Objectivism, Entities, Actions, and Attributes: A Reply to a Critic

A couple of days ago, I received the following anonymous comment on my article, A Critical Examination of the Objectivist Metaphysic:

Your Critique seems to rest on a series of misunderstandings about the nature of entities and attributes as understood in Objectivism.

Objectivism doesn’t claim that only entities can act or have attributes. It claims that actions are performed by entities, but those entities can have properties or attributes that contribute to the nature of their actions. For example, a person (an entity) can think (an action), but the action of thinking is facilitated by the person’s consciousness (an attribute of the person).

Objectivism doesn’t necessarily claim that consciousness or mind is an attribute rather than an entity. Consciousness and mind are aspects or attributes of a human being, but they are also entities in their own right in the sense that they are things which exist and can be identified.

You also appear to be confusing the idea of an entity as a distinct existent with the idea of an entity as a primary, independently existing thing. In Objectivism, an entity is simply something that exists and can be identified. So, consciousness, mind, and a person could all be considered entities in this sense.

The critique also assumes that if something is an attribute, then it cannot have attributes of its own. But in Objectivism, attributes can have attributes. For example, a person’s consciousness (an attribute of the person) can have its own attributes, like being aware, attentive, or distracted.

Essentially, the misunderstanding of the concepts led you to a false conclusion. This is simply put of course, but I can appreciate the thought you put into the critique.

Thanks

While I appreciate your constructive criticism, I must admit that you are mistaken when it comes to certain core aspects of Rand’s metaphysic. For this reason, I think it would only be right for me to address your points and explain where they go astray from the Objectivist perspective. Since I have addressed criticisms that are very similar to yours in the past, I’ll provide links to those posts at the end.

While you are correct in pointing out that Objectivism holds that an entity’s attributes determine or facilitate the kinds of actions the entity performs (cf. ITOE, 93-94), it is not true that Objectivism does not claim that only entities can act. On the contrary, Objectivism explicitly maintains the opposite—indeed, all actions are actions performed by entities:

“All actions are caused by entities. The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act; a thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature.” (For the New Intellectual (FNI), 152) 

“And—especially important in considering the law of cause and effect—there are no floating actions; there are only actions performed by entities….The adult validation of the law of causality consists in stating this relationship [“between the nature of an entity and its mode of action”] explicitly. The validation rests on two points: the fact that action is action of an entity; and the law of identity, A is A. Every entity has a nature; it is specific, noncontradictory, limited; it has certain attributes and no others. Such an entity must act in accordance with its nature. The only alternatives would be for an entity to act apart from its nature or against it; both of these are impossible. A thing cannot act apart from its nature, because existence is identity; apart from its nature, a thing is nothing. A thing cannot act against its nature, i.e., in contradiction to its identity, because A is A and contradictions are impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity. This is the action it will take, the action that is caused and necessitated by its nature….Cause and effect, therefore, is a universal law of reality. Every action has a cause (the cause is the nature of the entity which acts); and the same cause leads to the same effect (the same entity, under the same circumstances, will perform the same action)….Given the facts that action is action of entities, and that every entity has a nature—both of which facts are known simply by observation—it is self-evident that an entity must act in accordance with its nature.” (Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (OPAR), 13-16) 

“Action is the crux of the law of cause and effect: it is action that is caused—by entities. By the same token, the causal link does not relate two actions….Motions do not act, they are actions. It is entities which act—and cause. Speaking literally, it is not the motion of a billiard ball which produces effects; it is the billiard ball, the entity, which does so by a certain means.” (OPAR, 17-18) 

“The law of causality states that entities are the cause of actions—not the every entity, of whatever sort, has a cause, but that every action does; and not that the cause of action is action, but that the cause of action is entities.” (OPAR, 18)

“Entity, as we have seen, is the primary “category.” Only entities can act— and to be an entity is to be an individual.” (OPAR, 196)

“The first concepts man forms are concepts of entities—since entities are the only primary existents. (Attributes cannot exist by themselves, they are merely the characteristics of entities; motions are motions of entities; relationships are relationships among entities.)” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, (ITOE), 12) 

“Actions are caused by entities…” (ITOE, 285) 

“By “action” we mean the action of an entity.” (ITOE, 291)

I think the above passages are enough to establish my point that Objectivism does hold that all actions are actions performed by entities. Let’s continue.

“You also appear to be confusing the idea of an entity as a distinct existent with the idea of an entity as a primary, independently existing thing. In Objectivism, an entity is simply something that exists and can be identified.”

The problem with this criticism is that it rests upon a misunderstanding of Objectivist account of existents and entities. While Objectivism holds that all entities are distinct existents that can be identified, Objectivism does not hold that “an entity is simply [a “distinct”] something that exists and can be identified.” As a matter of fact, we find the opposite view frequently emphasized in Objectivist literature. Here are a few examples: 

“The first concepts man forms are concepts of entities—since entities are the only primary existents. (Attributes cannot exist by themselves, they are merely the characteristics of entities; motions are motions of entities; relationships are relationships among entities.)” (ITOE), 15) 

“An existent is, then, a particular which exists….An existent is a concrete. “Existent” is a very convenient term in that it subsumes entities and attributes and actions and event mental events. They exist….Everything that exists on which you can focus, anything which you can isolate, whether it is an entity, a relationship, an action, or an attribute. The concept “existent” refers to something which exists. And it is wider than the concept “entity,” because it permits you to subsume under that concept, and focus on, attributes or relationships or actions—on that which depends on an entity but can be studied separately. (ITOE, 198-199)

