F.H. Bradley and the Unreality of Motion

“Motion implies that which is moved is in two places in one time.”

In Chapter V of Appearance and Reality, F.H. Bradley argues against the reality of motion. He holds that the difficulties of motion stem from the problem of the One and the Many: the problem of reconciling and harmonizing Unity with Diversity and Identity with Successiveness. Bradley introduces the dilemma of motion thus:

“Motion implies that which is moved is in two places in one time; and this seems not possible. That motion implies two places is obvious; that these places are successive is no less obvious. But, on the other hand, it is clear that the process must have a unity. The thing moved must be one; and, again, the time must be one. If the time were only many times, out of relation, and not parts of a single temporal whole, then no motion would be found. But if the time is one, then, as we have seen, it cannot also be many. A common “explanation” is to divide both the space and the time into discrete corresponding units, taken literally ad libitum. The lapse in this case is supposed to fall somehow between them. But, as a theoretical solution, the device is childish. Greater velocity would in this case be quite impossible; and a lapse, falling between timeless units, has really, as we have seen, no meaning. And where the unity of these lapses, which makes the one duration, is to be situated, we, of course, are not, and could not be, informed. And how this inconsistent mass is related to the identity of the body moved is again unintelligible.” (Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 37) [My emphasis]

In order to fully appreciate the thrust of Bradley’s argument—and his very brief presentation thereof—it is necessary to cover the morphology of “motion,” and its core features: Thing, Place, and Time.

Thing:

Now, a moving thing must be self-identical—it must be One throughout its movement. The thing is a “continuant” or an “endurant,” and it “continues” or “endures” in and through its movement.

Place:

Motion, as Bradley says, implies two places, A and B. Clearly, these two places are different and antagonistic—they repel and exclude each other in space; or, to use a metaphor, they “recede” and “diverge” from each other. The “separateness” and mutual-exclusivity of these two points, A and B, is evidenced by the fact that they are “pushed apart” (to use another metaphor) by a kind of intangible “filling.” This intangible “filling” is “diffused” or “outspreaded” between the two points (it has a sort of “thickness” or “voluminousness” to it—in a negative sense, since there is no tangible “thing” or “body” that has or possesses the “thickness” or “voluminousness” in question). This negative “diffusion” or “outspreadedness” prevents the two points, A and B, from either collapsing “into” each other, or collapsing into a third point that lies half-way “between” them; it secures the integrity of the “here” and “there” by ensuring that the “here” remains “here” and does not “fall” into the “there,” and that the “there” remains “there” and does not “fall” into the “here.”

Time:

Furthermore, the span of time in and through which the motion occurs must itself be One—it must be a “solid” and “indivisible” duration (e.g., a “specious present”—a felt “Now”). But what is “unified” and “solidified” in and through this period? What “fills” this One time? A duality of aspects: On the one side, we have a “flowing stretch” wherein the object is “here”-and-swelling-into-the-“there”; on the other side, we have a “flowing stretch” wherein the object is “there”-and-fading-from-the-“here”.) The “unity” and “indivisibility” of the period or duration “concentrates” and “fuses” these two aspects into a “fluid” and “continuous” whole—into an “uninterrupted and unitary slide.” If the time-span or period in and through which motion unfolds was not a One, but a Many, then the life-blood of motion—unity, fluidity, and continuity—would vanish. When Bradley speaks of taking the “one time” (i.e., the One, indivisible, unitary, and “filled” duration) as being “many times”, he is alluding to any standpoint which denies the “lapse” the characteristic of “indivisibility.” This alternative view conceives the “lapse” as consisting of an infinity of punctiform and serially-arranged, lapse-less instants (i.e., durationless “Nows”). The following diagram is an illustration of the “punctiform” view that Bradley quickly rejects. 

“If the time were only many times...then no motion would be found.”

For Bradley, such an option is futile. Bradley’s worry is that such a view fails to take the motion seriously—indeed, it doesn’t account for the “continuity” and “fluidity” of movement in the slightest. There would never be a time when an object is in motion; for, every object would be fixed and immobile at every point-instant—an object would be stationed at a point in space at each moment in time (i.e., a “Now”). Motion does not consist in a serial arrangement of abrupt, static, and violent “jerks” and “jolts”—regardless of whether these “jerks” and “jolts” happen at point-instants or are themselves relations “between” point-instants (neither of which appears intelligible in its own right). On the contrary, to borrow an expression from William James, motion is “without breach, crack, or division.” Or, in the words of Henri Bergson, motion is a “solid and undivided whole.” Motion is legato, not staccato. 

