A Critical Examination of Objectivism and the Concept of an “Unperceived” Reality

“The basic metaphysical issues that [lie] at the root of any system of philosophy [are]: the primacy of existence or the primacy of consciousness. The primacy of existence (of reality) is the axiom that existence exists, i.e., that the universe exists independently of consciousness (of any consciousness), that things are what they are, that they possess a specific nature, an identity. The epistemological corollary is the axiom that consciousness is the faculty of perceiving that which exists—and that man gains knowledge of reality by looking outward. The rejection of these axioms represents a reversal: the primacy of consciousness—the notion that the universe has no independent existence, that it is the product of a consciousness (either human or divine or both). The epistemological corollary is the notion that man gains knowledge of reality by looking inward (either at his own consciousness or at the revelations it receives from another, superior consciousness.” (Philosophy Who Needs It, “The Metaphysical Versus The Man-Made”, 30)

Objectivism maintains that “all concepts are ultimately reducible to their base in perceptual entities, which are the base (the given) of man’s cognitive development.” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (ITOE), 21); and that Reality or Existence is such that it exists independent of its being perceived. However, the concept of a Reality that exists independently of its being perceived, is a concept that could neither have been legitimately arrived at by abstracting from entities “given” in perception, nor could it be “ultimately reduced” to entities “given” in perception. 

Indeed, whenever you perceive an entity, said entity necessarily has the attribute of “being perceived.” You cannot perceive an entity which does not have this attribute; for, it is a contradiction to perceive an entity that does not have the attribute of “being perceived;” nor can you form a de re conception of an entity without conceiving of said entity as “perceived” (e.g., as having a particular shade of color, a figure or shape, a texture, a perspectival character, etc.—all of which are perception-implying characteristics). Furthermore, Objectivism holds that “each of [an entity’s] characteristics has the same metaphysical status: each constitutes a part of the entity’s identity.” (ITOE, 98). But this just means that the attribute of “being perceived,” is equally determinative in constituting the identity of a perceived entity as the attributes of “being extended” and “having mass.” 

Now, whenever I perceive an entity, do I not have the property of “being a perceiver”? And is it not the case that the entity which I perceive has the property of “being a perceived entity”? After all, an entity that is perceived is a perceived entity, and a perceived entity is an entity that is quite different from an unperceived entity. But a perceived entity could only be different from an unperceived entity if they had different attributes. And if “being perceived” and “being unperceived” were not attributes, then it would be impossible to say that there was any difference between a perceived entity and an unperceived entity. So, it seems clear that the entities which we perceive have the attribute of “being perceived.” Indeed, we never perceive an entity that has the attribute of “being unperceived”—for, it would be a contradiction to perceive that which has the attribute of “being unperceived.” However, since all of an entity’s attributes are of the same metaphysical status, and each of the entity’s attributes is equally constitutive of the entity’s identity or nature, it follows that the attribute of “being perceived” is just as constitutive of the identity or nature of the entity we perceive as its other attributes (e.g., “Extension” or “spherical”). However, if the attribute of “being perceived” is just as constitutive of the identity or nature of the entity we perceive as are its other attributes, then it follows that whenever we perceive, the identity and nature of the perceived entity depends upon its “being perceived.” The reason for this is that (1) a perceived entity cannot not have the attribute of “being perceived”, and (2) all of an entity’s attributes are constitutive of its identity or nature. But an entity whose identity and nature depends upon its “being perceived” is an entity that cannot be said to have any existence independent of consciousness. In short, Objectivism’s own theories of perception, entities, and attributes entails that whatever is perceived, has been perceived, will be perceived, or could be perceived, has no existence independent of consciousness.

Based upon Objectivism’s own standards of concept formation, Objectivism commits the fallacy of vicious abstraction—rendering the concept of a Reality that exists independently of its being perceived an “invalid” or “stolen” concept.  Nothing “given” in perception harbors the necessary, determinate material for providing valid grounds of the concept of a “Reality” that exists independently of its being perceived. This particular fallacy is best described in the following passage from F.H. Bradley:

“If we find that a—b is true within x, on what ground do we rest for our desperate leap to the assertion that a—b is true without condition? It is one thing specially to notice a member.  It is one thing to say that this member at any rate is certainly here.  It is quite another thing to take the member apart, and assume that, by itself, it remains what it was when it lived in the whole.” (Bradley, The Principles of Logic, 560)

Resources and Evidence:

“Existence and identity are not attributes of existents, they are the existents.” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (ITOE), 56)

“[T]he rules of cognition must be derived from the nature of existence and the nature, the identity, of his cognitive faculty.” (ITOE, 82)

“[T]he rules of cognition must be derived from the nature of existence and the nature, the identity, of his cognitive faculty.” (ITOE, 87)

