My Adaptation of Giovanni Gentile’s “Conceivability Argument” for Idealism

P1) No actual, concrete being is conceivable otherwise than as an actual, concrete unity of meaning.

“Reality is conceivable only insofar as the reality conceived is conceived as being in relation to the activity of a Mind which conceives it, and in that relation it is not only a possible object of knowledge, but a present and actual one. To conceive a reality is to conceive, at the same time and as one with it, a Mind in and for which said reality manifests itself; and therefore the concept of a material reality is absurd....The concept of bodies existing generally outside all Mind, is a self-contradictory concept, since we can only meaningfully speak of things that are either objects of knowledge, or things that are conceived as objects of knowledge; and objects of knowledge are manifestations-to-and-for-Mind; they are ideas....The object, even when thought of as outside all Mind, is always mental….When we believe that we are actually conceiving a reality outside all Mind, we falsify our belief by conceiving of said reality as something which retains its meaning and sense in the absence of all Mind; for, even then, Mind is intervening and powerless to abstain from intervening, in the very act by which we affirm Mind’s absence.” (Gentile, Teoria Generale Dello Spirito Come Atto Puro, 1-4) [Translated by me] 

“For everything is within consciousness, and no way can be devised of issuing forth from it. We say that the brain is external to consciousness, and that the cranium encloses the brain, which in turn is enveloped by space luminous and airy, space filled with beautiful plants and beautiful animals; yet the fact remains that brain and skull and everything else are the potential or actual object of our thinking faculty, and cannot but remain therefore within that consciousness to which for a moment we supposed them to be external. We may start thinking, keeping in mind this indestructible substance of our thought; and as we proceed from this centre in which we have placed ourselves as subjects of thinking, and advance towards an ever-receding horizon, do we ever come in sight of the point where we must pause and say: “Here my thought ends; here something begins that is other than my thought”? Thought halts only before mystery. But even then it thinks it as mystery, and thinking it, transforms it, and then proceeds, and so never really stops. Such being the true life of the spirit, rightly have we called it universal. At every throb it soars through the infinite, without ever encountering aught else than its own spiritual actualisations. In this life, such as we see it from the interior when we do not fantastically materialize it with our imaginations, the spirit is free because it is infinite.” (Gentile, The Reform of Education, 56-57) 

“We give the name of realism to that manner of thinking which makes all reality consist in an external existence, abstract and separate from thought, and makes real knowledge consist in the conforming of our ideas to external things. By idealism on the other hand we mean that higher point of view from which we discover the impossibility of conceiving a reality which is not the reality of thought itself. For it, reality is not the idea as a mere object of the mind, which therefore can exist outside of the mind, and must exist there in order that the mind may eventually have the means of thinking it. Reality is this very thought itself by which we think all things, and which surely must be something if by means of it we want somehow to affirm any reality whatsoever, and must be a real activity if, in the act of thinking, it will not entangle itself in the enchanted web of dreams, but will instead give us the life of the real world. If it is not conceivable that such activity could ever go forth from itself and penetrate the presumably existent world of matter, then it means that it has no need of issuing from itself, in order to come in contact with real existence; it means that the reality which we call material and assume to be external to thought is in some way illusory; and that the true reality is that which is being realised by the activity of thought itself. For there is no way of thinking any reality except by setting thought as the basis of it.” (Gentile, The Reform of Education, 75)

“When Being is conceived as external to the human mind, and knowledge as separable from its object, so that the object could be without being known, it is evident that the existence of the object becomes a datum, something, as it were, place before the mind, something given to the mind, extraneous to it, and which the mind would never make its own did it not, summoning force encourage, swallow the bitter morsel by an irrational act of faith.  And yet all philosophy, as we go on unfolding it, shows that there is nothing outside mind, and there are therefore no data confronting it.  The very conceptions we form of this something, which is external, mechanical natural, show themselves to be not conceptions of data which already are external but data furnished to mind by itself.  Mind fashions this so-called external something because it enjoys fashioning it, and escapes by re-annulling it when it has no more joy in it.  Moreover, no one has yet found it possible to discover throughout the whole range of mind the mysterious and unqualifiable  faculty it requires,—faith.  It would have to be an intuition of the universal, or a though of the universal without the logical process of thought.  What is called an act of faith has been shown time and again to be an act of knowledge or an act of will, a theoretical or a practical form of mind.” (Croce, Logica, 120)

“There is no possible form of being which we can form a conception such that we can form a conception of its being actualized in some manner which is definitely non-psychical.  That is, with every possible form of being, though we may conceive it as actualized, without bringing its being experienced or otherwise into question, wherever we raise this question and try to conceive it either as actualized in a whole, or as a whole...which is experienced, or as actualized in detachment from any such whole...we find we can form a conception only of the first.” (Sprigge, The Vindication of Absolute Idealism, 127)

“[W]e can only think an object existing independently of our consciousness by thinking it as it would be if it were present to a mind. For example, if we are really to understand what is meant by talking of the state of the earth prior to man we must imagine some mind as contemplating it at the time…and think it as it would have been for that mind. We can make correct verbal statements about it without doing this, but this is the only way in which we can picture to ourselves what the statements really mean. Similarly, I can only realize other facts by picturing them as they would be for a knowing mind. It may even be contended that the only way in which I can think an a priori universal truth to be necessarily valid is by thinking it as such that any mind must necessarily accept it as true if he understands it.” (Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, 21) 

“Now we have already found an idealistic element in knowledge in the fact that in order to determine what something is we must first think what it would be for a mind fully and discriminately aware of it….For to think of objects of cognition as they are or would be for a knowing mind is a method necessary if we are to attain any truth at all. By this I do not mean merely the trivial tautology that what I cognize must stand in a relation, namely, the relation of being cognized, to a conscious mind, my own. I mean that to know any fact, X, or form any intelligible opinion about X, I must ultimately think X as it would be for a mind which was consciously aware of it as a present fact, though there may never be or have been such a mind...Thus ultimately we can only think of unperceived physical thinks in terms of a possible observer, in the sense that we must think them as if they were objects of actual present experience or rather conscious perception. A similar contention may be put forward even in regard to “necessary truths.” As far as I can see we can only think universal principles as true a priori by thinking them as in some sense necessary for any mind that accepts the premises on which they are based, by thinking of them as such that any mind which realized their meaning would be bound to accept them as true...The cognitive process…is idealistic…as it always involves thinking facts as they would be for as mind, as if they existed for a mind.” (Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, 56-58) 

