Wednesday, February 15, 2023

My Reading Notes

I have decided to start publishing my reading notes to the site. Since I am accustomed to annotating the pages of books and articles, rather than recording my thoughts in a separate document or notebook, the majority of my published reading notes (the entirety of which spans nearly 6,000 pages) will consist of quotations that I transcribed while reading—having considered them to be thought-provoking and worthy of further exploration (While many quotes contain fragments that I sympathize with, one will encounter passages which are radically disparate from my own beliefs and ways of thinking). I hope this archive sparks your interest. Enjoy.

Reading Notes



Monday, January 30, 2023

Fragmentary Notes §42—§45

§42
We frequently speak of “loving” and “cherishing” photographs. But what do we mean by this? What are we really expressing our “love” for? What is the genuine object of our “cherishment”? As soon as we begin to reflect upon the nature of photographs, we uncover webs of subtle and unconscious knots—confusions resulting not only from the haziness of common expressions and causal parlance, but also from the enigmatic relationship between what a thing “is” and what it is “of”—a relation of identity-in-difference.
§43
A photograph both is, and is not, itself. Indeed, a photograph is a photograph only insofar as it vanishes into what is “other” than itself—a hilly landscape, a blooming flower, a colorful bowl of fruit, etc. The visual medium “discloses” a message; and in disclosing the message, it must, in some respect, be in contact with it through a point of shared identity. The identity of every photograph is dependent upon its own self-abasement and self-denial as a stand-alone, self-dependent, and self-contained being. Mere “likeness” or “similarity” fails to capture the essence of the relationship between a photograph and its subject matter. And understanding this relationship is essential for grasping what we really mean when we speak of “loving” and “cherishing” photographs.
§44 
A photograph’s meaning, subject-matter, and value is determined by the person who comes into contact with it (physically or digitally). A photograph–by itself–is rarely the object of sentimental attachment. We treasure a photograph because of an object, event, or scene that lies outside or beyond the photograph—the photograph being a digital or chemical “representation” of said object, event, or scene. We “cherish” a photograph only insofar as we “love” what is “represented” by means of it or what is “disclosed” through it. We “treasure” and protect a photograph because it puts us into contact with an object of love and concern–and in most cases, this object has long since vanished.
§45
Unlike a photographic print, a digital photograph is, almost always, something “transparent”—like a glass window. If I am inside my house, I may see an object or event that is occurring outside “by means of” a glass window, or “through” a glass window. The glass window facilitates my view of the object or event without itself becoming the object of my attention or concern. 

Tuesday, November 29, 2022

Common-Sense and the Perceptible World

Whenever we perceive a part of the perceptible world, we perceive it as “having” or “consisting of” qualities. Furthermore, the qualities we perceive a part of the perceptible world as “having” or “consisting of” are the “what” (i.e., the “content” or characteristica) that we appeal to whenever we say that “this” part of the perceptible world is different from “that” part of the perceptible world. Indeed, without this qualitative “whatness,” every part of the perceptible world we perceive would be indistinguishable from any other. Puzzles regarding the peculiar relationship between a perceived part of the perceptible world and the qualities we perceive that part of the perceptible world as “having” or “consisting of” often leads Common-Sense to maintain that all the qualities we perceive any part of the perceptible world as “having” or “consisting of” are dependent upon and relative to the structure of our sense organs—a view which, when taken to its logical conclusions, leads to contradictions. 
Now, our sense organs—on which the qualities we perceive a part of the perceptible world as “having” or “consisting of” are said to depend—are themselves parts of the perceptible world, and, as such, the qualities we perceive our sense organs (e.g., Our eyes) as “having” or “consisting of” are likewise dependent upon and relative to our sense organs (e.g., Our hands). However, these “second-order” sense organs (e.g., Our hands)—on which the qualities we perceive the “first-order” sense organs (e.g., Our eyes) as “having” or “consisting of” depend—are, in turn, themselves parts of the perceptible world, and so the qualities we perceive the “second-order” sense organs (e.g., Our hands) as “having” or “consisting of” depend upon a “third-order” of sense organs (e.g., Our nose and tongue), or—Heaven forbid—upon the “first-order” sense organs again (e.g., Our eyes). There is no end to the mutual dependence. However, if, as Common-Sense holds, the qualities we perceive a part of the perceptible world as “having” or “consisting of” are themselves actual features of that part of the perceptible world we perceive them as inhering in, then we are either sent off into a vicious regress or entrapped within a vicious circle. In the former case, we are led into an inconsistency: all parts of the perceptible world (including our sense organs) dissolve into “states” of “states” of “states” of an unknown X—a “something-we-know-not-what” never to be found. In the latter case, we are led to an absurd contradiction: our sense organs would have given rise to the whole perceptible world of which our sense organs are proper parts—“into the man’s head the whole world goes, including the head itself.”
The above argument is a refinement of a similar argument from A.E. Taylor’s 1903 work, Elements of Metaphysics, page 198-199.