“Metaphysically, an entity is: all of the things which it is.  Each of its characteristics has the same metaphysical status: each constitutes a part of the entity’s identity.” (ITOE, 98)

“The nature of an entity determines what it can do and, in any given set of circumstances, dictates what it will do.  The Law of Causality is entailed by the Law of Identity.  Entities follow certain laws of action in consequence of their identity, and have no alternative to doing so.  Metaphysically, all facts are inherent in the identities of the entities that exist…” (ITOE, 108-109)

“Now, what is an entity? It is a sum of characteristics. There is no such thing as an entity without its characteristics, and, for that very reason, there is no such thing as a characteristic without an entity…Don’t take “sum” literally…Not in the sense that you would say “sum of its parts. Usually when I write I say the entity is its attributes. To be exact, you’d have to treat them as inseparable…[T]he attributes are the entity, or an entity is its attributes. The attributes are really separable only by abstraction.” (ITOE, 266)

“An attribute is something which is not the entity itself. No one attribute constitutes the whole entity, but all of them together are the entity—not “possessed by” but “are” the entity.” (ITOE, 276)

“Prof. A: In regard to the concept of an attribute—for example, “length”— since the attribute is something which does not exist separate in reality, is the referent of the concept of an attribute in the category of the epistemological rather than the metaphysical? AR: Oh no, why? Prof. A: Because length doesn’t exist per se in reality. Length is a human form of breaking up the identities of things. AR: Wait a moment, that’s a very, very dangerous statement. Length does exist in reality, only it doesn’t exist by itself. It is not separable from an entity, but it certainly exists in reality. If it didn’t, what would we be doing with our concepts of attributes? They would be pure fantasy then. The only thing that is epistemological and not metaphysical in the concept of “length” is the act of mental separation, of considering this attribute separately as if it were a separate thing. How would you project a physical object which had no length? You couldn’t. And therefore if to say it is epistemological rather than metaphysical is to say it exists only in relation to your grasp of it, or it requires your grasp of it in order to acquire existence—it doesn’t. Surely, if anything is metaphysical, attributes are. Prof. A: If I ask you, then, what is the referent of “length,” would you say “long objects"? AR: Not the objects, the attribute of length in all the objects which possess that attribute. Prof. A: Isn’t the referent something separated? AR: It’s mentally separated, but it is there in those objects.  It doesn’t have to be an entity to be a referent. Prof. A: I don’t understand then why the referent of the concept “red,” say, isn’t all the red concretes. AR: How about the other attributes of all those red concretes? Is the referent of “red” the length and weight of all the red concretes? Prof. A: No. AR: Well then, obviously the concrete itself isn’t the referent of the concept, but a particular aspect of that concrete, an inseparable aspect. Prof. B: You said that the referent must be separated, or something like that. There’s no reason why the referent of the concept should be separable from the object. Prof. A: But in the case of attributes, the referent is not the entity but only an aspect of the entity. And an aspect cannot exist except as an aspect of the whole entity. Prof. B: Can you follow that one step further? You say that the referent of “length” must be an aspect, and an aspect cannot exist separately—what is the next step? Prof. A: The referent is the aspect separated. Is that the wrong premise? Prof. B: The referent is the aspect, not the aspect separated. AR: Exactly.  Prof. B: Otherwise you switch metaphysics and epistemology. AR: That’s right. The aspect, not the separation. That’s very well put.” (ITOE, 277-279)

“Prof. F: But now, properties are all constitutive properties, right? AR: Yes.” (ITOE, 286)

“In this regard, the relation of the aspects of a state of awareness to the whole awareness is similar to the relation of the attributes of an entity to the whole entity; an entity is its attributes and a state of awareness is its aspects.” (How We Know (HWK), 57)

“A third and final basic axiom is implicit in the first two. It is the law of identity: to be is to be something, to have a nature, to possess identity. A thing is itself; or, in the traditional formula, A is A. The "identity" of an existent means that which it is, the sum of its attributes or characteristics… Ayn Rand offers a new formulation of this axiom: existence is identity. She does not say "existence has identity"—which might suggest that identity is a feature separable from existence (as a coat of paint is separable from the house that has it). The point is that to be is to be something. Existence and identity are indivisible; either implies the other. If something exists, then something exists; and if there is a something, then there is a something. The fundamental fact cannot be broken in two.” (Objectivism the Philosophy of Ayn Rand (OPAR), 7)