“If we are to think of the spatial objects to which we usually give the name, physical, as existing unperceived by us…we must think of them…as objects of experience…by thinking of them as standing in the position of images relatively to a non-human experience….In order to think what physical objects are we must think of them as if they were objects of experience….For example, in order to give full intelligibility to propositions about the state of the earth prior to man, we must imagine some mind as contemplating it at the time when no human mind was in fact contemplating it, and think it as it would have been for that mind. We can make correct verbal statements without doing this, but this is the only way in which we can picture to ourselves what the statements really mean. In this sense, it may be true that propositions about material objects can only be interpreted in terms of experience, either actual experience or the imaginary experience of an imaginary observer.” (Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, 393-399) 

“There are, however, other ways to gloss Schopenhauer’s insistence that we cannot “imagine an objective world without a knowing subject.” One such alternative reading sets out from the thought that to conceive of a physical object, X, is to imagine X as perceived. And what is it to imagine X as perceived? It is to imagine how X would appear to a perceiver apprehending X from some perspective situated within the spatiotemporal world to which X belongs. To be sure, I may imagine an object—the Statue of Liberty, say—as perceived from more than one such perspective; of that there can be no doubt. However, what I cannot do is imagine it as it looks from the fabled “view from nowhere”—that is, as apprehended from absolutely no perspective at all. The upshot is that to conceive of a physical object is always to conceive of it as “object for a subject”—that is, to imagine how it would appear from some perspective or other. But if this is correct—if “in the existence of matter we always think only of its being represented by a subject”—then we cannot conceive of physical objects as they are “in themselves,” or apart from the standpoint of perceivers.” (McDermid, Schopenhauer and Transcendental Idealism, 9)

P2) But an actual, concrete unity of meaning, logically presupposes an actual, concrete "sense-bestowing" Experience; an Experience which said being is either one with, or, in which and for which, said being has an intentionally constituted, unified, and determinate character.

“All empirical unities…are indicators of absolute systems of experience…[are] mere unities of an intentional “constitution”…[are] “merely intentional,” and therefore merely “relative.” To hold that they exist in an absolute sense is therefore absurd….In a certain sense and with proper care in the use of words we may even say that all real unities are “unities of meaning”. Unities of meaning presuppose…a sense-giving consciousness which, on its side, is absolute and not dependent in its turn on sense bestowed on it from another source….Reality and world, here used, are just the titles for certain valid unities of meaning, namely, unities of “meaning” related to certain organizations of pure absolute consciousness which dispense meaning and show forth its validity in certain essentially fixed, specific ways….[T]he whole being of the world consists in a certain “meaning” which presupposes absolute consciousness as the field from which the meaning is derived…” (Husserl, Ideas, §54-§55)

“The general Significance of the world, and the definite sense of its particulars, is something of which we are conscious within our perceiving, representing, thinking, valuing life, and therefore something “constituted” in some subjective genesis….We have to recognize that Relativity to Consciousness is not only an actual quality of our world, but, from eidetic necessity, the quality of every conceivable world. We may, in a free fancy, vary our actual world, and transmute it to any other which we can imagine, but we are obliged with the world to vary ourselves also, and ourselves we cannot vary except within the limits prescribed to us by the nature of Subjectivity. Change worlds as we may, each must ever be a world such as we could experience, prove upon the evidence of our theories, and inhabit with our practice.” (Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology, 189-190)

“The [objective component of experience is the] component of the not-self within my center of experience on which I especially concentrate my attention in doing so….When I see an object, the objective component, the relevant given part of the not-self, possesses shape and color, and perhaps “suggested” qualities such as a degree of felt warmth or coolness. Likewise, it normally possesses as part of its inherent character qualities pertaining to the thing’s recognized or actualized use value and its cultural significance….The given shape of what lies within experience is essentially perspectival, [and] depend[s] upon the position of the perceiver….And, of course, there are all the facts about the way in which the sensible character of the objective component of experience depends, as very little learning shows us, on the…varying states of [ourselves]. The aesthetic aspect of every form and quality of the objective component, the perspectival character of every shape found there, and the manner in which the particular uses we envisage or utilize in the thing bite into every aspect of the given object’s inherent being, all make nonsense of the idea that anything resembling it in anything but the most abstract of ways could exist outside consciousness. These facts make nonsense too of the more naïve kind of representational realism according to which the objective component is a close likeness of the thing we perceive by way of it. Naïve realism is incoherent, then, so long as it includes the idea that the thing perceived has, or could have, a being outside all consciousness.” (Sprigge, The Vindication of Absolute Idealism, 42-44) 

“In opposition to this view of the cognitive relation, the anti-realist maintains that the knowing process and the object known cannot stand in a relation in which one of the terms, the object, is independent of the other, the knowing act. No knowledge is conceivable if such be the relation between the knower and the thing known; unless in manner, the cognitive process determines its object, unless it works upon it and gives it a character, a significance in accordance with its own principles of working. He contends that the realist’s object since it is independent of our cognitive thinking, cannot even be thought about; no conception or idea can be relevant to it; it can therefore have no meaning, no definable content; and such as object, if we call it an object, is absolutely unknowable.” (Russell, A First Course in Philosophy, 154-155) 