“An entity is that which you perceive and which can exist by itself. Characteristics, qualities, attributes, actions, relationships, do not exist by themselves…attributes and actions cannot exist apart from the entity.” (ITOE, 265) 

“An attribute is something which is not the entity itself.  No one attribute constitutes the whole entity…” (ITOE, 276) 

“An entity means a self-sufficient form of existence—as against a quality, an action, a relationship, etc., which are simply aspects of an entity that we separate out by specialized focus. An entity is a thing.” (The Philosophy of Objectivism Lecture Series, Lecture 3) 

While it is the case that all entities are existents, not all existents are entities. Let us suppose that Objectivism did in fact maintain that “an entity is simply a [“distinct”] something that exists and can be identified.” How would this tally with the rest of the Objectivist metaphysic? Well, if an entity is any [“distinct”] something that exists and can be identified, it necessarily follows that any distinct and identifiable existent is an entity. Now, according to Objectivism, any particular action or attribute of an entity, and any particular relationship between entities, is itself an existent—an existent that is not only identifiable but an existent that is also distinct from other existents (this includes the entity which performs said action, the entity which has said attribute, and the entity which stands in said relationship, etc.). However, if it is the case that “an entity is simply a [“distinct”] something that exists and can be identified,” it would follow that any particular action or attribute of an entity, and any particular relationship between entities, is itself an entity—a conclusion which the Objectivist metaphysic explicitly rejects and repudiates.  Indeed, the passages referenced above make this clear. Note also that Rand explicitly states that no entity is identical to any one attribute. But, if no entity is identical to any one attribute, it follows that no one attribute is identical to any entity.

We have seen that Objectivism holds characteristics of entities, attributes of entities, actions of entities, and relationships between entities, to all be existents. We have also seen that although a characteristic of an entity, an attribute of an entity, an action of an entity, or a relationship between entities, is an existent—an existent that is identifiable and distinct from other existents—said existent is not itself an entity. On the contrary, as Rand herself says, unlike entities, “characteristics, qualities, attributes, actions, relationships, do not exist by themselves.” (ITOE, 265, cf. ITOE, 15) Just as it is wrong to conclude that “All mammals are dogs” from the fact that “all dogs are mammals,” so too is it wrong to conclude that “All distinct and identifiable existents are entities” from the fact that “All entities are distinct and identifiable existents.” Let’s continue.

“Objectivism doesn’t necessarily claim that consciousness or mind is an attribute rather than an entity.”

This is false. Objectivism does maintain that consciousness is an attribute rather than an entity. The following passages (among many others) illustrate this core aspect of Rand’s philosophy: 

“Consciousness, unlike existence, is a property: “Consciousness is an attribute of certain living entities, but it is not an attribute of a given state of awareness, it is that state.” (ITOE, 56) 

“Prof. F: Wouldn’t you say that consciousness is itself an attribute of man?...AR: Right, A faculty of man.” (ITOE, 154) 

“Whether he has a soul or is a material being with the attribute of consciousness, in either case his distinctive, essential attribute is consciousness, not matter…” (The Journals of Ayn Rand, 13) 

“Man is a being endowed with consciousness—an attribute which matter does not possess.” (The Letters of Ayn Rand, “The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged Years” (1945-1959), To Nathan Blumenthal, January 13, 1950) 

“A man’s volition is outside the power of other men. What the unalterable basic constituents are to nature, the attribute of a volitional consciousness is to the entity “man”.” (PWNI, 38) 

“Objectivity begins with the realization that man (including his every attribute and faculty, including his consciousness) is an entity of a specific nature who must act accordingly…” (ITOE, 82) 

“All questions presuppose that one has a faculty of knowledge, i.e., the attribute of consciousness. One ignorant of this attribute must perforce be ignorant of the whole field of cognition (and of philosophy).” (OPAR, 5) 

“Consciousness is an attribute of perceived entities here on earth.” (OPAR, 33) 

“The same observations which reveal that consciousness is an attribute of certain living organisms reveal that it belongs to separate organisms.” (OPAR, 196) 

“Since consciousness is not an independent entity, it cannot attain fulfillment within its own domain.” (OPAR, 420) 

“[Man] is, in Ayn Rand’s words, “an indivisible entity, an integrated unit of two attributes: of matter and consciousness.” Consciousness in his case takes the form of mind, i.e., a conceptual faculty; matter, of a certain kind of organic structure. Each of these attributes is indispensable to the other and to the total entity. The mind acquires knowledge and defines goals; the body translates these conclusions into action.” (OPAR, 196) 

“It is one’s recognition of the fact that the mind is an attribute of the individual and that no person can think for another.” (OPAR, 255) 

“Since man is an integration of two attributes, mind and body, every virtue reflects this integration.” (OPAR, 257)

The remainder of my response is going to rely on highly technical aspects of Rand’s metaphysic. 

“Objectivism doesn’t claim that only entities can act or have attributes. It claims that actions are performed by entities, but those entities can have properties or attributes that contribute to the nature of their actions.”

The question of whether or not attributes can have attributes of there own is not essential to the arguments in the original article or in any of the other articles where I critically analyze the Objectivist metaphysic. Nevertheless, the question as to whether attributes can have attributes of their own remains an important one. Firstly, if we suppose that some attributes have attributes of their own (i.e., are themselves a “unities” of attributes), then a pressing question arises: “Why are some “unities” of attributes independently existing primaries (i.e., entities) and other “unities” of attributes (i.e., attributes that have attributes of their own) not independently existing primaries?” What special “ingredient” makes the one, and not the other, a “self-contained” existent? To say that a “unity” of attributes of the former kind has the property of “being a self-contained existent,” while a “unity” of attributes of the latter kind does not have the property of “being a self-contained existent,” is to simply reaffirm the question rather than answer it. Such a response would be as helpful as appealing to opium’s “soporific quality” in an explanation of why opium induces sleep. The circularity is obvious. 

