Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Qualities

It is frequently maintained that the secondary and tertiary qualities that appear to saturate the world of Experience are nothing more than residual excrescences supervening on the “extended.” This view gains its support by an appeal to the relativity of the world’s apparent qualitative characteristics in contrast to the alleged constancy and permanence of the world’s quantitative determinations. This is the view of Materialism. The Materialist places the “real” nature and essence of the world in the latter species of characteristics, whilst relegating the former to the realm of “unreality” and “appearance.”

Materialism proceeds in the following way:

The colors, textures, odors, sounds, temperatures, and tastes—all of which being qualities that we perceive objects as having—fluctuate and change in relation to the states of our sense organs and nervous systems. However, these Objects would have incompatible characteristics at the same time if all the colors, textures, odors, sounds, temperatures, and tastes that we perceived them as having were actual properties of said objects. Therefore, it follows, on pain of contradiction, that objects do not possess the colors, textures, odors, sounds, temperatures, and tastes which we perceive them as having (i.e., secondary, and tertiary qualities)—rather, they only “appear” to have them. Indeed, objects are really destitute of color,  texture,  odor, sound, warmth, roughness, smoothness, taste, and so on; they are neither painful nor pleasant, neither small nor large, neither swift nor slow.

However, if secondary and tertiary qualities neither inhere in, nor in any way constitute the “real” nature of objects, then what are these wandering “adjectives” really qualifying? After all, I find myself immersed in a presentational-continuum of secondary and tertiary qualities and, qualities qua qualities must be the “real” qualities of some “substantive”—they cannot be “adjectives” that “really” have themselves as their own “substantives.”

Furthermore, the objects of our dreams feel smooth or rough, they are seen as red or blue, we may feel that they resist our effort and will, they may be felt as heavy or light, we find them as being pleasant or unpleasant, they are taken to be agreeable or disagreeable, etc. However, it is clear that these dream-objects do not enter into those relations with my sense organs that objects of my waking-life must enter into for their “apparent” secondary and “apparent” tertiary qualities to come into being. Indeed, the “apparent” secondary and “apparent” tertiary qualities that I perceive dream-objects as having must really qualify them. For, when I dream, I may touch the smooth surface of an apple, taste its sweetness, observe its rounded shape and color; however, said apple would not in any way be impinging upon those “real” sense organs of my waking-life. On the other hand, if I am asleep under an apple tree, an apple (i.e., an apple existing in the world that I encounter in my waking-life) may fall from the tree and impinge upon my sense organs, but such an impingement would not result in said apple suddenly possessing an “apparent” redness, “apparent” smoothness, “apparent” roundness, etc., either for me, or for anyone else.

Suppose the Materialist suggests that these “apparent” secondary and “apparent” tertiary qualities latently “slumber” within our nervous systems, and that whenever we perceive objects (both in our dream-life and waking-life) it is actually our nervous systems that possess the “apparent” secondary and “apparent” tertiary qualities that we perceive the objects in our dream-life and waking-life as having. This cannot be the case. After all, according to the Materialist, our nervous systems are themselves objects, and neither secondary qualities nor tertiary qualities either inhere in, or in any way constitute them. Let’s illustrate the dilemma that would ensue. Take, for instance, a sense organ, such as an eye. For the Materialist, an eye, E1, like any other object, does not possess qualities (neither secondary nor tertiary), but only “appears” to possess qualities when it enters into a special relation with either (i) a mirror—itself an object, or (ii) another eye, E2—itself being another object. However, since (i) and (ii) are both objects, the Materialist is forced to maintain that neither (i) nor (ii) possess qualities—they only “appear” to possess qualities when they enter into special relations with either E1—itself an object, or another eye, E3—itself being another object. So too is the case for our nervous systems. A part of a nervous system, N1, is itself an object, so N1 does not possess qualities—it only “appears” to possess qualities when it enters into a special relation with another part of itself (or another nervous system), N2, which is itself destitute of qualities, and only “appears” to possess qualities when it enters into a special relation with either N1 or another part of itself (or another nervous system), N3; and so on, and so on, ad infinitum.  