“Experience is real, and it gives us our conviction of the reality of the world and ourselves….Experience subsists in the subject, and can only subsist thus; but the subject only experiences when related to an object. Hence we may not abstract experience from the subject or the object, certainly not from both. To reason to ultimate conclusions respecting anything, we must think of it in its true relations. To separate experience or any phase of it from the subject is to take it out of its true relations and to relate it externally to the subject and to experience; whereas it is in and of the subject and is therefore internally related….Every object of your experience has its being in the universe of your experience; it is a part of the universe as you conceive it and is organically united in your experience with everything with which you have had commerce. An arm has its being and its meaning as an organic part of a body. When we think of a man's arm, our thought involves an implicit recognition of his body. So every particular of your experience has its being and its meaning for you in its organic union with your experience as a whole; and when you think that object apart from the whole, there is involved in your thought an implicit recognition of the whole. No portion of experience can be particularized without implication of the whole of experience. No particular experience is merely a particular experience. No experience is simply an experience of the particular object.” (Fletcher, An Introduction to Philosophy, 131-183)

C1) Therefore, no actual, concrete being is conceivable otherwise than as a being which is one with an actual, concrete Experience, or a being which is in and for an actual, concrete Experience. [From P1 and P2]

P3) But an actual, concrete being which is one with an actual, concrete Experience is just an actual, concrete Experience, and a being which is in and for an actual, concrete Experience is just a determination thereof.

“To understand, much more to know, spiritual reality, is to assimilate it with ourselves who know it. We may even say that a law of the knowledge of spiritual reality is that the object be resolved into the subject. Nothing has for us spiritual value save insofar as it comes to be resolved into ourselves who know it….When we speak of spiritual fact we speak of mind, and to speak of mind is always to speak of concrete, historical individuality; of a subject which is not thought as such, but which is actualized as such. The spiritual reality, then, which is the object of our knowing, is not mind and spiritual fact, it is purely and simply mind as subject. As subject, it can, as we have said, be known on one condition only—it can be known only insofar as its objectivity is resolved in the real activity of the subject who knows it. In no other way is a spiritual world conceivable. Whoever conceives it, if he has truly conceived it as spiritual, cannot set it up in opposition to his own activity in conceiving it. Speaking strictly, there can be no others outside us, for in knowing them and speaking of them they are within us. To know is to identify, to overcome otherness as such. Other is a kind of stage of our mind through which we must pass in obedience to our immanent nature, but we must pass through without stopping. ” (Gentile, The Theory of Mind as Pure Act, 10-13)

“When we present the concept of our consciousness to ourselves we can only conceive it as a sphere whose radius is infinite. Because, whatever effort we make to think or imagine other things or other consciousnesses outside our own consciousness, these things or consciousnesses remain within it, precisely because they are posited by us, even though posited as external to us. The without is always within; it denotes, that is to say, a relation between two terms which, though eternal to one another, are both entirely internal to consciousness. There is for us nothing which is not something we perceive, and this means that however we define it, whether as external or internal, it is admitted within our sphere, it is an object for which we are the object. Useless is the appeal to the ignorance in which, as we know by experience, we once were and others may now be of the realities within our subjective sphere. In so far as we are actually ignorant of them, they are not posited by consciousness and therefore do not come within its sphere. It is clear that our very ignorance is not a fact unless at the same time it is a cognition. That is to say, we are ignorant only insofar either as we ourselves perceive that we do not know or as we perceive that others perceive what we do not. So that ignorance is a fact to which experience can appeal only because it is known. And in knowing ignorance we know also the object of ignorance as being external to the ambit of a given knowing. But external or internal it is always in relation to, and so within, some consciousness….And as we move with thought along all that is thinkable, we never come to our thought’s margin, we never come up against something other than thought, the presence of which brings thought to a stop….[The mind] is never able to refer to an object which is external to it, never able therefore to  be conceived as itself a real among reals, as a part only of the reality….Our whole experience moves between the unity of its center, which is mind, and the infinite multiplicity of the points constituting the sphere of its objects.” (Gentile, The Theory of Mind as Pure Act, 28-31)

“If I am to distinguish myself from any other reality, then, obviously, I must be conscious of this other reality. But how can I be conscious of it without it being in me? If the objects of consciousness were outside me, they would make no difference to my internal state, and, therefore, I should not be conscious of them. And, also, if they were outside me, I should not exist. For the pure I, though doubtless an essential moment of the self; is only a moment, and cannot stand alone. If we withdraw from it all its content—the objects of cognition and volition—it would be a mere abstract nonentity….Thus the nature of the self is sufficiently paradoxical. What does it include? Everything of which it is conscious. What does it exclude? Equally—everything of which it is conscious. What can it say is not inside it? Nothing. What can it say is not outside it? A single abstraction.” (McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, 21-24)

C2) Therefore, no actual, concrete being is conceivable otherwise than as an actual, concrete Experience or a determination thereof. [From C1 and P3]

P4) But Reality is actual and concrete—and Reality is not a determination of anything higher than itself; for Reality is self-determined, and has all of its determinations “internal” to itself.

“Ultimate reality [is that] into which all else can be resolved and which cannot itself be resolved into anything beyond, that in terms of which all else can be expressed and which cannot itself be expressed in terms of anything outside itself.” (Haldane, The Pathway to Reality, 19) 

“For Reality…must be a complete individual whole, with the ground of all its differentiations within itself.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 255)

“The whole…is a self-differentiating system. It is a whole that determines, by the principle of organization that is universal to all its parts and moments, the nature and interrelations of its elements, making them mutually interdependent and constitutive. Accordingly, if their distinction one from another is elevated into a separation, and if they are severally isolated from each other and from the system, as is wont to happen under the influence and operation of the understanding, they contradict themselves and one another, a contradiction symptomatic of defect that is occasioned by their mutual exclusion and the oversight of their mutual complementarity.” (Harris, The Spirit of Hegel, 142-143) 

C3) Therefore, Reality is conceivable only insofar as Reality is conceived as an actual, concrete Experience. [From C2 and P4]

My Adaptation of One of Mary Whiton Calkins’ Arguments for Idealism

The following argument is my version of one of Mary Whiton Calkins’ arguments for idealism. The essence of Calkins’ argument can be found in her book, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy. My argument expands upon Calkins’ ideas and attempts to solidify her intended conclusions. I am indebted to Kris McDaniel and his essay, The Idealism of Mary Whiton Calkins for influencing the spirit and presentation of my argument. For a further defense of several of the premises, please refer to my other post, My Adaptation of Giovanni Gentile’s “Conceivability Argument” for Idealism.

