Why Materialism Cannot Genuinely Explain Experience

“The terms Subject and Object (Subjective and Objective) denote complementary ‘moments’ of a concrete fact—‘moments’ which necessarily emerge as correlated opposites within any and every ‘actual’ cognizant experience when that is raised (or raises itself) to the reflective level; or when (as I expressed it less accurately before) it is subjected to philosophical (‘critical’) analysis. The terms mean nothing, except when applied to ‘moments’ within their ‘concrete fact’—within some specific form or individual type of ‘actual’ knowledge; and, when thus applied, each means precisely that which, within the concretum, is not (is the contrasted correlative of) that which is meant by the other. Nothing, in short, is a subject or subjective, an object or objective, as such and per se. There is no activity of knowing—no act or process, for example, of perceiving, judging, or inferring—which when abstracted from the concrete fact of knowledge (from, for example, the perception, judgment, inference) has any character at all. The activity of knowing (perceiving, judging, inferring, &c.) is one of two ‘moments’ inseparable within, and presupposing, a concretum; and, within that concretum both ‘moments’ deserve, and receive, their respective appellation (viz. subjective and objective) precisely because the one is not, and can never be or become, the other.” (Joachim, Logical Studies, 151-152) 

Experience is that which is exhaustively self-differentiated, to, through, and for itself; and, in conceiving any actual “piece” of Reality, one is bound, by necessity, to conceive of an Experience, or a determination thereof. No actuality is conceivable otherwise; for all sensible and thinkable actualities are unities of meaning, saturated and sustained in-and-through a continuous atmosphere of Experience; an Experience within which said unities of meaning have their respective places as beings of an intentional-constitution—moments of actual or possible appreciation and contemplation for that Experience itself—the Subject. Experience is a Many-felt-in-One; a Multiplicity-in-Unity; a world of interpenetrating microcosms of meaning and ideal content, enveloped within a richer, all-embracing macrocosm; a boundless, internally-differentiated nebula of feeling; a continuous sphere wherein Subjectivity and Objectivity live and move together as distinguishable factors participating in a single, organic unity—a unity that does not exclude or negate differences, but embraces and preserves them. 

Experience is neither mere Subjectivity, or a barren, isolated, private “I”, nor is Experience mere Objectivity, or a mere fulguration of an ordered sequence or pattern of “sensa” or “percepta”; rather, Experience is, strictly speaking, a concrete, living Substance—it is a Substance within which Subjectivity and Objectivity are abstractly-distinguishable, coordinate factors, aspects, or or determinations. Experience is not the mere “togetherness” or “compresence” of Subject and Object; for, there is always a relatively determinable margin of Experience which, despite being present, falls outside the radius of explicit attention; this subliminal “surplus” wades in the margins of any given Experience and always “coats” or “qualifies” each moment of Experience with a unique “aura” or “tone.”

The Empire of Experience is without circumference or margin; its Kingdom is infinite. Its infinitude is evidenced by its all-embracing inclusivity and self-transcendency. Indeed, there is nothing beyond its scope; for, to reach beyond the pale of Experience is to disclose that which hath already lied within its grasp. Unfortunately, the sovereignty of Experience has not always been respected, let alone acknowledged. Time and again, Experience has been threatened by an ancient force that has sought to dissolve it into a storm of illusive material and physical factors. This ancient creed is none other than Materialism. Materialism stands or falls with its ability to explain Experience. Indeed, rather than treating Experience as the principle of explanation and discovery, the Materialist, “from defect of nature or of education, or probably both,” is led by an untutored instinct to explain the fact of Experience in terms of the abstract and unreal.  Let us follow the Materialist along this dreary path and see how he fares. 

Now, in explaining Experience, the Materialist starts off by making two fundamental mistakes—two missteps that are characteristic of all Materialistic explanations of Experience. Firstly, the Materialist fails to recognize two crucial facts that live and move within Experience: (i) the fact that, within Experience, the Subject of Consciousness and the Object of Consciousness are mutually implicative of each other, and (ii) the non-Objectified margin of Experience works to shape the character of the Object of Consciousness. The fatal consequences of the Materialist’s negligence of these facts will lurk in the background and haunt the entirety of his explanation. Indeed, the Materialist’s uncanny affinity for abstraction and division leads him to treat the Subjective and Objective factors within Experience as isolated, independent, and externally related units—forgetting that, within Experience, we find the Subject of Consciousness and Object of Consciousness to be two, abstract, mutually-implying determinations, aspects, or moments, of that “Many-felt-in-One” that the Materialist so desperately seeks to explain. Secondly, before anyone even has time to blink, the Materialist makes another blunder: he mistakenly identifies Experience with either (i) the Subject of Consciousness, (ii) the Object of Consciousness, or (iii) certain sensuous, qualitative determinations (e.g., qualia) of the Object of Consciousness (or the non-Objectified margin of Experience).

