A Critical Examination of Objectivism’s Account of Change, Motion, and Time

If Objectivism’s account of identity is true, then change, motion, and time are all “unreal.” I will proceed to illustrate this by outlining several key propositions that Objectivism is committed to:

• For any entity, X, X is “identical to” an independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes [a, b, c, d, e,…]. 

• For any independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], if said independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” an entity, X, then a, b, c, d, e, &c. are of the same metaphysical status. 

• For any independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], if said independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” an entity, X, then a, b, c, d, e, &c. are equally determinative in constituting the identity and nature of X.

• For any entity, X, X is “identical to” its identity and nature. 

At time T1, there exists an entity, X. Therefore, at time T1, there exists an independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], and this independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” X. Now, suppose that at time T2, there does not exist an independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…]. It would follow that X does not exist at time T2. Indeed, this is because X is “identical to” the independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], and, as we have said, there does not exist a unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…] at time T2.

Again, let us suppose that at time T2 there exists an independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes [not-a, b, c, d, e,…] that was “identical to” an entity. It would still be the case that X does not exist at time T2, because an entity’s identity or nature is “identical to” the entity itself; and, since the independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes [a, b, c, d, e,…] and the independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes [not-a, b, c, d, e,…] do not consist in the same attributes, it follows that they are not the same entity, but are instead two different entities with two different identities and natures. 

Now, one might object by saying that the entity at T1 and the entity at T2 are one and the same entity, and that the entity has simply lost an attribute which it had at T1.  However, this response is incompatible with the following two Objectivist positions: 

• For any independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], if said independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” an entity, X, then a, b, c, d, e, &c. are of the same “metaphysical status.” 

• For any independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], if said independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” an entity, X, then a, b, c, d, e, &c. are equally determinative in constituting the “identity” and “nature” of X.

However, Objectivism’s “hyper-essentialism” regarding the relationship between entities and attributes entails that change, action (and therefore causality as well), and time are impossible or “unreal.” The reason for this conclusion is the following:

Change and motion both imply that the identity and nature of the changing and moving entity remains “one and the same” throughout its change and motion. In other words, change and  motion are meaningless unless the changing and moving entity is the same entity before, during, and after its change and movement. However, as we have seen, if Objectivism’s views on the matter were true, then no entity would remain the same entity before, during, or after its change or movement. It is for this reason that if the Objectivist account of identity is true, that change and motion are “unreal.”

Furthermore, since Objectivism maintains that time is a “measure of motion,” and since Objectivism’s views as to an entity’s identity and nature prohibit change and motion—it would follow that Objectivism is committed to the “unreality” of time as well. 

On the other hand, we may approach the issue from the other side—the Heraclitan side. Indeed, from the above positions, it would equally follow that no entities ever endure—rather, an entity would come into being and cease to exist at one and the same instant. Thus, having been been engorged by the two horns of Being and Becoming, the Objectivist is faced with an ancient dilemma: he must choose between the changeless and the everchanging.

Resources and Evidence:

“Existence and identity are not attributes of existents, they are the existents.” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (ITOE), 56)

“[T]he rules of cognition must be derived from the nature of existence and the nature, the identity, of his cognitive faculty.” (ITOE, 82)

“[T]he rules of cognition must be derived from the nature of existence and the nature, the identity, of his cognitive faculty.” (ITOE, 87)

“Metaphysically, an entity is: all of the things which it is.  Each of its characteristics has the same metaphysical status: each constitutes a part of the entity’s identity.” (ITOE, 98)

“The nature of an entity determines what it can do and, in any given set of circumstances, dictates what it will do.  The Law of Causality is entailed by the Law of Identity.  Entities follow certain laws of action in consequence of their identity, and have no alternative to doing so.  Metaphysically, all facts are inherent in the identities of the entities that exist…” (ITOE, 108-109)

“Now, what is an entity? It is a sum of characteristics. There is no such thing as an entity without its characteristics, and, for that very reason, there is no such thing as a characteristic without an entity…Don’t take “sum” literally…Not in the sense that you would say “sum of its parts. Usually when I write I say the entity is its attributes. To be exact, you’d have to treat them as inseparable…[T]he attributes are the entity, or an entity is its attributes. The attributes are really separable only by abstraction.” (ITOE, 266)

“An attribute is something which is not the entity itself. No one attribute constitutes the whole entity, but all of them together are the entity—not “possessed by” but “are” the entity.” (ITOE, 276)