If motion’s “salvation” requires its richness and qualitative splendor to perish, let motion be damned—for there is nothing left of it to be “saved.” We would be left with a fictitious abstraction—a barren, mathematical conception of a “something” that can’t be called “motion.” Indeed, motion—or what is left of it—would be reduced to the “annihilation” of an object from one point, at one moment, only for it to “reappear” at another point, at another moment—surely, that is not “motion.” Ironically, motion’s “salvation” necessitates its unreality. 

The Contradiction:

“Motion implies that which is moved is in two places in one time.”

For Bradley, motion’s unreality stems from a restlessness and self-discrepancy embedded within its internal-structure. Similar to how the two points, A and B, (i.e., the “here” and the “there”), “exclude” and “repel” each other in space, motion’s two internal aspects—two “flowing stretches”—end up “excluding” and “repelling” each other within the process itself. The “stretch” wherein the object is “here”-and-swelling-into-the-“there” must precede the “stretch” wherein the object is “there”-and-fading-from-the-“here”. Likewise, the “stretch” wherein the object is “there”-and-fading-from-the-“here” must succeed the “stretch” wherein the object is “here”-and-swelling-into-the-“there”.

The moving object’s occupation of point A (i.e., the “here”) “falls” inside the earlier “flow;” and the moving object’s occupation of point B (i.e., the “there”) “falls” inside the later “flow.” But motion involves the “concentrating” and “fusing” of these two successive “flows” into a “solid” and “indivisible” unit—One time. And such a result implies that the two points, A and B, are both occupied by the moving object in One time. And so, we find that “Motion implies that which is moved is in two places in one time.” Thus, motion is unreal—it is an appearance.

A Defense of Ayn Rand’s Objectivism

A couple of weeks ago, an article was published concerning the place of consciousness in the Objectivist metaphysic. As far as I can ascertain, the article was written with the supplementary intention of rebutting my investigations into Objectivism. While reading the article, I stumbled across several mistakes that not only misrepresent, but also clash with, the very weltanschauung that the author had hoped to explain and defend. The following post is an attempt to set right those mistakes.

“In Objectivism, an entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents. An entity is a specific, concrete, and indivisible thing that possesses a distinct identity and exists independently of the observer’s consciousness. Entities can be either physical or abstract, and they can range in size and complexity from subatomic particles to entire galaxies. An entity can be anything that exists, whether it is a material object or an abstract concept, such as a mathematical equation or a moral principle. Objectivism holds that entities are not simply subjective creations of the human mind but rather are objective, existing independently of human consciousness.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity)

The above passage is, allegedly, the Objectivist answer to the question, “What is an entity?”. Unfortunately, the passage ends up (unintentionally) misrepresenting the Objectivist view in several significant respects. Furthermore, the answer is inconsistent with what is written later on in the article. To save on space, and to eliminate tedious repetition, I’ll examine each line individually and supply passages from Objectivist literature to substantiate my remarks.

“In Objectivism, an entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity)

Objectivism does not hold that “an entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents.” Such a view would contradict many crucial aspects of the Objectivist metaphysic. I’ll attempt to illustrate this as clearly as possible:

Suppose for a brief moment, that Objectivism did in fact maintain that “an entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents.” How would this tally with the rest of the Objectivist metaphysic? Well, if an entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents, it necessarily follows that any existent which can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents is itself an entity. Now, according to Objectivism, any particular action or attribute of an entity, and any particular relationship between entities, is itself an existent—an existent which can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents (this includes the entity which performs said action, the entity which has said attribute, and the entity which stands in said relationship, etc.). However, if, as we have supposed, “an entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents,” it would follow that any particular action or attribute of an entity, and any particular relationship between entities, would itself be an entity—a conclusion which the Objectivist metaphysic explicitly rejects and repudiates. 

According to Ayn Rand, “an existent is a concrete. “Existent” is a very convenient term in that it subsumes entities and attributes and actions and even mental events. They exist.” (ITOE, 208) When asked whether relationships are existents, Rand replies, “Yes—everything that exists on which you can focus, anything which you can isolate [is an existent], whether it is an entity, a relationship, an action, or an attribute.” (ITOE, 208) Now that we have understood the Objectivist view of existents, it is important to point out that not all existents are entities, even though all entities are existents. For Rand, “an entity is that which you perceive and which can exist by itself.  Characteristics, qualities, attributes, actions, relationships, do not exist by themselves…attributes and actions cannot exist apart from the entity [which has them].” (ITOE, 265)

We have seen that Objectivism holds characteristics of entities, qualities of entities, attributes of entities, actions of entities, and relationships between entities, to all be existents. We have also seen that although a particular quality, attribute, or action of an entity, and a particular relationship between entities, is an existent—an existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents—said existent is not itself an entity. On the contrary, as Rand herself says, unlike entities, “characteristics, qualities, attributes, actions, relationships, do not exist by themselves.” (ITOE, 265) And so, the very first sentence of the article mischaracterizes Objectivism; it is not the case that “an entity is existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents.” Let’s continue. 

