A Critical Examination of Objectivism’s Account of Parts and Attributes of Entities, and How it Pertains to Objectivism’s Account of Consciousness

Many Objectivists are unfamiliar with a very important aspect of Rand’s metaphysic: her distinction between parts of entities and attributes of entities. This distinction between parts of entities and attributes of entities is vital for understanding her ontology; and it happens to be a distinction that I am in complete agreement with.  For reference, Rand talks about this particular topic between pages 264 and 294 of her Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. We can illustrate what she means in the following way: Mount Everest is not an attribute of the Earth, rather Mount Everest is a part of the Earth, and the Earth has the attribute of “having Mount Everest as a part.” The reason that Rand holds Mount Everest to be a part of the Earth, and not an attribute of the Earth, is because Mount Everest could be “uprooted” from the Earth, and both the Earth and Mount Everest would continue to exist independently of each other. Or, to use a simpler example, a rock can be broken into two parts, each of which are separate entities, since both parts can exist by themselves independently of each other.

Again, we can see the important distinction between parts and attributes when plucking a leaf off of a tree. The leaf is a part of the tree, since the leaf continues to exist as an entity even after being plucked from the tree (that tree being itself an entity), and the tree continues to exist as an entity after the leaf is plucked from it. However, the leaf has the attribute of greenness, and this attribute cannot be separated from the leaf and continue to exist independently of the leaf. Ergo, greenness is a attribute and not a part of the leaf. Smoothness doesn’t exist independently of those entities which are smooth, sweetness doesn’t exist independently of those entities which are sweet, and roundness doesn’t exist independently of those entities which are round. Smoothness, sweetness, and roundness are all attributes of those entities which are smooth, sweet, and round, respectively.

We do not say that a person’s body is an entity that has a stomach as an attribute, nor do we say that a person’s hand is an entity that has a finger as an attribute. Rather, we say that a person’s stomach is an entity, and is a part of a person’s body (and that body is itself an entity), and that a person’s finger is an entity, and is a part of a person’s hand (and that hand is itself an entity). Both one’s stomach and one’s finger are “metaphysically separable” from one’s body and one’s hand, respectively (i.e., one’s stomach can exist independently of one’s body, and one’s finger can exist independently of one’s hand).

By contrast, you cannot “metaphysically separate” an attribute from an entity without the disillusion of said attribute. For example, you cannot “metaphysically separate” a strawberry (i.e., the entity) from its sweetness (i.e., the attribute) without the destruction of the attribute of sweetness. It follows from this that parts of entities—not attributes of entities—are themselves entities, and that attributes of entities are not—and cannot—themselves be entities.

We are, therefore, met with the following three tenets of Objectivism’s account of parts of entities and attributes of entities.

1. Parts of entities are capable of independent existence; ergo, parts of entities are themselves entities.
2. Attributes of entities are incapable of independent existence; ergo, attributes of entities are not themselves entities.
3. Therefore, Parts of entities are not attributes of entities, and attributes of entities are not parts of entities.

Now, if Objectivism holds that my consciousness is a part of an entity, then they commit themselves to holding that my consciousness is metaphysically separable from that entity of which my consciousness is a part, and that my consciousness would itself be an entity in its own right—i.e., a self-contained existent capable of existing independently of my physical body. And this is an unacceptable conclusion that Objectivism rejects. Therefore, an Objectivist cannot hold that my consciousness is a part of an entity. However, this leaves three options:

(a) My consciousness is an attribute (or faculty) of an entity.

(b) My consciousness is an action/activity performed by an entity. 

(c) My consciousness is a mental entity. 

Unfortunately, all three options result in contradictions with other fundamental aspects of Objectivism's own metaphysic.

If (a), then Objectivism runs into the contradiction of having an attribute (i.e., my consciousness) that acts, is causally efficacious, and has attributes of its own (all of which contradict key aspects of the Objectivist metaphysic. This is because Objectivism is committed to the position that only entities act, only entities are causally efficacious, and that only entities have attributes (because attributes are indivisible)). Therefore, (a) cannot be a solution.

