Reading Notes: August 17th, 2024

“Only a judgment can be true or false….A judgment always has a subject and a predicate. The subject is usually the object judged, and the predicate the judgment of that object. When someone says, “Centaurs have existence in the realm of the imaginative,” they have for their object of judgment, centaurs. They attribute to their object existence in the realm of the imaginative….Judgment has been defined as that which entails both an object of judgment and the judgment of that object. But there is another important element in all judgment. This is purpose or intention. When an individual judges, he judges his object or the object which he purposes to judge. So the object of his judgment is always willed or intended by him to be his object….Judgment is both restrictive and selective in nature. The frame of reference in judgment must be restricted to an intended object….Therefore an individual who judges has as object only what he intends to has as object. He has only to conform to that to which he wants his judgment to conform.” (Skinner, The Logocentric Predicament, 17-18)

“We shall consider in this hypothetical conversation three of the six persons involved, namely, the “real” Thomas, the “real” John, and Thomas as John conceives him to be. The problem is restricted to this: “When John judges Thomas, which Thomas does he judge?” It must be remembered that this analysis is wholly in terms of the common-sense view-point, which has been selected as a starting-point in the introduction to the problem. John is to judge Thomas. But which Thomas? For in terms of common sense, John’s judgment stands alone separated from its intended object. Now if John’s judgment is separated from its object, how can John judge at all? He cannot. At least he cannot judge the “real” Thomas for the “real” Thomas is outside his judging processes. Under these circumstances John cannot know the “real” Thomas. John perceives Thomas through his sensory apparatus. He conceptualizes his sensory data of Thomas. In this way he conceives Thomas. But what he conceives is not the “real” Thomas, but his “ideal” Thomas or “phantom” Thomas. The “real” Thomas is not in his thought at all. There is no connection between Thomas’ thought and John’s thought. Thomas is independent of John. Therefore John is limited to his “phantom” Thomas. He cannot bridge the gap of the common-sense separation. He must be satisfied with just what he thinks about Thomas. And even if Thomas told John something about himself, John would hear, that is, he would perceive through hearing the sounds of Thomas. He would conceptualize these sensory data and conceive Thomas. But the same predicament would hold. From this viewpoint there cannot be an exchange of ideas since all that I can ever know is what I conceive to be the case. As a result John can have only his image or concept of Thomas. He finds himself unable to know the one with whom he is conversing. They are speaking to each other, but at the same time they are total strangers holding only each one’s opinions of the other. Is error possible under such circumstances? Can John in this view be mistaken in his judgment of Thomas? We shall find that he cannot. He cannot err because he cannot judge the “real” Thomas. Whom does he judge? He judges his conception of Thomas which is wholly separated from the “real” Thomas. He judges his conception because he has nothing more than his conception to judge. When he judges, he never errs since he always intends as his object of judgment his conception of that object. He can intend nothing more. And John is not in error if he judges his own conception and intends to judge his own conception….The only possibility of John’s erring in respect to Thomas is if John intended the “real” Thomas. He cannot intend as his object what he does not and cannot in some sense know. He cannot err in his judgment of the “phantom” Thomas. Error is not possible with such a view of reality. And since error is not possible this position is untenable. Common sense affirms the factuality of error but fails in presenting adequate conditions for its existence.” (Skinner, The Logocentric Predicament, 20-21)