“An entity is a specific, concrete, and indivisible thing that possesses a distinct identity and exists independently of the observer’s consciousness. Entities can be either physical or abstract, and they can range in size and complexity from subatomic particles to entire galaxies. An entity can be anything that exists, whether it is a material object or an abstract concept, such as a mathematical equation or a moral principle. Objectivism holds that entities are not simply subjective creations of the human mind but rather are objective, existing independently of human consciousness.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity)

To say that an entity “can be anything that exists, whether it is a material object or an abstract concept,” would mean that not only material objects, mathematical equations, and moral principles would be entities, but also that feelings, sensations, emotions, valuations, and mental images (i.e., imaginata) are entities. Indeed, feelings, sensations, emotions, valuations, and mental images all exist—they are all existents; ergo, if an entity “can be anything that exists,” (cf. “An entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents.”) it necessarily follows that feelings, sensations, emotions, valuations, and mental images are all entities. However, if feelings, sensations, emotions, valuations, and mental images are all entities, then they would be self-contained, primary existents. Furthermore, since the article asserts that Objectivism maintains that entities “exist independently of any observer’s consciousness”, the logical conclusion that the article would be committed to is that feelings, sensations, emotions, valuations, and mental images all “exist independently of any observer’s consciousness”. And yet, such a conclusion is at odds with the Objectivist position. 

According to Objectivism, feelings, sensations, emotions, valuations, and mental images do not “exist independent of any observer’s consciousness”; indeed, they are what Rand calls “mental concretes” or “mental entities”. It is absolutely crucial to understand the difference between an entity and a mental entity (i.e., a mental concrete or mental unit). Firstly, it is important to note what Rand means by the expression “mental entities” (or “mental concretes” and “mental units”). Rand’s concept of a “mental entity” refers neither to my consciousness, nor to anyone else’s consciousness; rather, the concept of “mental entity” refers to existents that have no existence apart from, or independent of, my consciousness, or anyone else’s consciousness. The following brief back-and-forth dialogue from ITOE best illustrates Rand’s views as to the differences between an entity and a mental entity:

AR: The referents of the concept “concept” are other concepts.  For instance, let’s say you form the concepts “table,” “chair,” “man,” and a few other concepts of perceptually given concretes.  Then at a certain level you can form the concept of “concept,” the concretes of which are all your other specific, earlier-formed concepts. 

Prof. D: But they aren’t concretes, though. 

AR: They are mental concretes.  You are now discussing an integration of mental entities.  The referents of the concept of “concept” are all the concepts which you have learned [and will ever learn]. 

Prof. D: Then a mental entity is a concrete?  

AR: As a mental entity, yes.  It is a concrete in relation to the wider abstraction which is the concept of “concept.” Take another, similar case: the concept of “emotion.” What are its concretes? The various emotions which you observe introspectively, which you are able to conceptualize.  You would form the concepts “love,” “hate,” “anger,” “fear,” and then you arrive at the concept “emotion,” the units of which will be these various emotions that you have identified. 

Prof. D: I misunderstood, then, something that Professor B said. I thought that he was maintaining that these weren’t really concretes, not even concretes with holes in them so to speak—not even vague concretes.  

Prof. B: No, that was the content of the concept.  The concept as a mental entity would have measurements; it would be a certain mental product.  

AR: A mental entity standing for a certain number of concretes—a concept—is not the same as the concretes in vague form.  Because some schools of philosophy did hold just that—that a concept is a memory of a concrete, only very vague.  You see a concept is not a vague concrete, it is a mental entity—which means an entity of a different kind, bearing a certain specific relationship to the physical concretes.  

Prof. D: But metaphysically, though, the concept is a concrete; it’s a mental entity. You have a concept of “emotion.” The referents are these various mental entities, this particular emotion and that particular one. And then the concept of “emotion” itself is a mental entity in actual being.   

AR: Yes, you can call it that.   

Prof. D: So metaphysically, not epistemologically, all we have here are concretes.   

AR: If you mean: does such a thing as the concept of “emotion” in a mind really exist? Yes, it exists—mentally. And only mentally.  

