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A couple of days ago, I received the following anonymous comment on my article, A Critical Examination of the Objectivist Metaphysic:
Your Critique seems to rest on a series of misunderstandings about the nature of entities and attributes as understood in Objectivism.Objectivism doesn’t claim that only entities can act or have attributes. It claims that actions are performed by entities, but those entities can have properties or attributes that contribute to the nature of their actions. For example, a person (an entity) can think (an action), but the action of thinking is facilitated by the person’s consciousness (an attribute of the person).Objectivism doesn’t necessarily claim that consciousness or mind is an attribute rather than an entity. Consciousness and mind are aspects or attributes of a human being, but they are also entities in their own right in the sense that they are things which exist and can be identified.You also appear to be confusing the idea of an entity as a distinct existent with the idea of an entity as a primary, independently existing thing. In Objectivism, an entity is simply something that exists and can be identified. So, consciousness, mind, and a person could all be considered entities in this sense.The critique also assumes that if something is an attribute, then it cannot have attributes of its own. But in Objectivism, attributes can have attributes. For example, a person’s consciousness (an attribute of the person) can have its own attributes, like being aware, attentive, or distracted.Essentially, the misunderstanding of the concepts led you to a false conclusion. This is simply put of course, but I can appreciate the thought you put into the critique.Thanks
While I appreciate your constructive criticism, I must admit that you are mistaken when it comes to certain core aspects of Rand’s metaphysic. For this reason, I think it would only be right for me to address your points and explain where they go astray from the Objectivist perspective. Since I have addressed criticisms that are very similar to yours in the past, I’ll provide links to those posts at the end.
While you are correct in pointing out that Objectivism holds that an entity’s attributes determine or facilitate the kinds of actions the entity performs (cf. ITOE, 93-94), it is not true that Objectivism does not claim that only entities can act. On the contrary, Objectivism explicitly maintains the opposite—indeed, all actions are actions performed by entities:
“All actions are caused by entities. The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act; a thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature.” (For the New Intellectual (FNI), 152)“And—especially important in considering the law of cause and effect—there are no floating actions; there are only actions performed by entities….The adult validation of the law of causality consists in stating this relationship [“between the nature of an entity and its mode of action”] explicitly. The validation rests on two points: the fact that action is action of an entity; and the law of identity, A is A. Every entity has a nature; it is specific, noncontradictory, limited; it has certain attributes and no others. Such an entity must act in accordance with its nature. The only alternatives would be for an entity to act apart from its nature or against it; both of these are impossible. A thing cannot act apart from its nature, because existence is identity; apart from its nature, a thing is nothing. A thing cannot act against its nature, i.e., in contradiction to its identity, because A is A and contradictions are impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity. This is the action it will take, the action that is caused and necessitated by its nature….Cause and effect, therefore, is a universal law of reality. Every action has a cause (the cause is the nature of the entity which acts); and the same cause leads to the same effect (the same entity, under the same circumstances, will perform the same action)….Given the facts that action is action of entities, and that every entity has a nature—both of which facts are known simply by observation—it is self-evident that an entity must act in accordance with its nature.” (Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (OPAR), 13-16)“Action is the crux of the law of cause and effect: it is action that is caused—by entities. By the same token, the causal link does not relate two actions….Motions do not act, they are actions. It is entities which act—and cause. Speaking literally, it is not the motion of a billiard ball which produces effects; it is the billiard ball, the entity, which does so by a certain means.” (OPAR, 17-18)“The law of causality states that entities are the cause of actions—not the every entity, of whatever sort, has a cause, but that every action does; and not that the cause of action is action, but that the cause of action is entities.” (OPAR, 18)“Entity, as we have seen, is the primary “category.” Only entities can act— and to be an entity is to be an individual.” (OPAR, 196)“The first concepts man forms are concepts of entities—since entities are the only primary existents. (Attributes cannot exist by themselves, they are merely the characteristics of entities; motions are motions of entities; relationships are relationships among entities.)” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, (ITOE), 12)“Actions are caused by entities…” (ITOE, 285)“By “action” we mean the action of an entity.” (ITOE, 291)
I think the above passages are enough to establish my point that Objectivism does hold that all actions are actions performed by entities. Let’s continue.
“You also appear to be confusing the idea of an entity as a distinct existent with the idea of an entity as a primary, independently existing thing. In Objectivism, an entity is simply something that exists and can be identified.”