“The adult validation of the law of causality consists in stating this relationship explicitly. The validation rests on two points: the fact that action is action of an entity; and the law of identity, A is A. Every entity has a nature; it is specific, noncontradictory, limited; it has certain attributes and no others. Such an entity must act in accordance with its nature. The only alternatives would be for an entity to act apart from its nature or against it; both of these are impossible. A thing cannot act apart from its nature, because existence is identity; apart from its nature, a thing is nothing. A thing cannot act against its nature, i.e., in contradiction to its identity, because A is A and contradictions are impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity. This is the action it will take, the action that is caused and necessitated by its nature.” (OPAR, 15)

“Entities and their actions are measured by means of their attributes, such as length, weight, velocity. In every case, the primary standard is some easily perceivable concrete that functions as a unit. One measures length in units, say, of feet; weight in pounds; velocity in feet per second.” (OPAR, 82)

“Now let us apply this discussion to another aspect of the theory of concepts: the status of essences (as the term is used in the context of the theory of definition). On the one hand, according to Objectivism, essences are not attributes marked out by nature apart from man. "Essential" is not a metaphysical, but an epistemological term. "Essential" designates characteristics that perform a certain function in connection with human conceptualization. The function is to differentiate and condense various bodies of data, and the characteristics that perform this function in one cognitive context may not do so in another. Since the category of "essence" arises because of a need of man's consciousness, the "essential" in each context has to reflect the state of human knowledge.” (OPAR, 113)

“Definitions are statements of factual data—as condensed by a human consciousness in accordance with the needs of a human method of cognition. Like concepts, therefore, essences are products of a volitional relationship between existence and consciousness; they too (properly formed) are objective. In the traditional (Platonic and Aristotelian) viewpoint, every entity must have an essence or definition. This is not true in the Objectivist viewpoint. Since the designation of essentials arises only as an aid to the conceptualizing process, it is inapplicable apart from that process. Concretes that have not been integrated into a concept have no "essence"; in these cases, there is no need or possibility of a definition.” (OPAR, 113)

“Metaphysically, there is only one universe. This means that everything in reality is interconnected. Every entity is related in some way to the others; each somehow affects and is affected by the others. Nothing is a completely isolated fact, without causes or effects; no aspect of the total can exist ultimately apart from the total. Knowledge, therefore, which seeks to grasp reality, must also be a total; its elements must be interconnected to form a unified whole reflecting the whole which is the universe.” (OPAR, 123)

“The axiom of identity holds that each thing is itself, or, as Rand frequently puts it: “A is A.” The force of this statement is perfectly captured in Bishop Butler’s famous remark, “Every thing is what it is, and not another thing.” “Identity” names the fact that everything that is is something in particular. A given thing’s identity is the sum total of all of its characteristics. Synonyms for something’s “identity” might be its “character” or its “nature,” so long as it is understood that a thing’s identity at any given moment refers to all of its attributes, actions, relations, and so on.” (Blackwell Companion to Ayn Rand (BCAR), 249) 

“In regard to: the Law of Causality. Yes, of course, my formulation of it (“A thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature”) is mine; it is not the usual: “everything that happens has a cause.” Compare the two and decide which is the more fundamental. You say: “But the truth of the statement, in your formulation, is guaranteed by the meaning attached to the word ‘NATURE’.” You bet your life it is! But what shocked me was the fact that you seem to attach no meaning to the concept of “a thing’s nature,” even though it was specified most clearly in the lecture and in Atlas Shrugged. A thing’s nature is that which it is metaphysically; a thing’s nature is its identity, that which cannot be changed by miracle nor by any wish, whim, or will, God’s or man’s. This is the meaning of “A is A”—and you have told me firmly that you accepted it. How, then, could you cite, as an example in this context, such a thing as a man’s “temper-tantrum” and ask whether he “acted contrary to his nature”? On top of which, you assume that we would answer that this is “part of his nature.” (!!!) I will answer: This is what happens to logic (and language) without ontology. (Letters of Ayn Rand, 528-529) 

“To perceive existence, to discover the characteristics or properties (the identities) of the things that exist, means to discover and accept the metaphysically given.” (Philosophy Who Needs It (PWNI), “The Metaphysical Versus The Man-Made”, 30-31) 

“But man exists and his mind exists. Both are part of nature, both possess a specific identity….[M]an is able to initiate and direct his mental action only in accordance with the nature (the identity) of his consciousness.” (PWNI, 32)

“Prof. F: This question has to do with the concept of “property” and its significance for causality. In Galt’s speech, you say every action is caused by the nature of the acting entity. Now, by “the nature of an entity” do you mean the physical properties of an entity—properties like combustible, fragile, corrosive, and so on?  AR: Yes. And also the psychological properties of a consciousness, including free will.”  (ITOE, 282)

“Prof. F: Could you give me an example of a constituent property?  Prof. E: Physical structure.  AR: The arrangement of molecules.” (ITOE, 284) 