Prof. E: Would it be fair to say that a concept qua concept is not a concrete but an integration of concretes, but qua existent it is a concrete integration, a specific mental entity in a particular mind?  

AR: That’s right. But I kept saying, incidentally, that we can call them “mental entities” only metaphorically or for convenience. It is a “something.” For instance, before you have a certain concept, that particular something doesn’t exist in your mind. When you have formed the concept of “concept,” that is a mental something; it isn’t a nothing. But anything pertaining to the content of a mind always has to be treated metaphysically not as a separate existent, but only with this precondition, in effect: that it is a mental state, a mental concrete, a mental something. Actually, “mental something” is the nearest to an exact identification. Because “entity” does imply a physical thing. Nevertheless, since “something” is too vague a term, one can use the word “entity,” but only to say that it is a mental something as distinguished from other mental somethings (or from nothing). But it isn’t an entity in the primary, Aristotelian sense in which a primary substance exists. We have to agree here on the terminology, because we are dealing with a very difficult subject for which no clear definitions have been established. I personally would like to have a new word for it, but I am against neologisms. Therefore, I think the term “mental unit” or “mental entity” can be used, provided we understand by that: “a mental something.” (ITOE, 156-159)

Now that we have clarified and explained Rand’s distinction between entities and mental entities, we can continue with our analysis of the article. 

The next section of the article was written as an answer to the question, “Is Consciousness an Entity?”. The author’s answer is puzzling, to say the least, in that it clashes with the (alleged) Objectivist positions outlined in the previous section:

“In Objectivism, consciousness is not considered to be an entity in and of itself. Rather, consciousness is a faculty of the human mind (specific ability or capacity of the mind) that allows us to perceive and understand reality. According to Objectivist philosophy, consciousness is the means by which we identify and integrate sensory information from the world around us, and it is the foundation of our ability to reason and think abstractly. Objectivism holds that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of human nature and that it is distinct from the physical world. However, consciousness is not considered to be a separate entity or force that exists independently of the human mind. Rather, it is an attribute of the mind, which is itself a product of the physical processes that occur in the brain.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity)

As I said above, this answer to the question, “Is Consciousness an Entity?”, is puzzling. If we compare the two sections, one finds that the author’s answer to the question, “Is Consciousness an Entity?”, must be wrong if his answer to the question, “What is an Entity?”, is true, and vice versa. I’ll attempt to illustrate this as explicitly as possible:

According to the author, Objectivism is committed to the position that (a) an entity is “any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents;” (b) an entity “can be either physical or abstract…”; and (c) an entity “can be anything that exists, whether it is a material object or an abstract concept…”. Now, the author also maintains that Objectivism is committed to the position that “consciousness is not considered to be an entity in and of itself…[rather,] it is a faculty of the human mind (specific ability or capacity of the mind)…[and] is not considered to be a separate entity or force that exists independently of the human mind. Rather, it is an attribute of the mind, which is a product of the physical processes that occur in the brain.” There is a clear inconsistency here. When taken together, positions (a), (b), and (c), entail that Objectivism is committed to consciousness being an entity; however, the author tries to block this necessary conclusion by maintaining that Objectivism does not hold that consciousness is an entity, but is instead an “attribute of the mind, which is itself a product of the physical processes that occur in the brain.” This attempt at delaying the inevitable only introduces more inconsistencies into an already inconsistent article.

“Objectivism holds that consciousness…is an attribute of the mind, which is itself a product of the physical processes that occur in the brain.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity)

This line is interesting for a couple of reasons. Firstly, it is important to note that Rand frequently used the terms “consciousness” and “mind” interchangeably. Here are several examples:

“His vision, his strength, his courage came from his own spirit. A man’s spirit, however, is his self. That entity which is his consciousness. To think, to feel, to judge, to act are functions of the ego.” (For the New Intellectual (FNI), 90)

“A man’s mind is an attribute of his self, of that entity within him which is his consciousness. That entity can be called spirit. It can be called soul. It remains—no matter what its origin—a man’s self. His “I”. His ego.” (The Journals of Ayn Rand  (JAR), 237) 

“Your consciousness is that which you know—and are alone to know—by direct perception. It is that indivisible unit where knowledge and being are one, it is your “I”, it is the self which distinguishes you from all else in the universe. No consciousness can perceive another consciousness, only the results of its actions in material form, since only matter is an object of perception, and consciousness is the subject, perceivable by its nature only to itself. To perceive the consciousness, the “I”, of another would mean to become that other “I”—a contradiction in terms; to speak of souls perceiving one another is a denial of your “I”, of perception, of consciousness, of matter. The “I” is the irreducible unit of life.” (JAR, 571) 

