Reading Notes: August 27th, 2022

“All of our information about the world is derived from the function of our senses, and thus they are the principle source of all our knowledge….In a very real sense, who we are and how we see the world are the result of the experiences that are mediated by our sensory systems….A fundamental task of cognitive systems is to interpret incoming sensory information so that behaviors appropriate to the situation can be produced. While this is certainly not the only function of cognitive systems, it is one that is essential for survival. Because of the consequences of inefficient information transmission are no less severe than those of improper use of this information, the task of accurately representing external reality has been a powerful driving force in evolution. The result is that extant organisms possess an impressive array of highly specialized senses for which unique peripheral organs have evolved. Each of these sensory organs is a marvel of bioengineering and contains receptors that transduce a specific kind of energy into a code which the brain can use to detect and interpret external events. More impressive still is that while each of our sensory systems has its own specific neural machinery, which provides us with unique sensory impressions that have no counterparts in other senses…the brain regularly integrates these inputs to provide a coherent perceptual experience.” (Stein, Wallace, and Stanford, Single Neuron Electrophysiology, 433) 

“In the early analytic period of Moore, Russell and Ayer, British Idealism was caricatured and misinterpreted based on an emotional dislike against the dense writings of Kant and Hegel. Neither Moore’s Refutation of Idealism, nor Russell’s various pre-1930 philosophical works, ever actually seriously addressed even British Idealism in any detail.” (Pushpakumara, The Power of Negativity: A Philosophical Study of the Hegelian Heritage in Philosophy, 189) 

“If it is true that, whenever something has the quality X, something has the quality Y, this involves that, besides the relation between the two propositions “something has the quality X,” and “something has the quality Y,” there is a relation between the qualities X and Y. I propose to call this relation Intrinsic Determination….The quality X will be said to determine intrinsically the quality Y whenever the proposition that something has the quality X implies the proposition that something has the quality Y. The two qualities may be in the same thing or in two different things. The occurrence of blueness as a quality of anything intrinsically determines the occurrence of spatiality as a quality of the same thing….If, on the other hand, the occurrence of X does not intrinsically determine the occurrence of Y, we may say that Y is Intrinsically Undetermined by X, or Contingent to X.” (McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, Vol. I, 111-112) 

“For consider: An object, as we have seen, has two relations to a [representation]. The one is the relation that constitutes it the object meant by that [representation]. The other is the sort of correspondence that is to obtain between object and [representation]. As to the first of these two: An object is not the object of a given [representation] merely because the object causes the [representation], or impresses itself upon the [representation] as the seal impresses the wax. For there are objects of [representations] that are not causes of the [representations] which refer to these objects, just as there are countless cases where my [representations] are supposed to have causes, say physiological or psychological causes, of which I myself never become conscious at all, as my objects. Nor is the object the object of a given [representation] merely because, from the point of view of an external observer, who looks from without upon [representation] and object, and compares them, the [representation] resembles the object. For the sort of correspondence to be demanded of the [representation] is determined by itself, and this correspondence cannot be judged merely from without. Again, my [representation] of my own past experiences may resemble your past experiences, in case you have felt as I have felt, or have acted in any way as I have acted. Yet when my [representations], in a moment of reminiscence, refer to my own past, and have that for their object, they do not refer to your past, nor to your deeds and sorrows, however like my own these experiences of yours may have been. One who, merely comparing my [representations] and your experiences, said that because of the mere likeness I must be thinking of your past as my object, would, therefore, err, if it was my own past of which I was thinking. Neither such a relation as causal connection nor such a relation as mere similarity is, then, sufficient to identify an object as the object of a given [representation]. Nor yet can any other relation, so far as it is merely supposed to be seen from without, by an external observer, suffice to identify any object as the object of a given [representation].” (Royce, The World and the Individual, Vol. I, 297)