Let us illustrate this miserable mistake with help from a “part-whole” analogy. The Materialist mistakenly identifies a “whole” with one of its isolated “proper parts”—said “proper part” most evidently being less than that “whole” of which it is a constituent “proper part.” Furthermore, said “whole” (i.e., Experience) is not only richer in content than said isolated “proper part,” but also has a unique, qualitative, multi-dimensional structure (i.e., a Subject-dimension, a non-Perspectival-dimension, and a Perspectival-dimension) that is non-isomorphic to that of any of its “proper parts” taken singly. How on earth can a “proper part” of a “whole” give rise to that “whole” of which it is but a “proper part?” If you are a Materialist, and you wish to explain the fact of Experience, I only ask that you do justice to Experience by actually keeping in mind what Experience actually is.

Now, it doesn’t matter whether the Materialist mistakes Experience for the Subject of Consciousness, the Object of Consciousness, or certain sensuous, qualitative determinations of the Object of Consciousness; for, all three options are ultimately failures—but the Materialist doesn’t realize this. Indeed, he pushes even further by performing a biopsy on the Object of Consciousness.  The Materialist, forgetting that the Object of Consciousness’s determinate character is contributed in part by the Subject of Consciousness and that determinable, non-Objectified margin of Experience, attempts to strip the Object of Consciousness of any and all Subject-implying determinations and any and all Experience-implying determinations.  The biopsic operation destroys the datum upon which the Materialist was ravaging for answers, leaving him with a contentless, intangible, abstract, hypothetical, and unreal X. The Materialist divines this X to be an independent and self-subsisting “thing-in-itself” with causal efficacy. The Materialist cherishes this meager shadow of a reality as the answer to all of his difficulties. However, he soon realizes that his precious X has only a hypothetical existence—an existence “only in the understanding,” rather than an existence in reality. With the help of a bastardized form of the ontological proof, the Materialist establishes the unconditioned existence and reality of X by virtue of the fact that X would be much greater for his explanation if X actually existed in reality rather than as a mere concept “in the understanding.”

Having established to his liking the unconditioned existence of X, the Materialist now tries to spin the concrete and actual out of the desolate and the barren.  However, as was seen above, both the concept and unconditioned existence of X were arrived at with the help of several blunders and illegitimate inferences.  Further, X, as a concept, had its conceptual content and determinate meaning exhausted by facts “internal to” Experience. But this just means that X is conceptually sense-dependent upon facts “internal to” Experience; in other words, one cannot grasp or understand X without grasping or having a prior understanding of certain facts “internal to” Experience or Experience itself.¹ On the other hand, it is clear that one can grasp or understand Experience, and facts “internal to” Experience, without ever grasping or understanding the Materialist’s X.  Now, when the Materialist attempts to explain the existence of Experience in terms of X, or the emergence of Experience from X, he fails to see that the driving force of his explanation not only presupposes, but also depends upon for its meaning and “sense,” the presence of Experience within it. Furthermore, since facts “internal to” Experience exhaust X’s conceptual content and meaning, it follows that Experience cannot be eliminated from any posited X without said posited entity becoming meaningless and “sense-less.” As such, the Materialist’s explanation is self-condemned from the start. Indeed, vicious circularity haunts the Materialist at every turn. The following illustration should help visualize the Materialist’s dilemma. Let E represent Experience, and let (E—X) represent X. The Materialist, as we have seen, must explain E in terms of X; however, this just means that he must explain E in terms of (E—X). However, this cannot be done unless he first explains (E—X) in terms of ((E—X)—X); but this cannot be done unless he first explains ((E—X)—X) in terms of (((E—X)—X)—X); but this cannot be done unless he first explains (((E—X)—X)—X) in terms of ((((E—X)—X)—X)—X). And so on, and so on, ad infinitum. And this circle is clearly vicious.²

The Materialist is forced by his own hand to presuppose at the very beginning of his explanation, the very presence of the phenomenon which he professes to have reached as the final result. Therefore, it is impossible—in principle—for Materialism to genuinely explain Experience.