If (b), then Objectivism runs into the contradiction of having an action/activity of an entity (i.e., my consciousness) that acts, is causally efficacious , and has attributes of its own (all of which contradict key aspects of the Objectivist metaphysic. This is because Objectivism is committed to the position that only entities act (Rand explicitly rejected “action” or “event” causation, and instead endorsed “agent” causation), only entities are causally efficacious, and that only entities have attributes). Therefore, (b) cannot be a solution.

Now, (c), as a matter of fact, is an untenable option from the start, because it rests upon a misunderstanding of Rand’s concept of “mental entity” and the particular kind of existents that the concept refers to. When Rand speaks of mental entities (or mental concretes and mental units), she is not speaking of my consciousness or anyone else’s consciousness; rather she is speaking about “products” of my (and anyone else’s) consciousness, or phenomena that are contingent upon my (or anyone else’s) consciousness (e.g., phenomena that only exist within my consciousness or someone else’s consciousness; examples of metal entities include concepts—since they are mental integrations). So, in short, anyone who tries to argue that Rand holds my (or anyone else’s) consciousness to be a mental entity is saying that Rand holds one’s consciousness to be in the same ontological category as a product of itself—e.g., my consciousness would be on the same level as one of my thoughts or one of my emotions, both of which can only exist within my consciousness. However, and perhaps more importantly, this option results in a vicious regress. Let me illustrate:

If my consciousness is a mental entity, then my consciousness(a) cannot exist unless it is “inside of” or a “product of” someone else’s consciousness(b). But my consciousness(a) could not be “inside of” or a “product of” someone else’s consciousness(b) unless this person’s consciousness(b) existed. However, this person’s consciousness(b), being a mental entity, could not exist unless it was “inside of” or a “product of” another person’s consciousness(c). But that person’s consciousness(b) could not be “inside of” or a “product of” another person’s consciousness(c) unless the latter person’s consciousness(c) existed. However, that person’s consciousness(c) could not exist unless it was “inside of” or a “product of” another person’s consciousness(d), and so on, ad infinitum. And such a regress is vicious. In order for the my consciousness(a) to exist, we would have to accomplish the impossible task of arriving at the end of an infinite series. Therefore, (c) cannot be a solution.

Therefore, since (a), (b), and (c) are the only possible options that Objectivism’s metaphysic provides, and all three leave us with contradictions, we are forced to the conclusion that the Objectivist metaphysic cannot be reconciled with the Objectivist account of consciousness.

Resources for (a) and (b):

Objectivism maintains that entities are the only “primary” or “self-contained existents.” Here are several examples:

“The first concepts man forms are concepts of entities—since entities are the only primary existents. (Attributes cannot exist by themselves, they are merely the characteristics of entities; motions are motions of entities; relationships are relationships among entities.)” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, (ITOE), 15) 

“An entity is that which you perceive and which can exist by itself.  Characteristics, qualities, attributes, actions, relationships, do not exist by themselves…attributes and actions cannot exist apart from the entity.” (ITOE, 265) 

““Entity” does imply a physical thing.” (ITOE, 157) 

“An entity means a self-sufficient form of existence—as against a quality, an action, a relationship, etc., which are simply aspects of an entity that we separate out by specialized focus. An entity is a thing.” (The Philosophy of Objectivism Lecture Series, Lecture 3) 

“An entity is a solid thing open to human perception and capable of independent action.” (The Philosophy of Objectivism Lecture Series, Lecture 2, Question Period) 

“Entity, as we have seen, is the primary “category.” Only entities can act— and to be an entity is to be an individual.” (Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (OPAR, 196) 

“Entity, as we have seen, is the primary “category.” Only entities can act—and to be an entity is to be an individual. A group of men is a derivative phenomenon; it is not an entity, but a collection of them, an aggregate of individuals. “All the functions of body and spirit,” writes Ayn Rand, “are private. They cannot be shared or transferred.” One cannot think for or through another person any more than one can breathe or digest food for him. Each man’s brain, like his lungs and stomach, is his alone to use.” (OPAR, 198) 

“Rand held what she referred to as an Aristotelian (as against a Platonic) view of reality. Part of what she meant by this is that everything that exists is a particular with a determinate identity….Rand’s metaphysics is Aristotelian in another, related respect. Aristotle distinguished between different “categories” of existents: entities (which he called “substances”), actions, qualities, relations, and so on, and he regarded individual entities as fundamental to all other existents. Rand endorsed this position…” (The Blackwell Companion to Ayn Rand (BCAR), 458)

