Wednesday, August 31, 2022

Reading Notes: August 31st, 2022

“Nothing in the end is real but what is felt, and for me nothing in the end is real but that which I feel….We never in one sense do, or can, go beyond immediate experience. Apart from the immediacy of “this” and “now” we never have, or can have, reality. The real, to be real, must be felt. This is one side of the matter. But on the other side the felt content takes on a form which more and more goes beyond the essential character of feeling, i.e. direct and non-relational qualification. Distinction and separation into substantives and adjectives, terms and relations, alienate the content of immediate experience from the form of immediacy which still on its side persists. In other words, the ideality, present from the first, is developed, and to follow this ideality is our way to the true Reality which is there in feeling.” (Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, 190) 
“We have an object, a something given, and it is given to the subject. the subject given? No, for, if so, it would itself be an object. We seem, then, to have one term and a relation without a second term. But can there be a relation with one term? No; this appears to be self-contradictory, and, if we assert it, we must justify and defend our paradox. But, again, can a term be known only as a term of a relation or relations, while it is not, in any aspect, known otherwise? No, once more; this is impossible, and in the end unmeaning. Terms are never constituted entirely by a relation or relations. There is a quality always which is more than the relation, thought it may not be independent of it….But, once more, can we have a relation, one term of which is contained in the experienced and the other not? No; for a term, which is not in some sense experienced, seems nothing at all. If in itself it falls outside the experienced, then it appears to be unmeaning, and it cannot therefore consistently be said to exist….And now, leaving the terms, consider the relation. Is there, in the end, such a thing as a relation which is merely between terms? Or, on the other hand, does not a relation imply an underlying unity and an inclusive whole? And then, once again, must not this whole be experienced or be nothing? Here are points surely which at least require some discussion. But consciousness must lead to self-consciousness, where possibly these difficulties are lessened. If the object is given to me, then I also must be given, and on reflection I so find myself. I find myself given not in the abstract but as concrete experienced matter. Both terms are now objects, experienced with their relation, and the question is whether the difficulties are now less. We must reply in the negative. The correlated terms are for a subject which itself is not given. The correlation falls in the experience of this new subject, which itself remains outside that object. And of the relation to this new subject the old puzzles are true. This relation must have two terms, terms more than their relation; and the “more” again must be experienced, or else be nothing. Any attempt to pass from within the experienced to that which in itself is not experienced, seems quite suicidal. The distinction between the experienced and experience seems in the end totally inadmissible. And the infinite regress is but an actual unremoved contradiction. It is itself an absolute irrational limit.” (Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, 192-193) 
“If what is given is a Many without a One, the One is never attainable. And, if what we had at first were the mere correlation of subject and object, then to rise beyond that would be impossible. From such premises there is in my opinion no road except to total scepticism.” (Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, 199) 
“For the whole of our knowledge may be said to depend upon immediate experience. At bottom the Real is what we feel, and there is no reality outside feeling. And in the end Reality (whatever else we say of it) is experience. Our fundamental fact is immediate experience or feeling. We have here a many in one where, so far, there is no distinction between truth and fact. And feeling again is mine, though of course it is not merely my feeling. It is reality and myself in unbroken unity. We in a sense transcend this unity; that is clear, for we could not otherwise speak of it. But that we should ever in any way reach a reality outside of it, seems impossible. And if this is so, as I have contended more fully elsewhere, then experience is reality. For in attempting to deny this thesis, or to assert something else, we find on experiment that we have asserted this thesis or nothing. We have here a matter for observation and experiment and not for long trains of reasoning. [Footnote: In Mind, No. 75, p. 335, I notice, for instance that Prof. Perry, while uprooting Idealism, demolishes in passing myself. He takes me to argue to a conclusion which I do not hold, from a basis which I have rejected as an error, and then wonders at the unnamable vice of the process. But, if Prof. Perry wishes to get an idea as to the view which he is anxious to refute, why should he not suppose (for a moment) that on my side there is no argument at all, and that on his side there is an inference by way of vicious abstraction?]” (Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, 316) 