P1) No relations can obtain between two or more determinates unless there is a qualitative commonality obtaining between them.

“In the first place a relation, if it is to be a relation at all, must unite some terms. Secondly, most, if not all, kinds of relation presuppose a specific common character, usually or always of the type called by Mr. Johnson a determinable in the related terms, without which the assertion of the specific relation would be not merely false but absurd…” (Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, 128) 

“There can be no experience of plurality, whether of beings, qualities or events, that are absolutely disparate and disconnected—that is certain. All experienced diversity implies some identity; and, for the matter of that, all experienced identity some diversity. All this is so much logical commonplace. From this it follows that to every known or knowable Many there will be some common term applicable to them all, which logically unifies them all.” (Ward, The Realm of Ends, 222) 

“Every relation implies an identity underlying the manifest difference in the terms…” (Carr, A Theory of Monads, 1) 

“Neither duality nor multiplicity is conceivable without that unity whereby the two engender that whole in which the two units are connected, even though they mutually exclude one another: without that unity which fuses and unifies every multiplicity determined in a number, which correlates among themselves the units which constitute the number. We could strip multiplicity of all unity only by not thinking it. But then in the gloom of what is not thought, multiplicity truly enough would not be unity, but it would not even be multiplicity, because it could not be anything at all. Or, if we prefer, it would be absolutely unthinkable.” (Gentile, The Reform of Education, 107)

P2) A necessary condition for a qualitative commonality obtaining between two or more determinates is for said determinates to be of the same ontological kind—said ontological kind being none other than that “higher” determinable (or genus) through which said determinates must be conceived in order for their interrelatedness to be conceivable.

“Spatial relations presuppose in this way the common determinable of extension….the relation of similarity presupposes some common determinable in the determinate value of which the objects are said to be similar, the relations of enmity or love the common determinable of emotional capacity, the relation of causality the common character of being events or continuants in time, and perhaps membership in some specific causal system…..[A relation] could not be present at all if its terms were not characterized by a certain determinable and if their determinate qualities within this and other subordinate determinables did not fall within certain limits….” (Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, 129-130) 

“What, it will be asked, is a whole? It is defined ordinarily in some such fashion: the sum of the relations of distinct yet connected parts. What, then, is a relation? It cannot, in the first place, be external to the parts which it relates, else it would still be another reality and would itself need to be related with all the rest; and the new relation would again need relating, and so on ad infinitum. A relation external to the terms related would, in a word, be useless to them: it could not be their relation. As Hegel says, in “a unity of differents…, a composite, an aggregate…, the objects remain independent and…external to each other.” And yet, though a relation cannot be external to the terms which it relates, neither can it be a quality inherent in any or in every one of them. For the quality, or attribute, or function, which is in a particular reality, cannot be the bond between that particular and some other. In other words, if ultimate reality were a composite of completely related terms, and if the relations between the terms were qualities of the terms, each for each, then the relations would themselves need relating with each other, for each would belong to some particular reality. There is no escape from this difficulty except by the abandonment of the conception of ultimate reality as a composite, and the alternative conception of it as a whole which is also a singular, an absolute reality whose unique nature is manifested in the particular realities which form its parts. These parts, therefore, need no external relation; they are related in that they are alike expressions of the one reality.” (Calkins, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 380-381)

C1) Therefore, no relation can obtain between two or more determinates unless said determinates are of the same ontological kind—said ontological kind being none other than that “higher” determinable (or genus) through which said determinates must be conceived in order for their interrelatedness to be conceivable. [From P1 and P2]

P3) The Subject-dimension of Experience, and that which manifests itself, perspectivally and non-perspectivally, to and for the Subjective-dimension of Experience, are interrelated determinates.

C2) Therefore, the Subject-dimension of Experience, and that which manifests itself, perspectivally and non-perspectivally, to and for the Subject-dimension of Experience, are of the same ontological kind—said ontological kind being none other than that “higher” determinable (or genus) through which said beings must be conceived in order for their interrelatedness to be conceivable. [From C1 and P3]

P4) But the Subject-dimension of Experience, and that which manifests itself, perspectivally and non-perspectivally, to and for the Subject-dimension of Experience, are actual, concrete unities of meaning.

For a defense of this premise, confer my defense of the first premise of My Adaptation of Giovanni Gentile’s “Conceivability Argument” for Idealism.

C3) Therefore, the Subject-dimension of Experience, and that which manifests itself, perspectivally and non-perspectivally, to and for the Subject-dimension of Experience, are of the same ontological kind as actual, concrete unities of meaning—said ontological kind being none other than that “higher” determinable (or genus) through which said actual, concrete unities of meaning must be conceived in order for their interrelatedness to be conceivable. [From C2 and P4]

P5) But actual, concrete unities of meaning are beings that are either one with, or, beings that are determinations of, an Experiential ontological kind—Experience being none other than that ontological kind or “higher” determinable (or genus) through which said actual, concrete unities of meaning must be conceived in order for their interrelatedness to be conceivable.

For a defense of this premise, confer my defense of the second premise of My Adaptation of Giovanni Gentile’s “Conceivability Argument” for Idealism.

C4) Therefore, the Subject-dimension of Experience, and that which manifests itself, perspectivally and non-perspectivally, to and for the Subject-dimension of Experience, are beings that are either one with, or, beings that are determinations of, an Experiential ontological kind—Experience being none other than that ontological kind or “higher” determinable (or genus) through which said beings must be conceived in order for their interrelatedness to be conceivable. [From C3 and P5]

P6) Ultimate Reality is related to the Subject-dimension of Experience, and manifests itself, perspectivally and non-perspectivally, to and for the Subject-dimension of Experience.

