Fragmentary Notes §15—§16

§15

I would say that I hold to a form of Absolute Idealism. My thinking is heavily influenced by the late-19th and early-20th century American Idealists (e.g. Royce, Calkins, Cunningham, Hollands, and Blanshard) and British Idealists (e.g. Bradley, Bosanquet, Haldane, McTaggart, Ward, Stout, etc.). I am also greatly indebted to the genius insights of Arthur Schopenhauer.

§16

I view Reality as a concrete, all-inclusive, and systematic whole, saturated with meaning and value—it is a unity-in-difference which exhibits a principle of coherence, comprehensiveness, and intelligibility. Furthermore, I hold that Reality (i.e., the Absolute) is genuinely conceivable or thinkable only in terms of “Mind,” “Spirit,” or “Experience.” Indeed, I would say that the Absolute is one with my own center of Experience and other centers of Experience as that concrete and actual system of meanings which rational, purposive agents (as well as non-rational agents) possessive of those centers of Experience, must acknowledge and take into consideration (or conform to) in the pursuit and fulfillment of their respective subjective interests, goals, plans, desires, and fundamental needs. I like to think of myself as maintaining a holistic conception of metaphysics, as well as a synoptic philosophical methodology—a method that is vehemently anti-reductionist in its approach and conclusions.

“Speculative idealism...takes the standpoint of concrete experience, which is also the standpoint of common sense and science.  It begins by viewing mind and the objective system of nature as distinct, and it never dreams of identifying them; they remain distinct to the end.  But speculative idealism does not permit their distinction to blind it to the fact that they are complementary; they are for it what they are in concrete experience, namely inseparably related aspects of that conscious life which is experience.  It also accepts as complementary, and obviously so, the relation of the individual mind to the minds of other individuals. In other words, it accepts as complementary the social relationship between mind and mind.  Thus for speculative idealism there are three moments or coordinates within experience: the self, other selves, and nature.  These are accepted as they present themselves within experience as irreducible and ultimate distinctions.  But, while recognizing their difference, speculative idealism also recognized their complementary nature and relationship.  It does not accept them as discrete existences or entities each with its own independent self-enclosed center; holding on to the standpoint of concrete experience, it accepts them as complementary coordinates within experience.” (Cunningham, The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy, 296)

Fragmentary Notes §11—§14

§11

If we were to take infinitely many coplanar geometrical figures of various determinate shapes and sizes, and have them expand, contract, and scurry about a single plane of indefinite extent for an indefinite time, we can rest assured that no transformation, redistribution, pattern, or collision of said figures will ever yield a new figure with “cubical content”—a figure that not only exhibits a new dimension, but also envelops the aforementioned coplanar geometrical figures whose transformations, redistributions, patterns, or collisions gave rise to it. Indeed, all qualitative changes and transformations in those figures—and patterns thereof—will always be determinate manifestations of a generic character—or determinable—that had hitherto manifested itself in another determinate form.  If, after an indefinite time, a change in the arrangement of those coplanar geometrical figures resulted in the manifestation of a new figure exhibiting “cubical content” enveloping those aforementioned coplanar geometrical figures, then said manifestation would be the manifestation of a new determinable that was itself “inclusive of” the former determinable, without itself being “included under it” as a determinate manifestation of said determinable.  Such a disparate breach of continuity is paralleled in the idea that—at some point in time—Experience was “birthed” by transformations, redistributions, and modifications of Matter.

§12

(A) Matter has its center “out-of-itself.”

(B) Experience has its center “in-itself.” 

§13

(A) Matter is that which is exhaustively differentiated “out-of-itself.” (e.g. “Partes extra partes”)

(B) Experience is that which is exhaustively differentiated “into-itself.” (e.g. “Partes intra partes”)

§14

Qualitative and relational changes (e.g. transformations, dilations, expansions, translations, rotations, reflections, etc.) in that which is exhaustively differentiated “out-of-itself” cannot account for what would be the manifestation of a new determinable (hitherto unmanifested) that exhibits (i) an “internally-differentiated” structure that returns “into-itself,” and (ii) is “inclusive of” the “externally-differentiated” material factors or elements that gave rise to it.

