My Idealism: A Reply to a Criticism

I decided to respond to some criticisms and objections that I encountered during my discussion with the YouTube channel, Axioms on Trial. Feel free to check out the original video here.

““I view experience as an atmosphere that is inclusive of that which it has as its context.” What a load. Sorry, but c’mon. It’s sociologically fascinating why folk like your idealist guests cling to theories (and I use the term loosely) like this, but philosophically this is all just so devoid of usefulness....I think idealism is silly, and I think continental philosophy is inscrutable, and so the combination of the two just set me on edge. Combine that with your metaphoric and poetic language, and frankly I don’t even see how you’re doing philosophy anymore. But I’m an analytic curmudgeon. You do you, my friend.”

I appreciate your reply. I’d like to make a brief correction. In your reply, you write that I “view experience as an atmosphere that is inclusive of that which it has as its context.” I don’t believe that I said that. If it came off that way, I apologize.

The original quote that the user posted was actually a misquote. And, as such, it sounds like gibberish. I’ll post the passage (Starting at 43:57 from the original discussion) which the user misquoted from:

“I think of Experience, and Experiences generally, as atmospheres, as opposed to two objects [colliding with each other], e.g. Experience being on the one side, and the Experienced object being on the other side, and there is somehow a collision between the two. I view Experience as an atmosphere that is inclusive of that which it has as its contents….Experience is not a kind of box. Rather, [Experience] saturates its contents. [Experience] is neither restricted to sensations nor perceptions, but also [includes] meanings….I may not perceive the far side of the moon, but its still an aspect of my Experience. I can still understand [the moon]; I can grasp the meaning of [the moon]; I might know facts about [the moon]. [The moon] is not something alien to my Experience; it still enters into [my Experience] in a way that is non-presentational as opposed to presentational. We [mistakenly] tend to treat Experience as an activity, or as a container, or a kind of box where things are placed in from the outside, as opposed to something that grows from within.”

I’ll attempt to clarify what I mean. I said that I view “Experience” as analogous to an atmosphere, an atmosphere that has “internally-differentiated” content (not “context”). I specifically chose “atmosphere” as a metaphor which best characterizes “Experience,” because atmospheres are illustrative of the continuity and nebulosity that we find at all levels of Experience. Furthermore, similar to how atmospheres envelop and sustain all that they enshroud, Experience saturates its contents with “meaning” and “significance.” Take, for example, Earth’s atmosphere. Not only does Earth's atmosphere “include” the totality of Earth’s organic life as its content, but it also serves as the vitalizing medium that saturates and sustains said organic life. Eliminate the atmosphere, eliminate the life. Furthermore, the organic life “included within” said atmosphere is also determinative of the atmosphere’s structure and wellbeing. For example, humans inhale oxygen from the atmosphere, and exhale carbon dioxide back into the atmosphere; plants “inhale” carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, and “exhale” oxygen into the atmosphere. Again, Earth’s organic life is a vastly differentiated into certain genera, particular species, individual organisms, etc.; each genus, species, and individual organism being differentiations, aspects, or “parts” of the differentiated “whole” of organic life itself (with certain “differentiations” being more determinate or “specific” than others). Now, we see that such a “internally-differentiated” system of organic life is “included within” as well as “sustained by,” Earth’s atmosphere; said system of organic life being the atmosphere’s “internally-differentiated” contents.

As was said above, the relation between Experience and the content which said Experience is inclusive of, is akin to that of the relation between an atmosphere and the organic life which said atmosphere envelopes and preserves. Just as Experience saturates and sustains the “meaning” and “significance” of its contents, so too does an atmosphere saturate and sustain its contents by supplying the necessary conditions for the emergence and thriving of organic life. This is the first parallel. What other parallels are there? Well, as was said above, Experience and atmospheres have “internally-differentiated” contents. I already touched upon how this is the case with respect to atmospheres, so I’ll briefly turn to Experience as such. When I speak of the “internally-differentiated” content of Experience, I do not mean that the content of Experience consists merely in “sensuous” phenomena, like tastes, smells, sounds, colors, textures, bodily feelings, etc. While said “sensuous” phenomena do indeed make up much of the content we find within the sphere of Experience, it is not at all the case that Experience is merely “sensuous.” On the contrary, it is more accurate to say that the content of Experience is exhausted by “meanings.” “Meaning” encompasses both the “sensuous” and “non-sensuous” sides of Experience—both sides are really inseparable, and are only abstractly distinguishable in reflection. I use the term “meaning,” to refer to that determinable somewhat which is capable of being “for” a Subject’s actual and/or possible appreciation and/or acknowledgement.