Objectivism maintains that all actions are actions of entities, attributes are attributes of entities, and that only entities have causal efficacy.  Here are several examples:

“There are no attributes without entities, there are no actions without entities.” (ITOE, 264) 

“Attributes and actions cannot exist apart from the entity.” (ITOE, 265) 

“An attribute is something which is not the entity itself.  No one attribute constitutes the whole entity…” (ITOE, 276) 

“[An attribute is] one aspect or characteristic of an entity, an indivisible aspect or characteristic which cannot be factually, metaphysically, separated and cannot exist by itself.” (ITOE, 276) 

“Actions are caused by entities…” (ITOE, 285) 

“By “action” we mean the action of an entity.” (ITOE, 291) 

“And an action-concept cannot precede an entity-concept. He first has to conceptualize the objects—the entities—then, the kinds of action they can perform, or he can perform with them.” (ITOE, 210) 

“There are no floating actions; there are only actions performed by entities. “Action” is the name for what entities do. “Walking” or “digesting” have no existence or possibility apart from the creature with legs that walks or the body or organ with enzymes that does the digesting.” (OPAR, 14)

“Action is action of an entity…Every entity has a nature; it is specific, noncontradictory, limited; it has certain attributes and no others. Such an entity must act in accordance with its nature.” (OPAR, 14)

““The law of causality,” Ayn Rand sums up, “is the law of identity applied to action. All actions are caused by entities. The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act; a thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature.”” (OPAR, 15)

“Motions do not act, they are actions. It is entities which act— and cause.” (OPAR, 16)

“Action is the crux of the law of cause and effect: it is action that is caused—by entities.” (OPAR, 16)

Objectivism maintains that my Consciousness performs a variety of activities and is causally efficacious.  Here are several examples:

“It may be supposed that the concept “existent” is implicit even on the level of sensations—if and to the extent that a consciousness is able to discriminate on that level.” (ITOE, 6)

“Note that the concept “unit” involves an act of consciousness…it is not an arbitrary creation of consciousness: it is a method of identification or classification according to the attributes which a consciousness observes in reality.” (ITOE, 7) 

“Units are things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing relationships.” (ITOE, 7) 

“In considering the nature of concepts and the process of abstracting from abstraction, we must assume a mind capable of performing (or of retracing and checking) that process.” (ITOE, 21) 

“It is only in relation to the external world that the various actions of a consciousness can be experienced, grasped, defined or communicated.” (ITOE, 29) 

“The action of consciousness in regard to that content.” (ITOE, 30) 

“Just as, extrospectively, man can abstract attributes from entities—so, introspectively, he can abstract the action of his consciousness from its contents, and observe the differences among these various actions.” (ITOE, 30) 

“For instance (on the adult level), when a man sees a woman walking down the street, the action of his consciousness is perception; when he notes that she is beautiful, the action of his consciousness is evaluation, when he experiences an inner state of pleasure and approval, of admiration, the action of his consciousness is emotion; when he stops to watch her and draws conclusions, from the evidence, about her character, age, social position, etc., the action of his consciousness is thought; when, later, he recalls the incident, the action of his consciousness is reminiscence; when he projects that her appearance would be improved if her hair were blond rather than brown, and her dress were blue rather than red, the action of his consciousness is imagination.” (ITOE, 30) 

“He can also observe the similarities among the actions of his consciousness on various occasions, by observing the fact that these same actions—in different sequences, combinations and degrees—are, have been or can be applicable to other objects…” (ITOE, 30) 

“A special, separate act of consciousness is required to draw these [conceptual consequences]…” (ITOE, 159) 

“One’s own consciousness serves as the observer and the processes of consciousness as the observed, as the object which one observes an integrates.” (ITOE, 166) 

“Now, since it is an exact measurement, it presupposes a consciousness that is doing this.” (ITOE, 194)

“The CCD for all concepts of consciousness is: actions of consciousness.  That is the common denominator.” (ITOE, 223) 

“Therefore, you could compare thought to an emotion by the process which your consciousness performs in either…” (ITOE, 223) 