Now, we saw that the Materialist condemns secondary qualities and tertiary qualities to the realm of “appearance” on the basis of their alleged impermanence and relativity to our sense organs and nervous systems. The Materialist then goes on to place the “reality” of the objects—i.e., their “inherent” properties—in spatial and quantitative characteristics. For, according to the Materialist, the extended and quantitative is unwavering in its permanence—it is the reliable, and palpable kernel of every object, irrespective of our nervous systems, our sense organs, and our Experience. The Materialist maintains that he arrives at this result by means of argument and empirical evidence. However, is their line of reasoning even valid? There are several objections which can be made against it.

Every object that we distinguish and isolate within the sphere of Experience is always presented to us as indissolubly infused with “apparent” primary qualities, “apparent” secondary qualities, and “apparent” tertiary qualities. Examples of the latter two kinds of “apparent” qualities include redness, hardness, smoothness, roundedness, and fragrance; painfulness, pleasantness, bitterness, calmness, soothing, tranquility, and so on. And it is clear that none of these “apparent” secondary and “apparent” tertiary qualities have any “real,” independent being apart from Experience. Now, while it is indeed the case that an object’s “apparent” tertiary qualities are abstractly distinguishable from its “apparent” secondary qualities and “apparent” primary qualities, it is an invalid and fallacious move to go on to say that because it’s “apparent” primary qualities, “apparent” secondary qualities, and “apparent” tertiary qualities are distinguishable in thought, they are therefore separate, independent, and externally related existences in Reality. For example, if, within condition X, it is the case that a, b, and c always accompany each other, it is obviously fallacious to infer from this that without condition X, it would still be the case that a, b, and c would accompany each other just as they did when condition X obtained; and, further, it would also be fallacious to infer that without condition X or c or b, it would still be the case that a would continue to exist in the same manner as it did when condition X obtained and when both b and c were present.

Again, is extension really a property of any object? Extension manifests itself to us only in sight and touch; however, on the Materialist’s view, this extension (i.e., extension-as-seen, extension-as-felt) is none other than an object’s “apparent” extension—and apart from the object’s entrance into certain relations with our sense organs and nervous system, this “apparent” extension doesn’t exist. But, based upon the facts that we have hitherto considered, how can the Materialist validly infer that the “apparent” spatial characteristics—which come to us as inseparably one with “apparent” secondary and “apparent” tertiary qualities—be properties inherent in objects? After all, we have no miraculous a priori intuition of objects as being “really” extended.

On the one hand, it is clear that the “apparent” extension of objects cannot itself be the “real” extension that the Materialist claims. This can be demonstrated in the following way. Whenever we go to sight and touch, we are met with a presentational-continuum of secondary qualities infused with primary qualities. In sight, we encounter “outspreaded” color—differentiated into diverse hues, varying in brightness and intensity; and, in touch, we discover sensations of texture and resistance—exhibiting a certain degree of hardness, smoothness, warmth. These primary and secondary qualities beheld in sight and touch are always infused with tertiary qualities. And, as we have seen above, the Materialist holds that neither secondary nor tertiary qualities are properties of objects. Furthermore, since an object’s “apparent” extension is always infused with “apparent” redness, “apparent” hardness, “apparent” smoothness, “apparent” roundedness, “apparent” pleasantness, “apparent” calmness, etc., the Materialist cannot take this “apparent” extension as something “real” and independently of this “fusion”—on pain of committing a fallacious inference. As we said above: 

If, within condition X, it is the case that a, b, and c always accompany each other, it is obviously fallacious to infer from this that without condition X, it would still be the case that a, b, and c would accompany each other just as they did when condition X obtained; and, further, it would also be fallacious to infer that without condition X or c or b, it would still be the case that a would continue to exist in the same manner as it did when condition X obtained and when both b and c were present.

On the other hand, since the Materialist holds that the “apparent” qualities of objects depend for their existence upon said objects entering into special relations with our sense organs, it immediately follows that the “apparent” spatial characteristics of objects likewise depend for their existence upon said objects entering into special relations with our sense organs. In fact, the Materialist commits himself to the “real” properties of objects being sheltered behind a veil of “appearances”—the “real” properties remaining forever “unbeheld” by us. For, if the “real” spatial characteristics of objects were themselves the object’s “apparent” spatial characteristics, then objects’ “real” spatial characteristics would depend for their existence upon the aforementioned objects entering into special relations with our sense organs—said organs (themselves being objects) having their “real” spatial characteristics only upon their entrance into special relations with other sense organs, and so on, ad infinitum. Furthermore, it is fallacious to infer from an object’s “apparent” spatial characteristics to said object “really” possessing spatial characteristics. Therefore, in order for the Materialist to solidify a foundation for his theory, he must find an object which not merely “appears” to possess spatial characteristics, but “really” does possess spatial characteristics. However, such an endeavor is impossible on the Materialist’s own theory.