“Prof. F: I noticed that Galt does not say, “A thing must act in accordance with its nature”; he says it “cannot act in contradiction to its nature.” I wonder if you had some particular reason for stating it in the negative.  AR: Oh, no, only to make it stronger actually. You could have said “must act in accordance with its nature.” But I wanted to stress that one cannot claim causeless actions, or actions contrary to the nature of the interacting entities. I wanted to stress that actions cannot be inexplicable and causeless. If the cause lies in the nature of an entity, then it cannot do something other than what its nature makes possible.” (ITOE, 286-287) 

“The axiom of identity holds that each thing is itself, or, as Rand frequently puts it: “A is A.” The force of this statement is perfectly captured in Bishop Butler’s famous remark, “Every thing is what it is, and not another thing.” “Identity” names the fact that everything that is, is something in particular. A given thing’s identity is the sum total of all of its characteristics. Synonyms for something’s “identity” might be its “character” or its “nature,” so long as it is understood that a thing’s identity at any given moment refers to all of its attributes, actions, relations, and so on.” (BCAR, 451) 

A Critical Examination of Objectivism’s Account of Change, Motion, and Time

If Objectivism’s account of identity is true, then change, motion, and time are all “unreal.” I will proceed to illustrate this by outlining several key propositions that Objectivism is committed to:

• For any entity, X, X is “identical to” an independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes [a, b, c, d, e,…]. 

• For any independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], if said independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” an entity, X, then a, b, c, d, e, &c. are of the same metaphysical status. 

• For any independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], if said independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” an entity, X, then a, b, c, d, e, &c. are equally determinative in constituting the identity and nature of X.

• For any entity, X, X is “identical to” its identity and nature. 

At time T1, there exists an entity, X. Therefore, at time T1, there exists an independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], and this independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” X. Now, suppose that at time T2, there does not exist an independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…]. It would follow that X does not exist at time T2. Indeed, this is because X is “identical to” the independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], and, as we have said, there does not exist a unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…] at time T2.

Again, let us suppose that at time T2 there exists an independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes [not-a, b, c, d, e,…] that was “identical to” an entity. It would still be the case that X does not exist at time T2, because an entity’s identity or nature is “identical to” the entity itself; and, since the independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes [a, b, c, d, e,…] and the independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes [not-a, b, c, d, e,…] do not consist in the same attributes, it follows that they are not the same entity, but are instead two different entities with two different identities and natures. 

Now, one might object by saying that the entity at T1 and the entity at T2 are one and the same entity, and that the entity has simply lost an attribute which it had at T1.  However, this response is incompatible with the following two Objectivist positions: 

• For any independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], if said independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” an entity, X, then a, b, c, d, e, &c. are of the same “metaphysical status.” 

• For any independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes, [a, b, c, d, e,…], if said independent, and self-contained, unity of attributes is “identical to” an entity, X, then a, b, c, d, e, &c. are equally determinative in constituting the “identity” and “nature” of X.

However, Objectivism’s “hyper-essentialism” regarding the relationship between entities and attributes entails that change, action (and therefore causality as well), and time are impossible or “unreal.” The reason for this conclusion is the following:

Change and motion both imply that the identity and nature of the changing and moving entity remains “one and the same” throughout its change and motion. In other words, change and  motion are meaningless unless the changing and moving entity is the same entity before, during, and after its change and movement. However, as we have seen, if Objectivism’s views on the matter were true, then no entity would remain the same entity before, during, or after its change or movement. It is for this reason that if the Objectivist account of identity is true, that change and motion are “unreal.”

Furthermore, since Objectivism maintains that time is a “measure of motion,” and since Objectivism’s views as to an entity’s identity and nature prohibit change and motion—it would follow that Objectivism is committed to the “unreality” of time as well. 

On the other hand, we may approach the issue from the other side—the Heraclitan side. Indeed, from the above positions, it would equally follow that no entities ever endure—rather, an entity would come into being and cease to exist at one and the same instant. Thus, having been been engorged by the two horns of Being and Becoming, the Objectivist is faced with an ancient dilemma: he must choose between the changeless and the everchanging.