Footnotes:

^[1] Conceptual sense-dependence can be explained in the following way:

“Concept P is sense dependent on concept Q just in case one cannot count as having grasped P unless one counts as grasping Q….A paradigmatic sense dependence claim is Sellars’ classic argument in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind that one cannot master the use of “looks” talk without having mastered the use of “is” talk. The concepts nail and hammer may be related like this: one cannot understand what a nail is—something meant to be driven by a hammer—without understanding what a hammer is….Another example: the property being produced by a reliable belief-forming mechanism is conceptually dependent on that of being a true belief, because to be a reliable belief-forming mechanism is to produce beliefs that are likely to be true.” (Brandom, Holism and Idealism in Hegel’s Phenomenology, 78-79) 

^[2] I figured that it would be helpful to include a couple of passages that go into detail about what constitutes a “vicious regress of explanation.”

“Vicious regress of explanation: At each stage, n, an instance of a puzzle is posed an an explanation offered, and this explanation gives rise to a new instance of the puzzle, forming stage n+1; and furthermore, the success of the explanation at stage n depends on the puzzle at stage n+1 being resolved.” (Cameron, The Moving Spotlight: An Essay on Time and Ontology, 60)   

“Here, again, I think Russell clearly right in holding that there is one kind of “regress” which is always fatal to any hypothesis which implies it. No intelligible proposition can be such that an infinite “regress” arises in the very attempt to state its meaning. An apparent proposition P₀ which turns out to be such that we cannot state its meaning without first stating as parts of that meaning the infinite series of propositions P₁, P₂,…, P_n,…, P_ω, must be no proposition at all but a mere unmeaning noise. For, as we can never exhaust an infinite series by enumeration of its terms, we could never know definitely what such a P₀ means, and every proposition must have a fully determinate meaning. Hence for us, at any rate, P₀ is no proposition at all.” (Taylor, Philosophical Studies, 47-48)

Fragmentary Notes §15—§16

§15

I would say that I hold to a form of Absolute Idealism. My thinking is heavily influenced by the late-19th and early-20th century American Idealists (e.g. Royce, Calkins, Cunningham, Hollands, and Blanshard) and British Idealists (e.g. Bradley, Bosanquet, Haldane, McTaggart, Ward, Stout, etc.). I am also greatly indebted to the genius insights of Arthur Schopenhauer.

§16

I view Reality as a concrete, all-inclusive, and systematic whole, saturated with meaning and value—it is a unity-in-difference which exhibits a principle of coherence, comprehensiveness, and intelligibility. Furthermore, I hold that Reality (i.e., the Absolute) is genuinely conceivable or thinkable only in terms of “Mind,” “Spirit,” or “Experience.” Indeed, I would say that the Absolute is one with my own center of Experience and other centers of Experience as that concrete and actual system of meanings which rational, purposive agents (as well as non-rational agents) possessive of those centers of Experience, must acknowledge and take into consideration (or conform to) in the pursuit and fulfillment of their respective subjective interests, goals, plans, desires, and fundamental needs. I like to think of myself as maintaining a holistic conception of metaphysics, as well as a synoptic philosophical methodology—a method that is vehemently anti-reductionist in its approach and conclusions.

“Speculative idealism...takes the standpoint of concrete experience, which is also the standpoint of common sense and science.  It begins by viewing mind and the objective system of nature as distinct, and it never dreams of identifying them; they remain distinct to the end.  But speculative idealism does not permit their distinction to blind it to the fact that they are complementary; they are for it what they are in concrete experience, namely inseparably related aspects of that conscious life which is experience.  It also accepts as complementary, and obviously so, the relation of the individual mind to the minds of other individuals. In other words, it accepts as complementary the social relationship between mind and mind.  Thus for speculative idealism there are three moments or coordinates within experience: the self, other selves, and nature.  These are accepted as they present themselves within experience as irreducible and ultimate distinctions.  But, while recognizing their difference, speculative idealism also recognized their complementary nature and relationship.  It does not accept them as discrete existences or entities each with its own independent self-enclosed center; holding on to the standpoint of concrete experience, it accepts them as complementary coordinates within experience.” (Cunningham, The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy, 296)

Fragmentary Notes §11—§14

§11

If we were to take infinitely many coplanar geometrical figures of various determinate shapes and sizes, and have them expand, contract, and scurry about a single plane of indefinite extent for an indefinite time, we can rest assured that no transformation, redistribution, pattern, or collision of said figures will ever yield a new figure with “cubical content”—a figure that not only exhibits a new dimension, but also envelops the aforementioned coplanar geometrical figures whose transformations, redistributions, patterns, or collisions gave rise to it. Indeed, all qualitative changes and transformations in those figures—and patterns thereof—will always be determinate manifestations of a generic character—or determinable—that had hitherto manifested itself in another determinate form.  If, after an indefinite time, a change in the arrangement of those coplanar geometrical figures resulted in the manifestation of a new figure exhibiting “cubical content” enveloping those aforementioned coplanar geometrical figures, then said manifestation would be the manifestation of a new determinable that was itself “inclusive of” the former determinable, without itself being “included under it” as a determinate manifestation of said determinable.  Such a disparate breach of continuity is paralleled in the idea that—at some point in time—Experience was “birthed” by transformations, redistributions, and modifications of Matter.