Furthermore, the whole of Experience, and each of its differentiated moments (“moment” being used here in the sense that Hegel uses it; i.e. as “element,” “phase,” “aspect,” etc.), are exhausted by “meanings” appreciable in thought. All of these meanings manifest themselves “within” Experience, and are not “external” to it. I haven’t spoken of either the Subjective or Objective aspects of Experience, but I think this is unnecessary for now. In short, if anyone wishes to grasp the essence of Experience, one must (a) remain faithful to its immediacy, (b) appreciate the complexity of its determinable form and matter, (c) do justice to its concrete actuality and inclusivity, and (d) not only grasp, but also attempt to understand and articulate its unique and complex structure. Limitations of language—let alone the artificial boundaries of abstract formalisms—make such a task incredibly difficult and seemingly insurmountable; however, whether or not such a task is possible in the long-run cannot be known unless it is attempted. Recourse to metaphorical and poetical language is, in the end, inevitable when tackling such concrete problems as the nature of Experience and Ultimate Reality.

P.S.:

The empirical sciences have no need to resort to metaphor, but this is not due to their being “more in touch with Reality” than the philosopher or phenomenologist. On the contrary, it is a direct result of the lack of concreteness infecting the material which they investigate (e.g. pure mathematics being the bread and butter of certain branches of physics). The real is concrete and actual; it is not abstract and formal.

“All that exists, exists within Space and Time.”

Suppose it is maintained that “All that exists, exists within Space and Time.” But, nothing can exist within Space and Time unless Space and Time existed. But, ex hypothesi, something exists if and only if it exists within Space and Time. Therefore, if it is maintained that “All that exists, exists within Space and Time,” then one must maintain that Space and Time exist within Space and Time (on pain of contradiction). If they did not admit this, then they could not maintain that “All that exists, exists within Space and Time,” because X cannot exist “within” Y, unless Y itself existed for X to be “within” it. However, even if one admits that Space(1) and Time(1) exist within Space(2) and Time(2), another fatal problem arises. Space(1) and Time(1) could not exist within Space(2) and Time(2), unless Space(2) and Time(2) themselves existed. But, ex hypothesi, Space(2) and Time(2) could not exist unless Space(2) and Time(2) were within Space(3) and Time(3). But Space(2) and Time(2) could not exist within Space(3) and Time(3) unless Space(3) and Time(3) existed. But, ex hypothesi, Space(3) and Time(3) could not exist unless Space(3) and Time(3) were within Space(4) and Time(4). In short, a vicious infinite regress would have to come to an end before Space and Time could exist for things to exist within Space and Time. Ergo, one cannot admit, on pain of contradiction, that “All that exists, exists within Space and Time.”

“​I think PI needs some brain education. All perceptions are modified by our memory.”

If this is true, and all of my perceptions are “modified” by my memory, then I could have never had a first perception. Indeed, in order for me to have had my first perception, perception(1), said perception would have had to have been “modified” by my memory. However, my first perception(1) could never have been “modified” by my memory unless I already had another perception, perception(2), before perception(1), to serve as the basis of that memory which would “modify” perception(1). Furthermore, perception(2), being a perception, would itself have had to have been “modified” by my memory. But perception(2) could never have been “modified” by my memory unless I already had another perception, perception(3), before my perception(2), to serve as the basis of that memory which would “modify” my perception(2). In short, a vicious regress would have had to come to an end before I could ever have a first perception, perception(1). Ergo, since I do have perceptions, it cannot be the case that “All perceptions are modified by our memory.”

My Adaptation of Nick Thomas-Brown’s Argument for Idealism

P1) If, at a given time, a true proposition about every Object, at all times, is known relative to one or more Subjects, then every Object, at all times, is of such a nature as to be knowable relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time.

P2) If every Object, at all times, is of such a nature as to be knowable relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time, then no Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, is of such a nature as to be unknowable relative to one or more Subjects, at all times.

“Let us call something, X, “relatively” unknown when some but not all people fail to know propositional truths about X. Furthermore, we will call X “absolutely” unknown if, and only if, nobody knows any propositional truths concerning X. Now, it is clear that relative unknowns exist. Most people know nothing about the Cynic philosopher Hipparchia, but those who study ancient Greek philosophy surely know of her. Thus, Hipparchia is unknown relative to certain people at certain times. Suppose someone, A, does not know about Hipparchia at a time T. Given this, Hipparchia is unknown relative to A at T. It would, then, be a contradiction for A to know of Hipparchia at T. Hence, once it is admitted that Hipparchia is not known by A at T, it follows that she cannot be known by A at T. So, we can reasonably support the following epistemic theorem: whatever is unknown relative to someone at a certain time, is unknowable relative to her at that time. But, suppose that instead of being relatively unknown, Hipparchia is absolutely unknown. In other words, let us consider that Hipparchia is not known by anyone at any time. We might observe that this can be restated as the following: Hipparchia is unknown relative to any person at any given time. When combined with our discovered theorem, we can infer from this that Hipparchia is unknowable relative to any person at any time. Thus, we have reached a second epistemic theorem: whatever is absolutely unknown, is unknowable by anyone whatsoever.” (Thomas-Brown, Idealism and the Known Unknown, 3) 

C1) Therefore, if at a given time, a true proposition about every Object, at all times, is known relative to one or more Subjects, then no Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, is of such a nature as to be unknowable relative to one or more Subjects, at all times. [From P1 and P2]

P3) If no Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, is of such a nature as to be unknowable relative to one or more Subjects, at all times, then every Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, depends upon its being known relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time.