Resources and Evidence:

“Existence and identity are not attributes of existents, they are the existents.” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (ITOE), 56)

“[T]he rules of cognition must be derived from the nature of existence and the nature, the identity, of his cognitive faculty.” (ITOE, 82)

“[T]he rules of cognition must be derived from the nature of existence and the nature, the identity, of his cognitive faculty.” (ITOE, 87)

“Metaphysically, an entity is: all of the things which it is.  Each of its characteristics has the same metaphysical status: each constitutes a part of the entity’s identity.” (ITOE, 98)

“The nature of an entity determines what it can do and, in any given set of circumstances, dictates what it will do.  The Law of Causality is entailed by the Law of Identity.  Entities follow certain laws of action in consequence of their identity, and have no alternative to doing so.  Metaphysically, all facts are inherent in the identities of the entities that exist…” (ITOE, 108-109)

“Now, what is an entity? It is a sum of characteristics. There is no such thing as an entity without its characteristics, and, for that very reason, there is no such thing as a characteristic without an entity…Don’t take “sum” literally…Not in the sense that you would say “sum of its parts. Usually when I write I say the entity is its attributes. To be exact, you’d have to treat them as inseparable…[T]he attributes are the entity, or an entity is its attributes. The attributes are really separable only by abstraction.” (ITOE, 266)

“An attribute is something which is not the entity itself. No one attribute constitutes the whole entity, but all of them together are the entity—not “possessed by” but “are” the entity.” (ITOE, 276)

“Prof. A: In regard to the concept of an attribute—for example, “length”— since the attribute is something which does not exist separate in reality, is the referent of the concept of an attribute in the category of the epistemological rather than the metaphysical? AR: Oh no, why? Prof. A: Because length doesn’t exist per se in reality. Length is a human form of breaking up the identities of things. AR: Wait a moment, that’s a very, very dangerous statement. Length does exist in reality, only it doesn’t exist by itself. It is not separable from an entity, but it certainly exists in reality. If it didn’t, what would we be doing with our concepts of attributes? They would be pure fantasy then. The only thing that is epistemological and not metaphysical in the concept of “length” is the act of mental separation, of considering this attribute separately as if it were a separate thing. How would you project a physical object which had no length? You couldn’t. And therefore if to say it is epistemological rather than metaphysical is to say it exists only in relation to your grasp of it, or it requires your grasp of it in order to acquire existence—it doesn’t. Surely, if anything is metaphysical, attributes are. Prof. A: If I ask you, then, what is the referent of “length,” would you say “long objects"? AR: Not the objects, the attribute of length in all the objects which possess that attribute. Prof. A: Isn’t the referent something separated? AR: It’s mentally separated, but it is there in those objects.  It doesn’t have to be an entity to be a referent. Prof. A: I don’t understand then why the referent of the concept “red,” say, isn’t all the red concretes. AR: How about the other attributes of all those red concretes? Is the referent of “red” the length and weight of all the red concretes? Prof. A: No. AR: Well then, obviously the concrete itself isn’t the referent of the concept, but a particular aspect of that concrete, an inseparable aspect. Prof. B: You said that the referent must be separated, or something like that. There’s no reason why the referent of the concept should be separable from the object. Prof. A: But in the case of attributes, the referent is not the entity but only an aspect of the entity. And an aspect cannot exist except as an aspect of the whole entity. Prof. B: Can you follow that one step further? You say that the referent of “length” must be an aspect, and an aspect cannot exist separately—what is the next step? Prof. A: The referent is the aspect separated. Is that the wrong premise? Prof. B: The referent is the aspect, not the aspect separated. AR: Exactly.  Prof. B: Otherwise you switch metaphysics and epistemology. AR: That’s right. The aspect, not the separation. That’s very well put.” (ITOE, 277-279)

“Prof. F: But now, properties are all constitutive properties, right? AR: Yes.” (ITOE, 286)

“In this regard, the relation of the aspects of a state of awareness to the whole awareness is similar to the relation of the attributes of an entity to the whole entity; an entity is its attributes and a state of awareness is its aspects.” (How We Know (HWK), 57)

“A third and final basic axiom is implicit in the first two. It is the law of identity: to be is to be something, to have a nature, to possess identity. A thing is itself; or, in the traditional formula, A is A. The "identity" of an existent means that which it is, the sum of its attributes or characteristics… Ayn Rand offers a new formulation of this axiom: existence is identity. She does not say "existence has identity"—which might suggest that identity is a feature separable from existence (as a coat of paint is separable from the house that has it). The point is that to be is to be something. Existence and identity are indivisible; either implies the other. If something exists, then something exists; and if there is a something, then there is a something. The fundamental fact cannot be broken in two.” (Objectivism the Philosophy of Ayn Rand (OPAR), 7)

“The adult validation of the law of causality consists in stating this relationship explicitly. The validation rests on two points: the fact that action is action of an entity; and the law of identity, A is A. Every entity has a nature; it is specific, noncontradictory, limited; it has certain attributes and no others. Such an entity must act in accordance with its nature. The only alternatives would be for an entity to act apart from its nature or against it; both of these are impossible. A thing cannot act apart from its nature, because existence is identity; apart from its nature, a thing is nothing. A thing cannot act against its nature, i.e., in contradiction to its identity, because A is A and contradictions are impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity. This is the action it will take, the action that is caused and necessitated by its nature.” (OPAR, 15)