Secondly, another question emerges: “Do only some attributes have attributes of their own? Or do all attributes have attributes of their own?” If only some attributes have attributes of their own, then why do those attributes have attributes of their own while all other attributes do not? It seems that if some attributes are granted the privilege of having attributes of their own, there is no non-arbitrary reason that can be given to justify withholding this privilege from all other attributes.

Thirdly, if some attributes have attributes of their own, then these “privileged” attributes are either identical to, or not identical to, the totality of attributes they possess. If these “privileged” attributes are not identical to the totality of attributes they possess but are instead distinct from, or “over-and-above,” the totality of attributes they possess, this would jar with Rand’s conception of identity (passim. ITOE, OPAR, etc.) On the other hand, if these “privileged” attributes are identical to the totality of attributes they possess, we would have to ask another question: “What is the “essential characteristic” (to use Rand’s expression) of this “privileged” attribute?” In this case, the “privileged” attribute’s “essential characteristic” would be the characteristic that not only makes the greatest number of this “privileged” attribute’s other characteristics possible, but also explains the greatest number of its other characteristics.

Let’s take an entity, such as an apple. This apple is red, round, sweet, smooth, etc. “Redness,” “roundness,” “sweetness,” and “smoothness,” etc. are all attributes or characteristics of the apple. Now, do any of these attributes have attributes of their own? Are “redness,” “roundness,” “sweetness,” and “smoothness” examples of “privileged” attributes? (i.e., attributes that have attributes of their own). If not, then for what reason? If so, then what is the “essential attribute” of each? This question is much more challenging than it may appear to be. For instance, what are we to say of the apple’s attribute of “redness.” Does the apple’s attribute of “redness” have attributes of its own? If so, then what are they? It’s obvious that “redness” is not one of them—indeed, the attribute of “redness” is not itself red. The same is true for the rest of the apple’s attributes. The apple’s attribute of “roundness” is not itself round; the apple’s attribute of “sweetness” is not itself sweet-tasting; the apple’s attribute of “smoothness” is not itself smooth, etc. Furthermore, since the attribute of “redness” is not itself colored, we can’t say that an “essential characteristic” of “redness” is that it is “darker-than” or “brighter-than” something other than itself. We are thus at a loss as to what the “essential characteristic” of redness is. Anything that we can offer as a possible answer would itself be relational properties holding between colorless terms. Lastly, I think it is important to note that Rand maintained that attributes were “indivisible” (cf. ITOE, 276) and it seems that if attributes were to have attributes of their own, attributes would no longer be “indivisible,” but rather “infinitely divisible.” But I digress. 

As mentioned above, I have provided several modified versions of a few of the arguments that I posed in A Critical Examination of the Objectivist Metaphysic. While the following list of arguments is not exhaustive, and a couple of the arguments in the list may appear supererogatory, it is important to note that their soundness does not hinge upon the issue of whether or not attributes can possess attributes of their own. If anyone doubts any of the premises, I recommend that they refer to the original article. In that article, I provide an abundance of passages taken in context, as well as citations that can be used in support of the premises of each argument. 

Argument 1B

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by entities and that only entities are causally efficacious. 

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind performs actions and that my consciousness is causally efficacious. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an entity. [From P1 and P2] 

P3) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is not an entity. 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind both is, and is not, an entity. [From C1 and P3]

Argument 2B 

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) and that only independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) are causally efficacious.  

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind performs actions and that my consciousness is causally efficacious. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). [From P1 and P2] 

P3) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is not an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind both is, and is not, an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). [From C1 and P3]

Argument 3B

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by entities and that only entities are causally efficacious. 

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is not an entity. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind does not perform actions and that my consciousness/mind is not causally efficacious. [From P1 and P2] 

P3) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind performs actions and that my consciousness/mind is causally efficacious. 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind both does, and does not, perform actions, and that my consciousness/mind is, and is not, causally efficacious. [From C1 and P3]

Argument 4B

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) and that only independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) are causally efficacious. 

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind performs actions and that my consciousness is causally efficacious. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). [From P1 and P2] 

P3) Objectivism is committed to the position that an attribute of an entity is not an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is not an attribute of an entity. [From C1 and P3] 

P4) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an attribute of an entity. 

C3) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is, and is not, an attribute of an entity. [From C2 and P4]

Argument 5B

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) and that only independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) are causally efficacious. 

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that I perform actions and that I am causally efficacious. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). [From P1 and P2] 

P3) Objectivism is committed to the position that an attribute of an entity is not an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent).  

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am not an attribute of an entity. [From C1 and P3] 

P4) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an attribute of an entity.  

C3) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am not my consciousness/mind. [From C2 and P4] 

P5) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am my consciousness/mind.

C4) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am, and I am not, my consciousness/mind. [From C3 and P5]

Argument 6B

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that an attribute is always possessed by something that is not the attribute itself. 

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an attribute which I, and I alone possess. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am not my consciousness/mind. [From P1 and P2] 

P3) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am my consciousness/mind. 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am, and I am not, my consciousness/mind. [From C1 and P3]

Argument 7B

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that an attribute is always possessed by something that is not the attribute itself. 