“That which you call your soul or spirit is your consciousness, the life-keeper of your body. Your body is a machine, your consciousness—your mind—is its driver…” (JAR, 571) 

“Man’s consciousness is not material—but neither is it an element opposed to matter. It is the element by which man controls matter—but the two are part of one entity and one universe—man cannot change matter, he can control it only by understanding it and shaping it to his purpose. (The distinction between “entity” and “action”—between noun and verb. The essence of being.) Man’s soul or spirit is his consciousness—here, now, on earth. The ruling element, the control, the free-will element of his consciousness is his reason. The rest—his emotions, his memory, his desires, his instincts—all are determined by his thinking, by the kind of conclusions he has made and the kind of premises he has accepted. The man of spirit is the man of the mind. He is the man who is not the slave, but the ruler of matter. He is the man who makes it possible for mankind to survive. He is the creative man. The morality of the mind—to be true to truth. The great courage, integrity and responsibility that it requires. The only cardinal sin is the denial or suspension of one’s reason—the refusal to face reality, identify it and make rational connections. No man can go against his own mind—and that is why he cannot submit to force. The greatest field where this morality is needed and expressed is the field of material production. All material production is an achievement of the spirit—of the mind. Every human creation has to start in the mind and be given form in matter—whether it’s a work of art or a commercial gadget. Every spiritual value of man has to be expressed in material form or action. What is a virtue, if man does not practice it or act upon it? The great courage and virtue of the producers.” (JAR, 530)  

“I have stated explicitly (both in The Fountainhead and in Atlas Shrugged) that a man’s self is his consciousness and that the center and motor of his consciousness is his mind. I have discussed, illustrated and proved this point from every relevant aspect known to me. How am I to reconcile that with paragraph 6 of your note, particularly with the words: “some center of their lives, which is NOT THEMSELVES?” Since you rejected, without stating your reasons, the total of my view of what is man’s self—how could I tell what meaning you were assigning to the words “self” and “selfish” in your note?...This is an example of my conflict with modern philosophy: I am incapable of switching the definitions of my concepts to fit each separate occasion and of letting them mean one thing when I use them, but another when Bertrand Russell uses them, and a third when you use them. I am incapable of reading a paper such as your note, by the method of dropping or forgetting all definitions and then, without reference or commitment to any definition, using wide, fundamental concepts…while simultaneously regarding this usage as “non-definitional”.” (The Letters of Ayn Rand (LAR), 535-536) [Her caps and italics, not mine] 

“Man’s soul or spirit is his consciousness; the motor of his consciousness is reason; deprive him of freedom, i.e., the right to use his mind—and what is left of him is only a physical body, ready to be manipulated by the strings of any tribe.” (Rand, “Requiem for Man (Part III),” The Objectivist, Sept 1967)

“First of all, there is no ineffable mystic soul. If we use the term “soul”—and there’s nothing against it—we use it to designate an aspect of man’s consciousness. Similarly, the term “mind” designates an aspect of consciousness, the conceptual faculty.” (Peikoff, Understanding Objectivism, Lecture Nine, “Objectivism Versus Rationalism and Empiricism,” 260) [In this passage, Peikoff refers to one’s mind as being an aspect (or attribute) of one’s consciousness, rather than one’s consciousness being an aspect (or attribute) of one’s mind.] 

Secondly, Rand was very cautious and precise when it came to the relationship between one’s consciousness/mind and one’s brain. For one thing, she never maintained that consciousness or mind is a “product of the physical processes that occur in the brain” [my italics]. Furthermore, she denied that consciousness/mind was material. (cf. “Man’s consciousness is not material...”, etc.).

The next two sections, “Do Faculties have an Identity” and “Can a Faculty have an Attribute and an Identity,” are relatively straightforward. However, there are some lines which are rather opaque:  

“Consciousness (active): The faculty of awareness, perception, and identification of sensory information.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity) 

“Perception (passive): The faculty of recognizing and identifying sensory input from the external world.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity)

The author says that these two faculties (i.e., Consciousness (active) and Perception (passive), etc.) are “not interchangeable or reducible to one another…they are not simply different expressions of the same underlying capacity.” Now, the term “active” in the first line presumably alludes to Rand’s view of the faculty of consciousness as being “epistemologically active” and “metaphysically passive” (cf., “Consciousness is metaphysically passive, but epistemologically active.”). However, the term “passive” in the second line is puzzling. Is the author saying that the faculty of perception is “epistemologically passive” or “metaphysically passive”? More peculiar is the fact that the description of the faculty of consciousness (active) and the description of the faculty of perception (passive) are nearly identical! If they are not identical, but describe two different faculties, then the question that arises is: In what sense (i.e., the metaphysical sense, as opposed to the epistemological sense) is the former faculty “active” and the latter faculty “passive”?

