Fragmentary Notes §15—§16

§15

I would say that I hold to a form of Absolute Idealism. My thinking is heavily influenced by the late-19th and early-20th century American Idealists (e.g. Royce, Calkins, Cunningham, Hollands, and Blanshard) and British Idealists (e.g. Bradley, Bosanquet, Haldane, McTaggart, Ward, Stout, etc.). I am also greatly indebted to the genius insights of Arthur Schopenhauer.

§16

I view Reality as a concrete, all-inclusive, and systematic whole, saturated with meaning and value—it is a unity-in-difference which exhibits a principle of coherence, comprehensiveness, and intelligibility. Furthermore, I hold that Reality (i.e., the Absolute) is genuinely conceivable or thinkable only in terms of “Mind,” “Spirit,” or “Experience.” Indeed, I would say that the Absolute is one with my own center of Experience and other centers of Experience as that concrete and actual system of meanings which rational, purposive agents (as well as non-rational agents) possessive of those centers of Experience, must acknowledge and take into consideration (or conform to) in the pursuit and fulfillment of their respective subjective interests, goals, plans, desires, and fundamental needs. I like to think of myself as maintaining a holistic conception of metaphysics, as well as a synoptic philosophical methodology—a method that is vehemently anti-reductionist in its approach and conclusions.

“Speculative idealism...takes the standpoint of concrete experience, which is also the standpoint of common sense and science.  It begins by viewing mind and the objective system of nature as distinct, and it never dreams of identifying them; they remain distinct to the end.  But speculative idealism does not permit their distinction to blind it to the fact that they are complementary; they are for it what they are in concrete experience, namely inseparably related aspects of that conscious life which is experience.  It also accepts as complementary, and obviously so, the relation of the individual mind to the minds of other individuals. In other words, it accepts as complementary the social relationship between mind and mind.  Thus for speculative idealism there are three moments or coordinates within experience: the self, other selves, and nature.  These are accepted as they present themselves within experience as irreducible and ultimate distinctions.  But, while recognizing their difference, speculative idealism also recognized their complementary nature and relationship.  It does not accept them as discrete existences or entities each with its own independent self-enclosed center; holding on to the standpoint of concrete experience, it accepts them as complementary coordinates within experience.” (Cunningham, The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy, 296)