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an attribute. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is possessed by something that is not my consciousness/mind. [From P1 and P2] 

P3) Objectivism is committed to the position my consciousness/mind is an attribute which I, and I alone, possess. 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am not my consciousness/mind. [From C1 and P3] 

P4) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am my consciousness/mind. 

C3) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is possessed by something that is not me. [From C2 and P4]

Argument 8B

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that an attribute is always possessed by something that is not the attribute itself. 

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an attribute. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is possessed by something that is not my consciousness. [From P1 and P2] 

P3) Objectivism is committed to the position that I am my consciousness/mind. 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am possessed by something that is not me. [From C1 and P3]

To conclude, I think it would be best to provide links to my other writings where I analyze the Objectivist metaphysic. I hope that my critic might find these interesting or helpful:

A Defense of Ayn Rand’s Objectivism

A Critical Examination of Objectivism’s Account of Parts and Attributes of Entities, and How it Pertains to Objectivism’s Account of Consciousness 

A Critical Examination of Objectivism’s Account of Change, Activity, Motion, and Time 

A Critical Examination of Objectivism and the Concept of an “Unperceived” Reality

Some Replies to Objectivists

“Could you please tell me what ‘abstraction’ is in the Objectivist canon?” (An Objectivist)

“Abstraction” (or “abstracting”) is, for Rand, a volitional activity performed by a conscious mind in relation to existents (e.g., entities, attributes of entities, actions of entities, relations between entities, etc.) which it observes in reality. More specifically, it is a process wherein a mind “selectively” focuses upon, and mentally “isolates,” an existent present within a particular context, “omitting” (or regarding as “unspecified”) observed differences as being different from what is being “isolated,” and ”grasping” observed similarities as being similar to what is being mentally “isolated.” Abstraction is an essential phase of Rand’s account of concept formation, and it is intertwined with what Rand calls “measurement” and its subsidiary aspects (e.g., “unit” “measurement omission,” “commensurable characteristics,” etc.) 

“An ‘attribute’ is a mentally isolated element of the structure of an entity.” (An Objectivist)

“‘Attributes’ are not extant ‘things’. They are epistemological abstractions.” (An Objectivist)

This is totally mistaken. Attributes are not entities (or “things”), rather they are existent characteristics or properties of entities. For Rand, attributes and entities are types of existents. (Cf. “The building-block of man’s knowledge is the concept of an “existent”—of something that exists, be it a thing, an attribute or an action.”) Thus, Rand holds that attributes (e.g., the color of a particular book) and entities (e.g., the book which has that particular color) are existents. Although attributes and entities are both extant, only entities are self-subsistent and self-contained existents—attributes are neither self-subsistent nor self-contained existents. 

Although an attribute cannot exist independently of the entity which possesses it, it is nevertheless metaphysically distinct from the entity which possesses it. As evidenced on page 277 of ITOE, Rand makes it clear that attributes of entities are not “epistemological abstractions”—they are not products resulting from our measuring(s) or abstracting(s) from entities. On the contrary, she states that an attribute (e.g., the length of a stick, the shape of a book, the color of a flower, etc.) “does exist in reality, only it doesn’t exist by itself. It is not separable from an entity, but it certainly exists in reality….And therefore if to say it is epistemological rather than metaphysical is to say it exists only in relation to your grasp of it, or it requires your grasp of it in order to acquire existence—it doesn’t. Surely, if anything is metaphysical, attributes are.” 

In a similar vein, the referent of the concept of a particular attribute (e.g., the concept of “red,” the concept of “length,” the concept of “shape,” etc.) is not itself epistemological; on the contrary, the referent of the concept of a particular attribute is the attribute itself (i.e., the referent is the particular attribute possessed by all the entities which happen to possess that attribute). Rand states that although the concept of a particular attribute is the result of an act of “mental isolation” and “abstraction,” the referents of the concept are themselves metaphysical: they exist in reality and constitute the identities of the entities which possess them. The referents of the concept of a particular attribute are not themselves “epistemological abstractions.” As Rand says, on pg. 98 of ITOE, each of an entity’s characteristics (i.e., each of an entity’s attributes) “has the same metaphysical status: each constitutes a part of the entity’s identity”.

“Rand is saying that the attributes yes do exist, but not as a metaphysically distinct thing.” (An Objectivist)

A particular attribute of an entity is not metaphysically separable from the entity which possesses that particular attribute; however, that does not mean that the particular attribute and the entity in question are not metaphysically distinct. On the contrary, a particular attribute of an entity is clearly metaphysically distinct from the entity which possesses that particular attribute. Indeed, if a particular attribute of an entity was not metaphysically distinct (i.e., different) from the entity which possessed it, then the entity in question would be identical to that particular attribute which it possessed—and this is something which Rand rejects (Cf. “An attribute is something which is not the entity itself.” (ITOE, 276)). While Rand holds that an entity is not metaphysically distinct from the totality of its attributes, she holds that the entity is nevertheless metaphysically distinct from anything less than the totality of its attributes. (Cf. “No one attribute constitutes the whole entity, but all of them together are the entity—not “possessed by” but “are” the entity.” (ITOE, 276)) 

Furthermore, absurd contradictions would follow if a particular attribute of an entity was not metaphysically distinct (i.e., different) from the entity which possessed it. To reiterate, if a particular attribute of an entity was not metaphysically distinct (i.e., different) from the entity which possessed it, then the entity in question would be identical to that particular attribute which it possessed. The contradiction can be illustrated with the help of an example. Take, for instance, a book. This book is an entity, and it has many attributes; e.g., a particular shape, a particular color, a particular texture, a particular odor, etc.). If the book’s color (i.e., one of the book’s attributes) was not metaphysically distinct (i.e., different) from the book itself, then the book and the book’s color would be identical—and this is contradictory. Furthermore, if the book’s odor (i.e., one of the book’s attributes) was not metaphysically distinct (i.e., different) from the book itself, then the book and the book’s odor would be identical—and this is also contradictory. However, another contradiction would arise. Since identity is transitive (e.g., If A = B, and B = C, then A = C) it follows that if the book’s color was identical to the book, and the book was identical to the book’s odor, then the book’s color would be identical to the book’s odor—and this is absurd.