“Will you tell me in your example which you classify which example which you classify as the content and which is the action of consciousness?...The action of consciousness is a consideration and a conclusion drawn…That is the action of your consciousness.” (ITOE, 226) 

“Now we are talking about the action of your consciousness, aren’t we?” (ITOE, 227) 

“It takes an act of consciousness to be aware of all this, and it’s I, my consciousness, that’s performing that act.” (ITOE, 255) 

“In time, the child’s consciousness can focus separately on such features, isolating them in thought for purposes of conceptual identification and specialized study.” (OPAR, 13) 

“Man’s first duty is not to others, but to himself.  He can survive only through the functioning of his reasoning mind directed toward the conquest of nature.” (Letters of Ayn Rand (LAR), 82) 

“I believe that our mind controls everything—yes, even our sex emotions.  Perhaps the sex emotions more than anything else.  Although that’s the opposite of what most people believe.  Everything we do and are proceeds from our mind.  Our mind can be made to control everything.  The trouble is only that most of us don’t want our minds to control us—because it is not an easy job. So they drift and let chance and other people and their own subconscious decide for them.  I believe firmly that everything in a man’s life is subject to his mind’s control—and that his greatest tragedies come from the fact that he willfully suspends that control.” (LAR, 156) 

“As to the word “spirituality,” I use it to denote all that which pertains to man’s consciousness, most particularly to his thinking (which is the base and essence of his consciousness).  I do not know (nor care too greatly) whether man’s consciousness is a special spiritual element, different from the material, much as the religious conception of a soul—or whether it is only a function and manifestation of his physical body.  I am concerned only with how this consciousness works, here, on earth, what it can do, what it should do, how it should live.  Whether material or nonmaterial, a man’s consciousness (his spirit) is the essence of man and of his life, and it is (as you have often stated) a prime source of energy—spiritual (thinking) and physical energy, both.” I am in complete agreement with you that anything we say about man and his life is valid only if we keep it in terms of this earth, of the physical world, of space and time. (Did I understand you correctly in this?) Man’s consciousness is a fact of this world, too, of course.” (LAR, 355-356) 

“When applied to physical phenomena, such as the automatic functions of an organism, the term “goal-directed” is not to be taken to mean “purposive” (a concept applicable only to the actions of a consciousness) and is not to imply the existence of any teleological principle operating in insentient nature.” (The Virtue of Selfishness (TVS), 13) 

“Yet his life depends on such knowledge—and only a volitional act of his consciousness, a process of thought, can provide it…Nothing is given to man on earth except a potential and the material on which to actualize it. The potential is a superlative machine: his consciousness; but it is a machine without a spark plug, a machine of which his own will has to be the spark plug, the self-starter and the driver; he has to discover how to use it and he has to keep it in constant action. The material is the whole of the universe, with no limits set to the knowledge he can acquire and to the enjoyment of life he can achieve. But everything he needs or desires has to be learned, discovered and produced by him—by his own choice, by his own effort, by his own mind.” (TVS, 18) 

“The proper function of consciousness is: perception, cognition, and the control of action. An unobstructed consciousness, an integrated consciousness, a thinking consciousness, is a healthy consciousness. A blocked consciousness, an evading consciousness, a consciousness torn by conflict and divided against itself, a consciousness disintegrated by fear or immobilized by depression, a consciousness dissociated from reality, is an unhealthy consciousness.” (TVS, 32) 

“Rand considers consciousness a natural, biological faculty, whose vital function is to gain awareness of the organism’s environment and direct its life‐sustaining actions within that environment. A healthy consciousness is one that is able to do this; it is efficacious. An unhealthy or diseased consciousness is one in which this ability has been undermined or incapacitated; it is inefficacious.” (Blackwell Companion to Ayn Rand (BCAR), 116) 

“Because self‐esteem is the most basic need of man’s consciousness, Rand argues that the exact nature and extent of a man’s self‐esteem will shape his particular values, their structure and motivational force in his mind, and the essence of what he seeks to obtain in life. An individual’s sense of his mind’s efficacy, and the metaphysical and moral standards by which he judges his self, shape the structure of his soul.” (BCAR, 118)

Objectivism maintains that my consciousness possesses attributes.  Here are several examples:

“Two fundamental attributes are involved in every state, aspect or function of man’s consciousness: content and action—the content of awareness, and the action of consciousness is regard to that content.” (ITOE, 29-30) 