“Entities and their actions are measured by means of their attributes, such as length, weight, velocity. In every case, the primary standard is some easily perceivable concrete that functions as a unit. One measures length in units, say, of feet; weight in pounds; velocity in feet per second.” (OPAR, 82)

“Now let us apply this discussion to another aspect of the theory of concepts: the status of essences (as the term is used in the context of the theory of definition). On the one hand, according to Objectivism, essences are not attributes marked out by nature apart from man. "Essential" is not a metaphysical, but an epistemological term. "Essential" designates characteristics that perform a certain function in connection with human conceptualization. The function is to differentiate and condense various bodies of data, and the characteristics that perform this function in one cognitive context may not do so in another. Since the category of "essence" arises because of a need of man's consciousness, the "essential" in each context has to reflect the state of human knowledge.” (OPAR, 113)

“Definitions are statements of factual data—as condensed by a human consciousness in accordance with the needs of a human method of cognition. Like concepts, therefore, essences are products of a volitional relationship between existence and consciousness; they too (properly formed) are objective. In the traditional (Platonic and Aristotelian) viewpoint, every entity must have an essence or definition. This is not true in the Objectivist viewpoint. Since the designation of essentials arises only as an aid to the conceptualizing process, it is inapplicable apart from that process. Concretes that have not been integrated into a concept have no "essence"; in these cases, there is no need or possibility of a definition.” (OPAR, 113)

“Metaphysically, there is only one universe. This means that everything in reality is interconnected. Every entity is related in some way to the others; each somehow affects and is affected by the others. Nothing is a completely isolated fact, without causes or effects; no aspect of the total can exist ultimately apart from the total. Knowledge, therefore, which seeks to grasp reality, must also be a total; its elements must be interconnected to form a unified whole reflecting the whole which is the universe.” (OPAR, 123)

“The axiom of identity holds that each thing is itself, or, as Rand frequently puts it: “A is A.” The force of this statement is perfectly captured in Bishop Butler’s famous remark, “Every thing is what it is, and not another thing.” “Identity” names the fact that everything that is is something in particular. A given thing’s identity is the sum total of all of its characteristics. Synonyms for something’s “identity” might be its “character” or its “nature,” so long as it is understood that a thing’s identity at any given moment refers to all of its attributes, actions, relations, and so on.” (Blackwell Companion to Ayn Rand (BCAR), 249) 

“In regard to: the Law of Causality. Yes, of course, my formulation of it (“A thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature”) is mine; it is not the usual: “everything that happens has a cause.” Compare the two and decide which is the more fundamental. You say: “But the truth of the statement, in your formulation, is guaranteed by the meaning attached to the word ‘NATURE’.” You bet your life it is! But what shocked me was the fact that you seem to attach no meaning to the concept of “a thing’s nature,” even though it was specified most clearly in the lecture and in Atlas Shrugged. A thing’s nature is that which it is metaphysically; a thing’s nature is its identity, that which cannot be changed by miracle nor by any wish, whim, or will, God’s or man’s. This is the meaning of “A is A”—and you have told me firmly that you accepted it. How, then, could you cite, as an example in this context, such a thing as a man’s “temper-tantrum” and ask whether he “acted contrary to his nature”? On top of which, you assume that we would answer that this is “part of his nature.” (!!!) I will answer: This is what happens to logic (and language) without ontology. (Letters of Ayn Rand, 528-529) 

“To perceive existence, to discover the characteristics or properties (the identities) of the things that exist, means to discover and accept the metaphysically given.” (Philosophy Who Needs It (PWNI), “The Metaphysical Versus The Man-Made”, 30-31) 

“But man exists and his mind exists. Both are part of nature, both possess a specific identity….[M]an is able to initiate and direct his mental action only in accordance with the nature (the identity) of his consciousness.” (PWNI, 32)

“Prof. F: This question has to do with the concept of “property” and its significance for causality. In Galt’s speech, you say every action is caused by the nature of the acting entity. Now, by “the nature of an entity” do you mean the physical properties of an entity—properties like combustible, fragile, corrosive, and so on?  AR: Yes. And also the psychological properties of a consciousness, including free will.”  (ITOE, 282)

“Prof. F: Could you give me an example of a constituent property?  Prof. E: Physical structure.  AR: The arrangement of molecules.” (ITOE, 284) 