Another important point concerns identity. For Rand (and Peikoff), the totality of a thing’s characteristics (attributes) constitutes a thing’s identity because the totality of a thing’s characteristics is the thing’s identity. A thing is identical to the totality of its characteristics (attributes).  Suppose one asks the following question: Why is it the case that an existent apart from its characteristics would be an existent apart from its identity? Rand’s (and Peikoff’s) answer is straightforward and clear: An existent is nothing more than, and nothing less than, the totality of its characteristics. The totality of an existent’s characteristics just is the existent’s identity, and the identity of an existent just is that existent itself. For example:

“Existence and identity are not attributes of existents, they are the existents.” (ITOE, 56)

“Metaphysically, an entity is: all of the things which it is. Each of its characteristics has the same metaphysical status: each constitutes a part of the entity’s identity.” (ITOE, 98)

“A thing is—what it is; its characteristics constitute its identity. An existent apart from its characteristics, would be an existent apart from its identity, which means: a nothing, a non-existent.” (ITOE, 142)

“Now, what is an entity? It is a sum of characteristics. There is no such thing as an entity without its characteristics, and, for that very reason, there is no such thing as a characteristic without an entity….Usually when I write I say the entity is its attributes….The attributes are the entity, or an entity is its attributes.” (ITOE, 266)

“No one attribute constitutes the whole entity, but all of them together are the entity—not “possessed by” but “are” the entity.” (ITOE, 276)

“A thing’s nature is that which it is metaphysically; a thing’s nature is its identity, that which cannot be changed by miracle nor by any wish, whim, or will, God’s or man’s. This is the meaning of “A is A”.” (Letters of Ayn Rand, 528-529)

“A thing is itself; or, in the traditional formula, A is A. The “identity” of an existent means that which it is, the sum of its attributes or characteristics…Ayn Rand offers a new formulation of this axiom: existence is identity. She does not say “existence has identity”—which might suggest that identity is a feature separable from existence (as a coat of paint is separable from the house that has it). The point is that to be is to be something. Existence and identity are indivisible; either implies the other. If something exists, then something exists; and if there is a something, then there is a something. The fundamental fact cannot be broken in two.” (OPAR, 7)

“A thing cannot act apart from its nature, because existence is identity; apart from its nature, a thing is nothing. A thing cannot act against its nature, i.e., in contradiction to its identity, because A is A and contradictions are impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity. This is the action it will take, the action that is caused and necessitated by its nature.” (OPAR, 15)

“The axiom of identity holds that each thing is itself, or, as Rand frequently puts it: “A is A.” The force of this statement is perfectly captured in Bishop Butler’s famous remark, “Every thing is what it is, and not another thing.” “Identity” names the fact that everything that is is something in particular. A given thing’s identity is the sum total of all of its characteristics. Synonyms for something’s “identity” might be its “character” or its “nature,” so long as it is understood that a thing’s identity at any given moment refers to all of its attributes, actions, relations, and so on.” (Blackwell Companion to Rand, 249) 

“The relation of the attributes of an entity to the whole entity; an entity is its attributes and a state of awareness is its aspects.” (Binswanger, How We Know, 57)

Likewise, Rand emphasizes that an existent does not “possess” or “have” the totality of its characteristics because that would imply that the totality of the existent’s characteristics is something distinct or different from the existent “possessive” of said totality of characteristics. It is for this same reason that Rand insists that an existent is identical to its identity, rather than “possess” or “have” its identity. To suppose that an existent “possessed” or “had” its identity would imply that the identity “possessed by” or “had by” the existent was something distinct or different from the existent itself—and this is something which Rand and Peikoff explicitly reject. Indeed, it would be to suppose that an existent was something apart from, distinct from, and different from “itself”—a contradiction. As Rand and Peikoff say: it would be “a nothing, a non-existent.”

A Critical Examination of Objectivism’s Account of Change, Motion, and Time

If Objectivism’s account of identity is true, then change, motion, and time are all “unreal.” I will proceed to illustrate this by outlining several key propositions that Objectivism is committed to:

• For any entity, X, X is “identical to” an independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes [a, b, c, d, e,…]. 

• For any independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], if said independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” an entity, X, then a, b, c, d, e, &c. are of the same metaphysical status. 

• For any independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], if said independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” an entity, X, then a, b, c, d, e, &c. are equally determinative in constituting the identity and nature of X.

• For any entity, X, X is “identical to” its identity and nature. 

At time T1, there exists an entity, X. Therefore, at time T1, there exists an independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], and this independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” X. Now, suppose that at time T2, there does not exist an independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…]. It would follow that X does not exist at time T2. Indeed, this is because X is “identical to” the independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], and, as we have said, there does not exist a unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…] at time T2.

Again, let us suppose that at time T2 there exists an independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes [not-a, b, c, d, e,…] that was “identical to” an entity. It would still be the case that X does not exist at time T2, because an entity’s identity or nature is “identical to” the entity itself; and, since the independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes [a, b, c, d, e,…] and the independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes [not-a, b, c, d, e,…] do not consist in the same attributes, it follows that they are not the same entity, but are instead two different entities with two different identities and natures. 