With respect to the question, “Can a faculty have an attribute and an identity?”, it appears that only the latter half of the question is answered. The author does not say whether or not a faculty can have attributes—he only says that a faculty is an attribute, which doesn’t answer the question he set up for himself.

My response to the article has already exceeded its intended length, so I’ll continue my analysis of the article in another essay. The remaining sections of the article include: “Does Consciousness have an Identity Conflict with How Kant Viewed Consciousness,” “What is Intellectual Determinism,” and “What is the Objectivist [Critique] of Kant’s Epistemology.”

Some Replies to Objectivists

“Could you please tell me what ‘abstraction’ is in the Objectivist canon?” (An Objectivist)

“Abstraction” (or “abstracting”) is, for Rand, a volitional activity performed by a conscious mind in relation to existents (e.g., entities, attributes of entities, actions of entities, relations between entities, etc.) which it observes in reality. More specifically, it is a process wherein a mind “selectively” focuses upon, and mentally “isolates,” an existent present within a particular context, “omitting” (or regarding as “unspecified”) observed differences as being different from what is being “isolated,” and ”grasping” observed similarities as being similar to what is being mentally “isolated.” Abstraction is an essential phase of Rand’s account of concept formation, and it is intertwined with what Rand calls “measurement” and its subsidiary aspects (e.g., “unit” “measurement omission,” “commensurable characteristics,” etc.) 

“An ‘attribute’ is a mentally isolated element of the structure of an entity.” (An Objectivist)

“‘Attributes’ are not extant ‘things’. They are epistemological abstractions.” (An Objectivist)

This is totally mistaken. Attributes are not entities (or “things”), rather they are existent characteristics or properties of entities. For Rand, attributes and entities are types of existents. (Cf. “The building-block of man’s knowledge is the concept of an “existent”—of something that exists, be it a thing, an attribute or an action.”) Thus, Rand holds that attributes (e.g., the color of a particular book) and entities (e.g., the book which has that particular color) are existents. Although attributes and entities are both extant, only entities are self-subsistent and self-contained existents—attributes are neither self-subsistent nor self-contained existents. 

Although an attribute cannot exist independently of the entity which possesses it, it is nevertheless metaphysically distinct from the entity which possesses it. As evidenced on page 277 of ITOE, Rand makes it clear that attributes of entities are not “epistemological abstractions”—they are not products resulting from our measuring(s) or abstracting(s) from entities. On the contrary, she states that an attribute (e.g., the length of a stick, the shape of a book, the color of a flower, etc.) “does exist in reality, only it doesn’t exist by itself. It is not separable from an entity, but it certainly exists in reality….And therefore if to say it is epistemological rather than metaphysical is to say it exists only in relation to your grasp of it, or it requires your grasp of it in order to acquire existence—it doesn’t. Surely, if anything is metaphysical, attributes are.” 

In a similar vein, the referent of the concept of a particular attribute (e.g., the concept of “red,” the concept of “length,” the concept of “shape,” etc.) is not itself epistemological; on the contrary, the referent of the concept of a particular attribute is the attribute itself (i.e., the referent is the particular attribute possessed by all the entities which happen to possess that attribute). Rand states that although the concept of a particular attribute is the result of an act of “mental isolation” and “abstraction,” the referents of the concept are themselves metaphysical: they exist in reality and constitute the identities of the entities which possess them. The referents of the concept of a particular attribute are not themselves “epistemological abstractions.” As Rand says, on pg. 98 of ITOE, each of an entity’s characteristics (i.e., each of an entity’s attributes) “has the same metaphysical status: each constitutes a part of the entity’s identity”.