“Every state of consciousness involves two fundamental attributes: the content (or object) of awareness, and the action (or process) of consciousness in regard to that content.” (ITOE, 84) 

“Every state of consciousness involves two fundamental attributes: the content (or object) of awareness, and the action (or process) of consciousness in regard to that content.” (Rand and Branden, “The Contradiction of Determinism,” The Objectivist Newsletter, January, 1967) 

“One of the most important and fundamental elements in the Objectivist philosophy is the concept of man as a being of volitional consciousness….The function of your stomach, lungs or heart is automatic; the function of your mind is not….Psychological determinism denies the existence of any element of freedom or volition in man’s consciousness.” (Rand and Branden, “The Contradiction of Determinism,” The Objectivist Newsletter, May, 1963) 

“Man’s volition is an attribute of his consciousness (of his rational faculty) and consists in the choice to perceive existence or to evade it.” (Philosophy: Who Needs it (PWNI), 34) 

“The attributes and functions of consciousness are what they are.” (OPAR, 35) 

“Objectivists are not dualists…in the Platonic definition [of dualism]—of two worlds opposed to each other; but that does not make us monists either—monist, meaning, that there is only one entity, and that everything has to be subsumed under that one [kind of] entity. For instance, “everything is matter”—that’s materialism—“consciousness is an illusion.” Or, “everything is consciousness, therefore matter is just a content of consciousness”—that’s the idealists. Both of those are wrong because the perceivable facts are: there is matter, and there is the faculty of perceiving it. [These facts] are what you get by extrospection and what you get by introspection. Now, you can call that dualism—there’s two, but they’re integrated in living organisms, they’re not opposed to each other. They obviously have different characteristics. You can drop a ball, like Galileo did, and gravity will pull it down; but you can’t drop your mind. A consciousness of a certain level can introspect; but a stone cannot. I mean, you have a huge list of different attributes, so you cannot subsume one under the other and say that it doesn’t exist. And one of the attributes of consciousness is free will.” (Peikoff, The Peikoff Podcasts, Oct 27^th, 2008) 

“There is only one fundamental issue in philosophy: the cognitive efficacy of man’s mind.” (Rand, “Aristotle,” The Objectivist Newsletter, May, 1963)

Objectivism maintains that my consciousness is an attribute of an entity, and that my consciousness is not itself an entity.

“Consciousness, unlike existence, is a property: “Consciousness is an attribute of certain living entities, but it is not an attribute of a given state of awareness, it is that state.” (ITOE, 56) 

“Prof. F: Wouldn’t you say that consciousness is itself an attribute of man?...AR: Right, A faculty of man.” (ITOE, 154) 

“Whether he has a soul or is a material being with the attribute of consciousness, in either case his distinctive, essential attribute is consciousness, not matter…” (The Journals of Ayn Rand (JAR), 13) 

“Man is a being endowed with consciousness—an attribute which matter does not possess.” (The Letters of Ayn Rand, “The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged Years” (1945-1959), To Nathan Blumenthal, January 13, 1950) 

“A man’s volition is outside the power of other men. What the unalterable basic constituents are to nature, the attribute of a volitional consciousness is to the entity “man”.” (PWNI, 38) 

“Objectivity begins with the realization that man (including his every attribute and faculty, including his consciousness) is an entity of a specific nature who must act accordingly.” (ITOE, 82) 

“All questions presuppose that one has a faculty of knowledge, i.e., the attribute of consciousness. One ignorant of this attribute must perforce be ignorant of the whole field of cognition (and of philosophy).” (OPAR, 5) 

“Consciousness is an attribute of perceived entities here on earth.” (OPAR, 33) 

“The same observations which reveal that consciousness is an attribute of certain living organisms reveal that it belongs to separate organisms.” (OPAR, 196) 

“Since consciousness is not an independent entity, it cannot attain fulfillment within its own domain.” (OPAR, 420) 

“[Man] is, in Ayn Rand’s words, “an indivisible entity, an integrated unit of two attributes: of matter and consciousness.” Consciousness in his case takes the form of mind, i.e., a conceptual faculty; matter, of a certain kind of organic structure. Each of these attributes is indispensable to the other and to the total entity. The mind acquires knowledge and defines goals; the body translates these conclusions into action.” (OPAR, 196) 