Now, one might object by saying that the entity at T1 and the entity at T2 are one and the same entity, and that the entity has simply lost an attribute which it had at T1.  However, this response is incompatible with the following two Objectivist positions: 

• For any independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], if said independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” an entity, X, then a, b, c, d, e, &c. are of the same “metaphysical status.” 

• For any independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], if said independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” an entity, X, then a, b, c, d, e, &c. are equally determinative in constituting the “identity” and “nature” of X.

However, Objectivism’s “hyper-essentialism” regarding the relationship between entities and attributes entails that change, action (and therefore causality as well), and time are impossible or “unreal.” The reason for this conclusion is the following:

Change and motion both imply that the identity and nature of the changing and moving entity remains “one and the same” throughout its change and motion. In other words, change and  motion are meaningless unless the changing and moving entity is the same entity before, during, and after its change and movement. However, as we have seen, if Objectivism’s views on the matter were true, then no entity would remain the same entity before, during, or after its change or movement. It is for this reason that if the Objectivist account of identity is true, that change and motion are “unreal.”

Furthermore, since Objectivism maintains that time is a “measure of motion,” and since Objectivism’s views as to an entity’s identity and nature prohibit change and motion—it would follow that Objectivism is committed to the “unreality” of time as well. 

On the other hand, we may approach the issue from the other side—the Heraclitan side. Indeed, from the above positions, it would equally follow that no entities ever endure—rather, an entity would come into being and cease to exist at one and the same instant. Thus, having been been engorged by the two horns of Being and Becoming, the Objectivist is faced with an ancient dilemma: he must choose between the changeless and the everchanging.

Resources and Evidence:

“Existence and identity are not attributes of existents, they are the existents.” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (ITOE), 56)

“[T]he rules of cognition must be derived from the nature of existence and the nature, the identity, of his cognitive faculty.” (ITOE, 82)

“[T]he rules of cognition must be derived from the nature of existence and the nature, the identity, of his cognitive faculty.” (ITOE, 87)

“Metaphysically, an entity is: all of the things which it is.  Each of its characteristics has the same metaphysical status: each constitutes a part of the entity’s identity.” (ITOE, 98)

“The nature of an entity determines what it can do and, in any given set of circumstances, dictates what it will do.  The Law of Causality is entailed by the Law of Identity.  Entities follow certain laws of action in consequence of their identity, and have no alternative to doing so.  Metaphysically, all facts are inherent in the identities of the entities that exist…” (ITOE, 108-109)

“Now, what is an entity? It is a sum of characteristics. There is no such thing as an entity without its characteristics, and, for that very reason, there is no such thing as a characteristic without an entity…Don’t take “sum” literally…Not in the sense that you would say “sum of its parts. Usually when I write I say the entity is its attributes. To be exact, you’d have to treat them as inseparable…[T]he attributes are the entity, or an entity is its attributes. The attributes are really separable only by abstraction.” (ITOE, 266)

“An attribute is something which is not the entity itself. No one attribute constitutes the whole entity, but all of them together are the entity—not “possessed by” but “are” the entity.” (ITOE, 276)

“Prof. A: In regard to the concept of an attribute—for example, “length”— since the attribute is something which does not exist separate in reality, is the referent of the concept of an attribute in the category of the epistemological rather than the metaphysical? AR: Oh no, why? Prof. A: Because length doesn’t exist per se in reality. Length is a human form of breaking up the identities of things. AR: Wait a moment, that’s a very, very dangerous statement. Length does exist in reality, only it doesn’t exist by itself. It is not separable from an entity, but it certainly exists in reality. If it didn’t, what would we be doing with our concepts of attributes? They would be pure fantasy then. The only thing that is epistemological and not metaphysical in the concept of “length” is the act of mental separation, of considering this attribute separately as if it were a separate thing. How would you project a physical object which had no length? You couldn’t. And therefore if to say it is epistemological rather than metaphysical is to say it exists only in relation to your grasp of it, or it requires your grasp of it in order to acquire existence—it doesn’t. Surely, if anything is metaphysical, attributes are. Prof. A: If I ask you, then, what is the referent of “length,” would you say “long objects"? AR: Not the objects, the attribute of length in all the objects which possess that attribute. Prof. A: Isn’t the referent something separated? AR: It’s mentally separated, but it is there in those objects.  It doesn’t have to be an entity to be a referent. Prof. A: I don’t understand then why the referent of the concept “red,” say, isn’t all the red concretes. AR: How about the other attributes of all those red concretes? Is the referent of “red” the length and weight of all the red concretes? Prof. A: No. AR: Well then, obviously the concrete itself isn’t the referent of the concept, but a particular aspect of that concrete, an inseparable aspect. Prof. B: You said that the referent must be separated, or something like that. There’s no reason why the referent of the concept should be separable from the object. Prof. A: But in the case of attributes, the referent is not the entity but only an aspect of the entity. And an aspect cannot exist except as an aspect of the whole entity. Prof. B: Can you follow that one step further? You say that the referent of “length” must be an aspect, and an aspect cannot exist separately—what is the next step? Prof. A: The referent is the aspect separated. Is that the wrong premise? Prof. B: The referent is the aspect, not the aspect separated. AR: Exactly.  Prof. B: Otherwise you switch metaphysics and epistemology. AR: That’s right. The aspect, not the separation. That’s very well put.” (ITOE, 277-279)

“Prof. F: But now, properties are all constitutive properties, right? AR: Yes.” (ITOE, 286)

