contradiction, supply us with the same list of “special properties” that he provided in his answer to question (iii). If, in response to question (vi), the Materialist simply regurgitated his answer to question (iii), then, ex hypothesi, the “special properties” of Pn+1 would have been present in an earlier non-mental event (i.e., Pn)—thereby contradicting the Materialist’s answer to question (v). Moreover, the Materialist cannot simply provide his answer to question (iii) in response to question (vi) because he himself has admitted, by implication, that the properties of Pn were not of such a nature as to make Pn the cause of M. Let’s symbolize the Materialist’s revision of these “special properties” as C’.

However, another problem arises. In the same way the last instant of Pn had to be earlier in the time-series than the first instant of M, so too must the last instant of Pn+1 be earlier in the time-series than the first instant of M. If this were not so, and the last instant of Pn+1 was simultaneous with the first instant of M, then there would be a moment in time when there was mentality present in a world that, ex hypothesi, was exhausted by non-mentality—and this, of course, is a contradiction. And, as we have seen, since the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant, it follows that between Pn+1 and M (or, rather, between the last instant of Pn+1 and the first instant of M) there was another event, X’, distinct from both Pn+1 and M and separating the two events. This prompts us to ask the Materialist more questions:

Question (vii): Is X’ a non-mental event or a mental event?

In answer to question (vii), the Materialist must, of course, respond by declaring this particular event, X’, to be a non-mental event, Pn+2. If the Materialist answered by declaring X’ to be a mental event, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about M being the first-ever mental event since, ex hypothesi, X’ would have preceded M in time. 

The Materialist must answer question (vii) by declaring X’ to be a non-mental event, Pn+2. For consider, if the Materialist asserted X’ to be a mental event, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about M being the first-ever mental event because X’ would have preceded M in time. However, by declaring X’  to be a non-mental event, Pn+2, the Materialist contradicts his “revised” answer to question (i)—(i.e., that Pn+1 rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn) was the “cause” of M). As a result, the Materialist must “revise” his already “revised” answer to question (i) and declare Pn+2—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn or Pn+1)—to be the “cause” of M. In doing so, the Materialist must also revise his answer to question (v) and question (vi). He must assert that Pn+2 possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from all prior non-mental events) and that Pn+2’s possession of these “special properties” made Pn+2—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn or Pn+1)—the “cause” of M. However, in doing so, the Materialist must specify these “special properties” of Pn+2. Just like before, the Materialist must list a set of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of the “special properties” present in Pn+2 (i.e., features present in Pn+2 but absent from all preceding non-mental events) that made Pn+2—rather than any preceding non-mental event (e.g., Pn or Pn+1)—the “cause” of M. However, the Materialist cannot, on pain of contradiction, supply us with the same list of “special properties” that he provided in his answer to question (vi). If the Materialist did so, then the “special properties” of Pn+2 would have been present in an earlier non-mental event (i.e., Pn+1); however, he himself has admitted, by implication, that the properties of Pn+1 were not of such a nature as to make Pn+1 the cause of M.  Ergo, the Materialist must supply us with a new set of properties that were allegedly present in Pn+2, and made Pn+2—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the “cause” of M. Let’s symbolize the Materialist’s revision of these “special properties” as C’’.

However, the problem has only been aggravated. As we’ve seen before, the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant; ergo, it follows that between Pn+2 and M (or, rather, between the last instant of Pn+2 and the first instant of M) there was another event, X’’, distinct from both Pn+2 and M and separating the two events. This prompts us to ask the Materialist another question:

Question (viii): Is X’’ a non-mental event or a mental event?

The Materialist must answer question (viii) by declaring this particular event, X’’, to be a non-mental event, Pn+3. And we know where this will lead us. The Materialist is trapped in a vicious regress; for, inconsistencies in the Materialist’s responses require that he continually revise his answers ad infinitum. He is unable to consistently identify the non-mental event that allegedly gave birth to the first-ever mental event, and he is unable to consistently specify the identity of the alleged “special properties” that would have made this non-mental event—rather than any preceding non-mental event—the cause of the first-ever mental event.

With every step the Materialist takes towards his first-ever mental event, he is forced to take one step back—he is forever barred from receiving his final reward. The Materialist fails to harmonize the “first breath” of mentality within an asphyxiatingly barren, non-mental world.

“However far we pursue the course of the sense-excitation through the nerve, in however many ways we suppose its form changed and converted into ever finer and more delicate movements, we can never prove that it is in the nature of any movement so produced to cease as movement of its own accord, and to reappear as a bright color, as a tone, as a sweet taste. The chasm is never bridged over between the last state of the material elements within our reach and the first rise of the sensation; and scarce anyone will cherish the vain hope that at a higher stage of development science will find a mysterious bridge in a case where it is the impossibility of any sure crossing-over that forces itself on us with the most evident distinctness.” (Lotze, Mikrokosmus, Vol. I, 148)

Footnotes:

^[1] “For it follows from the structure of the time-series (I) that there are an indefinite number of terms of the series between any two members, between which there is a finite interval, and (II) that there is also an indefinite number of terms before or after any given member of the series. Like the series of real numbers, the time-series, because it satisfies the definition of a continuous infinite series, can have neither a first nor a last term, nor can any member of it have a next term. Applying this to the case of Causation, we may reason as follows: The same reasons which lead us to demand a cause A for any event B, and to find that cause in an assemblage of antecedent events, require that A should be similarly determined by another assemblage of antecedent events, and that this cause of A should itself have its own antecedent cause, and so on indefinitely. Thus, the causal principle, logically applied, never yields an intelligible explanation of any event Instead of exhibiting the transition A—B as the logical expression of a coherent principle, it refers us for the explanation of this transition to a previous instance of the same kind of transition, and then to another, and so forth without end. But it is impossible that what is not intelligible in one instance should become intelligible by the mere multiplication of similar unintelligibilities. (II) Similarly, if we look within the transition A—B. This transition, being continuous, must have its intermediate stages. A becomes B because it has already become C, and the transition A—C—B is again “explained” by showing that A became D which became C which became E which became B. And each of these stages, A—D, D—C, C—E, E—B can be once more submitted to the same sort of analysis. But in all this interpolation of immediate stages there is nothing to show the nature of the common principle in virtue of which the stages form a single process. We are, in fact, trying to do what we try to do wherever we establish a relation between terms, to answer a question by repeating it.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 177-178)