As we said above, according to the Materialist’s own theory, the “apparent” qualitative and “apparent” spatial characteristics of objects all depend for their existence upon said objects’ entrance into certain special relations with our sense organs, A. However, this prompts another question. We are forced to ask the Materialist whether or not our sense organs, A, (i.e., the ground of objects’ “apparent” qualitative and “apparent” spatial characteristics) are themselves spatially extended. The Materialist now encounters a dilemma. If he says yes, then he must hold that the real spatial characteristics of any object are identical to its “apparent” spatial characteristics—for, as we have seen above, it is fallacious to infer from an object’s “apparent” spatial characteristics to said object “really” possessing spatial characteristics. Since the Materialist is forced to concede that the real spatial characteristics of any object are identical to its “apparent” spatial characteristics, he lands into a deeper inconsistency. Our sense organs, A, are themselves objects (and, according to the Materialist, really have spatial characteristics), and so A’s real spatial characteristics (i.e., its “apparent” spatial characteristics) have no existence apart from A entering into special relations with our sense organs, B. However, if A’s real spatial characteristics have no existence apart from A’s entrance into a special relation with our sense organs, B, we must ask whether or not B (i.e., those sense organs which are the ground of A’s real spatial characteristics) really has spatial characteristics. We soon find that B, like all other objects, suffers the same fate as A. Since our sense organs, B, are themselves objects, the Materialist is forced to say that B’s real spatial characteristics have no existence apart from B’s entrance into special relations with our sense organs, C, and so on, ad infinitum.

In short, the Materialist must say, and yet cannot say, that objects really have spatial characteristics. On the one hand, if the Materialist says that objects really have spatial characteristics, then he could only do so by venturing into inconsistency by an invalid inference based upon the “apparent” qualitative and “apparent” spatial characteristics of objects that he himself has condemned as not being properties of objects. On the other hand, if the Materialist maintains that the real spatial characteristics of any object are identical to its “apparent” spatial characteristics, then he lands into a vicious regress.

Why Materialism Cannot Genuinely Explain Experience

“The terms Subject and Object (Subjective and Objective) denote complementary ‘moments’ of a concrete fact—‘moments’ which necessarily emerge as correlated opposites within any and every ‘actual’ cognizant experience when that is raised (or raises itself) to the reflective level; or when (as I expressed it less accurately before) it is subjected to philosophical (‘critical’) analysis. The terms mean nothing, except when applied to ‘moments’ within their ‘concrete fact’—within some specific form or individual type of ‘actual’ knowledge; and, when thus applied, each means precisely that which, within the concretum, is not (is the contrasted correlative of) that which is meant by the other. Nothing, in short, is a subject or subjective, an object or objective, as such and per se. There is no activity of knowing—no act or process, for example, of perceiving, judging, or inferring—which when abstracted from the concrete fact of knowledge (from, for example, the perception, judgment, inference) has any character at all. The activity of knowing (perceiving, judging, inferring, &c.) is one of two ‘moments’ inseparable within, and presupposing, a concretum; and, within that concretum both ‘moments’ deserve, and receive, their respective appellation (viz. subjective and objective) precisely because the one is not, and can never be or become, the other.” (Joachim, Logical Studies, 151-152) 

Experience is that which is exhaustively self-differentiated, to, through, and for itself; and, in conceiving any actual “piece” of Reality, one is bound, by necessity, to conceive of an Experience, or a determination thereof. No actuality is conceivable otherwise; for all sensible and thinkable actualities are unities of meaning, saturated and sustained in-and-through a continuous atmosphere of Experience; an Experience within which said unities of meaning have their respective places as beings of an intentional-constitution—moments of actual or possible appreciation and contemplation for that Experience itself—the Subject. Experience is a Many-felt-in-One; a Multiplicity-in-Unity; a world of interpenetrating microcosms of meaning and ideal content, enveloped within a richer, all-embracing macrocosm; a boundless, internally-differentiated nebula of feeling; a continuous sphere wherein Subjectivity and Objectivity live and move together as distinguishable factors participating in a single, organic unity—a unity that does not exclude or negate differences, but embraces and preserves them. 