The problem with this criticism is that it rests upon a misunderstanding of Objectivist account of existents and entities. While Objectivism holds that all entities are distinct existents that can be identified, Objectivism does not hold that “an entity is simply [a “distinct”] something that exists and can be identified.” As a matter of fact, we find the opposite view frequently emphasized in Objectivist literature. Here are a few examples:
“The first concepts man forms are concepts of entities—since entities are the only primary existents. (Attributes cannot exist by themselves, they are merely the characteristics of entities; motions are motions of entities; relationships are relationships among entities.)” (ITOE), 15)“An existent is, then, a particular which exists….An existent is a concrete. “Existent” is a very convenient term in that it subsumes entities and attributes and actions and event mental events. They exist….Everything that exists on which you can focus, anything which you can isolate, whether it is an entity, a relationship, an action, or an attribute. The concept “existent” refers to something which exists. And it is wider than the concept “entity,” because it permits you to subsume under that concept, and focus on, attributes or relationships or actions—on that which depends on an entity but can be studied separately. (ITOE, 198-199)“An entity is that which you perceive and which can exist by itself. Characteristics, qualities, attributes, actions, relationships, do not exist by themselves…attributes and actions cannot exist apart from the entity.” (ITOE, 265)“An attribute is something which is not the entity itself. No one attribute constitutes the whole entity…” (ITOE, 276)“An entity means a self-sufficient form of existence—as against a quality, an action, a relationship, etc., which are simply aspects of an entity that we separate out by specialized focus. An entity is a thing.” (The Philosophy of Objectivism Lecture Series, Lecture 3)
While it is the case that all entities are existents, not all existents are entities. Let us suppose that Objectivism did in fact maintain that “an entity is simply a [“distinct”] something that exists and can be identified.” How would this tally with the rest of the Objectivist metaphysic? Well, if an entity is any [“distinct”] something that exists and can be identified, it necessarily follows that any distinct and identifiable existent is an entity. Now, according to Objectivism, any particular action or attribute of an entity, and any particular relationship between entities, is itself an existent—an existent that is not only identifiable but an existent that is also distinct from other existents (this includes the entity which performs said action, the entity which has said attribute, and the entity which stands in said relationship, etc.). However, if it is the case that “an entity is simply a [“distinct”] something that exists and can be identified,” it would follow that any particular action or attribute of an entity, and any particular relationship between entities, is itself an entity—a conclusion which the Objectivist metaphysic explicitly rejects and repudiates. Indeed, the passages referenced above make this clear. Note also that Rand explicitly states that no entity is identical to any one attribute. But, if no entity is identical to any one attribute, it follows that no one attribute is identical to any entity.
We have seen that Objectivism holds characteristics of entities, attributes of entities, actions of entities, and relationships between entities, to all be existents. We have also seen that although a characteristic of an entity, an attribute of an entity, an action of an entity, or a relationship between entities, is an existent—an existent that is identifiable and distinct from other existents—said existent is not itself an entity. On the contrary, as Rand herself says, unlike entities, “characteristics, qualities, attributes, actions, relationships, do not exist by themselves.” (ITOE, 265, cf. ITOE, 15) Just as it is wrong to conclude that “All mammals are dogs” from the fact that “all dogs are mammals,” so too is it wrong to conclude that “All distinct and identifiable existents are entities” from the fact that “All entities are distinct and identifiable existents.” Let’s continue.
“Objectivism doesn’t necessarily claim that consciousness or mind is an attribute rather than an entity.”