“The theoretical criterion, for myself, is in theory supreme. The truth for any man is that which at the time satisfies his theoretical want, and “more or less true” means more or less of such satisfaction.” (Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, 317) 
“We must pass on to enquire as to the sense which we give to the Meaningless. The Meaningless, I should reply, is some object which, first (a), taken as itself, is positive, but which further (b) offers a meaning—an idea which it contains—though this meaning and idea is really none. The Meaningless is the absence of meaning from that which is before us as an object which owns meaning and offers it. We have thus a thinking which is empty and is no real thought, not because it excludes its object, but because the object fails. That which is offered as contained in the object, and deprived of which thought is helpless, proves trial to be lacking. Of the ideas which we were to examine there remains the Self-contradictory….It is this character of self-discrepancy and internal strife which, when we abstract it, is held as our idea of the Self-contradictory. It consists in a conjunction of jarring elements, that everywhere tends to dissolve itself on scrutiny, except so far as it remains fixed externally by error or artifice. For merely as and by itself, and apart from a conjunction which superadds a unity from without, the Self-contradictory is unthinkable. But, like the other negative idea which we have discussed, the Self-contradictory has everywhere in experience a positive side. And it is held together and maintained in existence by this foreign bond, from which, in order to become truly itself, it must abstract, but apart from which, it could not even appear as a fact in experience.” (Bradley, The Principles of Logic, Vol. II, 671-672) 
“I cannot argue the point here, but to me Realism and Pluralism (so far as denying what I hold) each essentially consists in an abstraction—an abstraction which is not only untenable but is downright illusory. The assertion of the Pluralist vitally depends on the unity which he rejects, and the doctrine of the Realist is thinkable only so long as it still involves that experience from which it claims to be free….I, on my side, find, not only that Realism and Pluralism maintain what is self-contradictory and in the end unthinkable, but, again and also, that they leave unexplained not a less but a far greater part of the undeniable facts.” (Bradley, The Principles of Logic, Vol. II, 682-684) 
“Everything, that in any sense is experienced, is felt, and what in particular is felt is always in feeling. It falls, that is, within an immediate experienced whole, which whole is not itself relational, and is not subject to any strict application of the category of Whole and Parts. Attempting here in predication to apply that category, you are forced to recognize that something in the end has been left outside. You have omitted, that is, the aspect of immediate inclusive oneness. There is, and there can be, no such given thing as a mere object, of whatever kind. There is experienced always with the object a content not included in the object, a content which is positively felt. An object therefore, as an object, is never more than an abstraction. And no feeling, emotion, desire, or volition, can ever by any device be resolved in objects or terms in relation.”  (Bradley, The Principles of Logic, Vol. II, 693) 
“How could I possibly deny the existence of the soul?” (Bradley, A Reply to a Criticism, 149) 
“Mr. Strange, like some other advocates of realism, fails to understand the position which he is anxious to attack. The contention which he has to meet is this, that he is taking a mere abstraction for reality, and that the burden of showing that what we contend is an abstraction is really more, rests properly with him. Such an idea seems not to have occurred to him, but he will find that it is perhaps more worth his attention than the ingenious arguments which, I must acknowledge, he does not attribute to myself.” (Bradley, A Reply to a Criticism, 150) 
“The primary form of experience may, I think, be best called “immediate experience” or “feeling”….I mean here by “feeling” such a mode of experience of sameness and difference in one as in an awareness direct and non-relational of that which is at once one and many. If we may permit ourselves to speak here prematurely of a whole and parts, then in immediate experience the whole qualifies every part while the parts qualify all and each both one both another and the whole.” (Bradley, Relations, 631) 
“Logical Positivism…is, as we have hinted, a descendant of Hume’s sensationalism, a mode of considering the world to which the English mind, it would seem, is naturally prone. Thought sets itself, positivism informs us, to construct satisfying propositions; and all propositions not founded on or capable of being established through sense experience are unmeaning; e.g. that the sensible world is unreal, or that there is a transcendent God….On the other hand, propositions founded on sense experience have meaning; but they can never be known to be true or false; they are either probable or improbable. The only true propositions are mathematical or logical; analytic, not synthetic. This is why the task of thought is to analyse propositions; to make them say exactly what they mean; and this involves the use of symbols. As early as 1881, J. Venn, in his Symbolic Logic, extending the earlier operations of the quantification of the predicate, had transformed into quasi-mathematical equations the traditional logical