“Prof. A: In regard to the concept of an attribute—for example, “length”— since the attribute is something which does not exist separate in reality, is the referent of the concept of an attribute in the category of the epistemological rather than the metaphysical? AR: Oh no, why? Prof. A: Because length doesn’t exist per se in reality. Length is a human form of breaking up the identities of things. AR: Wait a moment, that’s a very, very dangerous statement. Length does exist in reality, only it doesn’t exist by itself. It is not separable from an entity, but it certainly exists in reality. If it didn’t, what would we be doing with our concepts of attributes? They would be pure fantasy then. The only thing that is epistemological and not metaphysical in the concept of “length” is the act of mental separation, of considering this attribute separately as if it were a separate thing. How would you project a physical object which had no length? You couldn’t. And therefore if to say it is epistemological rather than metaphysical is to say it exists only in relation to your grasp of it, or it requires your grasp of it in order to acquire existence—it doesn’t. Surely, if anything is metaphysical, attributes are. Prof. A: If I ask you, then, what is the referent of “length,” would you say “long objects"? AR: Not the objects, the attribute of length in all the objects which possess that attribute. Prof. A: Isn’t the referent something separated? AR: It’s mentally separated, but it is there in those objects.  It doesn’t have to be an entity to be a referent. Prof. A: I don’t understand then why the referent of the concept “red,” say, isn’t all the red concretes. AR: How about the other attributes of all those red concretes? Is the referent of “red” the length and weight of all the red concretes? Prof. A: No. AR: Well then, obviously the concrete itself isn’t the referent of the concept, but a particular aspect of that concrete, an inseparable aspect. Prof. B: You said that the referent must be separated, or something like that. There’s no reason why the referent of the concept should be separable from the object. Prof. A: But in the case of attributes, the referent is not the entity but only an aspect of the entity. And an aspect cannot exist except as an aspect of the whole entity. Prof. B: Can you follow that one step further? You say that the referent of “length” must be an aspect, and an aspect cannot exist separately—what is the next step? Prof. A: The referent is the aspect separated. Is that the wrong premise? Prof. B: The referent is the aspect, not the aspect separated. AR: Exactly.  Prof. B: Otherwise you switch metaphysics and epistemology. AR: That’s right. The aspect, not the separation. That’s very well put.” (ITOE, 277-279)

“Prof. F: But now, properties are all constitutive properties, right? AR: Yes.” (ITOE, 286)

“In this regard, the relation of the aspects of a state of awareness to the whole awareness is similar to the relation of the attributes of an entity to the whole entity; an entity is its attributes and a state of awareness is its aspects.” (How We Know (HWK), 57)

“A third and final basic axiom is implicit in the first two. It is the law of identity: to be is to be something, to have a nature, to possess identity. A thing is itself; or, in the traditional formula, A is A. The "identity" of an existent means that which it is, the sum of its attributes or characteristics… Ayn Rand offers a new formulation of this axiom: existence is identity. She does not say "existence has identity"—which might suggest that identity is a feature separable from existence (as a coat of paint is separable from the house that has it). The point is that to be is to be something. Existence and identity are indivisible; either implies the other. If something exists, then something exists; and if there is a something, then there is a something. The fundamental fact cannot be broken in two.” (Objectivism the Philosophy of Ayn Rand (OPAR), 7)

“The adult validation of the law of causality consists in stating this relationship explicitly. The validation rests on two points: the fact that action is action of an entity; and the law of identity, A is A. Every entity has a nature; it is specific, noncontradictory, limited; it has certain attributes and no others. Such an entity must act in accordance with its nature. The only alternatives would be for an entity to act apart from its nature or against it; both of these are impossible. A thing cannot act apart from its nature, because existence is identity; apart from its nature, a thing is nothing. A thing cannot act against its nature, i.e., in contradiction to its identity, because A is A and contradictions are impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity. This is the action it will take, the action that is caused and necessitated by its nature.” (OPAR, 15)

“Entities and their actions are measured by means of their attributes, such as length, weight, velocity. In every case, the primary standard is some easily perceivable concrete that functions as a unit. One measures length in units, say, of feet; weight in pounds; velocity in feet per second.” (OPAR, 82)

“Now let us apply this discussion to another aspect of the theory of concepts: the status of essences (as the term is used in the context of the theory of definition). On the one hand, according to Objectivism, essences are not attributes marked out by nature apart from man. "Essential" is not a metaphysical, but an epistemological term. "Essential" designates characteristics that perform a certain function in connection with human conceptualization. The function is to differentiate and condense various bodies of data, and the characteristics that perform this function in one cognitive context may not do so in another. Since the category of "essence" arises because of a need of man's consciousness, the "essential" in each context has to reflect the state of human knowledge.” (OPAR, 113)