My Idealism: A Reply to a Criticism

I decided to respond to some criticisms and objections that I encountered during my discussion with the YouTube channel, Axioms on Trial. Feel free to check out the original video here.

““I view experience as an atmosphere that is inclusive of that which it has as its context.” What a load. Sorry, but c’mon. It’s sociologically fascinating why folk like your idealist guests cling to theories (and I use the term loosely) like this, but philosophically this is all just so devoid of usefulness....I think idealism is silly, and I think continental philosophy is inscrutable, and so the combination of the two just set me on edge. Combine that with your metaphoric and poetic language, and frankly I don’t even see how you’re doing philosophy anymore. But I’m an analytic curmudgeon. You do you, my friend.”

I appreciate your reply. I’d like to make a brief correction. In your reply, you write that I “view experience as an atmosphere that is inclusive of that which it has as its context.” I don’t believe that I said that. If it came off that way, I apologize.

The original quote that the user posted was actually a misquote. And, as such, it sounds like gibberish. I’ll post the passage (Starting at 43:57 from the original discussion) which the user misquoted from:

“I think of Experience, and Experiences generally, as atmospheres, as opposed to two objects [colliding with each other], e.g. Experience being on the one side, and the Experienced object being on the other side, and there is somehow a collision between the two. I view Experience as an atmosphere that is inclusive of that which it has as its contents….Experience is not a kind of box. Rather, [Experience] saturates its contents. [Experience] is neither restricted to sensations nor perceptions, but also [includes] meanings….I may not perceive the far side of the moon, but its still an aspect of my Experience. I can still understand [the moon]; I can grasp the meaning of [the moon]; I might know facts about [the moon]. [The moon] is not something alien to my Experience; it still enters into [my Experience] in a way that is non-presentational as opposed to presentational. We [mistakenly] tend to treat Experience as an activity, or as a container, or a kind of box where things are placed in from the outside, as opposed to something that grows from within.”

I’ll attempt to clarify what I mean. I said that I view “Experience” as analogous to an atmosphere, an atmosphere that has “internally-differentiated” content (not “context”). I specifically chose “atmosphere” as a metaphor which best characterizes “Experience,” because atmospheres are illustrative of the continuity and nebulosity that we find at all levels of Experience. Furthermore, similar to how atmospheres envelop and sustain all that they enshroud, Experience saturates its contents with “meaning” and “significance.” Take, for example, Earth’s atmosphere. Not only does Earth's atmosphere “include” the totality of Earth’s organic life as its content, but it also serves as the vitalizing medium that saturates and sustains said organic life. Eliminate the atmosphere, eliminate the life. Furthermore, the organic life “included within” said atmosphere is also determinative of the atmosphere’s structure and wellbeing. For example, humans inhale oxygen from the atmosphere, and exhale carbon dioxide back into the atmosphere; plants “inhale” carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, and “exhale” oxygen into the atmosphere. Again, Earth’s organic life is a vastly differentiated into certain genera, particular species, individual organisms, etc.; each genus, species, and individual organism being differentiations, aspects, or “parts” of the differentiated “whole” of organic life itself (with certain “differentiations” being more determinate or “specific” than others). Now, we see that such a “internally-differentiated” system of organic life is “included within” as well as “sustained by,” Earth’s atmosphere; said system of organic life being the atmosphere’s “internally-differentiated” contents.

