Faith and the “Diamond Net” of Reason

Only when reason has been uplifted by faith may it spread its wings and ascend towards reality and truth. To sever the power of reason from the agency of faith is to render reason idle—it is to condemn reason to a state of dormancy and impotence. Far from being opposing and mutually exclusive faculties or departments of human experience, reason and faith reinforce each other—they are abstractly distinguishable factors of a single process that gradually unfolds throughout the course of conscious development on an individual and collective level. Indeed, reason runs on the rails of faith and revelation: a faith in reason’s own efficacy, and reason’s revelation to itself, and through itself, as efficacious. Now, the notion that reason and faith are compatible and not hostile foes demands explanation. Our purpose in this brief essay is to illustrate how these two factors are complementary and mutually reinforcing movements in the life of mind.

Before presenting a case for why reason and faith are in harmony, it is necessary to examine how they relate to ourselves as conscious beings. Augustine writes that “we both are, and know that we are, and take delight in our being and knowing;”¹ and these are hallmarks of our conscious life. They are evidenced by our insatiable thirst for knowledge and understanding. It is a restless impulse that resonates throughout our minds and drives us onwards towards the fulfillment of an ideal end: the knowledge and understanding of what is real and true. The journey is certainly long, and the path is undoubtably treacherous; however, the mind is not alone on this ‘pilgrim’s progress’. The “two-fold force”² of reason and faith—to use Augustine’s expression—accompany him along the way.

How, then, are we to understand reason?”³ Strictly speaking, reason is the power or activity of the mind concerned with the principles of structure, universality, and order. Reason is neither a matter of merely observing and perceiving the world, nor again is reason merely the act of reporting what one observes or perceives; rather, it is the mind’s capacity for determining and grasping relations; it is an intellectual activity by means of which the mind organizes its conception of the world (e.g., its judgments, thoughts, beliefs, etc.) in a way that exhibits universality, systematicity, coherence, and explicability. Reason seeks to establish a system of necessary connections; a system wherein the impulse of thought can glide smoothly without interruption. Reason’s ideal is to spin a coherent, all-encompassing arras of ideas: an intelligible fabric wherein each element is threaded to every other—every junction and knot opening itself up to further analysis and explanation in light of the whole.

Abstractly considered, reason seems to distance itself from anything reminiscent of faith—an innocent seeming which disposes us to judge faith as hostile to reason. Furthermore, this judgment can quickly solidify into an unspoken conscious attitude—an explicit rejection of the possibility of any interpenetration or ecumenism between the two. So understood, any eirenicon between reason and faith threatens to introduce stains, discolorations, and abrasions into the systematic tapestry that reason has crafted for itself.  

Again, at first glance, reason appears to get along just fine without recourse to leaps of faith, ungrounded revelations, or any authorities other than itself. Indeed, reason affects us so deeply that we are left with the impression that it is an all-seeing arbitrator—being the one, lone standard by means of which all authorities are weighed and measured. Nevertheless, these seemings, appearances, and impressions are, upon thorough analysis, delusive—all being products of vicious abstraction. The light of reason and the agency of faith are, in fact, the systolic and diastolic beats of a single pulse in the life of mind. Indeed, as John Scotus Eriugena reminds us, “there can be no doubt that both spring from a common source…”⁴

We began this essay with the assertion that “reason runs on the rails of faith.” This idea has been disputed and challenged by many. In order to better understand reason’s indebtedness to faith, it is necessary to penetrate into the heart of reason’s claim to be the “measure of all things”—requiring neither assistance, nor supplementation, from anything other than itself. This can be done with help from the following illustration:

Take, for instance, a Geiger counter, a thermometer, and a clock. How are we to determine whether or not the measurements of these diverse instruments are accurate as opposed to delusive? The answer is that we must compare the readings, and calibrate the instruments, in relation to a standard. The question then becomes what this standard is. Usually, the calibration of these instruments involves comparing and correlating their respective readings to those of another instrument of the same respective type. Thus, the Geiger counter’s readings are adjusted and corrected in light of the readings of another Geiger counter; the thermometer’s readings in light of the readings of another thermometer; and the clock’s readings (e.g., the position of the hour, minute, and second hand) in light of the readings of another clock (e.g., a digital watch). However, a problem arises as soon as we ask if the instruments belonging to the second set give us accurate measurements of radioactivity, outside temperature, and time of day. There are three possible options available: (a) compare and calibrate the second set of instruments in relation to the first set—thereby treating the first set as the standard, (b) compare and calibrate the second set of instruments in relation to a third set—thereby treating the third set of instruments as the standard, and (c) compare and calibrate the second set of instruments in relation to a standard that has been arbitrarily determined and whose accuracy cannot itself be called into question. Now, (a) entangles us in a vicious circle, and (b) launches us into a vicious regress.⁵ The only option that we have left is (c). To answer our question, “How do we know that the instruments belonging to the second set give us accurate measurements of radioactivity, outside temperature, and time of day,” we would have to expose the Geiger counter to a known and well-defined quantity of radioactive matter, introduce the thermometer into an environment with a known and controlled temperature, and synchronize the hands of the clock with signals from an atomic clock.