§12

(A) Matter has its center “out-of-itself.”

(B) Experience has its center “in-itself.” 

§13

(A) Matter is that which is exhaustively differentiated “out-of-itself.” (e.g. “Partes extra partes”)

(B) Experience is that which is exhaustively differentiated “into-itself.” (e.g. “Partes intra partes”)

§14

Qualitative and relational changes (e.g. transformations, dilations, expansions, translations, rotations, reflections, etc.) in that which is exhaustively differentiated “out-of-itself” cannot account for what would be the manifestation of a new determinable (hitherto unmanifested) that exhibits (i) an “internally-differentiated” structure that returns “into-itself,” and (ii) is “inclusive of” the “externally-differentiated” material factors or elements that gave rise to it.

My Idealism: A Reply to a Criticism

I decided to respond to some criticisms and objections that I encountered during my discussion with the YouTube channel, Axioms on Trial. Feel free to check out the original video here.

““I view experience as an atmosphere that is inclusive of that which it has as its context.” What a load. Sorry, but c’mon. It’s sociologically fascinating why folk like your idealist guests cling to theories (and I use the term loosely) like this, but philosophically this is all just so devoid of usefulness....I think idealism is silly, and I think continental philosophy is inscrutable, and so the combination of the two just set me on edge. Combine that with your metaphoric and poetic language, and frankly I don’t even see how you’re doing philosophy anymore. But I’m an analytic curmudgeon. You do you, my friend.”

I appreciate your reply. I’d like to make a brief correction. In your reply, you write that I “view experience as an atmosphere that is inclusive of that which it has as its context.” I don’t believe that I said that. If it came off that way, I apologize.

The original quote that the user posted was actually a misquote. And, as such, it sounds like gibberish. I’ll post the passage (Starting at 43:57 from the original discussion) which the user misquoted from:

“I think of Experience, and Experiences generally, as atmospheres, as opposed to two objects [colliding with each other], e.g. Experience being on the one side, and the Experienced object being on the other side, and there is somehow a collision between the two. I view Experience as an atmosphere that is inclusive of that which it has as its contents….Experience is not a kind of box. Rather, [Experience] saturates its contents. [Experience] is neither restricted to sensations nor perceptions, but also [includes] meanings….I may not perceive the far side of the moon, but its still an aspect of my Experience. I can still understand [the moon]; I can grasp the meaning of [the moon]; I might know facts about [the moon]. [The moon] is not something alien to my Experience; it still enters into [my Experience] in a way that is non-presentational as opposed to presentational. We [mistakenly] tend to treat Experience as an activity, or as a container, or a kind of box where things are placed in from the outside, as opposed to something that grows from within.”

I’ll attempt to clarify what I mean. I said that I view “Experience” as analogous to an atmosphere, an atmosphere that has “internally-differentiated” content (not “context”). I specifically chose “atmosphere” as a metaphor which best characterizes “Experience,” because atmospheres are illustrative of the continuity and nebulosity that we find at all levels of Experience. Furthermore, similar to how atmospheres envelop and sustain all that they enshroud, Experience saturates its contents with “meaning” and “significance.” Take, for example, Earth’s atmosphere. Not only does Earth's atmosphere “include” the totality of Earth’s organic life as its content, but it also serves as the vitalizing medium that saturates and sustains said organic life. Eliminate the atmosphere, eliminate the life. Furthermore, the organic life “included within” said atmosphere is also determinative of the atmosphere’s structure and wellbeing. For example, humans inhale oxygen from the atmosphere, and exhale carbon dioxide back into the atmosphere; plants “inhale” carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, and “exhale” oxygen into the atmosphere. Again, Earth’s organic life is a vastly differentiated into certain genera, particular species, individual organisms, etc.; each genus, species, and individual organism being differentiations, aspects, or “parts” of the differentiated “whole” of organic life itself (with certain “differentiations” being more determinate or “specific” than others). Now, we see that such a “internally-differentiated” system of organic life is “included within” as well as “sustained by,” Earth’s atmosphere; said system of organic life being the atmosphere’s “internally-differentiated” contents.

