My Adaptation of One of Mary Whiton Calkins’ Arguments for Idealism

The following argument is my version of one of Mary Whiton Calkins’ arguments for idealism. The essence of Calkins’ argument can be found in her book, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy. My argument expands upon Calkins’ ideas and attempts to solidify her intended conclusions. I am indebted to Kris McDaniel and his essay, The Idealism of Mary Whiton Calkins for influencing the spirit and presentation of my argument. For a further defense of several of the premises, please refer to my other post, My Adaptation of Giovanni Gentile’s “Conceivability Argument” for Idealism.

P1) No relations can obtain between two or more determinates unless there is a qualitative commonality obtaining between them.

“In the first place a relation, if it is to be a relation at all, must unite some terms. Secondly, most, if not all, kinds of relation presuppose a specific common character, usually or always of the type called by Mr. Johnson a determinable in the related terms, without which the assertion of the specific relation would be not merely false but absurd…” (Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, 128) 

“There can be no experience of plurality, whether of beings, qualities or events, that are absolutely disparate and disconnected—that is certain. All experienced diversity implies some identity; and, for the matter of that, all experienced identity some diversity. All this is so much logical commonplace. From this it follows that to every known or knowable Many there will be some common term applicable to them all, which logically unifies them all.” (Ward, The Realm of Ends, 222) 

“Every relation implies an identity underlying the manifest difference in the terms…” (Carr, A Theory of Monads, 1) 

“Neither duality nor multiplicity is conceivable without that unity whereby the two engender that whole in which the two units are connected, even though they mutually exclude one another: without that unity which fuses and unifies every multiplicity determined in a number, which correlates among themselves the units which constitute the number. We could strip multiplicity of all unity only by not thinking it. But then in the gloom of what is not thought, multiplicity truly enough would not be unity, but it would not even be multiplicity, because it could not be anything at all. Or, if we prefer, it would be absolutely unthinkable.” (Gentile, The Reform of Education, 107)

P2) A necessary condition for a qualitative commonality obtaining between two or more determinates is for said determinates to be of the same ontological kind—said ontological kind being none other than that “higher” determinable (or genus) through which said determinates must be conceived in order for their interrelatedness to be conceivable.

“Spatial relations presuppose in this way the common determinable of extension….the relation of similarity presupposes some common determinable in the determinate value of which the objects are said to be similar, the relations of enmity or love the common determinable of emotional capacity, the relation of causality the common character of being events or continuants in time, and perhaps membership in some specific causal system…..[A relation] could not be present at all if its terms were not characterized by a certain determinable and if their determinate qualities within this and other subordinate determinables did not fall within certain limits….” (Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, 129-130) 

“What, it will be asked, is a whole? It is defined ordinarily in some such fashion: the sum of the relations of distinct yet connected parts. What, then, is a relation? It cannot, in the first place, be external to the parts which it relates, else it would still be another reality and would itself need to be related with all the rest; and the new relation would again need relating, and so on ad infinitum. A relation external to the terms related would, in a word, be useless to them: it could not be their relation. As Hegel says, in “a unity of differents…, a composite, an aggregate…, the objects remain independent and…external to each other.” And yet, though a relation cannot be external to the terms which it relates, neither can it be a quality inherent in any or in every one of them. For the quality, or attribute, or function, which is in a particular reality, cannot be the bond between that particular and some other. In other words, if ultimate reality were a composite of completely related terms, and if the relations between the terms were qualities of the terms, each for each, then the relations would themselves need relating with each other, for each would belong to some particular reality. There is no escape from this difficulty except by the abandonment of the conception of ultimate reality as a composite, and the alternative conception of it as a whole which is also a singular, an absolute reality whose unique nature is manifested in the particular realities which form its parts. These parts, therefore, need no external relation; they are related in that they are alike expressions of the one reality.” (Calkins, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 380-381)

C1) Therefore, no relation can obtain between two or more determinates unless said determinates are of the same ontological kind—said ontological kind being none other than that “higher” determinable (or genus) through which said determinates must be conceived in order for their interrelatedness to be conceivable. [From P1 and P2]

P3) The Subject-dimension of Experience, and that which manifests itself, perspectivally and non-perspectivally, to and for the Subjective-dimension of Experience, are interrelated determinates.

C2) Therefore, the Subject-dimension of Experience, and that which manifests itself, perspectivally and non-perspectivally, to and for the Subject-dimension of Experience, are of the same ontological kind—said ontological kind being none other than that “higher” determinable (or genus) through which said beings must be conceived in order for their interrelatedness to be conceivable. [From C1 and P3]

P4) But the Subject-dimension of Experience, and that which manifests itself, perspectivally and non-perspectivally, to and for the Subject-dimension of Experience, are actual, concrete unities of meaning.

For a defense of this premise, confer my defense of the first premise of My Adaptation of Giovanni Gentile’s “Conceivability Argument” for Idealism.

C3) Therefore, the Subject-dimension of Experience, and that which manifests itself, perspectivally and non-perspectivally, to and for the Subject-dimension of Experience, are of the same ontological kind as actual, concrete unities of meaning—said ontological kind being none other than that “higher” determinable (or genus) through which said actual, concrete unities of meaning must be conceived in order for their interrelatedness to be conceivable. [From C2 and P4]

P5) But actual, concrete unities of meaning are beings that are either one with, or, beings that are determinations of, an Experiential ontological kind—Experience being none other than that ontological kind or “higher” determinable (or genus) through which said actual, concrete unities of meaning must be conceived in order for their interrelatedness to be conceivable.

For a defense of this premise, confer my defense of the second premise of My Adaptation of Giovanni Gentile’s “Conceivability Argument” for Idealism.

C4) Therefore, the Subject-dimension of Experience, and that which manifests itself, perspectivally and non-perspectivally, to and for the Subject-dimension of Experience, are beings that are either one with, or, beings that are determinations of, an Experiential ontological kind—Experience being none other than that ontological kind or “higher” determinable (or genus) through which said beings must be conceived in order for their interrelatedness to be conceivable. [From C3 and P5]

P6) Ultimate Reality is related to the Subject-dimension of Experience, and manifests itself, perspectivally and non-perspectivally, to and for the Subject-dimension of Experience.

C5) Therefore, Ultimate Reality is a being that is either one with, or, a being that is a determination of, an Experiential ontological kind. [From C4 and P6]

P7) But Ultimate Reality is not a determination of anything “higher” than itself; for Ultimate Reality is self-determined, and has all of its determinations “internal” to itself. (But this can only mean that Ultimate Reality is itself an Experience, and not a determination thereof.)

“Ultimate reality [is that] into which all else can be resolved and which cannot itself be resolved into anything beyond, that in terms of which all else can be expressed and which cannot itself be expressed in terms of anything outside itself.” (Haldane, The Pathway to Reality, 19) 

“For Reality…must be a complete individual whole, with the ground of all its differentiations within itself.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 255) 

“The whole…is a self-differentiating system. It is a whole that determines, by the principle of organization that is universal to all its parts and moments, the nature and interrelations of its elements, making them mutually interdependent and constitutive. Accordingly, if their distinction one from another is elevated into a separation, and if they are severally isolated from each other and from the system, as is wont to happen under the influence and operation of the understanding, they contradict themselves and one another, a contradiction symptomatic of defect that is occasioned by their mutual exclusion and the oversight of their mutual complementarity.” (Harris, The Spirit of Hegel, 142-143)

C5) Therefore, Ultimate Reality is an Experience. [From C5 and P7]