C5) Therefore, Ultimate Reality is a being that is either one with, or, a being that is a determination of, an Experiential ontological kind. [From C4 and P6]

P7) But Ultimate Reality is not a determination of anything “higher” than itself; for Ultimate Reality is self-determined, and has all of its determinations “internal” to itself. (But this can only mean that Ultimate Reality is itself an Experience, and not a determination thereof.)

“Ultimate reality [is that] into which all else can be resolved and which cannot itself be resolved into anything beyond, that in terms of which all else can be expressed and which cannot itself be expressed in terms of anything outside itself.” (Haldane, The Pathway to Reality, 19) 

“For Reality…must be a complete individual whole, with the ground of all its differentiations within itself.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 255) 

“The whole…is a self-differentiating system. It is a whole that determines, by the principle of organization that is universal to all its parts and moments, the nature and interrelations of its elements, making them mutually interdependent and constitutive. Accordingly, if their distinction one from another is elevated into a separation, and if they are severally isolated from each other and from the system, as is wont to happen under the influence and operation of the understanding, they contradict themselves and one another, a contradiction symptomatic of defect that is occasioned by their mutual exclusion and the oversight of their mutual complementarity.” (Harris, The Spirit of Hegel, 142-143)

C5) Therefore, Ultimate Reality is an Experience. [From C5 and P7]

What is the Difference Between the Real and the Imaginary?

What do we mean when we say that something is “real” as opposed to “imaginary?” If there were no difference between the meaning of “real” and the meaning of “imaginary,” then “real” and “imaginary” would have the same meaning—and this is absurd. When we judge X to be “real,” we simultaneously judge X to not be “imaginary;” and when we judge Y to be “imaginary,” we simultaneously judge Y to not be “real.” But what actually constitutes this difference between the “real” and the “imaginary;” and what are their respective meanings? We must now attempt to answer these questions.

Before proceeding further, we must address some anticipated objections.  A would-be objector might reply with the following:

The difference between the “real” and the “imaginary” simply consists in the fact that the “real” is “real” and the “imaginary” is “imaginary.” The “real” is not “imaginary” and the “imaginary” is not “real.” This, and this alone, is the difference between the “real” and the “imaginary.” To be “real” simply means to not be “imaginary;” and to be “imaginary” simply means to not be “real.” This, and this alone, is the meaning of “real” and “imaginary.”

Let's briefly examine this objection from our would-be objector. Our initial questions had to do with (a) what constitutes the difference between the “real” and the “imaginary,” and (b) what we mean by “real” when we judge something to be “real,” and what we mean by “imaginary” when we judge something to be “imaginary.” To reply, as our would-be objector does, that the difference between the “real” and the “imaginary” merely lies in the fact that the “real" is “real” and the “imaginary” is “imaginary” is to do nothing but utter barren tautologies. Obviously the “real” is “real” and the “imaginary” is “imaginary;” but such statements tell us nothing about either (a) what constitutes the difference between the “real” and the “imaginary,” or (b) the meanings of “real” and “imaginary.” Indeed, such a move is nothing other than a restatement of the very problem we are trying to answer. As Mary Whiton Calkins would say, our would-be objector’s responses are as illuminating as the following excerpt from Oliver Herford’s An Alphabet of Celebrities:

Furthermore, our would-be objector has ensnared himself in a dilemma. If someone were to ask him if X is “real,” our would-be objector could only reply with the following: X is “real” if X is not “imaginary.” And, if that same person were to press our would-be objector further by asking him if X is “imaginary,” our would-be objector could only reply with the following: X is “imaginary” if X is not “real.” How illuminating. None of our would-be objector’s responses answer the questions asked of him. None of his answers shed light on either the constitutive differences between, or the meanings of, the “real” and the “imaginary.” Furthermore, our would-be objector’s responses result in a vacuous vicious circle. If someone neither knew the meaning of “real” nor the meaning of “imaginary,” then, based on our would-be objector’s responses, it would be impossible—in principle—for this person to ever (a) come to an understanding of what constitutes the difference between the “real” and the “imaginary,” (b) come to an understanding of the meaning of “real” and the meaning of “imaginary,” and (c) come to know whether X was “real” or “imaginary.”

Now, our would-be objector might try to clarify his previous responses in the following way:

The difference between the “real” and the “imaginary” is that what is “real” actually “exists,” while what is “imaginary” does not actually “exist.” With this clarification  in mind, my previous answers are vindicated. If someone were to ask me if X is “real” or “imaginary,” then I would simply reply that X is “real” if X actually “exists,” and that X is “imaginary” if X does not actually “exist.”

Has our would-be objector provided a solution? Not at all. On the contrary, he has fallen prey to those same arguments we waged against his previous responses. If that same person who inquired into the meanings of, and differences between, the “real" and “imaginary” did not know either the meanings of, and differences between, “exist” and not “exist,” then, based upon our would-be objector’s first and second replies, said person could neither come to an understanding of the meanings of, and differences between, (a) “exist” and not “exist,” and (b) “real” and “imaginary.” Furthermore, he could never come to know either (c) whether X is “real” or “imaginary,” or (d) whether X “exists” or does not “exist.” Our would-be objector has done nothing but utter tautologies and entrap himself within vacuous vicious circles. Let’s suppose our would-be objector plays his final move in the following way:

The difference between the “real” and the “imaginary” lies in the fact that the “real” exists within Space and Time, whilst the “imaginary” does not exist within Space and Time. If someone were to ask me if X is “real” or “imaginary,” then I would simply reply that X is “real” if X exists within Space and Time, and that X is “imaginary” if X does not exist within Space and Time. 