“In this regard, the relation of the aspects of a state of awareness to the whole awareness is similar to the relation of the attributes of an entity to the whole entity; an entity is its attributes and a state of awareness is its aspects.” (How We Know (HWK), 57)

“A third and final basic axiom is implicit in the first two. It is the law of identity: to be is to be something, to have a nature, to possess identity. A thing is itself; or, in the traditional formula, A is A. The "identity" of an existent means that which it is, the sum of its attributes or characteristics… Ayn Rand offers a new formulation of this axiom: existence is identity. She does not say "existence has identity"—which might suggest that identity is a feature separable from existence (as a coat of paint is separable from the house that has it). The point is that to be is to be something. Existence and identity are indivisible; either implies the other. If something exists, then something exists; and if there is a something, then there is a something. The fundamental fact cannot be broken in two.” (Objectivism the Philosophy of Ayn Rand (OPAR), 7)

“The adult validation of the law of causality consists in stating this relationship explicitly. The validation rests on two points: the fact that action is action of an entity; and the law of identity, A is A. Every entity has a nature; it is specific, noncontradictory, limited; it has certain attributes and no others. Such an entity must act in accordance with its nature. The only alternatives would be for an entity to act apart from its nature or against it; both of these are impossible. A thing cannot act apart from its nature, because existence is identity; apart from its nature, a thing is nothing. A thing cannot act against its nature, i.e., in contradiction to its identity, because A is A and contradictions are impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity. This is the action it will take, the action that is caused and necessitated by its nature.” (OPAR, 15)

“Entities and their actions are measured by means of their attributes, such as length, weight, velocity. In every case, the primary standard is some easily perceivable concrete that functions as a unit. One measures length in units, say, of feet; weight in pounds; velocity in feet per second.” (OPAR, 82)

“Now let us apply this discussion to another aspect of the theory of concepts: the status of essences (as the term is used in the context of the theory of definition). On the one hand, according to Objectivism, essences are not attributes marked out by nature apart from man. "Essential" is not a metaphysical, but an epistemological term. "Essential" designates characteristics that perform a certain function in connection with human conceptualization. The function is to differentiate and condense various bodies of data, and the characteristics that perform this function in one cognitive context may not do so in another. Since the category of "essence" arises because of a need of man's consciousness, the "essential" in each context has to reflect the state of human knowledge.” (OPAR, 113)

“Definitions are statements of factual data—as condensed by a human consciousness in accordance with the needs of a human method of cognition. Like concepts, therefore, essences are products of a volitional relationship between existence and consciousness; they too (properly formed) are objective. In the traditional (Platonic and Aristotelian) viewpoint, every entity must have an essence or definition. This is not true in the Objectivist viewpoint. Since the designation of essentials arises only as an aid to the conceptualizing process, it is inapplicable apart from that process. Concretes that have not been integrated into a concept have no "essence"; in these cases, there is no need or possibility of a definition.” (OPAR, 113)

“Metaphysically, there is only one universe. This means that everything in reality is interconnected. Every entity is related in some way to the others; each somehow affects and is affected by the others. Nothing is a completely isolated fact, without causes or effects; no aspect of the total can exist ultimately apart from the total. Knowledge, therefore, which seeks to grasp reality, must also be a total; its elements must be interconnected to form a unified whole reflecting the whole which is the universe.” (OPAR, 123)

“The axiom of identity holds that each thing is itself, or, as Rand frequently puts it: “A is A.” The force of this statement is perfectly captured in Bishop Butler’s famous remark, “Every thing is what it is, and not another thing.” “Identity” names the fact that everything that is is something in particular. A given thing’s identity is the sum total of all of its characteristics. Synonyms for something’s “identity” might be its “character” or its “nature,” so long as it is understood that a thing’s identity at any given moment refers to all of its attributes, actions, relations, and so on.” (Blackwell Companion to Ayn Rand (BCAR), 249) 

“In regard to: the Law of Causality. Yes, of course, my formulation of it (“A thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature”) is mine; it is not the usual: “everything that happens has a cause.” Compare the two and decide which is the more fundamental. You say: “But the truth of the statement, in your formulation, is guaranteed by the meaning attached to the word ‘NATURE’.” You bet your life it is! But what shocked me was the fact that you seem to attach no meaning to the concept of “a thing’s nature,” even though it was specified most clearly in the lecture and in Atlas Shrugged. A thing’s nature is that which it is metaphysically; a thing’s nature is its identity, that which cannot be changed by miracle nor by any wish, whim, or will, God’s or man’s. This is the meaning of “A is A”—and you have told me firmly that you accepted it. How, then, could you cite, as an example in this context, such a thing as a man’s “temper-tantrum” and ask whether he “acted contrary to his nature”? On top of which, you assume that we would answer that this is “part of his nature.” (!!!) I will answer: This is what happens to logic (and language) without ontology. (Letters of Ayn Rand, 528-529) 

“To perceive existence, to discover the characteristics or properties (the identities) of the things that exist, means to discover and accept the metaphysically given.” (Philosophy Who Needs It (PWNI), “The Metaphysical Versus The Man-Made”, 30-31) 

“But man exists and his mind exists. Both are part of nature, both possess a specific identity….[M]an is able to initiate and direct his mental action only in accordance with the nature (the identity) of his consciousness.” (PWNI, 32)

“Prof. F: This question has to do with the concept of “property” and its significance for causality. In Galt’s speech, you say every action is caused by the nature of the acting entity. Now, by “the nature of an entity” do you mean the physical properties of an entity—properties like combustible, fragile, corrosive, and so on?  AR: Yes. And also the psychological properties of a consciousness, including free will.”  (ITOE, 282)