As was said above, the relation between Experience and the content which said Experience is inclusive of, is akin to that of the relation between an atmosphere and the organic life which said atmosphere envelopes and preserves. Just as Experience saturates and sustains the “meaning” and “significance” of its contents, so too does an atmosphere saturate and sustain its contents by supplying the necessary conditions for the emergence and thriving of organic life. This is the first parallel. What other parallels are there? Well, as was said above, Experience and atmospheres have “internally-differentiated” contents. I already touched upon how this is the case with respect to atmospheres, so I’ll briefly turn to Experience as such. When I speak of the “internally-differentiated” content of Experience, I do not mean that the content of Experience consists merely in “sensuous” phenomena, like tastes, smells, sounds, colors, textures, bodily feelings, etc. While said “sensuous” phenomena do indeed make up much of the content we find within the sphere of Experience, it is not at all the case that Experience is merely “sensuous.” On the contrary, it is more accurate to say that the content of Experience is exhausted by “meanings.” “Meaning” encompasses both the “sensuous” and “non-sensuous” sides of Experience—both sides are really inseparable, and are only abstractly distinguishable in reflection. I use the term “meaning,” to refer to that determinable somewhat which is capable of being “for” a Subject’s actual and/or possible appreciation and/or acknowledgement.

Furthermore, the whole of Experience, and each of its differentiated moments (“moment” being used here in the sense that Hegel uses it; i.e. as “element,” “phase,” “aspect,” etc.), are exhausted by “meanings” appreciable in thought. All of these meanings manifest themselves “within” Experience, and are not “external” to it. I haven’t spoken of either the Subjective or Objective aspects of Experience, but I think this is unnecessary for now. In short, if anyone wishes to grasp the essence of Experience, one must (a) remain faithful to its immediacy, (b) appreciate the complexity of its determinable form and matter, (c) do justice to its concrete actuality and inclusivity, and (d) not only grasp, but also attempt to understand and articulate its unique and complex structure. Limitations of language—let alone the artificial boundaries of abstract formalisms—make such a task incredibly difficult and seemingly insurmountable; however, whether or not such a task is possible in the long-run cannot be known unless it is attempted. Recourse to metaphorical and poetical language is, in the end, inevitable when tackling such concrete problems as the nature of Experience and Ultimate Reality.

P.S.:

The empirical sciences have no need to resort to metaphor, but this is not due to their being “more in touch with Reality” than the philosopher or phenomenologist. On the contrary, it is a direct result of the lack of concreteness infecting the material which they investigate (e.g. pure mathematics being the bread and butter of certain branches of physics). The real is concrete and actual; it is not abstract and formal.

“All that exists, exists within Space and Time.”

Suppose it is maintained that “All that exists, exists within Space and Time.” But, nothing can exist within Space and Time unless Space and Time existed. But, ex hypothesi, something exists if and only if it exists within Space and Time. Therefore, if it is maintained that “All that exists, exists within Space and Time,” then one must maintain that Space and Time exist within Space and Time (on pain of contradiction). If they did not admit this, then they could not maintain that “All that exists, exists within Space and Time,” because X cannot exist “within” Y, unless Y itself existed for X to be “within” it. However, even if one admits that Space(1) and Time(1) exist within Space(2) and Time(2), another fatal problem arises. Space(1) and Time(1) could not exist within Space(2) and Time(2), unless Space(2) and Time(2) themselves existed. But, ex hypothesi, Space(2) and Time(2) could not exist unless Space(2) and Time(2) were within Space(3) and Time(3). But Space(2) and Time(2) could not exist within Space(3) and Time(3) unless Space(3) and Time(3) existed. But, ex hypothesi, Space(3) and Time(3) could not exist unless Space(3) and Time(3) were within Space(4) and Time(4). In short, a vicious infinite regress would have to come to an end before Space and Time could exist for things to exist within Space and Time. Ergo, one cannot admit, on pain of contradiction, that “All that exists, exists within Space and Time.”

“​I think PI needs some brain education. All perceptions are modified by our memory.”

