What is the Difference Between the Real and the Imaginary?

What do we mean when we say that something is “real” as opposed to “imaginary?” If there were no difference between the meaning of “real” and the meaning of “imaginary,” then “real” and “imaginary” would have the same meaning—and this is absurd. When we judge X to be “real,” we simultaneously judge X to not be “imaginary;” and when we judge Y to be “imaginary,” we simultaneously judge Y to not be “real.” But what actually constitutes this difference between the “real” and the “imaginary;” and what are their respective meanings? We must now attempt to answer these questions.

Before proceeding further, we must address some anticipated objections.  A would-be objector might reply with the following:

The difference between the “real” and the “imaginary” simply consists in the fact that the “real” is “real” and the “imaginary” is “imaginary.” The “real” is not “imaginary” and the “imaginary” is not “real.” This, and this alone, is the difference between the “real” and the “imaginary.” To be “real” simply means to not be “imaginary;” and to be “imaginary” simply means to not be “real.” This, and this alone, is the meaning of “real” and “imaginary.”

Let's briefly examine this objection from our would-be objector. Our initial questions had to do with (a) what constitutes the difference between the “real” and the “imaginary,” and (b) what we mean by “real” when we judge something to be “real,” and what we mean by “imaginary” when we judge something to be “imaginary.” To reply, as our would-be objector does, that the difference between the “real” and the “imaginary” merely lies in the fact that the “real" is “real” and the “imaginary” is “imaginary” is to do nothing but utter barren tautologies. Obviously the “real” is “real” and the “imaginary” is “imaginary;” but such statements tell us nothing about either (a) what constitutes the difference between the “real” and the “imaginary,” or (b) the meanings of “real” and “imaginary.” Indeed, such a move is nothing other than a restatement of the very problem we are trying to answer. As Mary Whiton Calkins would say, our would-be objector’s responses are as illuminating as the following excerpt from Oliver Herford’s An Alphabet of Celebrities:

Furthermore, our would-be objector has ensnared himself in a dilemma. If someone were to ask him if X is “real,” our would-be objector could only reply with the following: X is “real” if X is not “imaginary.” And, if that same person were to press our would-be objector further by asking him if X is “imaginary,” our would-be objector could only reply with the following: X is “imaginary” if X is not “real.” How illuminating. None of our would-be objector’s responses answer the questions asked of him. None of his answers shed light on either the constitutive differences between, or the meanings of, the “real” and the “imaginary.” Furthermore, our would-be objector’s responses result in a vacuous vicious circle. If someone neither knew the meaning of “real” nor the meaning of “imaginary,” then, based on our would-be objector’s responses, it would be impossible—in principle—for this person to ever (a) come to an understanding of what constitutes the difference between the “real” and the “imaginary,” (b) come to an understanding of the meaning of “real” and the meaning of “imaginary,” and (c) come to know whether X was “real” or “imaginary.”

Now, our would-be objector might try to clarify his previous responses in the following way:

The difference between the “real” and the “imaginary” is that what is “real” actually “exists,” while what is “imaginary” does not actually “exist.” With this clarification  in mind, my previous answers are vindicated. If someone were to ask me if X is “real” or “imaginary,” then I would simply reply that X is “real” if X actually “exists,” and that X is “imaginary” if X does not actually “exist.”

Has our would-be objector provided a solution? Not at all. On the contrary, he has fallen prey to those same arguments we waged against his previous responses. If that same person who inquired into the meanings of, and differences between, the “real" and “imaginary” did not know either the meanings of, and differences between, “exist” and not “exist,” then, based upon our would-be objector’s first and second replies, said person could neither come to an understanding of the meanings of, and differences between, (a) “exist” and not “exist,” and (b) “real” and “imaginary.” Furthermore, he could never come to know either (c) whether X is “real” or “imaginary,” or (d) whether X “exists” or does not “exist.” Our would-be objector has done nothing but utter tautologies and entrap himself within vacuous vicious circles. Let’s suppose our would-be objector plays his final move in the following way:

The difference between the “real” and the “imaginary” lies in the fact that the “real” exists within Space and Time, whilst the “imaginary” does not exist within Space and Time. If someone were to ask me if X is “real” or “imaginary,” then I would simply reply that X is “real” if X exists within Space and Time, and that X is “imaginary” if X does not exist within Space and Time. 