This is false. Objectivism does maintain that consciousness is an attribute rather than an entity. The following passages (among many others) illustrate this core aspect of Rand’s philosophy:
“Consciousness, unlike existence, is a property: “Consciousness is an attribute of certain living entities, but it is not an attribute of a given state of awareness, it is that state.” (ITOE, 56)“Prof. F: Wouldn’t you say that consciousness is itself an attribute of man?...AR: Right, A faculty of man.” (ITOE, 154)“Whether he has a soul or is a material being with the attribute of consciousness, in either case his distinctive, essential attribute is consciousness, not matter…” (The Journals of Ayn Rand, 13)“Man is a being endowed with consciousness—an attribute which matter does not possess.” (The Letters of Ayn Rand, “The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged Years” (1945-1959), To Nathan Blumenthal, January 13, 1950)“A man’s volition is outside the power of other men. What the unalterable basic constituents are to nature, the attribute of a volitional consciousness is to the entity “man”.” (PWNI, 38)“Objectivity begins with the realization that man (including his every attribute and faculty, including his consciousness) is an entity of a specific nature who must act accordingly…” (ITOE, 82)“All questions presuppose that one has a faculty of knowledge, i.e., the attribute of consciousness. One ignorant of this attribute must perforce be ignorant of the whole field of cognition (and of philosophy).” (OPAR, 5)“Consciousness is an attribute of perceived entities here on earth.” (OPAR, 33)“The same observations which reveal that consciousness is an attribute of certain living organisms reveal that it belongs to separate organisms.” (OPAR, 196)“Since consciousness is not an independent entity, it cannot attain fulfillment within its own domain.” (OPAR, 420)“[Man] is, in Ayn Rand’s words, “an indivisible entity, an integrated unit of two attributes: of matter and consciousness.” Consciousness in his case takes the form of mind, i.e., a conceptual faculty; matter, of a certain kind of organic structure. Each of these attributes is indispensable to the other and to the total entity. The mind acquires knowledge and defines goals; the body translates these conclusions into action.” (OPAR, 196)“It is one’s recognition of the fact that the mind is an attribute of the individual and that no person can think for another.” (OPAR, 255)“Since man is an integration of two attributes, mind and body, every virtue reflects this integration.” (OPAR, 257)
The remainder of my response is going to rely on highly technical aspects of Rand’s metaphysic.
“Objectivism doesn’t claim that only entities can act or have attributes. It claims that actions are performed by entities, but those entities can have properties or attributes that contribute to the nature of their actions.”
The question of whether or not attributes can have attributes of there own is not essential to the arguments in the original article or in any of the other articles where I critically analyze the Objectivist metaphysic. Nevertheless, the question as to whether attributes can have attributes of their own remains an important one. Firstly, if we suppose that some attributes have attributes of their own (i.e., are themselves a “unities” of attributes), then a pressing question arises: “Why are some “unities” of attributes independently existing primaries (i.e., entities) and other “unities” of attributes (i.e., attributes that have attributes of their own) not independently existing primaries?” What special “ingredient” makes the one, and not the other, a “self-contained” existent? To say that a “unity” of attributes of the former kind has the property of “being a self-contained existent,” while a “unity” of attributes of the latter kind does not have the property of “being a self-contained existent,” is to simply reaffirm the question rather than answer it. Such a response would be as helpful as appealing to opium’s “soporific quality” in an explanation of why opium induces sleep. The circularity is obvious.
Secondly, another question emerges: “Do only some attributes have attributes of their own? Or do all attributes have attributes of their own?” If only some attributes have attributes of their own, then why do those attributes have attributes of their own while all other attributes do not? It seems that if some attributes are granted the privilege of having attributes of their own, there is no non-arbitrary reason that can be given to justify withholding this privilege from all other attributes.
Thirdly, if some attributes have attributes of their own, then these “privileged” attributes are either identical to, or not identical to, the totality of attributes they possess. If these “privileged” attributes are not identical to the totality of attributes they possess but are instead distinct from, or “over-and-above,” the totality of attributes they possess, this would jar with Rand’s conception of identity (passim. ITOE, OPAR, etc.) On the other hand, if these “privileged” attributes are identical to the totality of attributes they possess, we would have to ask another question: “What is the “essential characteristic” (to use Rand’s expression) of this “privileged” attribute?” In this case, the “privileged” attribute’s “essential characteristic” would be the characteristic that not only makes the greatest number of this “privileged” attribute’s other characteristics possible, but also explains the greatest number of its other characteristics.
Let’s take an entity, such as an apple. This apple is red, round, sweet, smooth, etc. “Redness,” “roundness,” “sweetness,” and “smoothness,” etc. are all attributes or characteristics of the apple. Now, do any of these attributes have attributes of their own? Are “redness,” “roundness,” “sweetness,” and “smoothness” examples of “privileged” attributes? (i.e., attributes that have attributes of their own). If not, then for what reason? If so, then what is the “essential attribute” of each? This question is much more challenging than it may appear to be. For instance, what are we to say of the apple’s attribute of “redness.” Does the apple’s attribute of “redness” have attributes of its own? If so, then what are they? It’s obvious that “redness” is not one of them—indeed, the attribute of “redness” is not itself red. The same is true for the rest of the apple’s attributes. The apple’s attribute of “roundness” is not itself round; the apple’s attribute of “sweetness” is not itself sweet-tasting; the apple’s attribute of “smoothness” is not itself smooth, etc. Furthermore, since the attribute of “redness” is not itself colored, we can’t say that an “essential characteristic” of “redness” is that it is “darker-than” or “brighter-than” something other than itself. We are thus at a loss as to what the “essential characteristic” of redness is. Anything that we can offer as a possible answer would itself be relational properties holding between colorless terms. Lastly, I think it is important to note that Rand maintained that attributes were “indivisible” (cf. ITOE, 276) and it seems that if attributes were to have attributes of their own, attributes would no longer be “indivisible,” but rather “infinitely divisible.” But I digress.