“Prof. F: I noticed that Galt does not say, “A thing must act in accordance with its nature”; he says it “cannot act in contradiction to its nature.” I wonder if you had some particular reason for stating it in the negative.  AR: Oh, no, only to make it stronger actually. You could have said “must act in accordance with its nature.” But I wanted to stress that one cannot claim causeless actions, or actions contrary to the nature of the interacting entities. I wanted to stress that actions cannot be inexplicable and causeless. If the cause lies in the nature of an entity, then it cannot do something other than what its nature makes possible.” (ITOE, 286-287) 

“The axiom of identity holds that each thing is itself, or, as Rand frequently puts it: “A is A.” The force of this statement is perfectly captured in Bishop Butler’s famous remark, “Every thing is what it is, and not another thing.” “Identity” names the fact that everything that is, is something in particular. A given thing’s identity is the sum total of all of its characteristics. Synonyms for something’s “identity” might be its “character” or its “nature,” so long as it is understood that a thing’s identity at any given moment refers to all of its attributes, actions, relations, and so on.” (BCAR, 451) 

A Critical Examination of Objectivism’s Account of Parts and Attributes of Entities, and How it Pertains to Objectivism’s Account of Consciousness

Many Objectivists are unfamiliar with a very important aspect of Rand’s metaphysic: her distinction between parts of entities and attributes of entities. This distinction between parts of entities and attributes of entities is vital for understanding her ontology; and it happens to be a distinction that I am in complete agreement with.  For reference, Rand talks about this particular topic between pages 264 and 294 of her Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. We can illustrate what she means in the following way: Mount Everest is not an attribute of the Earth, rather Mount Everest is a part of the Earth, and the Earth has the attribute of “having Mount Everest as a part.” The reason that Rand holds Mount Everest to be a part of the Earth, and not an attribute of the Earth, is because Mount Everest could be “uprooted” from the Earth, and both the Earth and Mount Everest would continue to exist independently of each other. Or, to use a simpler example, a rock can be broken into two parts, each of which are separate entities, since both parts can exist by themselves independently of each other.

Again, we can see the important distinction between parts and attributes when plucking a leaf off of a tree. The leaf is a part of the tree, since the leaf continues to exist as an entity even after being plucked from the tree (that tree being itself an entity), and the tree continues to exist as an entity after the leaf is plucked from it. However, the leaf has the attribute of greenness, and this attribute cannot be separated from the leaf and continue to exist independently of the leaf. Ergo, greenness is a attribute and not a part of the leaf. Smoothness doesn’t exist independently of those entities which are smooth, sweetness doesn’t exist independently of those entities which are sweet, and roundness doesn’t exist independently of those entities which are round. Smoothness, sweetness, and roundness are all attributes of those entities which are smooth, sweet, and round, respectively.

We do not say that a person’s body is an entity that has a stomach as an attribute, nor do we say that a person’s hand is an entity that has a finger as an attribute. Rather, we say that a person’s stomach is an entity, and is a part of a person’s body (and that body is itself an entity), and that a person’s finger is an entity, and is a part of a person’s hand (and that hand is itself an entity). Both one’s stomach and one’s finger are “metaphysically separable” from one’s body and one’s hand, respectively (i.e., one’s stomach can exist independently of one’s body, and one’s finger can exist independently of one’s hand).

By contrast, you cannot “metaphysically separate” an attribute from an entity without the disillusion of said attribute. For example, you cannot “metaphysically separate” a strawberry (i.e., the entity) from its sweetness (i.e., the attribute) without the destruction of the attribute of sweetness. It follows from this that parts of entities—not attributes of entities—are themselves entities, and that attributes of entities are not—and cannot—themselves be entities.

We are, therefore, met with the following three tenets of Objectivism’s account of parts of entities and attributes of entities.

1. Parts of entities are capable of independent existence; ergo, parts of entities are themselves entities.
2. Attributes of entities are incapable of independent existence; ergo, attributes of entities are not themselves entities.
3. Therefore, Parts of entities are not attributes of entities, and attributes of entities are not parts of entities.

Now, if Objectivism holds that my consciousness is a part of an entity, then they commit themselves to holding that my consciousness is metaphysically separable from that entity of which my consciousness is a part, and that my consciousness would itself be an entity in its own right—i.e., a self-contained existent capable of existing independently of my physical body. And this is an unacceptable conclusion that Objectivism rejects. Therefore, an Objectivist cannot hold that my consciousness is a part of an entity. However, this leaves three options:

(a) My consciousness is an attribute (or faculty) of an entity.

(b) My consciousness is an action/activity performed by an entity. 

(c) My consciousness is a mental entity. 

Unfortunately, all three options result in contradictions with other fundamental aspects of Objectivism's own metaphysic.

If (a), then Objectivism runs into the contradiction of having an attribute (i.e., my consciousness) that acts, is causally efficacious, and has attributes of its own (all of which contradict key aspects of the Objectivist metaphysic. This is because Objectivism is committed to the position that only entities act, only entities are causally efficacious, and that only entities have attributes (because attributes are indivisible)). Therefore, (a) cannot be a solution.