Experience is neither mere Subjectivity, or a barren, isolated, private “I”, nor is Experience mere Objectivity, or a mere fulguration of an ordered sequence or pattern of “sensa” or “percepta”; rather, Experience is, strictly speaking, a concrete, living Substance—it is a Substance within which Subjectivity and Objectivity are abstractly-distinguishable, coordinate factors, aspects, or or determinations. Experience is not the mere “togetherness” or “compresence” of Subject and Object; for, there is always a relatively determinable margin of Experience which, despite being present, falls outside the radius of explicit attention; this subliminal “surplus” wades in the margins of any given Experience and always “coats” or “qualifies” each moment of Experience with a unique “aura” or “tone.”

The Empire of Experience is without circumference or margin; its Kingdom is infinite. Its infinitude is evidenced by its all-embracing inclusivity and self-transcendency. Indeed, there is nothing beyond its scope; for, to reach beyond the pale of Experience is to disclose that which hath already lied within its grasp. Unfortunately, the sovereignty of Experience has not always been respected, let alone acknowledged. Time and again, Experience has been threatened by an ancient force that has sought to dissolve it into a storm of illusive material and physical factors. This ancient creed is none other than Materialism. Materialism stands or falls with its ability to explain Experience. Indeed, rather than treating Experience as the principle of explanation and discovery, the Materialist, “from defect of nature or of education, or probably both,” is led by an untutored instinct to explain the fact of Experience in terms of the abstract and unreal.  Let us follow the Materialist along this dreary path and see how he fares. 

Now, in explaining Experience, the Materialist starts off by making two fundamental mistakes—two missteps that are characteristic of all Materialistic explanations of Experience. Firstly, the Materialist fails to recognize two crucial facts that live and move within Experience: (i) the fact that, within Experience, the Subject of Consciousness and the Object of Consciousness are mutually implicative of each other, and (ii) the non-Objectified margin of Experience works to shape the character of the Object of Consciousness. The fatal consequences of the Materialist’s negligence of these facts will lurk in the background and haunt the entirety of his explanation. Indeed, the Materialist’s uncanny affinity for abstraction and division leads him to treat the Subjective and Objective factors within Experience as isolated, independent, and externally related units—forgetting that, within Experience, we find the Subject of Consciousness and Object of Consciousness to be two, abstract, mutually-implying determinations, aspects, or moments, of that “Many-felt-in-One” that the Materialist so desperately seeks to explain. Secondly, before anyone even has time to blink, the Materialist makes another blunder: he mistakenly identifies Experience with either (i) the Subject of Consciousness, (ii) the Object of Consciousness, or (iii) certain sensuous, qualitative determinations (e.g., qualia) of the Object of Consciousness (or the non-Objectified margin of Experience).

Let us illustrate this miserable mistake with help from a “part-whole” analogy. The Materialist mistakenly identifies a “whole” with one of its isolated “proper parts”—said “proper part” most evidently being less than that “whole” of which it is a constituent “proper part.” Furthermore, said “whole” (i.e., Experience) is not only richer in content than said isolated “proper part,” but also has a unique, qualitative, multi-dimensional structure (i.e., a Subject-dimension, a non-Perspectival-dimension, and a Perspectival-dimension) that is non-isomorphic to that of any of its “proper parts” taken singly. How on earth can a “proper part” of a “whole” give rise to that “whole” of which it is but a “proper part?” If you are a Materialist, and you wish to explain the fact of Experience, I only ask that you do justice to Experience by actually keeping in mind what Experience actually is.

Now, it doesn’t matter whether the Materialist mistakes Experience for the Subject of Consciousness, the Object of Consciousness, or certain sensuous, qualitative determinations of the Object of Consciousness; for, all three options are ultimately failures—but the Materialist doesn’t realize this. Indeed, he pushes even further by performing a biopsy on the Object of Consciousness.  The Materialist, forgetting that the Object of Consciousness’s determinate character is contributed in part by the Subject of Consciousness and that determinable, non-Objectified margin of Experience, attempts to strip the Object of Consciousness of any and all Subject-implying determinations and any and all Experience-implying determinations.  The biopsic operation destroys the datum upon which the Materialist was ravaging for answers, leaving him with a contentless, intangible, abstract, hypothetical, and unreal X. The Materialist divines this X to be an independent and self-subsisting “thing-in-itself” with causal efficacy. The Materialist cherishes this meager shadow of a reality as the answer to all of his difficulties. However, he soon realizes that his precious X has only a hypothetical existence—an existence “only in the understanding,” rather than an existence in reality. With the help of a bastardized form of the ontological proof, the Materialist establishes the unconditioned existence and reality of X by virtue of the fact that X would be much greater for his explanation if X actually existed in reality rather than as a mere concept “in the understanding.”