forms of propositions, A, E, I, and O, and of syllogisms, Barbara, Celarent, and the rest. But the process has been carried far beyond Venn by Carnap and Wittgenstein….If, however, we are to reach what Russell calls the habit of basing our beliefs on observations purely impersonal, we shall have to be prepared for Russell’s transformation of the sentence “Scott was the author of Waverly” into “One and only one man wrote Waverly, and that man was Scott”; or, more fully, “There is an entity c such that the statement x wrote Waverly is true if x is c, and false otherwise; moreover, c is Scott”. No wonder that Whitehead has remarked that if our remote ancestors had been wise positivists they would never have sought for reasons, they would never have apprehended connexions or consequences, and civilization would have ended before it had begun.” (Lofthouse, F.H. Bradley, 114-115) 
“[In] Mr. Hobhouse’s work on the Theory of Knowledge, I find an argument against “subjective idealism” which it may be well to consider briefly. The same argument would appear also suited, if not directed, to prove the reality of primary qualities taken as bare. And though this is very probably not intended…I will criticize it…from both points of view. The process seems to consist, as was natural, in an attempt at removal by elimination of all the conditions of a relation A—B, until A—B is left true and real by itself. And A—B in the present case is to be a relation of naked primary qualities, or again a relation of something apart from and independent of myself. After some assertions as to the possibility of eliminating in turn all other psychical facts but my perceptive consciousness assertions which seem to me, as I understand them, to be wholly untenable and quite contrary to fact the naked independence of A—B appears to be proved thus. Take a state of things where one term of the connection is observed, and the other is not observed. We have still here to infer the existence of the term unobserved, but an existence, because unobserved, free (let us say first) from all secondary qualities. But I should have thought myself that the conclusion which follows is quite otherwise. I should have said that what was proved from the premises was not that A—B exists naked, but that A—B, if unconditioned, is false and unreal, and ought never to have been asserted at all except as a useful working fiction. In other words, the observed absence of one of the terms from its place, i.e. the field of observation, is not a proof that this term exists elsewhere, but is rather here a negative instance to disprove the assumed universal A—B, if that is taken unconditionally. Of course, if you started by supposing A—B to be unconditionally true, you would at the start have assumed the conclusion to be proved.” (Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 614-615) 
“And, taken as directed against Solipsism, the argument once more is bad, as I think any argument against Solipsism must be, unless it begins by showing that the premises of Solipsism are in part erroneous. But any attempt at refutation by way of elimination seems to me even to be absurd. For in any observation to find in fact the absence of all CÅ“nesthesia and inner feeling of self is surely quite impossible. Nor again would the Solipsist lightly admit that his self was co-extensive merely with what at any one time is present to him. And if further the Solipsist admits that he cannot explain the course of outward experience, any more than he can explain the sequence of his inmost feelings, and that he uses all such abstract universals as your A—B simply as useful fictions, how can you, by such an argument as the above, show that he contradicts himself? A failure to explain is certainly not always an inconsistency, and to prove that a view is unsatisfactory is not always to demonstrate that it is false, Mr. Hobhouse’s crucial instance to prove the reality of A—B apart from the self could to the Solipsist at most show a sequence that he was unable to explain. [Footnote: The position of the Solipsist I understand to be is this, that no reality or fact has any existence or meaning except the reality of his self…] How in short in this way you are to drive him out of his circle I do not see unless of course he is obliging enough to contradict himself in advance by allowing the possibility of A—B existing apart, or being real or true independently and unconditionally.” (Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 615) 
“The Solipsist, while he merely maintains the essential necessity of his self to the Universe and every part of it, cannot in my opinion be refuted, and so far certainly he is right. For, except as a relative point of view, there is no apartness or independence in the Universe. It is not by crude attempts at elimination that you can deal with the Solipsist, but rather (as in this chapter I have explained) by showing that the connection which he maintains, though really essential, has not the character which he assigns to it. You may hope to convince him that he himself commits the same fault as is committed by the assertor of naked primary qualities, or of things existing quite apart from myself—the fault, that is, of setting up as an independent reality a mere abstraction from experience. You refute the Solipsist, in short, by showing how experience, as he has conceived it, has been wrongly divided and one-sidedly narrowed.” (Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 615-616) 