As mentioned above, I have provided several modified versions of a few of the arguments that I posed in A Critical Examination of the Objectivist Metaphysic. While the following list of arguments is not exhaustive, and a couple of the arguments in the list may appear supererogatory, it is important to note that their soundness does not hinge upon the issue of whether or not attributes can possess attributes of their own. If anyone doubts any of the premises, I recommend that they refer to the original article. In that article, I provide an abundance of passages taken in context, as well as citations that can be used in support of the premises of each argument.
Argument 1B
P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by entities and that only entities are causally efficacious.
P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind performs actions and that my consciousness is causally efficacious.
C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an entity. [From P1 and P2]
P3) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is not an entity.
C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind both is, and is not, an entity. [From C1 and P3]
Argument 2B
P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) and that only independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) are causally efficacious.
P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind performs actions and that my consciousness is causally efficacious.
C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). [From P1 and P2]
P3) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is not an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent).
C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind both is, and is not, an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). [From C1 and P3]Argument 3B
P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by entities and that only entities are causally efficacious.
P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is not an entity.
C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind does not perform actions and that my consciousness/mind is not causally efficacious. [From P1 and P2]
P3) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind performs actions and that my consciousness/mind is causally efficacious.
C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind both does, and does not, perform actions, and that my consciousness/mind is, and is not, causally efficacious. [From C1 and P3]
Argument 4B
P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) and that only independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) are causally efficacious.
P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind performs actions and that my consciousness is causally efficacious.
C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). [From P1 and P2]
P3) Objectivism is committed to the position that an attribute of an entity is not an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent).
C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is not an attribute of an entity. [From C1 and P3]
P4) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an attribute of an entity.
C3) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is, and is not, an attribute of an entity. [From C2 and P4]Argument 5B
P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that all actions are actions performed by independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) and that only independently existing, metaphysical primaries (i.e., self-contained existents) are causally efficacious.
P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that I perform actions and that I am causally efficacious.
C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent). [From P1 and P2]
P3) Objectivism is committed to the position that an attribute of an entity is not an independently existing, metaphysical primary (i.e., a self-contained existent).
C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am not an attribute of an entity. [From C1 and P3]
P4) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an attribute of an entity.
C3) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am not my consciousness/mind. [From C2 and P4]
P5) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am my consciousness/mind.
C4) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am, and I am not, my consciousness/mind. [From C3 and P5]Argument 6B
P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that an attribute is always possessed by something that is not the attribute itself.
P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an attribute which I, and I alone possess.
C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am not my consciousness/mind. [From P1 and P2]
P3) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am my consciousness/mind.
C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am, and I am not, my consciousness/mind. [From C1 and P3]Argument 7B
P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that an attribute is always possessed by something that is not the attribute itself.
P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an attribute.
C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is possessed by something that is not my consciousness/mind. [From P1 and P2]
P3) Objectivism is committed to the position my consciousness/mind is an attribute which I, and I alone, possess.
C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am not my consciousness/mind. [From C1 and P3]
P4) However, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am my consciousness/mind.
C3) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is possessed by something that is not me. [From C2 and P4]Argument 8B
P1) Objectivism is committed to the position that an attribute is always possessed by something that is not the attribute itself.
P2) Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is an attribute.
C1) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that my consciousness/mind is possessed by something that is not my consciousness. [From P1 and P2]
P3) Objectivism is committed to the position that I am my consciousness/mind.
C2) Therefore, Objectivism is committed to the position that I am possessed by something that is not me. [From C1 and P3]
To conclude, I think it would be best to provide links to my other writings where I analyze the Objectivist metaphysic. I hope that my critic might find these interesting or helpful:
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