Having established to his liking the unconditioned existence of X, the Materialist now tries to spin the concrete and actual out of the desolate and the barren.  However, as was seen above, both the concept and unconditioned existence of X were arrived at with the help of several blunders and illegitimate inferences.  Further, X, as a concept, had its conceptual content and determinate meaning exhausted by facts “internal to” Experience. But this just means that X is conceptually sense-dependent upon facts “internal to” Experience; in other words, one cannot grasp or understand X without grasping or having a prior understanding of certain facts “internal to” Experience or Experience itself.¹ On the other hand, it is clear that one can grasp or understand Experience, and facts “internal to” Experience, without ever grasping or understanding the Materialist’s X.  Now, when the Materialist attempts to explain the existence of Experience in terms of X, or the emergence of Experience from X, he fails to see that the driving force of his explanation not only presupposes, but also depends upon for its meaning and “sense,” the presence of Experience within it. Furthermore, since facts “internal to” Experience exhaust X’s conceptual content and meaning, it follows that Experience cannot be eliminated from any posited X without said posited entity becoming meaningless and “sense-less.” As such, the Materialist’s explanation is self-condemned from the start. Indeed, vicious circularity haunts the Materialist at every turn. The following illustration should help visualize the Materialist’s dilemma. Let E represent Experience, and let (E—X) represent X. The Materialist, as we have seen, must explain E in terms of X; however, this just means that he must explain E in terms of (E—X). However, this cannot be done unless he first explains (E—X) in terms of ((E—X)—X); but this cannot be done unless he first explains ((E—X)—X) in terms of (((E—X)—X)—X); but this cannot be done unless he first explains (((E—X)—X)—X) in terms of ((((E—X)—X)—X)—X). And so on, and so on, ad infinitum. And this circle is clearly vicious.²

The Materialist is forced by his own hand to presuppose at the very beginning of his explanation, the very presence of the phenomenon which he professes to have reached as the final result. Therefore, it is impossible—in principle—for Materialism to genuinely explain Experience.

Footnotes:

^[1] Conceptual sense-dependence can be explained in the following way:

“Concept P is sense dependent on concept Q just in case one cannot count as having grasped P unless one counts as grasping Q….A paradigmatic sense dependence claim is Sellars’ classic argument in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind that one cannot master the use of “looks” talk without having mastered the use of “is” talk. The concepts nail and hammer may be related like this: one cannot understand what a nail is—something meant to be driven by a hammer—without understanding what a hammer is….Another example: the property being produced by a reliable belief-forming mechanism is conceptually dependent on that of being a true belief, because to be a reliable belief-forming mechanism is to produce beliefs that are likely to be true.” (Brandom, Holism and Idealism in Hegel’s Phenomenology, 78-79) 

^[2] I figured that it would be helpful to include a couple of passages that go into detail about what constitutes a “vicious regress of explanation.”

“Vicious regress of explanation: At each stage, n, an instance of a puzzle is posed an an explanation offered, and this explanation gives rise to a new instance of the puzzle, forming stage n+1; and furthermore, the success of the explanation at stage n depends on the puzzle at stage n+1 being resolved.” (Cameron, The Moving Spotlight: An Essay on Time and Ontology, 60)   

“Here, again, I think Russell clearly right in holding that there is one kind of “regress” which is always fatal to any hypothesis which implies it. No intelligible proposition can be such that an infinite “regress” arises in the very attempt to state its meaning. An apparent proposition P₀ which turns out to be such that we cannot state its meaning without first stating as parts of that meaning the infinite series of propositions P₁, P₂,…, P_n,…, P_ω, must be no proposition at all but a mere unmeaning noise. For, as we can never exhaust an infinite series by enumeration of its terms, we could never know definitely what such a P₀ means, and every proposition must have a fully determinate meaning. Hence for us, at any rate, P₀ is no proposition at all.” (Taylor, Philosophical Studies, 47-48)

Fragmentary Notes §15—§16

§15

I would say that I hold to a form of Absolute Idealism. My thinking is heavily influenced by the late-19th and early-20th century American Idealists (e.g. Royce, Calkins, Cunningham, Hollands, and Blanshard) and British Idealists (e.g. Bradley, Bosanquet, Haldane, McTaggart, Ward, Stout, etc.). I am also greatly indebted to the genius insights of Arthur Schopenhauer.