“Rand is saying that the attributes yes do exist, but not as a metaphysically distinct thing.” (An Objectivist)

A particular attribute of an entity is not metaphysically separable from the entity which possesses that particular attribute; however, that does not mean that the particular attribute and the entity in question are not metaphysically distinct. On the contrary, a particular attribute of an entity is clearly metaphysically distinct from the entity which possesses that particular attribute. Indeed, if a particular attribute of an entity was not metaphysically distinct (i.e., different) from the entity which possessed it, then the entity in question would be identical to that particular attribute which it possessed—and this is something which Rand rejects (Cf. “An attribute is something which is not the entity itself.” (ITOE, 276)). While Rand holds that an entity is not metaphysically distinct from the totality of its attributes, she holds that the entity is nevertheless metaphysically distinct from anything less than the totality of its attributes. (Cf. “No one attribute constitutes the whole entity, but all of them together are the entity—not “possessed by” but “are” the entity.” (ITOE, 276)) 

Furthermore, absurd contradictions would follow if a particular attribute of an entity was not metaphysically distinct (i.e., different) from the entity which possessed it. To reiterate, if a particular attribute of an entity was not metaphysically distinct (i.e., different) from the entity which possessed it, then the entity in question would be identical to that particular attribute which it possessed. The contradiction can be illustrated with the help of an example. Take, for instance, a book. This book is an entity, and it has many attributes; e.g., a particular shape, a particular color, a particular texture, a particular odor, etc.). If the book’s color (i.e., one of the book’s attributes) was not metaphysically distinct (i.e., different) from the book itself, then the book and the book’s color would be identical—and this is contradictory. Furthermore, if the book’s odor (i.e., one of the book’s attributes) was not metaphysically distinct (i.e., different) from the book itself, then the book and the book’s odor would be identical—and this is also contradictory. However, another contradiction would arise. Since identity is transitive (e.g., If A = B, and B = C, then A = C) it follows that if the book’s color was identical to the book, and the book was identical to the book’s odor, then the book’s color would be identical to the book’s odor—and this is absurd.

Another important point concerns identity. For Rand (and Peikoff), the totality of a thing’s characteristics (attributes) constitutes a thing’s identity because the totality of a thing’s characteristics is the thing’s identity. A thing is identical to the totality of its characteristics (attributes).  Suppose one asks the following question: Why is it the case that an existent apart from its characteristics would be an existent apart from its identity? Rand’s (and Peikoff’s) answer is straightforward and clear: An existent is nothing more than, and nothing less than, the totality of its characteristics. The totality of an existent’s characteristics just is the existent’s identity, and the identity of an existent just is that existent itself. For example:

“Existence and identity are not attributes of existents, they are the existents.” (ITOE, 56)

“Metaphysically, an entity is: all of the things which it is. Each of its characteristics has the same metaphysical status: each constitutes a part of the entity’s identity.” (ITOE, 98)

“A thing is—what it is; its characteristics constitute its identity. An existent apart from its characteristics, would be an existent apart from its identity, which means: a nothing, a non-existent.” (ITOE, 142)

“Now, what is an entity? It is a sum of characteristics. There is no such thing as an entity without its characteristics, and, for that very reason, there is no such thing as a characteristic without an entity….Usually when I write I say the entity is its attributes….The attributes are the entity, or an entity is its attributes.” (ITOE, 266)

“No one attribute constitutes the whole entity, but all of them together are the entity—not “possessed by” but “are” the entity.” (ITOE, 276)

“A thing’s nature is that which it is metaphysically; a thing’s nature is its identity, that which cannot be changed by miracle nor by any wish, whim, or will, God’s or man’s. This is the meaning of “A is A”.” (Letters of Ayn Rand, 528-529)

“A thing is itself; or, in the traditional formula, A is A. The “identity” of an existent means that which it is, the sum of its attributes or characteristics…Ayn Rand offers a new formulation of this axiom: existence is identity. She does not say “existence has identity”—which might suggest that identity is a feature separable from existence (as a coat of paint is separable from the house that has it). The point is that to be is to be something. Existence and identity are indivisible; either implies the other. If something exists, then something exists; and if there is a something, then there is a something. The fundamental fact cannot be broken in two.” (OPAR, 7)

“A thing cannot act apart from its nature, because existence is identity; apart from its nature, a thing is nothing. A thing cannot act against its nature, i.e., in contradiction to its identity, because A is A and contradictions are impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity. This is the action it will take, the action that is caused and necessitated by its nature.” (OPAR, 15)

“The axiom of identity holds that each thing is itself, or, as Rand frequently puts it: “A is A.” The force of this statement is perfectly captured in Bishop Butler’s famous remark, “Every thing is what it is, and not another thing.” “Identity” names the fact that everything that is is something in particular. A given thing’s identity is the sum total of all of its characteristics. Synonyms for something’s “identity” might be its “character” or its “nature,” so long as it is understood that a thing’s identity at any given moment refers to all of its attributes, actions, relations, and so on.” (Blackwell Companion to Rand, 249) 