As was said above, the relation between Experience and the content which said Experience is inclusive of, is akin to that of the relation between an atmosphere and the organic life which said atmosphere envelopes and preserves. Just as Experience saturates and sustains the “meaning” and “significance” of its contents, so too does an atmosphere saturate and sustain its contents by supplying the necessary conditions for the emergence and thriving of organic life. This is the first parallel. What other parallels are there? Well, as was said above, Experience and atmospheres have “internally-differentiated” contents. I already touched upon how this is the case with respect to atmospheres, so I’ll briefly turn to Experience as such. When I speak of the “internally-differentiated” content of Experience, I do not mean that the content of Experience consists merely in “sensuous” phenomena, like tastes, smells, sounds, colors, textures, bodily feelings, etc. While said “sensuous” phenomena do indeed make up much of the content we find within the sphere of Experience, it is not at all the case that Experience is merely “sensuous.” On the contrary, it is more accurate to say that the content of Experience is exhausted by “meanings.” “Meaning” encompasses both the “sensuous” and “non-sensuous” sides of Experience—both sides are really inseparable, and are only abstractly distinguishable in reflection. I use the term “meaning,” to refer to that determinable somewhat which is capable of being “for” a Subject’s actual and/or possible appreciation and/or acknowledgement.

Furthermore, the whole of Experience, and each of its differentiated moments (“moment” being used here in the sense that Hegel uses it; i.e. as “element,” “phase,” “aspect,” etc.), are exhausted by “meanings” appreciable in thought. All of these meanings manifest themselves “within” Experience, and are not “external” to it. I haven’t spoken of either the Subjective or Objective aspects of Experience, but I think this is unnecessary for now. In short, if anyone wishes to grasp the essence of Experience, one must (a) remain faithful to its immediacy, (b) appreciate the complexity of its determinable form and matter, (c) do justice to its concrete actuality and inclusivity, and (d) not only grasp, but also attempt to understand and articulate its unique and complex structure. Limitations of language—let alone the artificial boundaries of abstract formalisms—make such a task incredibly difficult and seemingly insurmountable; however, whether or not such a task is possible in the long-run cannot be known unless it is attempted. Recourse to metaphorical and poetical language is, in the end, inevitable when tackling such concrete problems as the nature of Experience and Ultimate Reality.

P.S.:

The empirical sciences have no need to resort to metaphor, but this is not due to their being “more in touch with Reality” than the philosopher or phenomenologist. On the contrary, it is a direct result of the lack of concreteness infecting the material which they investigate (e.g. pure mathematics being the bread and butter of certain branches of physics). The real is concrete and actual; it is not abstract and formal.

“All that exists, exists within Space and Time.”

Suppose it is maintained that “All that exists, exists within Space and Time.” But, nothing can exist within Space and Time unless Space and Time existed. But, ex hypothesi, something exists if and only if it exists within Space and Time. Therefore, if it is maintained that “All that exists, exists within Space and Time,” then one must maintain that Space and Time exist within Space and Time (on pain of contradiction). If they did not admit this, then they could not maintain that “All that exists, exists within Space and Time,” because X cannot exist “within” Y, unless Y itself existed for X to be “within” it. However, even if one admits that Space(1) and Time(1) exist within Space(2) and Time(2), another fatal problem arises. Space(1) and Time(1) could not exist within Space(2) and Time(2), unless Space(2) and Time(2) themselves existed. But, ex hypothesi, Space(2) and Time(2) could not exist unless Space(2) and Time(2) were within Space(3) and Time(3). But Space(2) and Time(2) could not exist within Space(3) and Time(3) unless Space(3) and Time(3) existed. But, ex hypothesi, Space(3) and Time(3) could not exist unless Space(3) and Time(3) were within Space(4) and Time(4). In short, a vicious infinite regress would have to come to an end before Space and Time could exist for things to exist within Space and Time. Ergo, one cannot admit, on pain of contradiction, that “All that exists, exists within Space and Time.”

“​I think PI needs some brain education. All perceptions are modified by our memory.”

If this is true, and all of my perceptions are “modified” by my memory, then I could have never had a first perception. Indeed, in order for me to have had my first perception, perception(1), said perception would have had to have been “modified” by my memory. However, my first perception(1) could never have been “modified” by my memory unless I already had another perception, perception(2), before perception(1), to serve as the basis of that memory which would “modify” perception(1). Furthermore, perception(2), being a perception, would itself have had to have been “modified” by my memory. But perception(2) could never have been “modified” by my memory unless I already had another perception, perception(3), before my perception(2), to serve as the basis of that memory which would “modify” my perception(2). In short, a vicious regress would have had to come to an end before I could ever have a first perception, perception(1). Ergo, since I do have perceptions, it cannot be the case that “All perceptions are modified by our memory.”