Unfortunately, our would-be objector has stumbled into self-contradiction. He is maintaining that (a) something is “real” if it exists within Space and Time, and (b) something is “imaginary” if it does not exist within Space and Time. However, it immediately follows from these two positions that Space and Time would be “imaginary” and not “real” unless Space and Time existed within Space and Time—and this is absurd. However, even if our would-be objector embraced the absurdity of saying that Space and Time existed within Space and Time, he would run into another problem. Ex hypothesi, Space(1) and Time(1) would be “imaginary” and not “real” unless Space(1) and Time(1) existed within Space(2) and Time(2). However, Space(1) and Time(1) could not exist within Space(2) and Time(2) unless Space(2) and Time(2) were “real” and not “imaginary.” After all, something “real” cannot exist within something “imaginary.” But, ex hypothesi, Space(2) and Time(2) would be “imaginary” and not “real” if Space(2) and Time(2) did not exist within Space(3) and Time(3). However, Space(2) and Time(2) could not exist within Space(3) and Time(3) unless Space(3) and Time(3) were “real” and not “imaginary.” But, ex hypothesi, Space(3) and Time(3) would be “imaginary” and not “real” if Space(3) and Time(3) did not exist within Space(4) and Time(4). And so on and so on. Based upon our would-be objector’s positions, a vicious infinite regress would have to come to an end for Space and Time to be “real” and not “imaginary;” and such a completion is, of course, impossible. Therefore, it is not the case that the difference between the “real” and the “imaginary” lies in the fact that the “real” exists within Space and Time, whilst the “imaginary” does not exist within Space and Time.

We have hitherto disposed of several conceptions as to the difference between the “real” and the “imaginary.” They are the following: 

• The difference between the “real” and the “imaginary” simply consists in the fact that the “real” is “real” and the “imaginary” is “imaginary.” The “real” is not “imaginary” and the “imaginary” is not “real.”

• The difference between the “real” and the “imaginary” is that what is “real” actually “exists,” while what is “imaginary” does not actually “exist.”

• The difference between the “real” and the “imaginary” lies in the fact that the “real” exists within Space and Time, whilst the “imaginary” does not exist within Space and Time.

With these mistaken conceptions disposed of, we must now search for clues as to the genuine nature of the difference between the “real” and the “imaginary.” Unfortunately, the question as to the nature of the “real,” in contradistinction to the “imaginary,” is—like any other perennial question—not easy. As such, the question must be unraveled and approached from one particular angle at a time. Because of this, I will first limit myself to investigating only one specific region and concentrate on how the difference between “real” and “imaginary” plays out therein; then, I will investigate Reality as such. The first area of investigation will be the sphere of materiality.

What, then, is the difference between a “real” material object and its merely “imaginary” counterpart? Initially, we may reply with the following conception:

The difference between a “real” and an “imaginary” material object lies in the fact that the “real” material object is, or may be, one with my own center of Experience as something which I, as a rational, purposive agent, must acknowledge and take into consideration in the pursuit and fulfilment of my subjective interests, goals, plans, and desires.

Indeed, Kant reached a similar conclusion in his critique of the ontological proof. Taking a hundred dollars as his example, he went on to show that the “reality” of the “real” hundred dollars consisted in the fact that they are, or may be, objects of Experience. Kant went on to show that the “unreality” of the “imaginary” hundred dollars consisted in the fact that they neither are, nor may be, actual objects of Experience. Indeed, the “real” hundred dollars are, or may be, something felt, touched, and handled; seen, smelled, and tasted; exchanged for a currency of a different type, used for purchasing goods and services in the market, or simply deposited in a bank for future use. The “imaginary” hundred dollars, however, neither are, nor may be, felt, touched, and handled; seen, smelled, and tasted; exchanged for a currency of a different type, used for purchasing goods and services in the market, or simply deposited in a bank for future use.