“It is one’s recognition of the fact that the mind is an attribute of the individual and that no person can think for another.” (OPAR, 255) 

“Since man is an integration of two attributes, mind and body, every virtue reflects this integration.” (OPAR, 257) 

“Integrity, the refusal to permit a breach between thought and action, presupposes an individual’s freedom in regard to both man’s attributes: mind and body.” (OPAR, 388) 

“Such is the harmony between mind and body attained in practice by a system that is based from the start on a correct view of these two attributes of man.” (OPAR, 401) 

“The method must reflect two factors: the facts of external reality and the nature of man’s consciousness. It must reflect the first, because consciousness is not a self-contained entity; it is the faculty of perceiving that which exists. The method must reflect the second factor, because consciousness has identity; the mind is not blank receptivity; it is a certain kind of integrating mechanism, and it must act accordingly.” (OPAR, 117)

Apart from being committed to positions which clearly necessitate that my consciousness is an “entity" and not an attribute, Objectivism even explicitly refers to consciousness as an entity!  Here are some examples:

“His vision, his strength, his courage came from his own spirit. A man’s spirit, however, is his self. That entity which is his consciousness. To think, to feel, to judge, to act are functions of the ego.” (For the New Intellectual (FNI), 90) 

“The basic fact implicit in such observations is that consciousness, like every other kind of entity, acts in a certain way and only in that way.” (OPAR, 18) 

“It must reflect the first, because consciousness is not a self-contained entity; it is the faculty of perceiving that which exists.” (OPAR, 117) 

“You asked me to explain the meaning of my sentence in The Fountainhead: “To say ‘I love you’ one must know first how to say the “I”.” The meaning of that sentence is contained in the whole of The Fountainhead.  And it is stated right in the speech on page 400 from which you took that sentence.  The meaning of the “I” is an independent, self-sufficient entity that does not exist for the sake of any other person.  A person who exists only for the sake of his loved one is not an independent entity, but a spiritual parasite. The love of the parasite is worth nothing.  The usual (and very vicious) nonsense preached on the subject of love claims that love is self-sacrifice.  A man’s self is his spirit.  If one sacrifices his spirit, who or what is left to feel the love? True love is profoundly selfish, in the noblest meaning of the word—it is an expression of one’s self, of one’s highest values.  When a person is in love, he seeks his own happiness—and not his sacrifice to the loved one.  And the loved one would be a monster if she wanted or expected sacrifice.  Any person who wants to live for others—for one sweetheart or for the whole of mankind—is a selfless nonentity.  An independent “I” is a person who exists for his own sake.  Such a person does not make any vicious pretense of self-sacrifice and does not demand it from the person he loves.  Which is the only way to be in love and the only form of a self-respecting relationship between two people.” (LAR, 396-397) 

“Their supposed Ego was composed of whirling words—[Rand’s] concept of the Ego is an entity, a person, a living creature functioning in concrete reality.” (LAR, 176) 

“It has to begin with pride in self, with that which constitutes man—the reasoning mind. The rights or application of the mind is unlimited, except for the right to deny itself—if a mind denies itself, it cannot enjoy the rights which belong only to it. To deny itself means to deny the mind’s essential [nature as] an individual entity. The mind can conclude anything it wishes—except that [it may] impose its will by force upon other minds.” (JAR, 227) 

“Since man’s physical survival depends upon his rational faculty, the realm of his mind precedes and determines every other sphere of his activity. That which is not proper in this realm cannot be proper in any of his actions. A man’s mind is an attribute of his self, of that entity within him which is his consciousness. That entity can be called spirit. It can be called soul. It remains—no matter what its origin—a man’s self. His “I.” His ego.” (JAR, 237)

Resources for (c):

“The result of a process of concept-formation is a mental entity, a mental unit, which is an integration of the various elements involved in the process.  That is the reason why I used the word “integration” is to indicate that it is not a mere sum but an inseparable sum forming a new mental unit.” (ITOE), 153)