“Prof. F: Could you give me an example of a constituent property?  Prof. E: Physical structure.  AR: The arrangement of molecules.” (ITOE, 284) 

“Prof. F: I noticed that Galt does not say, “A thing must act in accordance with its nature”; he says it “cannot act in contradiction to its nature.” I wonder if you had some particular reason for stating it in the negative.  AR: Oh, no, only to make it stronger actually. You could have said “must act in accordance with its nature.” But I wanted to stress that one cannot claim causeless actions, or actions contrary to the nature of the interacting entities. I wanted to stress that actions cannot be inexplicable and causeless. If the cause lies in the nature of an entity, then it cannot do something other than what its nature makes possible.” (ITOE, 286-287) 

“The axiom of identity holds that each thing is itself, or, as Rand frequently puts it: “A is A.” The force of this statement is perfectly captured in Bishop Butler’s famous remark, “Every thing is what it is, and not another thing.” “Identity” names the fact that everything that is, is something in particular. A given thing’s identity is the sum total of all of its characteristics. Synonyms for something’s “identity” might be its “character” or its “nature,” so long as it is understood that a thing’s identity at any given moment refers to all of its attributes, actions, relations, and so on.” (BCAR, 451) 

A Critical Examination of the Objectivist Metaphysic

Objectivism is Committed to the Following Propositions about Entities:

• Entities are the only existents that are independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents).
• Entities are the only existents that are causally efficacious. 
• Entities are the only existents that perform actions: all actions are actions performed by entities.
• Parts of entities are themselves entities.

Objectivism is Committed to the Following Propositions about Attributes of Entities:

• An attribute of an entity is an existent that is not an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). 
• An attribute of an entity is an existent that is possessed by something that is not the attribute itself. 
• Attributes are attributes of entities. 
• No one attribute is itself an entity: no single attribute constitutes one entity.

Objectivism is Committed to the Following Propositions about a Man’s Consciousness/Mind:

• A man’s consciousness/mind is an existent that is not an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). 
• A man’s consciousness/mind is an attribute of an entity. 
• A man’s consciousness/mind is causally efficacious.
• A man’s consciousness/mind is an existent that performs actions.
• A man’s consciousness/mind is an existent that has attributes.
• A man’s consciousness/mind is an attribute which he, and he alone, possesses.
• A man’s consciousness/mind is his self; and a man’s self is his consciousness/mind.
• A man’s consciousness/mind is a faculty possessed by an entity. 

A Diagram of the Objectivist Metaphysical Categories of Entities, Parts of Entities, Attributes of Entities, and Actions of Entities:

Argument #1:

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by entities and only entities are causally efficacious.

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that a man’s consciousness/mind performs actions and a man’s consciousness/mind is causally efficacious. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that a man’s consciousness/mind is an entity. [From P1 and P2] 

P3) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that a man’s consciousness/mind is not an entity. 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that a man’s consciousness/mind both is, and is not, an entity. And this is a contradiction. [From C1 and P3]

Argument #2:

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) and only independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) are causally efficacious.  

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that a man’s consciousness/mind performs actions and a man’s consciousness/mind is causally efficacious. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that a man’s consciousness/mind is an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). [From P1 and P2] 

P3) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that a man’s consciousness/mind is not an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that a man’s consciousness/mind both is, and is not, an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). And this is a contradiction. [From C1 and P3]

Argument #3:

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by entities and only entities are causally efficacious. 

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that a man’s consciousness/mind is not an entity. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that a man’s consciousness/mind does not perform actions and a man’s consciousness/mind is not causally efficacious. [From P1 and P2] 

P3) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that a man’s consciousness/mind performs actions and a man’s consciousness/mind is causally efficacious. 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that a man’s consciousness/mind both does, and does not, perform actions, and a man’s consciousness/mind is, and is not, causally efficacious. And this is a contradiction. [From C1 and P3]

Argument #4:

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that I am my consciousness/mind. [This is the “is” of identity, not the “is” of predication]. 

P2) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is not an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am not an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). [From P1 and P2] 

P3) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) and only independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) are causally efficacious. 

C3) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I do not perform actions and that I am not causally efficacious. [From C1 and P3] 

Argument #5:

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that an attribute is always possessed by something that is not the attribute itself. 

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an attribute which I, and I alone possess. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am not my consciousness/mind. [From P1 and P2] 

P3) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am my consciousness/mind. [This is the “is” of identity, not the “is” of predication].

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am, and I am not, my consciousness/mind. And this is a contradiction. [From C1 and P3]

Argument #6:

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that an attribute is always possessed by something that is not the attribute itself. 

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an attribute. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is possessed by something that is not my consciousness/mind. [From P1 and P2] 

P3) Objectivism is committed to the position my consciousness/mind is an attribute which I, and I alone, possess. 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am not my consciousness/mind. [From C1 and P3] 

P4) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am my consciousness/mind. [This is the “is” of identity, not the “is” of predication].

C3) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is possessed by something that is not me. And this is a contradiction. [From C2 and P4]

Argument #7:

P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that an attribute is always possessed by something that is not the attribute itself. 

P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an attribute. 

C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is possessed by something that is not my consciousness/mind. [From P1 and P2] 

P3) Objectivism is committed to the position my consciousness/mind is an attribute which I, and I alone, possess. 

C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am not my consciousness/mind. [From C1 and P3] 

P4) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am my consciousness/mind. 

[This is the “is” of identity, not the “is” of predication].

C3) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is possessed by something that is not me. And this is a contradiction. [From C2 and P4]