Sunday, August 28, 2022

Fragmentary Notes §29—§30

§29
Metaphysics is the systematic study of the ultimate nature of Reality. Anyone who embarks upon such a journey is, strictly speaking, a metaphysician. To say that such a task is either beyond the scope of knowledge, meaningless, or impractical, is to unconsciously enter the arena of metaphysical speculation. Indeed, any would-be objector to metaphysical inquiry is none other than “a brother metaphysician with a rival theory of first principles.”
§30
Metaphysics, despite being a spiritual endeavor, is not a discipline which necessitates the embracing of a species of theism, agnosticism, or atheism. Nor again should a metaphysic be identified with—heaven forbid—a mere quibbling over words, or a tedious regurgitation of banal truisms. A metaphysic, or at least a genuine metaphysic, is a systematic and holistic illustration of the concrete world of Experience—it is a spiritual act, a reflective act that is expressive of the world within which we live, move, and have our being.

Saturday, August 27, 2022

Reading Notes: August 27th, 2022

“All of our information about the world is derived from the function of our senses, and thus they are the principle source of all our knowledge….In a very real sense, who we are and how we see the world are the result of the experiences that are mediated by our sensory systems….A fundamental task of cognitive systems is to interpret incoming sensory information so that behaviors appropriate to the situation can be produced. While this is certainly not the only function of cognitive systems, it is one that is essential for survival. Because of the consequences of inefficient information transmission are no less severe than those of improper use of this information, the task of accurately representing external reality has been a powerful driving force in evolution. The result is that extant organisms possess an impressive array of highly specialized senses for which unique peripheral organs have evolved. Each of these sensory organs is a marvel of bioengineering and contains receptors that transduce a specific kind of energy into a code which the brain can use to detect and interpret external events. More impressive still is that while each of our sensory systems has its own specific neural machinery, which provides us with unique sensory impressions that have no counterparts in other senses…the brain regularly integrates these inputs to provide a coherent perceptual experience.” (Stein, Wallace, and Stanford, Single Neuron Electrophysiology, 433) 
“In the early analytic period of Moore, Russell and Ayer, British Idealism was caricatured and misinterpreted based on an emotional dislike against the dense writings of Kant and Hegel. Neither Moore’s Refutation of Idealism, nor Russell’s various pre-1930 philosophical works, ever actually seriously addressed even British Idealism in any detail.” (Pushpakumara, The Power of Negativity: A Philosophical Study of the Hegelian Heritage in Philosophy, 189) 
“If it is true that, whenever something has the quality X, something has the quality Y, this involves that, besides the relation between the two propositions “something has the quality X,” and “something has the quality Y,” there is a relation between the qualities X and Y. I propose to call this relation Intrinsic Determination….The quality X will be said to determine intrinsically the quality Y whenever the proposition that something has the quality X implies the proposition that something has the quality Y. The two qualities may be in the same thing or in two different things. The occurrence of blueness as a quality of anything intrinsically determines the occurrence of spatiality as a quality of the same thing….If, on the other hand, the occurrence of X does not intrinsically determine the occurrence of Y, we may say that Y is Intrinsically Undetermined by X, or Contingent to X.” (McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, Vol. I, 111-112) 
“For consider: An object, as we have seen, has two relations to a [representation]. The one is the relation that constitutes it the object meant by that [representation]. The other is the sort of correspondence that is to obtain between object and [representation]. As to the first of these two: An object is not the object of a given [representation] merely because the object causes the [representation], or impresses itself upon the [representation] as the seal impresses the wax. For there are objects of [representations] that are not causes of the [representations] which refer to these objects, just as there are countless cases where my [representations] are supposed to have causes, say physiological or psychological causes, of which I myself never become conscious at all, as my objects. Nor is the object the object of a given [representation] merely because, from the point of view of an external observer, who looks from without upon [representation] and object, and compares them, the [representation] resembles the object. For the sort of correspondence to be demanded of the [representation] is determined by itself, and this correspondence cannot be judged merely from without. Again, my [representation] of my own past experiences may resemble your past experiences, in case you have felt as I have felt, or have acted in any way as I have acted. Yet when my [representations], in a moment of reminiscence, refer to my own past, and have that for their object, they do not refer to your past, nor to your deeds and sorrows, however like my own these experiences of yours may have been. One who, merely comparing my [representations] and your experiences, said that because of the mere likeness I must be thinking of your past as my object, would, therefore, err, if it was my own past of which I was thinking. Neither such a relation as causal connection nor such a relation as mere similarity is, then, sufficient to identify an object as the object of a given [representation]. Nor yet can any other relation, so far as it is merely supposed to be seen from without, by an external observer, suffice to identify any object as the object of a given [representation].” (Royce, The World and the Individual, Vol. I, 297)