“The relation of the attributes of an entity to the whole entity; an entity is its attributes and a state of awareness is its aspects.” (Binswanger, How We Know, 57)

Likewise, Rand emphasizes that an existent does not “possess” or “have” the totality of its characteristics because that would imply that the totality of the existent’s characteristics is something distinct or different from the existent “possessive” of said totality of characteristics. It is for this same reason that Rand insists that an existent is identical to its identity, rather than “possess” or “have” its identity. To suppose that an existent “possessed” or “had” its identity would imply that the identity “possessed by” or “had by” the existent was something distinct or different from the existent itself—and this is something which Rand and Peikoff explicitly reject. Indeed, it would be to suppose that an existent was something apart from, distinct from, and different from “itself”—a contradiction. As Rand and Peikoff say: it would be “a nothing, a non-existent.”

Reading Notes: March 27th, 2023

“The basic commitment of empiricism is that all conceptual content derives from experience. The idealism of the empiricists, however, does not follow directly from this principle alone. Among the theses that combined with the empiricists principle to yield idealism are: (1) the myth of the given; (2) the belief that what is given is one’s current mental state; (3) the belief in the atomic, hierarchical, constructivist structure of the mental or conceptual realm; (4) the belief in the fundamental unity of the sensory and the conceptual; and (5) the belief that conceptual content is derived from sensory content by abstraction. How these principles combined to yield forms of idealism in both eighteenth- and twentieth-century empiricism is, in general, clear: The empiricist takes sensory experience not only to be knowledge, but to be the very paradigm of knowledge and the source—via abstraction—of all concepts and meaning. If sensory experience is not only what we know first and best, but also is the only and ultimate source of all conceptual content, from which all our ideas must be derived or constructed, then our concepts and our knowledge are limited to the sensory and constructions therefrom. The sensory is mental, our concepts are mental; thus, there is no way to reach beyond the mental, so the mental must be ontologically and explanatorily prior to any other form of being. This basic reasoning can be found just as much in the twentieth-century phenomenalists as in Berkeley and Hume.” (deVries, Getting Beyond Idealisms, 212-213) 

“The myth of the given is a multi-dimensional thesis, in that it has both methodological and substantive sides. The myth of the given is the doctrine that the cognitive states of any cognitive subject include some that are both (1) epistemically basic (independent of the epistemic status of any other cognitive state), and (2) warrant the subject’s non-basic cognitive states. Such basic cognitive states are traditionally taken to be the beginning points of all knowledge and inquiry, as well as “the ultimate court of appeals for all factual claims-particular and general-about the world”….In pre-Kantian thought, it was commonplace to assume that what is given is our own mental state: we know our minds first and best. Methodologically, the belief that one's own mental states are what is given encourages a deliberate naivete about the process of understanding our own minds. We need only direct our thoughts to consciousness itself and we will, perhaps with some practice or training, gain insight into its very nature. The idea that consciousness is somehow immediate and transparent to itself discourages us from recognizing both that theory is called for in order to understand consciousness and the mind, and that the appropriate philosophical theory is distinctively meta. One of the important developments in twentieth-century philosophy, one that Sellars helped solidify, is the realization that philosophical questions about the intrinsic characteristics of the mental fundamentally concern the logic of those dimensions of our conceptual framework that describe, explain, and express our mental or conscious lives….Methodologically, Sellars replaces the enterprise of analyzing the mind or mental states with that of analyzing our concepts of mind and mental states. The difference is not trivial. It is the difference between a philosophy of mind that knows itself to be philosophy and a philosophy of mind that still confuses itself with psychology.” (deVries, Getting Beyond Idealisms, 215-216) 

“Turning to the substantive side, there are at least two distinguishable beliefs associated with the myth that mental states are given. One is the thesis that if x is a mental state, then we are directly conscious of it. This is a very strong claim; it is often weakened to the thesis that if x is a mental state, then we can be directly conscious of it. The mental is always available for our direct awareness or inspection. I'll call this the immediacy of the mental. (IM) X is mental ⟹ x is available to direct consciousness. Conversely, it has also been held that what is available for our direct awareness is the mental. We can call this claim the mentality of the immediate: (MI) X is available to direct consciousness ⟹ x is mental….If something is available to consciousness, it is still an open question how it appears in consciousness, as what it is available to consciousness. In the baldest form of the givenness of the mental, consciousness of a mental state is necessarily of that mental state in propria persona, that is, as the mental state it is. We can therefore distinguish a stronger form of the immediacy of the mental (IMS) X is mental ⟹ x is available to direct consciousness as the mental state it is.” (deVries, Getting Beyond Idealisms, 216-217)