Unfortunately, our would-be objector has stumbled into self-contradiction. He is maintaining that (a) something is “real” if it exists within Space and Time, and (b) something is “imaginary” if it does not exist within Space and Time. However, it immediately follows from these two positions that Space and Time would be “imaginary” and not “real” unless Space and Time existed within Space and Time—and this is absurd. However, even if our would-be objector embraced the absurdity of saying that Space and Time existed within Space and Time, he would run into another problem. Ex hypothesi, Space(1) and Time(1) would be “imaginary” and not “real” unless Space(1) and Time(1) existed within Space(2) and Time(2). However, Space(1) and Time(1) could not exist within Space(2) and Time(2) unless Space(2) and Time(2) were “real” and not “imaginary.” After all, something “real” cannot exist within something “imaginary.” But, ex hypothesi, Space(2) and Time(2) would be “imaginary” and not “real” if Space(2) and Time(2) did not exist within Space(3) and Time(3). However, Space(2) and Time(2) could not exist within Space(3) and Time(3) unless Space(3) and Time(3) were “real” and not “imaginary.” But, ex hypothesi, Space(3) and Time(3) would be “imaginary” and not “real” if Space(3) and Time(3) did not exist within Space(4) and Time(4). And so on and so on. Based upon our would-be objector’s positions, a vicious infinite regress would have to come to an end for Space and Time to be “real” and not “imaginary;” and such a completion is, of course, impossible. Therefore, it is not the case that the difference between the “real” and the “imaginary” lies in the fact that the “real” exists within Space and Time, whilst the “imaginary” does not exist within Space and Time.

We have hitherto disposed of several conceptions as to the difference between the “real” and the “imaginary.” They are the following: 

• The difference between the “real” and the “imaginary” simply consists in the fact that the “real” is “real” and the “imaginary” is “imaginary.” The “real” is not “imaginary” and the “imaginary” is not “real.”

• The difference between the “real” and the “imaginary” is that what is “real” actually “exists,” while what is “imaginary” does not actually “exist.”

• The difference between the “real” and the “imaginary” lies in the fact that the “real” exists within Space and Time, whilst the “imaginary” does not exist within Space and Time.

With these mistaken conceptions disposed of, we must now search for clues as to the genuine nature of the difference between the “real” and the “imaginary.” Unfortunately, the question as to the nature of the “real,” in contradistinction to the “imaginary,” is—like any other perennial question—not easy. As such, the question must be unraveled and approached from one particular angle at a time. Because of this, I will first limit myself to investigating only one specific region and concentrate on how the difference between “real” and “imaginary” plays out therein; then, I will investigate Reality as such. The first area of investigation will be the sphere of materiality.

What, then, is the difference between a “real” material object and its merely “imaginary” counterpart? Initially, we may reply with the following conception:

The difference between a “real” and an “imaginary” material object lies in the fact that the “real” material object is, or may be, one with my own center of Experience as something which I, as a rational, purposive agent, must acknowledge and take into consideration in the pursuit and fulfilment of my subjective interests, goals, plans, and desires.

Indeed, Kant reached a similar conclusion in his critique of the ontological proof. Taking a hundred dollars as his example, he went on to show that the “reality” of the “real” hundred dollars consisted in the fact that they are, or may be, objects of Experience. Kant went on to show that the “unreality” of the “imaginary” hundred dollars consisted in the fact that they neither are, nor may be, actual objects of Experience. Indeed, the “real” hundred dollars are, or may be, something felt, touched, and handled; seen, smelled, and tasted; exchanged for a currency of a different type, used for purchasing goods and services in the market, or simply deposited in a bank for future use. The “imaginary” hundred dollars, however, neither are, nor may be, felt, touched, and handled; seen, smelled, and tasted; exchanged for a currency of a different type, used for purchasing goods and services in the market, or simply deposited in a bank for future use.

As an aside, we must be careful to point out an important distinction, namely that of my psychical act of “imagining” and the “imaginatum” which I am “imagining.” My psychical act of “imagining” the “imaginary” hundred dollars is certainly “real” and not “imaginary,” because the psychical act of “imagining” is one with my Experience, it is something which I am actually doing. On the other hand, the “imaginatum” which I am “imagining” (i.e., the “unreal” or “imaginary” hundred dollars”) neither is, nor can be, something which enters into my Experience. If one muddles the distinction between the “imagining” and the “imaginatum,” then one inevitably falls into one of the following two absurdities: (a) they end up committing themselves to the “reality” of griffins, round-squares, and leprechauns because they collapse the “unreal” “imaginatum” into the “real” psychical act of “imagining;” or (b) they end up committing themselves to the “unreality” of psychical acts of “imagining” because they collapse the psychical act of “imagining” into the “unreal” “imaginatum.” With this clarification in mind, we can proceed with our investigation into the difference between a “real” material object and its merely “imaginary” counterpart.

Now, I, as a rational, purposive agent, must acknowledge and take into consideration in the pursuit and fulfilment of my subjective interests, goals, plans, and desires, the fact that there are other centers of Experience belonging to other rational, purposive agents, who, like myself, seek to fulfil their subjective interests, accomplish their goals, realize plans, as well as acknowledge, understand, and appreciate the same material objects which I myself encounter within the world of my Experience—albeit from perspectives differing from my own. Indeed, it would be impossible for me to make any rational sense of my own history, subjective interests, language, and self-identity, unless I either acknowledged, or took into account, the universal sphere of intersubjectivity—that community of centers of Experience indissolubly one with my own. Therefore, we may modify our initial conception and instead say:

The difference between a “real” and an “imaginary” material object lies in the fact that the “real” material object is, or may be, either one with my own center of Experience, or one with other centers of Experience, as something which the rational, purposive agents possessive of those centers of Experience, must acknowledge and take into consideration in the pursuit and fulfilment of their respective subjective interests, goals, plans, and desires.

I think we can go further. It is not the case that only “rational agents” possess centers of Experience.  Indeed, there are countless organisms which, while not necessarily rational, do indeed alter their behavior to those states of affairs which said organisms must conform to in order to fulfill their fundamental needs as living organisms. Furthermore, these countless centers of Experience possessed by non-human organisms are inseparably connected with the well-being, growth, and development of those rational, purposive agents which are also possessive of centers of Experience. Indeed, the former centers of Experience must be taken into consideration by the rational agents possessive of the latter centers of Experience in the pursuit and fulfilment of their respective subjective interests, goals, plans, and desires. Thus, we may finalize our conception of the difference between a “real” material object and its merely “imaginary” counterpart by saying:

The difference between a “real” and an “imaginary” material object lies in the fact that the “real” material object is, or may be, either one with my own center of Experience, or one with other centers of Experience, as something which the rational, purposive agents (as well as non-rational agents) possessive of those centers of Experience, must acknowledge and take into consideration (or conform to) in the pursuit and fulfilment of their respective subjective interests, goals, plans, desires, and fundamental needs.

