Some Afterthoughts on Illusionism

According to Illusionism, nothing—whether it be an object or an experience—has sensory-qualities; and if an object (or experience) seems to have sensory-qualities, it is because “our brain’s introspective mechanisms” have “misrepresented” the object (or experience) as having them. The Illusionist’s position is “clever” (but only as “clever” as a parlor trick) because it interprets illusions in a way that does not introduce sensory-qualities—it interprets illusions strictly in terms of dispositions (e.g., the disposition to react as if the illusory thing existed; or, again, the disposition to judge/believe that we are aware of sensory-qualities—even though sensory-qualities do not exist, they only “seem” to exist).

As a result, one cannot “refute” Illusionism by saying, “But an experience of sensory-qualities can’t be an illusion because such an illusion would necessarily involve the presence of sensory-qualities.” Nor can one “refute” Illusionism by saying, “If I seem to be experiencing sensory-qualities, then I am experiencing sensory-qualities.” Against such objections, the Illusionist would be correct in saying that the objectors beg the question against the Illusionist position. 

As mentioned above, the Illusionist thinks that we can “misrepresent” objects (or experiences) as having sensory-qualities even if sensory-qualities don’t exist. The Illusionist tries to make this clear by providing examples the he believes are sufficient to establish the Illusionist’s foundation-stone: (i) the content of a representation need not exist in order for a representation of it to exist, and (ii) we have had many instances of observation wherein we have observed a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality it represents (e.g., “A representation of a [sensory-quality] needn’t be qualitative, just as the word ‘red’ needn’t be red.” (Keith Frankish, Twitter/X, Sep 27th, 2019)

However, Illusionism cannot get off the ground unless it can establish the truth or plausibility of the following proposition:

There exist “representations of sensory-qualities” (e.g., a “representation of a red sensory-quality”) that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind.

Now, as I demonstrate in my essay, A Critical Examination of Illusionism, the aforementioned proposition—a vital premise upholding the entirety of Illusionism—is baseless. Furthermore, I show that the Illusionist cannot argue for the proposition without coming face-to-face with an inescapable, two-horned dilemma: he must choose between a petitio principii or a non-sequiturial inference.

Unfortunately, Keith Frankish has never acknowledged the existence of my paper, despite the fact that I have sent it to him and reached out to him several times about it—surely he has time to read a brief article if he has enough time to pick apart “low hanging fruit” objections on Twitter….But I digress. He is, without a doubt, a busy man and is likely bombarded with countless messages on a daily basis).

I won’t bother writing out the entirety of my argument (and my elaborate defense of it) here, but I’ll present one of its main points. The Illusionist cannot validly infer (or posit) the existence of “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, from the fact that we have had many instances of observation wherein we have observed a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality it represents; the reason being that we have always observed objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. However, “instances of observation wherein we have observed a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality it represents” is the only “empirical evidence” available to the Illusionist (and such evidence cannot be used to support his “foundation stone” without the Illusionist committing several fallacies). 

Thus, Illusionism’s foundation-stone is an arbitrary and unwarranted assumption. Far from being a viable option, the “coherent research programme” of Illusionism has the structural integrity of a castle in the air...

Unfortunately, Keith Frankish—one of the most well-known Illusionists alive today—has never acknowledged the existence of my paper, despite the fact that I have sent it to him and reached out to him about it—surely he has time to read a brief article if he has enough time to pick apart “low hanging fruit” objections on Twitter….But I digress. He is, without a doubt, a busy man and is likely bombarded with countless messages on a daily basis.

To conclude, I can’t help but notice that Illusionists have a bizarre and disquieting “disposition” to portray their opponents as being “bedazzled” and “tricked” by an apparent “inner magic show.” When I read books and essays by Illusionists, the only “theatrical performance” or “slight of hand” that I “seem” to be aware of—nay I “know” I am aware of—is the spectacle unfolding before my eyes.