These examples illustrate reason’s capacity for “rising above” and “enveloping” the measurement-situation. Reason “transcends” the instruments, their respective readings, the measurable quantities, and the respective standards in terms of which the instrument readings are compared. Without this power, reason would be unable to either recognize, evaluate, or determine whether or not the instruments were providing accurate or delusive measurements.

In light of this vignette, suppose that reason asks the following question: “Is reason capable of knowing and understanding what is real and true?” How can reason go about answering this question? What appropriate steps, methods, or tools does reason have at its disposal? For consider, when reason asked itself whether the Geiger counter, thermometer, and clock were delivering accurate measurements of radioactivity, outside temperature, and time of day, reason could arrive at an answer by comparing and evaluating the instruments’ respective measurements in relation to an independent and predefined standard of reference. In all three cases, the “authoritative” standard, or reference point, is one that reason has defined for its own purpose: this purpose being reason’s attainment of a universalizable, systematic, coherent, and explicable account of innumerable things and processes (e.g., radioactive, thermal, and temporal phenomena, etc.). Furthermore, reason could evaluate the reliability of the three instruments only insofar as the instruments, their readings, the measurable quantities, and the “authoritative” standards were all given together on a level; or, to use a metaphor, all of these phenomena were circumscribed within reason’s “visual field.” However, just as the bodily eye cannot see itself, it seems that the relation between reason and the world (i.e., a relation in virtue of which reason has the capacity to know the world), will forever evade the “diamond net” of reason.

On the one hand, reason cannot prove its own efficacy—reason cannot argue its way to the conclusion that it is capable of knowing and understanding what is real and true. Reason cannot make its case by means of deductive, inductive, or abductive inferences. Indeed, if reason were to do such a thing, it would be arguing in a circle—pointing to instances of its own past and present activity (i.e., hand-picked instances having been evaluated, and deemed appropriate, by reason itself) and appealing to them as demonstrative evidence of reason’s own competence (or lack thereof). This circularity is no different from the attempt to determine the accuracy of the second Geiger counter, the second thermometer, and the second clock by comparing their respective readings to the first Geiger counter, the first thermometer, and the first clock—the first”⁶ set of instruments being the “authoritative” standard in relation to which the accuracy or inaccuracy of the second set of instruments are judged.   

On the other hand, reason cannot criticize its own efficacy—reason cannot argue its way to the conclusion that it is incapable of knowing and understanding what is real and true:

“To do so would require a second species of thought to sit in judgment upon our first or actual thought, and a third thought to test the validity of the verdict thus obtained, and so on ad infinitum—a species of never-ending appeal as wearisome as fruitless.”⁷

This regress is no different from the attempt to determine the accuracy or inaccuracy of the second Geiger counter, the second thermometer, and the second clock by comparing their respective readings to a third set of instruments whose accuracy or inaccuracy can be determined only in relation to a fourth set, and so on, ad infinitum—leaving us forever in the dark as to whether or not the second set of instruments deliver accurate measurements of radioactivity, outside temperature, and time of day.

Reason, unlike a Geiger counter, thermometer, or clock, is not a thing among things. Furthermore, reason does not exist in vacuo—it is nothing apart from its content: it requires a substantial “filling.” In a word, reason demands a world—a world that admits of being subject to reason’s various organizing and systematizing activities; and, prima facie, reason’s demand for a world appears to be fulfilled. However, couldn’t this apparent communion be delusive? After all, the abstract, logical scaffolding of reason’s implicative and entailment relations cannot, of themselves, disclose any harmony (or lack thereof) between reason and reality without either rotating round and round in circles, or shooting off into an infinite regress. And, if this is so, it appears that reason can neither prove, nor disprove, that it harbors within itself the capacity for knowing and understanding the real and the true. What, then, is the powerful force moves reason to confidently declare that it is “the eye with which the universe beholds itself and knows itself divine?”⁸ Indeed, what is the nature of the unfaltering impulse that leads the mind to affirm that reason envelops reality, or, indeed, to exclaim that what is rational is real; and what is real is rational? We must answer that it is a theoretical assumption—an unwavering conviction that cannot be established, justified, or scrutinized by any of the tools that the rational intellect has forged for itself. Although this assumption is of a theoretical sort, it should not be mistaken for a static premise; on the contrary, it is rather a movement—a galvanizing act that is of profound metaphysical significance. As F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet expertly put it:

“You may call the intellect, if you like, a mere tendency to movement, but you must remember that it is a movement of a very special kind....In thought the standard, you may say, amounts merely to “act so”; but then “act so” means “think so,” and “think so” means “it is.” And the psychological origin and base of this movement, and of this inability to act otherwise, may be anything you please; for that is all utterly irrelevant to the metaphysical issue. Thinking is the attempt to satisfy a special impulse, and the attempt implies an assumption about reality. You may avoid the assumption so far as you decline to think, but, if you sit down to the game, there is only one way of playing. In order to think at all you must subject yourself to a standard, a standard which implies an absolute knowledge of reality; and while you doubt this, you accept to, and obey while you rebel.”⁹ 