To conclude, I will present my reply to our initial question: “What is the Difference between the Real and the Imaginary?”

The difference between the “real” and the “imaginary” lies in the fact that the “real” is one with my own center of Experience and other centers of Experience as that concrete and actual system of meanings which rational, purposive agents (as well as non-rational agents) possessive of those centers of Experience, must acknowledge and take into consideration (or conform to) in the pursuit and fulfillment of their respective subjective interests, goals, plans, desires, and fundamental needs.

Physiological Subjectivism

This article is a critique of what I call “physiological subjectivism.” Physiological subjectivists maintain some variation of the following positions: (i) Subjects only perceive elements contained in a set E (e.g., set E being the set of possible and actual “representations,” “appearances,” sensa, or percepta) and (ii) Subjects (namely neuroscientists and physiologists) have empirical evidence of Subjects’ nervous systems “producing,” “causing” (or causally determining), “shaping,” or  “filtering” all of the “representations,” “appearances,” sensa, or percepta perceived by Subjects. The following passages are excellent illustrations of physiological subjectivism:

“We never perceive the objects of the external world immediately, rather we perceive only the effects of these objects upon our nervous apparatus, and this has been so from the first moment of our life. By what means then have we been brought from the world of the sensations of our nerves to the world of reality? Obviously only through an inference; we must posit the presence of external objects as causes of our nervous excitation; for there can be no effect without a cause.” (Helmholtz, Philosophische Vorträge, 115-116) 

“It is natural to suppose that what the physiologist sees is in the brain he is observing. But if we are speaking of physical space, what the physiologist sees is in his own brain.” (Russell, An Outline of Philosophy, 146) 

“What you see when you look at a brain through a microscope is part of your private world….What I maintain is that we can witness or observe what goes on in our own heads, and that we cannot witness or observe anything else at all.” (Russell, My Philosophical Development, 18-19) 

“The whole of my perceptual world is...in my head and occupies a volume smaller than my head.” (Russell, The Analysis of Matter, 145) 

“The whole of a man’s visual space is, for physics, inside his head....All our percepts are in our head.” (Russell, The Analysis of Matter, 253)  

“We do not know much about the contents of any part of the world except our own heads.....Whoever accepts the causal theory of perception is compelled to conclude that percepts are in our heads....It follows from this that what the physiologist sees when he examines a brain is in the physiologist, not in the brain he is examining.” (Russell, The Analysis of Matter, 319) 

“The object of sense must be within my nervous system in order to be sensible...it is the nervous system itself sensibly affected. The hot felt is the tactile nerves heated, the white seen is the optic nerves so coloured….The sensible object then is…an effect in the nervous system.” (Case, Physical Realism, 22)

“What do we see when we look at a table? First and foremost, a lighted region containing some air, lit by rays coming partly from the direction of the table, partly from other sources; then the further boundaries of this region, surfaces of objects, including part of the surface of the table….And where is colour according to this scheme? Somewhere in the eye, as anyone who cares to strike his eye will discover….Thus what is directly apprehended is a modification of a sense organ, and its apprehension is a further modification of the nervous system...” (Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, 176-178) 

“Whether beautiful or ugly or just conveniently at hand, the world of experience is produced by the man who experiences it. This is not the attitude of a skeptic, only of a psychologist. There certainly is a real world of trees and people and cars and even books, and it has a great deal to do with our experiences of these objects. However, we have no direct, immediate access to the world, nor to any of its properties. The ancient theory of eidola, which supposed that faint copies of objects can enter the mind directly, must be rejected. Whatever we know about reality has been mediated, not only by the organs of sense but by complex systems which interpret and reinterpret sensory information. Physically, this page is an array of small mounds of ink, lying in certain positions on the more highly reflective surface of the paper. It is this physical page which Koffka (1935) and others would have called the “distal stimulus,” and from which the reader is hopefully acquiring some information. But the sensory input is not the page itself; it is a pattern of light rays, originating in the sun or in some artificial source, that are reflected from the page and happen to reach the eye. Suitably focused by the lens and other ocular apparatus, the rays fall on the sensitive retina, where they can initiate the neural processes that eventually lead to seeing and reading and remembering. These patterns of light at the retina are the so-called “proximal stimuli.” They are not the least bit like eidola. One-sided in their perspective, shifting radically several times each second, unique and novel at every moment, the proximal stimuli bear little resemblance to either the real object that gave rise to them or to the object of experience that the perceiver will construct as a result….Our knowledge of the world must be somehow developed from the stimulus input; the theory of eidola is false.” (Neisser, Cognitive Psychology, 3-5) 

“A percept is the creation of a given neuronal system...” (Moutoussis, The Machine Behind the Stage: A Neurobiological Approach toward Theoretical Issues of Sensory Perception, 2) 

“A person’s entire life experience—everyone, everything, every experience he or she has ever known—exists to that person only as a function of his or her brain’s activity....Neurologist and Nobel laureate Sir John Eccles wrote that the natural world contains no color, sound, textures, patterns, beauty, or scent. Thus, color, brightness, smell, and sound are...created by complicated brain circuits.” (Martinez-Conde and Macknik, Entry on “Nonveridical Perception” in The Encyclopedia of Perception, Vol. I, 637-642) 

“Bitterness or sweetness are, like colors, creations of the nervous system. An analogous situation exists for smell.” (Goldstein, Entry on “The Private Nature of Perceptual Experience” in The Encyclopedia of Perception, Vol. I, 829)

And so, in the words of James Ward, “into the man’s head the whole world goes, including the head itself.” The following argument of mine is a demonstration of the self-undermining character of physiological subjectivism; indeed, we may say that the physiological subjectivist must answer the following question in the negative: “Is the truth of this theory consistent with the fact that I know it to be true?” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 90).