If this is true, and all of my perceptions are “modified” by my memory, then I could have never had a first perception. Indeed, in order for me to have had my first perception, perception(1), said perception would have had to have been “modified” by my memory. However, my first perception(1) could never have been “modified” by my memory unless I already had another perception, perception(2), before perception(1), to serve as the basis of that memory which would “modify” perception(1). Furthermore, perception(2), being a perception, would itself have had to have been “modified” by my memory. But perception(2) could never have been “modified” by my memory unless I already had another perception, perception(3), before my perception(2), to serve as the basis of that memory which would “modify” my perception(2). In short, a vicious regress would have had to come to an end before I could ever have a first perception, perception(1). Ergo, since I do have perceptions, it cannot be the case that “All perceptions are modified by our memory.”

My Adaptation of Nick Thomas-Brown’s Argument for Idealism

P1) If, at a given time, a true proposition about every Object, at all times, is known relative to one or more Subjects, then every Object, at all times, is of such a nature as to be knowable relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time.

P2) If every Object, at all times, is of such a nature as to be knowable relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time, then no Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, is of such a nature as to be unknowable relative to one or more Subjects, at all times.

“Let us call something, X, “relatively” unknown when some but not all people fail to know propositional truths about X. Furthermore, we will call X “absolutely” unknown if, and only if, nobody knows any propositional truths concerning X. Now, it is clear that relative unknowns exist. Most people know nothing about the Cynic philosopher Hipparchia, but those who study ancient Greek philosophy surely know of her. Thus, Hipparchia is unknown relative to certain people at certain times. Suppose someone, A, does not know about Hipparchia at a time T. Given this, Hipparchia is unknown relative to A at T. It would, then, be a contradiction for A to know of Hipparchia at T. Hence, once it is admitted that Hipparchia is not known by A at T, it follows that she cannot be known by A at T. So, we can reasonably support the following epistemic theorem: whatever is unknown relative to someone at a certain time, is unknowable relative to her at that time. But, suppose that instead of being relatively unknown, Hipparchia is absolutely unknown. In other words, let us consider that Hipparchia is not known by anyone at any time. We might observe that this can be restated as the following: Hipparchia is unknown relative to any person at any given time. When combined with our discovered theorem, we can infer from this that Hipparchia is unknowable relative to any person at any time. Thus, we have reached a second epistemic theorem: whatever is absolutely unknown, is unknowable by anyone whatsoever.” (Thomas-Brown, Idealism and the Known Unknown, 3) 

C1) Therefore, if at a given time, a true proposition about every Object, at all times, is known relative to one or more Subjects, then no Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, is of such a nature as to be unknowable relative to one or more Subjects, at all times. [From P1 and P2]

P3) If no Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, is of such a nature as to be unknowable relative to one or more Subjects, at all times, then every Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, depends upon its being known relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time.

“Granted our two theorems, we can move to demonstrate that nothing absolutely unknown ever exists. We know as certainly as we can that any given entity is either square or not square, for this is an instance of the law of excluded middle. In grasping this universal truth, we know a truth concerning all things past, present, or future. If an absolute unknown existed, we would have some knowledge of it by way of such universal truths. But, it is a contradiction for an absolute unknown to be known by someone or other. Hence, if we are to have knowledge of universal truths at any time, there can never exist absolute unknowns. Yet, we do, of course, possess such knowledge; and, thus, no absolute unknowns exist, past, present, or future. Whatever exists or comes to exist is, therefore, known by someone or other at some time or other. In other words, to be is to be known and existence implies knowledge. Once we understand that something’s existence entails its being known, we can further see that its existence depends on its being known. However, the presence of knowledge presupposes that of a knower. Hence, the existence of a given object depends on there being an intelligent self or selves.” (Thomas-Brown, Idealism and the Known Unknown, 3-4)

C2) Therefore, if at a given time, a true proposition about every Object, at all times, is known relative to one or more Subjects, then every Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, depends upon its being known relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time. [From C1 and P3]

P4) At a given time, a true proposition about every Object, at all times, is known relative to one or more Subjects.

C3) Therefore, every Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, depends upon its being known relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time. [From C2 and P4]

All credit for the original version of this particular argument goes to Nick Thomas-Brown. Thomas-Brown published the argument in a 2019 paper titled “Idealism and the Known Unknown.”