“Definitions are statements of factual data—as condensed by a human consciousness in accordance with the needs of a human method of cognition. Like concepts, therefore, essences are products of a volitional relationship between existence and consciousness; they too (properly formed) are objective. In the traditional (Platonic and Aristotelian) viewpoint, every entity must have an essence or definition. This is not true in the Objectivist viewpoint. Since the designation of essentials arises only as an aid to the conceptualizing process, it is inapplicable apart from that process. Concretes that have not been integrated into a concept have no "essence"; in these cases, there is no need or possibility of a definition.” (OPAR, 113)

“Metaphysically, there is only one universe. This means that everything in reality is interconnected. Every entity is related in some way to the others; each somehow affects and is affected by the others. Nothing is a completely isolated fact, without causes or effects; no aspect of the total can exist ultimately apart from the total. Knowledge, therefore, which seeks to grasp reality, must also be a total; its elements must be interconnected to form a unified whole reflecting the whole which is the universe.” (OPAR, 123)

“The axiom of identity holds that each thing is itself, or, as Rand frequently puts it: “A is A.” The force of this statement is perfectly captured in Bishop Butler’s famous remark, “Every thing is what it is, and not another thing.” “Identity” names the fact that everything that is is something in particular. A given thing’s identity is the sum total of all of its characteristics. Synonyms for something’s “identity” might be its “character” or its “nature,” so long as it is understood that a thing’s identity at any given moment refers to all of its attributes, actions, relations, and so on.” (Blackwell Companion to Ayn Rand (BCAR), 249) 

“In regard to: the Law of Causality. Yes, of course, my formulation of it (“A thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature”) is mine; it is not the usual: “everything that happens has a cause.” Compare the two and decide which is the more fundamental. You say: “But the truth of the statement, in your formulation, is guaranteed by the meaning attached to the word ‘NATURE’.” You bet your life it is! But what shocked me was the fact that you seem to attach no meaning to the concept of “a thing’s nature,” even though it was specified most clearly in the lecture and in Atlas Shrugged. A thing’s nature is that which it is metaphysically; a thing’s nature is its identity, that which cannot be changed by miracle nor by any wish, whim, or will, God’s or man’s. This is the meaning of “A is A”—and you have told me firmly that you accepted it. How, then, could you cite, as an example in this context, such a thing as a man’s “temper-tantrum” and ask whether he “acted contrary to his nature”? On top of which, you assume that we would answer that this is “part of his nature.” (!!!) I will answer: This is what happens to logic (and language) without ontology. (Letters of Ayn Rand, 528-529) 

“To perceive existence, to discover the characteristics or properties (the identities) of the things that exist, means to discover and accept the metaphysically given.” (Philosophy Who Needs It (PWNI), “The Metaphysical Versus The Man-Made”, 30-31) 

“But man exists and his mind exists. Both are part of nature, both possess a specific identity….[M]an is able to initiate and direct his mental action only in accordance with the nature (the identity) of his consciousness.” (PWNI, 32)

“Prof. F: This question has to do with the concept of “property” and its significance for causality. In Galt’s speech, you say every action is caused by the nature of the acting entity. Now, by “the nature of an entity” do you mean the physical properties of an entity—properties like combustible, fragile, corrosive, and so on?  AR: Yes. And also the psychological properties of a consciousness, including free will.”  (ITOE, 282)

“Prof. F: Could you give me an example of a constituent property?  Prof. E: Physical structure.  AR: The arrangement of molecules.” (ITOE, 284) 

“Prof. F: I noticed that Galt does not say, “A thing must act in accordance with its nature”; he says it “cannot act in contradiction to its nature.” I wonder if you had some particular reason for stating it in the negative.  AR: Oh, no, only to make it stronger actually. You could have said “must act in accordance with its nature.” But I wanted to stress that one cannot claim causeless actions, or actions contrary to the nature of the interacting entities. I wanted to stress that actions cannot be inexplicable and causeless. If the cause lies in the nature of an entity, then it cannot do something other than what its nature makes possible.” (ITOE, 286-287) 

“The axiom of identity holds that each thing is itself, or, as Rand frequently puts it: “A is A.” The force of this statement is perfectly captured in Bishop Butler’s famous remark, “Every thing is what it is, and not another thing.” “Identity” names the fact that everything that is, is something in particular. A given thing’s identity is the sum total of all of its characteristics. Synonyms for something’s “identity” might be its “character” or its “nature,” so long as it is understood that a thing’s identity at any given moment refers to all of its attributes, actions, relations, and so on.” (BCAR, 451)