“Thought will go forward if it possibly can. It will affirm meanings; an order or connexion which is one side of meaning. This might be called a non-formal principle. The laws of logic and other axioms are merely, I suggest, the expression of our elementary experiments in actual thinking at different points of our experience....If we are not allowed to think, we are not allowed to exercise the act which these pervading laws need for their establishment. They are not premises. They are principles evident throughout our thinking as the manners of its self-assertion....But if thought is forbidden to proceed, the principle cannot be established. This is not a “psychological” necessity. It is a necessity of the nature of reality which is thought’s function and character to reveal. How do we know it is thought’s function and character to do so? Because every act of thought says so. Thought, in asserting, does not say “I think so”. It says “it is so”. “I think so” is merely one case of “it is so,” and is as absolute as any other assertion of a fact about reality.”¹⁰ 

Reason operates through a conviction—a mode of revelation that stands on its own authority and is incapable of being captured within the “diamond net” that reason casts, and cannot help but cast, upon the world. Faith—faith in the affirmation that reality and truth are appreciable by reason—envelops and saturates the entirety of our intellectual life; indeed, it dictates the normative ideal which reason finds itself compelled to follow in its effort to know and understand the world. Augustine writes that “we must first believe whatever great and divine matter we desire to understand. Else would the Prophet have said in error, Except ye believe, ye shall not understand;”¹¹ likewise, we must affirm—through an act of faith—that there is a harmony between reason and the world, in order for us to understand the world.

Footnotes:

^[1] Augustine, “Self-Knowledge and the Three-Fold Nature of Mind,” essay, in The Longman Standard History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. Daniel Kolak and Garrett Thompson (New York, NY: Pearson Education Inc., 2008), 28–34, 29.

^[2] Augustine, The Essential Augustine, ed. Vernon J. Bourke (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1974), 25.

^[3] Cf. Brand Blanshard, Reason and Analysis (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1964), 25-26.

^[4] John Scotus Eriugena, Philosophy, Faith, and Reason, n.d., 114.

^[5] Since the accuracy, or inaccuracy, of the first set of instruments had been judged by comparing their respective readings to those belonging to the second set, it would be viciously circular to then evaluate the accuracy of the second set of instruments by comparing their respective readings to those belonging to the first set of instruments.

^[6] “One cannot in strictness speak of testing a thing by itself.” Cf. Richard Lewis Nettleship, Philosophical Lectures and Remains of Richard Lewis Nettleship, ed. A.C. Bradley and G.R. Benson, vol. I, II vols. (London, England: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1897), 181.

^[7] Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, Hegelianism and Personality, 2nd ed. (London, England: William Blackwood and Sons, 1893), 90.

^[8] F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 152-153.

^[9] Bernard Bosanquet, “‘This or Nothing,’” Mind, New Series, XXXI, no. 122 (April 1922): 178–184, 180-181.

^[10] Percy Bysshe Shelley, “Hymn of Apollo,” essay, in The Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, vol. III (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1855), 52–53, 53.

^[11] Augustine, The Essential Augustine, 24.

A Critical Examination of Illusionism

Whether or not Illusionism is growing in acceptance, I do not know; however, it does appear that Illusionism is receiving more and more attention in the contemporary philosophical scene. The following essay is a brief analysis of an assumption that lies at the heart of Illusionism. When discussing their views, Illusionists usually invoke the terms “qualia,” “phenomenal qualities,” “phenomenal characters,” “phenomenal feels,” “phenomenal properties,” “what-it’s-likenesses” and “sensory-qualities.” For the sake of clarity and uniformity, I am going to use “sensory-qualities” as a catch-all for these terms. The “programme and platform” of Illusionism is summarized in the following passages by its most active proponent, Keith Frankish:

“Illusionists believe that consciousness [and/or objects of consciousness] involve no properties that are not detectable and fully describable by third-person science. Any other properties we think are involved are illusory….[Sensory-qualities] are illusory.” (Frankish, Illusion or Identity, 1-2)

“[Illusionism] holds that [sensory-qualities are] an illusion and aims to explain why it seems [that sensory-qualities] exist….I shall refer to the problem of explaining why experiences [and/or objects of experiences] seem to have [sensory-qualities] as the illusion problem….Illusionists deny that experiences [and/or objects of experiences] have [sensory-qualities] and focus on explaining why they seem to have them. They typically allow that we are introspectively aware of our sensory states but argue that this awareness is partial and distorted, leading us to misrepresent the states [and/or objects of those states] as having [sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 1-3)

Nothing—whether it be an object or an experience—has sensory-qualities. If an object (or experience) seems to have sensory-qualities, it is because our brain’s introspective mechanisms have “misrepresented” the object (or experience) as having them. So much then for Illusionism.

