Reading Notes: June 7th, 2022

“After a study of the possible issues, the Committee presented, as the first of its questions for debate, the following: “In cases where a real (and non-hallucinatory) object is involved, what is the relation between the real and the perceived object with respect (a) to their numerical identity at the moment of perception, (b) with respect to the possibility of the existence of the real object at other moments apart from any perception?” This question was to be understood by all who were to cooperate, as determined by the meanings assigned by the Committee to the terms “object,” “perceived object,” and “real object.” The definitions of these terms, as printed in the Committee’s report, are as follows: “By object in this discussion shall be meant any complex of physical qualities, whether perceived or unperceived and whether real or unreal. By real objects is meant in this discussion such objects as are true parts of the material world. By perceived object is meant in this discussion an object given in some particular actual perception.” It appears, from the context, and from the formulation of the question for debate quoted above, that the Committee very naturally laid some stress upon the fact that what is meant by “some particular actual perception” involved an occurrence at some “moment of time,” called also “the moment of perception”; or, again, involved some determinate set or sequence of such momentary occurrences, “in some particular individuated stream of perceptions,” that is, in the mind or in the experience of some person….The Committee did not define what it meant by the adjective “given,” used in the above-cited definition of “perceived object”….As a fact, however, their definition of the term “perceived object,” taken together with their formulation of their question, and the context in which they used the which they are used the word given, involved a very serious interference with the range of the cooperation which they invited. For what is “given” in a “moment of perception,” and what is not “given at a particular moment,” and the sense in which what is “given” can also be an “object”—all these matters are not topics of a merely pedantic curiosity about words. They are matters which have been lengthily, frequently, and momentously discussed, both in the controversies about perception and in other philosophical inquiries.” (Royce, On Definitions and Debates, 237) 

“In The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (1885), ideas are taken to be representations of real objects. As images of what is perceived or thought, a man’s ideas are all that is present to his mind. These ideas are the only content of his thought, and the objects represented remain outside his thought. To this extent the position of subjective idealism is correct, i.e. “my mind can be concerned only with its own ideas.” But an immediate problem for a subjective idealist is to account for the difference between truth and error. If all I think about will be my ideas, and what they represent are but other ideas of mine, then to assert anything about them must be correct. In that case, sincerity and truth are identical, for when I assert anything there is no reference to anything outside of my own thought. As long as I honestly consult my own ideas, I cannot be in error. The truth of my ideas, however, is commonly taken to be their correspondence to the objects they represent. There is a “commonplace assumption” that error is possible, that an assertion can fail to agree with a real object outside of thought. But how is one to judge if this particular assertion is true or false? To answer that, Royce considers what role the judgment plays in human cognition. It is not an act distinct from that of understanding. That is, the judgment by itself has no intelligible object other than the ideas present to all thought. Royce concludes that the judgment synthesizes my ideas—a position he explicitly avows to be neo-Kantian. But if the judgment reaches no object beyond ideas, the common-sense belief in error must either be abandoned or supplemented. The former course is impossible, for in choosing it one would be admitting the common-sense knowledge had been in error. To state “error is impossible” as a remedy for a mistaken assumption is clearly contradictory. So that latter course alone proves viable. Since no single judgment can be an error (for it reaches no object beyond itself), there must be a higher thought that includes both the judgment and its real object. By comparing the two, this higher thought determines whether the first thought was true or false. Left to itself, the latter remains a fragment “neither true nor false, objectless, no complete act of thought at all.” This is a very brief sketch of Royce’s method of presupposition by denial. He begins with the fact of error in the world, and concludes to an Absolute Thought.” (Zanardi, Idea and Absolute in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce, 10-11) [Underlining is mine]