“Prof. F: If you and I have the same concept, does that mean that the same entity is in both of our minds? AR: If we are both careful and rational thinkers, yes. Or, rather, put it this way: the same entity should be in both of our minds. Prof. F: Okay, taking concepts, therefore, as entities, they do not have spatial location, do they? AR: No, I have said they are mental entities. Prof. A: When you say a concept is a mental entity, you don’t mean “entity” in the sense that a man is an entity, do you? AR: I mean it in the same sense in which I mean a thought, an emotion, or a memory is an entity, a mental entity—or put it this way: a phenomenon of consciousness. Prof. A: Wouldn’t you say that consciousness is itself an attribute of man? AR: Right. A faculty of man.  And of animals, or at least the middle and higher animals.” (ITOE, 154)

“AR:…The referents of the concept “concept” are other concepts.  For instance, let’s say you form the concepts “table,” “chair,” “man,” and a few other concepts of perceptually given concretes.  Then at a certain level you can form the concept of “concept,” the concretes of which are all your other specific, earlier-formed concepts. Prof. D: But they aren’t concretes, though. AR: They are mental concretes.  You are now discussing an integration of mental entities.  The referents of the concept of “concept” are all the concepts which you have learned [and will ever learn]. Prof. D: Then a mental entity is a concrete? AR: As a mental entity, yes.  It is a concrete in relation to the wider abstraction which is the concept of “concept.” Take another, similar case: the concept of “emotion.” What are its concretes? The various emotions which you observe introspectively, which you are able to conceptualize.  You would form the concepts “love,” “hate,” “anger,” “fear,” and then you arrive at the concept “emotion,” the units of which will be these various emotions that you have identified. Prof. D: I misunderstood, then, something that Professor B said. I thought that he was maintaining that these weren’t really concretes, not even concretes with holes in them so to speak—not even vague concretes. Prof. B: No, that was the content of the concept.  The concept as a mental entity would have measurements; it would be a certain mental product. AR: A mental entity standing for a certain number of concretes—a concept—is not the same as the concretes in vague form.  Because some schools of philosophy did hold just that—that a concept is a memory of a concrete, only very vague.  You see a concept is not a vague concrete, it is a mental entity—which means an entity of a different kind, bearing a certain specific relationship to the physical concretes. Prof. D: But metaphysically, though, the concept is a concrete; it’s a mental entity. You have a concept of “emotion.” The referents are these various mental entities, this particular emotion and that particular one. And then the concept of “emotion” itself is a mental entity in actual being. AR: Yes, you can call it that. Prof. D: So metaphysically, not epistemologically, all we have here are concretes. AR: If you mean: does such a thing as the concept of “emotion” in a mind really exist? Yes, it exists—mentally. And only mentally. Prof. E: Would it be fair to say that a concept qua concept is not a concrete but an integration of concretes, but qua existent it is a concrete integration, a specific mental entity in a particular mind? AR: That’s right. But I kept saying, incidentally, that we can call them “mental entities” only metaphorically or for convenience. It is a “something.” For instance, before you have a certain concept, that particular something doesn’t exist in your mind. When you have formed the concept of “concept,” that is a mental something; it isn’t a nothing. But anything pertaining to the content of a mind always has to be treated metaphysically not as a separate existent, but only with this precondition, in effect: that it is a mental state, a mental concrete, a mental something. Actually, “mental something” is the nearest to an exact identification. Because “entity” does imply a physical thing. Nevertheless, since “something” is too vague a term, one can use the word “entity,” but only to say that it is a mental something as distinguished from other mental somethings (or from nothing). But it isn’t an entity in the primary, Aristotelian sense in which a primary substance exists. We have to agree here on the terminology, because we are dealing with a very difficult subject for which no clear definitions have been established. I personally would like to have a new word for it, but I am against neologisms. Therefore, I think the term “mental unit” or “mental entity” can be used, provided we understand by that: “a mental something.” (ITOE, 156-159)

“Obviously some things in the world are, in various senses of the term, “mind-dependent.” Perception, concepts, thoughts, and so on depend upon a living thing possessing consciousness, of which they are parts. The mind has “states,” activities, or, in the case of individual items of knowledge such as a concept, a unique category that Rand called “mental ‘entities’” (‘entities’ typically kept in scare-quotes to remind her reader that such a thing was not to be regarded as a literal entity.” (The Blackwell Companion to Ayn Rand (BCAR), 468)