In defending Illusionism, Keith Frankish makes heavy use of “representations.” But what is a “representation”? In cognitive science, a representation is understood as being a structure that stands for something by virtue of relations such as similarity, causal history, and connections with other representations. Frankish uses the term “representation” in a similar way:

“First, how do I use the term “representation”? I use it in its standard sense in cognitive science for a brain state (a pattern of neuron firing) that serves as a proxy for something else, producing psychological effects appropriate to the presence of the thing....[They are] part of the neural machinery that makes us aware of the things they represent.” (Frankish, Illusionism and its Place in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, 304)

I’ll accept this account of “representations” for the sake of argument. 

Frankish’s Illusionism cannot get off the ground unless it can establish the truth or plausibility of the following proposition: There exist “representations of sensory-qualities” (e.g., a “representation of a red sensory-quality”) that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. This is a very strong claim, and Frankish must adequately defend it without recourse to faith, intuition, or revelation. This is how Frankish defends Illusionism’s foundation stone: 

“It is true that cognitive scientists talk of there being representations in the brain. Representations in this sense are...parts of the machinery that makes us aware of things…Such representations need not share properties with the things they represent. The mental representation of redness need not be red, any more than the word ‘red’ or the numeral that denotes red in a painting-by-numbers kit…These representations [of sensory-qualities] don’t have [sensory-qualities], of course…Rather, they are patterns of neuron-firing that signal the presence of [sensory-qualities] in much the same way that written words signal the presence of things.” (Frankish, What if your Consciousness is an Illusion Created by your Brain?, 5)¹

“When illusionists say that [sensory-qualities] are illusory, they mean that we have introspective representations like those that we would have if our experiences had [sensory-qualities]. And we can have such representations even if our experiences don’t have [sensory-qualities]. Of course, [Illusionism requires] that the [introspective] representations [of sensory-qualities] don’t have [sensory-qualities]. But, as I noted, representations needn’t possess the properties they represent. Representations of redness needn’t be red, and representations of [sensory-qualities] needn’t [have sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, What if your Consciousness is an Illusion Created by your Brain?, 10) 

“A representation of a [sensory-quality] needn’t be qualitative, just as the word ‘red’ needn’t be red.” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Sep 27th, 2019)

“Representations needn’t possess the properties they represent. A representation of redness needn’t be red, and a representation of phenomenal redness needn’t be phenomenally red.” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Jan 2^nd, 2020)

“It implies some representation of the illusory thing—[sensory-qualities] in this case. But that representation needn’t itself have the properties of the illusory thing. A representation of [sensory-qualities] needn’t itself have [sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Feb 8^th, 2021)

“A representation of F needn’t itself be F. A representation of a square needn’t be a square, a representation of worldly green needn’t be green, and a representation of phenomenal green needn’t be phenomenally green.” (Frankish, Twitter/X, Mar 15^th, 2018)

Frankish’s line of reasoning can be summarized as follows:

P1) If there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent. 

P2) If  “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. 

C1) Therefore, if there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. [From P1—P2] 

P3) There have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent. 

C2) Therefore, there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. [From P1—C1, P3]

Such reasoning is clearly fallacious. The consequent in P2 does not at all follow from the antecedent. Indeed, it is a complete non sequitur—as well as an example of hasty generalization. Before I dive into a thorough analysis of Frankish’s reasoning, I think it will be most helpful if we do a bit of phenomenology. 

In many (if not all) of our observational activities, we direct our attention to an object, and this object is immersed within a multeity of objects. We observe the object of our attention as having or as consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds; likewise, the multeity of objects (in the periphery) are observed as having or as consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. Not only do these sensory-qualities constitute the “what” (i.e., the “content” or characteristica) we appeal to whenever we say that This observed (or observable) object is different from That observed (or observable) object, they also differentiate the object of our attention from the multeity of objects (in the periphery) and the multeity of objects (in the periphery) from the object of our attention. Objects (“representations” included) totally devoid of sensory-qualities would be nothing to us (observationally speaking); it is only by means of their apparent sensory-qualities that said observable objects have actual or possible significance for us.^2,3,4 Regardless of whether or not the sensory-qualities that the objects are observed as having or as consisting of are “real,” it is clear that it is only by means of them that we are able to  single out an object (in observation) from a field of objects—singling it out as a particular This among other Thises.

Suppose that we were to observe an object, X, and X is a “representation of a red sensory-quality.” Now, it does not necessarily follow that we will observe X as having or consisting of the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality which it represents (i.e., the red sensory-quality); indeed, we may observe X as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities that do not even fall under the heading of “color”—e.g., X may be observed as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of a tactile, gustatory, auditory, or olfactory kind. Nevertheless—and this point is essential—we have never observed objects (“representations” included) as neither having nor consisting of sensory-qualities; on the contrary, we have always observed objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds.⁴ The following scenario will help make this point more concrete:

Suppose that John is observing a cup on a table, and he observes the cup as having a determinate (or determinable) blue sensory-quality. Whenever John observes the cup as having a blue sensory-quality, he has a “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality.” John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” is localized to a particular chunk or region of his brain, and we can observe this particular chunk or region of John’s brain whenever he observes the cup as having a blue sensory-quality. Now, if we were to observe John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” (i.e., a particular chunk or region of John’s brain) as he observes the cup as having a blue sensory-quality, it is almost certain that we will not observe it as having a blue sensory-quality; however, we can be certain that we would observe it as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds; indeed, we would observe it as having or consisting of sensory-qualities, e.g., pinkness, warmth, smoothness, sliminess, etc. Although John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” is not observed as having a blue sensory-quality, it is nevertheless observed as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. Indeed, both the cup (i.e., the cup which John observes as having a blue sensory-quality) and John’s “representation of the cup as having a blue sensory-quality” are both observed as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. In light of this illustration, what evidence is there for the following cornerstone of Illusionism:

There can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind.^{5, 6}

If Illusionism is to be held to its own standards, it cannot be allowed to defend the above claim by appealing to ‘intuitions’. Illusionism must appeal to the ‘empirical’. But what ‘empirical’ evidence is there? Or, rather, what is sample of available evidence is there for the Illusionist to appeal to in order to support the above-mentioned premise? (Whether or not the evidence does in fact support it). The following:

• We have had many instances of observation wherein we have observed a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality it represents.

• We have never had any instances of observation wherein a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) is observed as being totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind.

• We have always observed objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds.

• We have never had any instances of observation wherein the observed objects (“representations” included) are observed as neither having nor consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds.

Does the ‘empirical’ evidence support the consequent featured in P2 of Illusionism’s argument? Indeed, based on the bullet-points, can the Illusionist he validly conclude that there can exist (let alone that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable? No, he cannot do so. From these facts, it is clear that the Illusionist cannot validly infer (or posit) that there can exist (let alone that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind from instances of empirical observation.

I'll conclude the first part of this shrill shout of mine with a brief argument:

P1) If we cannot validly infer (or empirically verify) that “there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind” from the fact of there being instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent,” then we are not justified in believing an essential premise in all arguments for Illusionism.

P2) If we are not justified in believing an essential premise in all arguments for Illusionism, then we are not justified in believing Illusionism to be true. 

C1) Therefore, if we cannot validly infer (or empirically verify) that “there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind” from the fact of there being instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent,” then we are not justified in believing Illusionism to be true.  [From P1 and P2]  

P3) We cannot validly infer (or empirically verify) that “there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind” from the fact of there being instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent.” 

C2) Therefore, we are not justified in believing Illusionism to be true. [From P1 and P2] 

Thus, Illusionism’s foundation-stone is an arbitrary and unwarranted assumption. Far from being a viable option, the “coherent research programme” of Illusionism has the structural integrity of a castle in the air...

Addressing a Possible Objection:

I will attempt to address a potential objection, but before doing so, I think it would be best to outline the Illusionist’s argument in full and highlight the fallacy at its heart:

P1) If there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent. 

P2) If  “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. 

C1) Therefore, if there have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. [From P1 and P2]

P3) If there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, then it is possible for us to “misrepresent” objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of sensory-qualities even though sensory-qualities do not exist and are not instantiated in the world (i.e., sensory-qualities only “seem” to exist and only “seem” to be instantiated in the world). 

C2) Therefore, if there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, then it is possible that sensory-qualities do not exist (i.e., it is possible that they are not instantiated in the world) even though we observe objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of sensory-qualities. [From C1 and P3] 

P4) If it is possible that sensory-qualities do not exist (i.e., if it is possible that they are not instantiated in the world) even though we observe objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of sensory-qualities, then it is possible that Illusionism is true. 

C3) Therefore, if there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, then it is possible that Illusionism is true. [From C2 and P4] 

P5) There have been instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent.  

C4) Therefore, it is possible that Illusionism is true. [From P1—C3, P5]

Now that we have standardized the Illusionist’s argument, we can examine it in detail. The move from P1 to P2 is fallacious—it is, as I have said, a non sequitur and involves an instance of hasty generalization (among other fallacies). As I have shown, the Illusionist cannot validly infer (or posit) that there can exist (let alone that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, from the fact that we have had many instances of observation wherein we have observed a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of a red sensory-quality) as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality it represents; the reason being that we have always observed objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. 

Now, throughout his work, Frankish continually addresses common criticisms of Illusionism. I think it would be helpful to include one of these criticisms (and Frankish’s response) here: 