Monday, August 15, 2022

Reading Notes: August 15th, 2022

“For [Russell] mere resemblance in effects will no longer constitute meaning; these effects must be appropriate to the object, i.e., apparently they must fulfil some purpose or desire that we entertain in regard to it. Does this amendment help? Unfortunately, no. Several of the defects that we have just found in the amended form break out again in this one. We would point especially to the old hysteron proteron that dogs the heels of every causal and pragmatic theory of the idea. The word or image is to cause behavior appropriate to some object; through causing this it means that object. But it does seem a little miraculous that a word or image which means nothing at all should have this special and gratifying result. Why my thought of something thought help me to act appropriately toward it if it had no reference to this whatever before the behaviour supervened, is very hard to see. Surely, it is because I can think of it before I adjust myself that I succeed in adjusting myself at all; the thought conditions the adjustment, not the adjustment the thought.” (Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, Vol. I, 294-295) 
“We are told that an image means an object through being similar to it. Now, that when I think of something I may have an image that resembles it is of course admitted. But that the image’s meaning the object is not the same as its likeness to it may be shown very readily. Suppose you have just seen an unlabeled picture of the Nawab of Pataudi and think of it by help of its image, while I think of the Nawab himself. It is quite clear that your image may be more like him than mine, but yours will not mean him at all while mine will. Your image happens by accident to be like some particular man of whose existence you have probably never heard. If meaning consists in likeness, your image should mean him more obviously than mine. But it cannot mean him, for you know of no such object to mean. If accidental resemblance is meaning, then in our everyday thoughts we are thinking of things and persons that we never heard of. This is absurd. Hence meaning does not consist in similarity.” (Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, Vol. I, 288) 
“To develop [Dr. Schiller’s argument] in our own way, we should say: If meaning were resemblance, then the clearer the image, the more evidently would it mean one particular object, whereas in fact it does not. If Mr. Russell replies that it does, he must also say some very strange things.” (Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, Vol. I, 289) 
“[According to Russell:] “What is called an image “of” some definite object…has some of the effects which the object would have. This applies especially to the effects that depend upon association”….And this similarity in producing effects is what we mean by meaning. How will this serve? Difficulties crowd in. (1) A moment ago, at Mr. Russell’s suggestion, I did think of St. Paul’s, but before the thought could sprout associates, it was cut off by my hearing footsteps outside my door. If meaning consists in giving rise to later associates, my image, so far as I can see, meant nothing. And this is incredible. When I mean something, does my image happen first, and its meaning arrive later? It seems to me quite clear that I can make a passing reference to St. Paul’s and that this reference is equally genuine whether it gives rise to a train of associates or not. Should I have meant St. Paul’s more truly if I had gone on to think of Dean Inge, and then of his love of epigrams, and then, perhaps, of the epigrams of Martial? We may agree that my first image started off the train, but surely not that it was meaningless until the train appeared. And how much of the train is needed? Would my image have meant St. Paul’s more clearly if five steps rather than two were included within its causal efficacy?....But that the image did not delay for its meaning until it had proved its causal efficacy can be shown by a consideration already used. [You] cannot explain how one image calls up another if you take the first as quite meaningless. It is only because my image already meant St. Paul’s that it could lead on to the thought of this cathedral’s former Dean. If the image did not already mean St. Paul’s, why should it call up the head of St. Paul’s rather than the head of St. Peter’s, or indeed anything rather than anything else? And if it did mean St. Paul’s already, what becomes of the theory that meaning lies in causal efficacy.” (Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, Vol. I, 292-293)