§16

I view Reality as a concrete, all-inclusive, and systematic whole, saturated with meaning and value—it is a unity-in-difference which exhibits a principle of coherence, comprehensiveness, and intelligibility. Furthermore, I hold that Reality (i.e., the Absolute) is genuinely conceivable or thinkable only in terms of “Mind,” “Spirit,” or “Experience.” Indeed, I would say that the Absolute is one with my own center of Experience and other centers of Experience as that concrete and actual system of meanings which rational, purposive agents (as well as non-rational agents) possessive of those centers of Experience, must acknowledge and take into consideration (or conform to) in the pursuit and fulfillment of their respective subjective interests, goals, plans, desires, and fundamental needs. I like to think of myself as maintaining a holistic conception of metaphysics, as well as a synoptic philosophical methodology—a method that is vehemently anti-reductionist in its approach and conclusions.

“Speculative idealism...takes the standpoint of concrete experience, which is also the standpoint of common sense and science.  It begins by viewing mind and the objective system of nature as distinct, and it never dreams of identifying them; they remain distinct to the end.  But speculative idealism does not permit their distinction to blind it to the fact that they are complementary; they are for it what they are in concrete experience, namely inseparably related aspects of that conscious life which is experience.  It also accepts as complementary, and obviously so, the relation of the individual mind to the minds of other individuals. In other words, it accepts as complementary the social relationship between mind and mind.  Thus for speculative idealism there are three moments or coordinates within experience: the self, other selves, and nature.  These are accepted as they present themselves within experience as irreducible and ultimate distinctions.  But, while recognizing their difference, speculative idealism also recognized their complementary nature and relationship.  It does not accept them as discrete existences or entities each with its own independent self-enclosed center; holding on to the standpoint of concrete experience, it accepts them as complementary coordinates within experience.” (Cunningham, The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy, 296)

Fragmentary Notes §11—§14

§11

If we were to take infinitely many coplanar geometrical figures of various determinate shapes and sizes, and have them expand, contract, and scurry about a single plane of indefinite extent for an indefinite time, we can rest assured that no transformation, redistribution, pattern, or collision of said figures will ever yield a new figure with “cubical content”—a figure that not only exhibits a new dimension, but also envelops the aforementioned coplanar geometrical figures whose transformations, redistributions, patterns, or collisions gave rise to it. Indeed, all qualitative changes and transformations in those figures—and patterns thereof—will always be determinate manifestations of a generic character—or determinable—that had hitherto manifested itself in another determinate form.  If, after an indefinite time, a change in the arrangement of those coplanar geometrical figures resulted in the manifestation of a new figure exhibiting “cubical content” enveloping those aforementioned coplanar geometrical figures, then said manifestation would be the manifestation of a new determinable that was itself “inclusive of” the former determinable, without itself being “included under it” as a determinate manifestation of said determinable.  Such a disparate breach of continuity is paralleled in the idea that—at some point in time—Experience was “birthed” by transformations, redistributions, and modifications of Matter.

§12

(A) Matter has its center “out-of-itself.”

(B) Experience has its center “in-itself.” 

§13

(A) Matter is that which is exhaustively differentiated “out-of-itself.” (e.g. “Partes extra partes”)

(B) Experience is that which is exhaustively differentiated “into-itself.” (e.g. “Partes intra partes”)

§14

Qualitative and relational changes (e.g. transformations, dilations, expansions, translations, rotations, reflections, etc.) in that which is exhaustively differentiated “out-of-itself” cannot account for what would be the manifestation of a new determinable (hitherto unmanifested) that exhibits (i) an “internally-differentiated” structure that returns “into-itself,” and (ii) is “inclusive of” the “externally-differentiated” material factors or elements that gave rise to it.