“Another common objection to Illusionism is that in the case of [sensory-qualities] there is no gap between illusion and reality. [According to this objection] something can look like a Penrose triangle without being a Penrose triangle, but an experience that seems to have a greenish [sensory-quality] really does have a greenish [sensory-quality]….This is often presented as a crushing objection to Illusionism, but it is far from compelling. It turns on what we mean by [an experience] seeming to have a greenish [sensory-quality]. If we mean having an introspective experience with the same [sensory-quality] as [an experience that has] a greenish [sensory-quality], then, trivially, there is no distinction between seeming and reality. But of course this is not what Illusionists mean. [Illusionists] mean introspectively representing oneself as having [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality], and one can do this without having [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality]. The objector may reply that, in order to create the illusion of [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality], the introspective representation would have to employ a greenish [sensory-quality] mode of presentation, which would itself have an introspectable greenish [sensory-quality]. However, Illusionists will simply deny this, arguing that the content of introspective representations is determined by [non-sensory-qualities], causal or functional factors. [Footnote: Alternatively, Illusionists might concede that introspection employs modes of presentation that appear to have [sensory-qualities], but argue that this too is an illusion—that introspection misrepresents the modes of presentation as having [sensory-qualities] they lack. For a defense of this option and an argument that it does not generate an infinite regress, see Pereboom (Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, 27-28)]….The Illusionist claims that when we think we are having [an experience with] a greenish [sensory-quality (or when we think we are observing an object with a greenish sensory-quality] we are in fact merely misrepresenting ourselves as having [an experience with a greenish sensory-quality (or misrepresenting ourselves as observing an object with a greenish sensory-quality)]. This claim may be false, but the no-gap objection does not anything to the case against it.” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 16-17)

In light of Frankish’s response to his hypothetical objector, suppose Frankish was to reply to our argument by saying:

“John’s “representation of the blue sensory-quality” and my “representation of John’s “representation of the blue sensory-quality” as having sensory-qualities” can both be totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind, and still represent their respective content as having or consisting of sensory-qualities because the content of a representation is fixed by the representation’s functional and relational features (i.e., non-sensory-qualities) and not intrinsic ones (e.g., sensory-qualities—if they existed).”

Such a reply would beg the question at issue because it presupposes that there can exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind—the very thing being disputed; and, as I have shown, the Illusionist has yet to present a valid argument for such a premise. Furthermore, he also begs the question because this premise plays an essential part in the Illusionist’s reasons (and attempted rationalization) for his denial of the existence of sensory-qualities. Unless the Illusionist can establish the premise, he can neither defend his theory, nor his denial of the existence of sensory-qualities, by invoking ideas that presuppose the premise’s truth (i.e., ideas which rest upon the very premise that the Illusionist has yet to establish or render plausible).

Furthermore, the response would be a red herring. It is beside the point to say that “the content of a representation is fixed by the functional and relational features (i.e., non-sensory-qualities) of the representation and not intrinsic ones (e.g., sensory-qualities—if they existed),” because my criticism does not concern how introspective “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” get their content “fixed” in the absence of any determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities being instantiated in the world; rather, my criticism targets Illusionist’s fallacious, non-sequiturial inference from instances where we have observed “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, to the conclusion that there can exist (or that there does exist)  “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. Without this premise, Illusionism cannot get off the ground. 

Secondly, it may be true that the content of a representation is fixed by functional and relational features (i.e., non-sensory-qualities), but that doesn’t change the fact that the Illusionist has yet to prove that there can exist (or that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. Until the Illusionist is able to provide a valid and sound argument for that premise, Illusionism succumbs to “vicious circle” and “vicious regress” objections.

But what are these “vicious circle” and “vicious regress” objections? They take the following form:

“Many people think of illusions as involving [sensory-qualities]….If [sensory-qualities] were an illusion in that sense, then Illusionism would be circular. There would have to be another set of [sensory-qualities] in which the [sensory-quality] illusion was rendered, and we’d be no better off.” (Frankish, Illusionism and its Place in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, 301-302) (Cf. Frankish, Like a Rainbow, 1)

In other words, if the “introspective representations” which the Illusionist infers (or posits)—i.e., “representations of experiences/objects as having or consisting of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities”—had or consisted of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds (regardless of whether or not these inferred or (posited) representations had or consisted of, the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent), then Illusionism would be viciously circular. In order to avoid falling into a vicious circle or a vicious regress, the Illusionist must infer (or posit) the existence of introspective “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. Yet, as I have shown, such an inference (or positing) cannot be made (without committing several fallacies). The Illusionist cannot appeal to the premise as being an ‘open possibility’ (i.e., that it is an ‘open possibility’ that there can exist (or that there does exist) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind). On the contrary, it does not tally (epistemically speaking) with what we have observed and with what we currently observe. The only kinds of representations evidenced by ‘empirical’ observation (i.e., the only available and relevant sample of representations that the Illusionist can validly infer (or posit)—without fallacy) are “representations of  particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that have been perceived as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds—i.e., instances that do not permit the Illusionist to infer (or posit) “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind).

Footnotes:

^[1] Contra the Early Wittgenstein, who holds that X cannot be a “representation of Y,” unless X has “something in common” (e.g., a “shared” logical form) with Y. Thus: “The picture is a model of reality.” (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 2.12) “The picture consists in the fact that its elements are combined with one in a definite way.” (2.14) “The picture is a fact.” (2.141) “That the elements of the picture are combined with one another in a definite way, represents that the things are some combined with one another.” (2.15) “According to this view the representing relation which makes it a picture, also belongs to the picture.” (2.1513) “The representing relation consists of the coordinations of the elements of the picture and the things.” (2.1514) “In order to be a picture a fact must have something in common with what it pictures.” (2.16) “In the picture and the pictured there must be something identical in order that the one can be a picture of the other at all.” (2.161) “What the picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it after its manner—rightly or falsely—is its form of representation.” (2.17) “The picture can represent every reality whose form it has. The spatial picture, everything spatial, the coloured, everything coloured, etc.” (2.171) “The picture has the logical form of representation in common with what it pictures.” (2.2) “The gramophone record, the musical thought, the score, the waves of sound, all stand to one another in that pictorial internal relation, which holds between language and the world. To all of them the logical structure is common. (Like the two youths, their two horses and their lilies in the story. They are all in a certain sense one).” (4.014) We find something similar in Nettleship’s Lectures on Logic: “In the first place, we must ask what is a sign or symbol? To say that A is a symbol of B implies, of course, that A is something different from B, but (and this is often forgotten) it also implies that it is in some respect the same as B. The most remote, far-fetched symbol in the world must have something in common with that which it symbolizes; i.e., the person to whom it has the symbolic meaning must have some (however little it may be) of the same feeling or experience when he experiences the symbol, as he has when he experiences that which it symbolizes. In other words, there are such things as symbols just because the most different things in the world have something in common.” (Nettleship, Philosophical Lectures and Remains, Vol. I, 23-24)

^[2] Indeed, in another article, Frankish himself agrees when he says, “When I look at a ripe banana, I seem to be aware of a rich yellow [sensory-quality]….Similarly, with smells, sounds, tastes, pains, and other sensory-qualities.” Likewise, he says, “I agree…that it seems as if [objects of] experiences have [sensory-qualities].” (Frankish, Why Panpsychism Fails to Solve the Mystery of Consciousness, 8). However, he goes on to say, “These [sensory-qualities] are not more present in the world around us than they are in our brains.” (Frankish, What is Illusionism?, 12). 

^[3] In a similar vein, he says, “We experience objects as having a distinctive but ineffable significance for us, which is a marker of their affordances. This is what we call their quality or feel.” (Frankish, Bright Shiny Colours, 1) And again, “As subjects of experience, our interest is in how things seem to us introspectively—the illusion [of sensory-qualities] itself, not the mechanisms that cause it.” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 8) And yet again, “We perceive things as having a certain impact on us, as infused with potent [sensory-qualities]….[Sensory-qualities] are not really anywhere. Thanks to the combination of perceptual and introspective processes in our brains, we experience objects as qualitatively charged. But the [sensory-qualities] don’t correspond to real, intrinsic features either of objects or us. They are potent illusions, an imperative commentary, generated by our brains to express the significance things have for us.” (Frankish, Illusionism and its Place in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, 304)

^[4] In a different context, Frankish discusses this when he describes possible variations of Illusionism (e.g., inward-looking Illusionism and outward-looking Illusionism): “I characterized Illusionism as the view that [sensory-qualities are] an introspective illusion, reflecting the widely held view that [sensory-qualities] are properties of experience. This may be too restrictive, however. Some theorists hold that experience is transparent: when we attend to our experiences, we are aware only of properties of their objects. Thus, redness is experienced as a property of surfaces, pain as a property of parts of our bodies, and so on (e.g., Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995; 2000). This points to the possibility of an outward-looking Illusionism, on which experience misrepresents distal stimuli as having [sensory-qualities]. Vision, for example, would represent objects as having illusory [sensory-qualities of colour] as well as real physical colours (for a view of this kind, see Hall, 2007). This view can be regarded as a variant of standard, inward-looking Illusionism, differing principally on where the illusory [sensory-qualities] are represented as being located. And, like the inward-looking version, it may posit processes of internal monitoring. The illusion of phenomenality may involve a combination of introspection and projection, in which we both misrepresent features of experience as [sensory-qualities] and then re-represent these illusory [sensory-qualities] as properties of the external world, mistaking complex physical properties of our sensory states for simple [sensory-qualities] of external objects (Humphrey, 2011, chapter 7).” (Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 7)

^[5] Observation is a relation between a person (or a mind) and an object (or a multeity of objects)—not a relation between an object (or a multeity of objects) and a part of a person (e.g., a visual system, an introspective mechanism, a sense-organ, or a brain). Instances of “blind-sight” give us no reason to suppose that we have instances of observation wherein an object is observed as neither having nor consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. For a “blind-sighted” person to correctly guess the identity of some object placed in front of their eyes is not for him to observe it. Indeed, the “blind-sighted” person does not observe the object at all. Similarly, if I am seated in a room and I happen to correctly guess that there is a man lurking in another room a few doors down, I do not thereby observe him. As C.D. Broad says, “For the relation to the organ, whatever it may be, is not the relation of being perceived, since that is a relation to the mind and not to the body.” (Broad, Perception, Physics, and Reality, 189)