If (b), then Objectivism runs into the contradiction of having an action/activity of an entity (i.e., my consciousness) that acts, is causally efficacious , and has attributes of its own (all of which contradict key aspects of the Objectivist metaphysic. This is because Objectivism is committed to the position that only entities act (Rand explicitly rejected “action” or “event” causation, and instead endorsed “agent” causation), only entities are causally efficacious, and that only entities have attributes). Therefore, (b) cannot be a solution.

Now, (c), as a matter of fact, is an untenable option from the start, because it rests upon a misunderstanding of Rand’s concept of “mental entity” and the particular kind of existents that the concept refers to. When Rand speaks of mental entities (or mental concretes and mental units), she is not speaking of my consciousness or anyone else’s consciousness; rather she is speaking about “products” of my (and anyone else’s) consciousness, or phenomena that are contingent upon my (or anyone else’s) consciousness (e.g., phenomena that only exist within my consciousness or someone else’s consciousness; examples of metal entities include concepts—since they are mental integrations). So, in short, anyone who tries to argue that Rand holds my (or anyone else’s) consciousness to be a mental entity is saying that Rand holds one’s consciousness to be in the same ontological category as a product of itself—e.g., my consciousness would be on the same level as one of my thoughts or one of my emotions, both of which can only exist within my consciousness. However, and perhaps more importantly, this option results in a vicious regress. Let me illustrate:

If my consciousness is a mental entity, then my consciousness(a) cannot exist unless it is “inside of” or a “product of” someone else’s consciousness(b). But my consciousness(a) could not be “inside of” or a “product of” someone else’s consciousness(b) unless this person’s consciousness(b) existed. However, this person’s consciousness(b), being a mental entity, could not exist unless it was “inside of” or a “product of” another person’s consciousness(c). But that person’s consciousness(b) could not be “inside of” or a “product of” another person’s consciousness(c) unless the latter person’s consciousness(c) existed. However, that person’s consciousness(c) could not exist unless it was “inside of” or a “product of” another person’s consciousness(d), and so on, ad infinitum. And such a regress is vicious. In order for the my consciousness(a) to exist, we would have to accomplish the impossible task of arriving at the end of an infinite series. Therefore, (c) cannot be a solution.

Therefore, since (a), (b), and (c) are the only possible options that Objectivism’s metaphysic provides, and all three leave us with contradictions, we are forced to the conclusion that the Objectivist metaphysic cannot be reconciled with the Objectivist account of consciousness.

Resources for (a) and (b):

Objectivism maintains that entities are the only “primary” or “self-contained existents.” Here are several examples:

“The first concepts man forms are concepts of entities—since entities are the only primary existents. (Attributes cannot exist by themselves, they are merely the characteristics of entities; motions are motions of entities; relationships are relationships among entities.)” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, (ITOE), 15) 

“An entity is that which you perceive and which can exist by itself.  Characteristics, qualities, attributes, actions, relationships, do not exist by themselves…attributes and actions cannot exist apart from the entity.” (ITOE, 265) 

““Entity” does imply a physical thing.” (ITOE, 157) 

“An entity means a self-sufficient form of existence—as against a quality, an action, a relationship, etc., which are simply aspects of an entity that we separate out by specialized focus. An entity is a thing.” (The Philosophy of Objectivism Lecture Series, Lecture 3) 

“An entity is a solid thing open to human perception and capable of independent action.” (The Philosophy of Objectivism Lecture Series, Lecture 2, Question Period) 

“Entity, as we have seen, is the primary “category.” Only entities can act— and to be an entity is to be an individual.” (Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (OPAR, 196) 

“Entity, as we have seen, is the primary “category.” Only entities can act—and to be an entity is to be an individual. A group of men is a derivative phenomenon; it is not an entity, but a collection of them, an aggregate of individuals. “All the functions of body and spirit,” writes Ayn Rand, “are private. They cannot be shared or transferred.” One cannot think for or through another person any more than one can breathe or digest food for him. Each man’s brain, like his lungs and stomach, is his alone to use.” (OPAR, 198) 

“Rand held what she referred to as an Aristotelian (as against a Platonic) view of reality. Part of what she meant by this is that everything that exists is a particular with a determinate identity….Rand’s metaphysics is Aristotelian in another, related respect. Aristotle distinguished between different “categories” of existents: entities (which he called “substances”), actions, qualities, relations, and so on, and he regarded individual entities as fundamental to all other existents. Rand endorsed this position…” (The Blackwell Companion to Ayn Rand (BCAR), 458)