P1) If a Subject is committed to the position that (i) Subjects only perceive elements contained in set E, and (ii) Subjects have empirical evidence of B “producing,” “causing,” “shaping,” or “filtering” all elements contained in set E, then said Subject is committed to the position that B is not an element contained in set E.

If a Subject is committed to the position that (i) all elements contained in set E are “produced,” “caused,” “shaped,” or “filtered” by B, and (ii) B is an element contained in set E, then said Subject would be committed to the position that B—an element contained in set E—was “produced,” “caused,” “shaped,” or “filtered” by B. However, such a position is contradictory; for, B cannot be “self-produced,” “self-caused,” “self-shaped,” or “self-filtered.” Therefore, if a Subject is committed to the position that Subjects have empirical evidence of B “producing,” “causing,” “shaping,” or “filtering” all elements contained in set E, then he is committed to the position that B is not an element contained in set E.

P2) If a Subject is committed to the position that B is not an element contained in set E, then said Subject is committed to the position that Subjects cannot—in principle—perceive B.

If a Subject is committed to the position that (i) Subjects only perceive elements contained in set E, and (ii) B is not an element contained in set E, it follows that he is committed to the position that Subjects cannot—in principle—perceive B. For, if he were committed to the position that Subjects can—in principle—perceive B, then he would be committed to the contradictory position that B both is, and is not, an element contained in set E. Therefore, if a Subject is committed to the position that B is not an element contained in set E, then said Subject is committed to the position that Subjects cannot—in principle—perceive B.

P3) If a Subject is committed to the position that Subjects cannot—in principle—perceive B, then said Subject is committed to the position that Subjects have never perceived B “producing,” “causing,” “shaping,” or “filtering” all elements contained in set E.

If a Subject is committed to the position that Subjects cannot—in principle—perceive B, then it immediately follows that he is also committed to the position that Subjects have never perceived B engaging in any form of activity, let alone perceive B “producing,” “causing,” or “shaping” all elements contained in set E. Indeed, if he were committed to the position that Subjects can—in principle—perceive B “producing,” “causing,” “shaping,” or “filtering” all elements contained in set E, then he would be committed to the position that B is an element contained in set E. However, if he is committed to the position that B is an element contained in set E, then he would be committed to the position that B was “self-produced,” “self-caused,” “self-shaped,” or “self-filtered”—and such a position is self-contradictory. Therefore, if a Subject is committed to the position that Subjects cannot—in principle—perceive B, then said Subject is committed to the position that Subjects have never perceived B “producing,” “causing,” “shaping,” or “filtering” all elements contained in set E.

P4) If a Subject is committed to the position that Subjects have never perceived B “producing,” “causing,” “shaping,” or “filtering” all elements contained in set E, then said Subject is committed to the position that Subjects do not have empirical evidence of B “producing,” “causing,” “shaping,” or “filtering” all elements contained in set E.

Empirical evidence consists in evidence that one can see, hear, taste, touch, or smell; indeed, empirical evidence is perceptible evidence. However, if a Subject is committed to the position that Subjects cannot—in principle—perceive B, and that Subjects cannot—in principle—perceive B “producing,” “causing,” “shaping,” or “filtering” all elements contained in set E, then it follows that said Subject is committed to the position that Subjects do not have empirical evidence of B “producing,” “causing,” “shaping,” or “filtering” all elements contained in set E.

C1) Therefore, if a Subject is committed to the position that (i) Subjects only perceive elements contained in set E and (ii) Subjects have empirical evidence of B “producing,” “causing,” “shaping,” or “filtering” all elements contained in set E, then said Subject is committed to the position that Subjects do not have empirical evidence of B “producing,” “causing,” “shaping,” or “filtering” all elements contained in set E. [From P1—P4]

P5) But the position that (ii) Subjects have empirical evidence of B “producing,” “causing,” “shaping,” or “filtering” all elements contained in set E, and the position that Subjects do not have empirical evidence of B “producing,” “causing,” “shaping,” or “filtering” all elements contained in set E, contradict each other.

This is should be obvious. If it is true that Subjects have empirical evidence of B “producing,” “causing,” “shaping,” or “filtering” all elements contained in set E, then it is false that Subjects do not have empirical evidence of B “producing,” “causing,” “shaping,” or “filtering” all all elements contained in set E; and if it is true that Subjects do not have empirical evidence of B “producing,” “causing,” “shaping,” or “filtering” all elements contained in set E, then it is false that Subjects have empirical evidence of B “producing,” “causing,” “shaping,” or “filtering” all elements contained in set E.

C2) Therefore, if a Subject is committed to the position that (i) Subjects only perceive elements contained in set E and (ii) Subjects have empirical evidence of B “producing,” “causing,” “shaping,” or “filtering” all elements contained in set E, then said Subject is committed to a contradiction. [From C1—P5]

In fact, we can make a parallel argument against certain forms of Materialism that claim support from physiology:

All parts of Nature are “produced” by my body.

How could they not be? After all, according to Materialism, my percepta (i.e., what I perceive) are states and affections of my nervous system.

My body is itself a part of Nature.

How could it not be? After all, my body and its internal organs and nerves are themselves perceptible; for, if they could not be perceived, then they would be nothing to me at all. Indeed, if my body was not perceptible, then what empirical grounds would Materialism have for asserting that what I perceive depends upon my nervous system? We are thus left with the following absurdity:

All parts of Nature are “produced” by a “self-producing” part of Nature.

If you are interested in learning more about the general argument which my post expounds upon, please confer Chapter 22, “Nature,” in F.H. Bradley’s 1893 magnum opus, Appearance and Reality and Chapter IV, “The Physiology of the Sense Organs and the World as Representation,” in Volume III of F.A. Lange’s excellent work, The History of Materialism.