^[6] Frankish endorses the view, advanced by Derk Pereboom, that it is an ‘open possibility’ that there exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. (Cf. Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, 6). This ‘open possibility’ is subject to devastating criticisms in Torin Atler’s review of Pereboom’s Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. Pereboom’s arguments for this ‘open possibility’ assume a form of Kantianism (regarding the nature of introspection and first-person access]. Furthermore, he attempts to substantiate this ‘open possibility’ by relying upon fragments from John Locke’s epistemology (a ghost laid to rest ages ago by Berkeley, Bradley, etc.). Unfortunately, Pereboom doesn’t take the opportunity to either re-examine the coherence of these appeals to Locke in light of Berkeley’s and Bradley’s crushing objections, or to take a step back and ask himself whether his implicit Kantianism is consistent with his knowledge of the fact of his having such views at all. (Cf. Pereboom, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, 15)

My Adaptation of the “Mary’s Room” Argument Against Physicalism

Mary lives in a room that is purely black and white—there are no achromatic gradients or shades of grey in the room whatsoever. While she is in the room, Mary learns all of the “physical” facts about light and color vision (i.e., All that neuroscience and physics have to say about light and color vision and the relationships between different colors). For example, while Mary is in her room, she learns that the color red is identical to light wavelengths of 625nm to 700nm, the color blue is identical to light wavelengths of 450nm to 485nm, the color green is identical to light wavelengths of 500nm to 565nm, and the color yellow is identical to light wavelengths of 565nm to 590nm. Mary also has memorized the sequence of colors in order of shortest-to-longest wavelengths.

One day Mary leaves the room (which, as we must keep in mind, was purely black and white without any kind of shading or achromatic gradient mediating between the black and white). Mary is then escorted to a table where a couple of fellow scientists are waiting for her. On the surface of the table lies an assortment of colored tiles (which are not in any particular order or arrangement; they are simply “scattered” and “mixed up”). There is one red tile, one blue tile, one green tile, and one yellow tile. Mary (who had learned all of the “physical” facts about light and color vision; indeed, she has even memorized the light wavelengths of red, blue, green, and yellow) is told—on the spot—the following: “Mary, you are in the presence of four colored tiles. Arrange the colored tiles in the order of shortest-to-longest wavelengths.”

It’s clear that Mary would be stumped.

Another scientist interrupts the silence and says, “Mary, with your left hand, pick up the red tile, or the tile whose color is identical to wavelengths of 625nm to 700nm; and, with your right hand, pick up the green tile, or the tile whose color is identical to the wavelengths of 500nm to 565nm.”

It is pretty clear that (i) Mary would not know which four tiles to pick up with her left hand and (ii) Mary would not know which of the four tiles to pick up with her right hand.

Despite her exhaustive knowledge of all the “physical” facts about light and color vision, Mary would not know which of the four colored tiles presented to her was the red tile and which of the four tiles was the green tile.

After a few moments without any answer from Mary, one of the scientists places the red tile in Mary’s left hand and says, “This is red.” The other scientist then places the green tile in Mary’s right hand and says, “This is green.” Upon hearing these statements, Mary learns new facts about light and color vision; namely that there are drastic qualitative differences and similarities between red and green—e.g., they have different sensory characteristics; one is “softer” than the other; one is “warmer” than the other; one is more “vibrant” than the other; and one is less “harsh” and more “mellow” than the other. One of the scientists then picks up the yellow tile and tells Mary, “This is yellow.” Upon hearing this statement, Mary, again, learns another new fact about light and color vision; namely the fact that yellow is more “vibrant” than green—which is “mellower”—and that the qualitative character of yellow is lighter and less “imposing” than red.

Now, suppose, on the other hand, the situation was altered. Suppose that immediately after Mary left her room, one of the scientists placed the red tile in Mary’s left hand and said, “This is green;” and the other scientist placed the green tile in Mary’s right hand and said “This is red.” Clearly, if Mary learned all the “physical” facts about light and color vision, she would immediately respond by saying “You both are wrong. The green tile is in my right hand, and the red tile is in my left.” However, it’s obvious that upon leaving her room, Mary would have no idea that she was being told falsehoods about the colors of the tiles—indeed (after being told that the red tile in her left and was green, and the green tile in her right hand was red) she would think that the red tile was green and the green tile was red. However, red and green have different wavelengths—and Mary would have known this upon her release.

If Mary knew all there is to know about light and color vision, then Mary should have been able to identify the colors of the tiles and arrange them in sequence of shortest-to-longest wavelengths upon her release, without hesitation. And yet, she couldn’t. Thus, since Mary knew all of the “physical” facts about light and color vision before leaving her room (i.e., All that neuroscience and physics have to say about light and color vision and the relationships between different colors), it follows that not all facts are “physical” facts.

Fragmentary Notes §46—§47

§46

Objects “appear” and manifest themselves perspectivally; however, an Object’s various “appearance-patterns” do not themselves “appear” or manifest themselves perspectivally, rather they are the “appearings” of the Object. Fleeting and transitory, an “appearance-pattern” is ideal—it is essentially incomplete and fragmentary. It passes beyond itself and strives for completion and stability in what lies beyond itself.

§47

In referring to myself as “I”, I consciously determine myself as a being of which I am conscious; I posit myself as knowing, and knowing myself as such—thus, I establish myself as an identity of Subject and Object. As Object, I am enveloped within my own knowledge; as Subject, I am the enveloping.