“What follows is a summarized version of Royce’s more lengthy argument. The fact of error is undeniable; to deny this is to contradict oneself, for how else can this fact be refuted if not by proving it erroneous? Each error implies a judgment whose intended object is other than my ideas and so lies beyond my judgment. Such an object will also be an object of a corresponding true judgment. Since the existence of error implies a higher thought, it will be this thought that contains the object of both the true and false judgments. Since the possibilities of error are infinite, the inclusive thought must be infinite. And since error is possible not only as regards objects but also as regards relations, all possible relations in the world must be present to this infinite thought. Finally, to know all relations at once is to know them in absolute rational unity, i.e. as one single thought….Even if one were to find fault with his argument, the error charged to Royce’s position is alleged to prove the existence of Absolute Thought. It alone knows the real and can compare a judgment with its intended object. Royce offers other arguments for the existence of Absolute Thought. The problem of knowing other minds is an instance of employing the already cited view of human understanding. My idea of another person can only be true or false if there is a third party to compare my idea with the real person. There is also a problem of relating a past idea to a present thought. The past idea was unique in its separate existence and in its view of the future. To determine the identity between its conception of the future and the present thought’s conception of what now has become reality requires an inclusive thought which compare them. How else could my past thought have made any assertion about a future moment? Royce refutes a response that rests on verifying a prediction only upon its fulfillment or failure to occur. My memory of an original thought differs from it and so is still in need of a comparison with that original thought. Again, Royce appeals to a higher thought to make a synthesis of what to the human knower are disparate ideas.” (Zanardi, Idea and Absolute in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce, 11-12) [Underlining is mine] 

Royce’s argument is genius. However, the implicit Neo-Kantianism weakens it greatly. I have attempted to transpose the argument into less “subjectivistic” form that still arrives at Royce’s intended result: 

If erroneous judgments are possible, then all of the necessary conditions underlying this possibility actually exist. Erroneous judgments are possible. Therefore, all of the necessary conditions for the possibility of erroneous judgments actually exist. A necessary condition for the possibility of an erroneous judgment is for the erroneous judgment to fail to agree with that which the thought making the erroneous judgment has intended for its object. But that which the thought making the erroneous judgment has intended for its object can only be that which is known to the thought making the erroneous judgment. Therefore, a necessary condition for the possibility of an erroneous judgment is for the erroneous judgment to fail to agree with that which is known to the thought making the erroneous judgment. But an erroneous judgment cannot fail to agree with that which is known to the thought making the erroneous judgment unless the erroneous judgment is known as being in error with respect to its intended object. Therefore, a necessary condition for the possibility of an erroneous judgment is for the erroneous judgment to be known as being in error with respect to its intended object. But an erroneous judgment is known as being in error with respect to its intended object only insofar as the erroneous judgment and its intended object are known to a thought which compares them, and judges the erroneous judgment to be in error with respect to its intended object. Therefore, a necessary condition for the possibility of an erroneous judgment is for the erroneous judgment and its intended object to be known to a thought which compares them, and judges the erroneous judgment to be in error with respect to its intended object. Therefore, since all of the necessary conditions for the possibility of erroneous judgments actually exist, it follows that for every erroneous judgment that exists, there actually exists a thought which knows said erroneous judgment and its intended object, compares them, and judges the erroneous judgment to be in error with respect to its intended object. There exists at least one erroneous judgment that had the Universe as a whole (and every aspect of it) as its intended object. Therefore, there actually exists a thought which knows said erroneous judgment and the Universe as a whole (and every aspect of it), compares them, and judges the erroneous judgment to be in error with respect to the Universe as a whole (and every aspect of it). A thought which knew the aforementioned erroneous judgment and the Universe as a whole (and every aspect of it), compared them, and judged the erroneous judgment to be in error with respect to the Universe as a whole (and every aspect of it) would be an all-knowing, Absolute Thought. Therefore, since all of the necessary conditions for the possibility of erroneous judgments actually exist, and there exists at least one erroneous judgment that had the Universe as a whole (and every aspect of it) as its intended object, it follows that there actually exists an all-knowing, Absolute Thought. Q.E.D.