“Granted our two theorems, we can move to demonstrate that nothing absolutely unknown ever exists. We know as certainly as we can that any given entity is either square or not square, for this is an instance of the law of excluded middle. In grasping this universal truth, we know a truth concerning all things past, present, or future. If an absolute unknown existed, we would have some knowledge of it by way of such universal truths. But, it is a contradiction for an absolute unknown to be known by someone or other. Hence, if we are to have knowledge of universal truths at any time, there can never exist absolute unknowns. Yet, we do, of course, possess such knowledge; and, thus, no absolute unknowns exist, past, present, or future. Whatever exists or comes to exist is, therefore, known by someone or other at some time or other. In other words, to be is to be known and existence implies knowledge. Once we understand that something’s existence entails its being known, we can further see that its existence depends on its being known. However, the presence of knowledge presupposes that of a knower. Hence, the existence of a given object depends on there being an intelligent self or selves.” (Thomas-Brown, Idealism and the Known Unknown, 3-4)

C2) Therefore, if at a given time, a true proposition about every Object, at all times, is known relative to one or more Subjects, then every Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, depends upon its being known relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time. [From C1 and P3]

P4) At a given time, a true proposition about every Object, at all times, is known relative to one or more Subjects.

C3) Therefore, every Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, depends upon its being known relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time. [From C2 and P4]

All credit for the original version of this particular argument goes to Nick Thomas-Brown. Thomas-Brown published the argument in a 2019 paper titled “Idealism and the Known Unknown.”

Fragmentary Notes §7—§10

§7

Experience has a determinate, “qualitatively contentful” structure that is diffused across three dimensions.  Experience has (i) a Subject-dimension, (ii) a marginal-dimension, and (iii) a focal-dimension. Dimensions (i), (ii), and (iii) are “differentiated” structures that converge back into (i). The Subject-dimension, of course, is that dimension of Experience to-which, through-which, and for-which Experience, and all of its dimensions—including the Subject-dimension itself—are “differentiated.” 

§8

“Meaning” is a valuative, qualitative “filling” or “content” that is for a Subject’s actual and/or possible appreciation and/or acknowledgement.

§9

The world of actual and possible “Meaning” is exhaustively saturated by value and feeling. As the “being” of value and feeling are both equally sustained by that Subject, to-which, through-which, and for-which they exist, it follows that the “being” of “Meaning” is incapable of being divorced or separated from the “being” of Subjectivity. 

§10

A purely formal system is no different from Matter. A purely formal system lacks any determinate “Meaning” either “for-itself” or “for” any of its parts; indeed, all “Meaning” which said system has acquired, or will acquire, is “Meaning” that has been bestowed upon it from something Other than the formal system itself—a being that is “outside” of the system. Furthermore, even after this bestowal of “Meaning,” said system is still devoid of “Meaning-for-itself;” its “Meaning” is exhaustively “Meaning-for-another.” Now, that Other which is “outside” the system, and bestows the system with “Meaning,” not only “includes” said system within itself as “content,” but also distinguishes said system from itself—it recognizes the system as its “content,” as its Object, and acknowledges said Object as a being-for-me. Now, this Other is none other than Thought itself.

Fragmentary Notes §1—§6

§1

Experience is an “internally-differentiated” atmosphere; an atmosphere which self-differentiates itself in-and-through froths of meaning; all of which “pour themselves out for” a determination of that atmosphere itself—this locus, or center, to-which and for-which all meanings converge, is none other than the Subject.

§2

Experience’s manifold differentiations all flow “inward” towards the Subject, and for the Subject.  

§3

Experience is like a whirlpool, whose spiraling currents drag ribbons of sea-foam down from its directrix, into its submerged apex, wherein they collapse into a simple point; this very point, this Archimedean point, is the Subject.

§4

Experience is that which is exhaustively self-differentiated, to, through, and for, a determination of itself.

§5

The Subject is that to-which, through-which, and for-which, an Experience is exhaustively self-differentiated.

§6

The Object of Consciousness is that determination or aspect of Experience which is actively attended to by a factor, aspect, or determination of that Experience itself, said determination being that to-which, through-which, and for-which, said Experience is exhaustively self-differentiated.