Monday, October 31, 2022

Answering a Reply to “Why Materialism Cannot Genuinely Explain Experience”

I recently received a reply to my article, “Why Materialism Cannot Genuinely Explain Experience,” and I wanted to provided a detailed answer to the commenter’s questions. He writes: 
“If X is (E—X) then isn’t ((E—X)—X) the same as (X—X)? And what does the notation mean anyways?”
Think of each pair of parentheses as representing a particular concept, and think of whatever is between each pair of parentheses as representing the content of said concept. The “—” symbol is used to make the distinction between certain contents internal to a concept. With regard to your other question, I think the following passage from McTaggart’s Studies in Hegelian Cosmology helps clarify what I am getting at: 
“If…we tried to explain the idea of a parent merely in terms of the idea of a child, we should have fallen into a vicious circle, since we should find that the idea of a child could not be explained except in relation to the idea of a parent.” (McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, §69)
As McTaggart points out, the concept of “Child” cannot be understood or grasped apart from the concept of “Parent;” and so it follows that the concept of “Parent” features in the concept of “Child” as one of its conceptual contents. In other words, the concept of “Child” is conceptually sense-dependent upon the concept of “Parent.” We can represent this with the following notion. Let P represent the concept of “Parent,” and let (P—X) represent the concept of “Child.” (In this particular instance, X serves as a placeholder for conceptual content that is not itself conceptually-sense dependent upon the concept of “Parenthood.” In my original essay, X is not only a placeholder, but also the very concept that the Materialist attempts to explain Experience in terms of). If we were to explain the concept of “Parent” in terms of the concept of “Child,” then we would have to explain P in terms of (P—X). However, this cannot be done unless we first explain (P—X) in terms of ((P—X)—X); but this cannot be done unless we first explain ((P—X)—X) in terms of (((P—X)—X)—X); but this cannot be done unless we first explain (((P—X)—X)—X) in terms of ((((P—X)—X)—X)—X). And so on, and so on, ad infinitum. And this circle is clearly vicious.

Now, just as the concept of “Child” cannot be understood or grasped apart from the concept of “Parent,” so too is it the case that the concept of “Parent” cannot be understood apart from the concept of “Child.” Thus, the concept of “Child” features in the concept of “Parent” as one of its conceptual contents. And so, it follows that the concept of “Parent” is conceptually sense-dependent on the concept of “Child.” We can represent this with the following notion. Let C represent the concept of “Child,” and let (C—X) represent the concept of “Parent.” If we were to explain the concept of “Child” in terms of the concept of “Parent,” then we would have to explain C in terms of (C—X). However, this cannot be done unless we first explain (C—X) in terms of ((C—X)—X); but this cannot be done unless we first explain ((C—X)—X) in terms of (((C—X)—X)—X); but this cannot be done unless we first explain (((C—X)—X)—X) in terms of ((((C—X)—X)—X)—X). And so on, and so on, ad infinitum. And this circle is clearly vicious. 

While it is the case that the concept of “Parent” and the concept of “Child” are reciprocally sense-dependent, it is not the case that the concept of “Experience” and the concept of “Matter” (i.e., the Materialist’s X) are reciprocally sense-dependent. As I say in my article:
“Further, X, as a concept, had its conceptual content and determinate meaning exhausted by facts “internal to” Experience. But this just means that X is conceptually sense-dependent upon facts “internal to” Experience; in other words, one cannot grasp or understand X without grasping or having a prior understanding of certain facts “internal to” Experience or Experience itself. On the other hand, it is clear that one can grasp or understand Experience, and facts “internal to” Experience, without ever grasping or understanding the Materialist’s X.”
In short, since the Materialist’s X is conceptually sense-dependent upon the concept of “Experience,” but the concept of “Experience” is not conceptually sense-dependent upon the Materialist’s X, it follows that Experience cannot be explained in terms of the Materialist’s X without the explanation becoming viciously circular; indeed, “the Materialist is forced by his own hand to presuppose at the very beginning of his explanation, the very presence of the phenomenon which he professes to have reached as the final result.” And so, with these clarifications out of the way, I think it is safe to say that it is impossible—in principle—for Materialism to genuinely explain Experience.