As an aside, we must be careful to point out an important distinction, namely that of my psychical act of “imagining” and the “imaginatum” which I am “imagining.” My psychical act of “imagining” the “imaginary” hundred dollars is certainly “real” and not “imaginary,” because the psychical act of “imagining” is one with my Experience, it is something which I am actually doing. On the other hand, the “imaginatum” which I am “imagining” (i.e., the “unreal” or “imaginary” hundred dollars”) neither is, nor can be, something which enters into my Experience. If one muddles the distinction between the “imagining” and the “imaginatum,” then one inevitably falls into one of the following two absurdities: (a) they end up committing themselves to the “reality” of griffins, round-squares, and leprechauns because they collapse the “unreal” “imaginatum” into the “real” psychical act of “imagining;” or (b) they end up committing themselves to the “unreality” of psychical acts of “imagining” because they collapse the psychical act of “imagining” into the “unreal” “imaginatum.” With this clarification in mind, we can proceed with our investigation into the difference between a “real” material object and its merely “imaginary” counterpart.

Now, I, as a rational, purposive agent, must acknowledge and take into consideration in the pursuit and fulfilment of my subjective interests, goals, plans, and desires, the fact that there are other centers of Experience belonging to other rational, purposive agents, who, like myself, seek to fulfil their subjective interests, accomplish their goals, realize plans, as well as acknowledge, understand, and appreciate the same material objects which I myself encounter within the world of my Experience—albeit from perspectives differing from my own. Indeed, it would be impossible for me to make any rational sense of my own history, subjective interests, language, and self-identity, unless I either acknowledged, or took into account, the universal sphere of intersubjectivity—that community of centers of Experience indissolubly one with my own. Therefore, we may modify our initial conception and instead say:

The difference between a “real” and an “imaginary” material object lies in the fact that the “real” material object is, or may be, either one with my own center of Experience, or one with other centers of Experience, as something which the rational, purposive agents possessive of those centers of Experience, must acknowledge and take into consideration in the pursuit and fulfilment of their respective subjective interests, goals, plans, and desires.

I think we can go further. It is not the case that only “rational agents” possess centers of Experience.  Indeed, there are countless organisms which, while not necessarily rational, do indeed alter their behavior to those states of affairs which said organisms must conform to in order to fulfill their fundamental needs as living organisms. Furthermore, these countless centers of Experience possessed by non-human organisms are inseparably connected with the well-being, growth, and development of those rational, purposive agents which are also possessive of centers of Experience. Indeed, the former centers of Experience must be taken into consideration by the rational agents possessive of the latter centers of Experience in the pursuit and fulfilment of their respective subjective interests, goals, plans, and desires. Thus, we may finalize our conception of the difference between a “real” material object and its merely “imaginary” counterpart by saying:

The difference between a “real” and an “imaginary” material object lies in the fact that the “real” material object is, or may be, either one with my own center of Experience, or one with other centers of Experience, as something which the rational, purposive agents (as well as non-rational agents) possessive of those centers of Experience, must acknowledge and take into consideration (or conform to) in the pursuit and fulfilment of their respective subjective interests, goals, plans, desires, and fundamental needs.

To conclude, I will present my reply to our initial question: “What is the Difference between the Real and the Imaginary?”

The difference between the “real” and the “imaginary” lies in the fact that the “real” is one with my own center of Experience and other centers of Experience as that concrete and actual system of meanings which rational, purposive agents (as well as non-rational agents) possessive of those centers of Experience, must acknowledge and take into consideration (or conform to) in the pursuit and fulfillment of their respective subjective interests, goals, plans, desires, and fundamental needs.