Reading Notes: June 6th, 2025

“[Every] idea is, after all, the experience of a self who is conscious. Even when, as students of the mere idea, we have neglected the self and taken no notice of it, yet all the time we have been dimly conscious of it as underlying all our feelings. In other words, we have realized that a perception, an imagination or an emotion does not exist independently, but that it is my perception, your imagination or his emotion. As James says: “Every ‘state’ or ‘thought’ is part of a personal consciousness….In this lecture room,…there are a multitude of thoughts, yours and mind….They are as little each-for-itself and reciprocally independent as they are all-belonging-together….My thought belongs with my other thoughts, and your thought with your other thoughts. The only states of consciousness that we naturally deal with are found in personal consciousnesses,…selves, concrete particular I’s and you’s.” This means that besides realizing my conscious experiences, or feelings, I am also conscious of my conscious self, as in a sense including, but not as identical with, the perceptions, the emotions or the thoughts of any given moment.” (Calkins, An Introduction to Psychology, 151)

“What, now, is this intimate consciousness of self which underlies and includes, though it does not consist in, the moment-by-moment ideas and experiences? What, in other words, do I mean by the ‘I’ which is conscious or has experiences?” (Calkins, An Introduction to Psychology, 151)

“The self underlying the conscious experiences…is not a single, lonely self, but a self related to a group of selves. Every self is, in other words, a social self, that is, a self in inextricable relation with many other selves, “a chain of linked thought, Of love and might to be divided not.” I, who read this paragraph, for instance, simply cannot be conscious of my own self except as related in the most varying ways to a vast number of other people.” (Calkins, An Introduction to Psychology, 152)

“Experiences may be contrasted as they refer to unparticularized selves, that is, to any or all selves, or as they refer to definite and particular selves. In perceiving, for instance, I am vaguely conscious that other people might see what I am seeing, but in hating I do not hate anybody in general, but some very special and definite person or persons.” (Calkins, An Introduction to Psychology, 154)

“The term ‘element’ is…almost always used of what we have called the structural elements, sensational, attributive, and relational.” (Calkins, An Introduction to Psychology, 151)

“A psychology which considers only psychic events or consciousnesses is, therefore a causal science; whereas psychology, in so far as it studies selves in their relations; does not treat its facts as causally related to each other, because, strictly speaking, only phenomena in time are causally connected, and selves are, to say the least, not primarily regarded as realities in time. Anybody may verify this by his introspection. One thinks of one’s body as beginning and ending at distinct moments; one thinks of one’s ideas and feelings as occurring yesterday or to-day—at a quarter of twelve or half-past three; but one does not primarily regard oneself as ‘in time,’ and one, therefore does not think of selves in causal relations to each other. They are related, of course, by virtue of the imperiousness, the demands, the acknowledgements, and the adoptions which make up, as we have seen, the very nature of a self; but these relations are not the causal ones which connect ideas.” (Calkins, An Introduction to Psychology, 154-155)

Materialism and the “First Breath” of Mentality (A Revised Version with Objections (to the Original Argument) and Replies)

According to Materialism, there was, at some point in time, an instant, M, whose “content” was the first-ever mental state; and this instant, M, was preceded in time by a compact series of non-mental instants (i.e., a compact series wherein each instant had a “content” that was exhaustively non-mental in character). How, then, does the Materialist go on to explain the “first breath” of mentality? He invokes an alluring word: “causality.” A reader sympathetic to the Materialist’s case might protest against such a brief statement of his position, so it would only be fair to let the Materialist interject and present his view in his own words:

Modern Materialism holds that mental states are nothing “over and above” physical states; mentality is but a delicate, rare, and ephemeral form of physicality. Old Materialism made an error that Modern Materialism has since corrected; it blundered by declaring a priori that (i) all physical states are non-mental in nature and that (ii) all mental states are non-physical in nature. Despite this supposed categorical difference between mental states (i.e., non-physical states) and physical states (i.e., non-mental states), Old Materialism went on to assert that every mental state located in the series of past, present, and future mental states is the causally-generated “effect,” or the epiphenomenal “by-product,” of a corresponding non-mental state located in the series of past, present, and future non-mental states. Thus, each mental state is causally dependent upon a particular non-mental state located in the total series of non-mental states. Although the total series of mental states was not itself conceived by these Old Materialists as being a “segment” of the total series of non-mental states, it was nevertheless made subordinate to it. While the thread of mental states lacked self-sufficiency, the chain of physical states (i.e., the totality of past, present, and future non-mental states—or the chain of non-mental states ordered in relations of “earlier than” and “later than”) constituted an independent series—resting on nothing other than itself. The Old Materialists recognized the difficulties in their position (e.g., the relationship between the two series), and failed to build an explanatory bridge that could intelligibly, and non-arbitrarily, unite “cause” with “effect.” Modern Materialism, by contrast, rejects the Old Materialist’s dogmatism and refuses to declare a priori that (i) every physical state is non-mental in nature, and that (ii) every mental state is non-physical in nature. Instead of maintaining that the thread of mental states is populated by non-physical, causally-generated “effects” or epiphenomenal “by-products” of an “independent” series that is exhausted by non-mental states, Modern Materialism, by contrast, holds that when a mental state occurs, this occurrence is identical to a particular physical state located in the total series of physical states. Thus, mental states are no longer viewed as “residual excrescences” that supervene upon the “shock of atoms” in the physical order; they are no longer granted a unique series of their own. On the contrary, mental states just are physical states. This is Modern Materialism.

Now, like any other physical state, the first-ever mental state (i.e., the “content” of the first-ever mental instant, M) would have been the effect of a preceding physical state, and this prior physical state would have been a non-mental state (i.e., the “content” of a non-mental instant)—but Modern Materialism assures us that there are no difficulties inherent in such a transition. By assimilating mental states into the physical order by way of “identity,” the Modern Materialist has advanced further than any of his predecessors: he has taken a step forward towards explaining the “first breath” of mentality.

Let’s examine the Materialist’s account in detail. The Materialist postulates two temporally-distinct instants: (i) a definite instant, M, whose “content” was the first-ever mental state, and (ii) a definite instant, Pn, whose “content” was a non-mental state that preceded the “content” of the first-ever mental instant in time. Let’s offer a brief sketch of the nature of the time-series by specifying some of its properties:

“A series is continuous when any term divides the whole series unambiguously into two mutually exclusive parts which between them comprise all the terms of the series, and when every term which so divides the series is itself a term of that series. From this second condition it obviously follows that a number of intermediate terms can always be inserted between any two terms whatever of a continuous series; no term of the series has a next term….The whole series of real numbers is continuous [because] every member of the number-series divides it into two classes, so that every number of one is less than every number of the other, and every number which thus divides the series is itself a term of the number-series....From the continuity of the series of real numbers it follows that any other series which corresponds point for point with the terms of the number series will be continuous. Now one such series is that of the [time series]. Every moment of time divides the whole series of moments into two mutually exclusive classes, the moments before itself and the moments which are not before itself. And whatever thus divides the time-series is itself a moment in that series.” (Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 171-172)

Thus, it follows from time’s continuity that no two instants in the time-series ever “touch.” When this fact and the Materialist’s proposed connection between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M are brought into focus, we find that the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M cannot temporally overlap—i.e., the first-ever mental state (i.e., the “content” of instant M) and the non-mental state (i.e., the “content” of instant Pn) had to be not only not simultaneous with each other, but also had to be in a relation of “earlier than” and “later than” to each other. Indeed, if the “content” of Pn was simultaneous with the “content” of M, then we would have a contradiction on our hands: there would be a moment in time when there was mentality present in a world that, ex hypothesi, was exhausted by non-mentality. In light of this, we must ask the Materialist several questions:

Question (i): Was the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

The Materialist’s theory requires that he answer question (i) in the affirmative. And so, in response to question (i), the Materialist declares the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—to be the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Question (ii): What was it about the “content” of Pn that made it the non-mental state—rather than any preceding non-mental state—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

On pain of inconsistency, the Materialist must respond to question (ii) by asserting that the “content” of Pn was a non-mental state that possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from all prior non-mental states), and that its possession of these “special properties” made the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Question (iii): What were the “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn and absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants, that made the “content” of Pn–rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

In reply to question (iii), the Materialist will likely posit a bunch of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of these “special properties.” Let’s symbolize the identity of these “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn—but absent from all the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants—as C.

At first glance, all seems fine and well; however, there is a puzzle lurking beneath the surface: a puzzle involving (i) the continuous nature of the time-series, (ii) the Materialist’s identification of the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any of the other non-mental instant—as being the possessor of the aforementioned “special properties,” and (iii) the Materialist’s identification of what these “special properties” actually are. Let’s explore this latent puzzle in the Materialist’s theory.

As we have noted above, the “content” of Pn (i.e., a state exhaustively non-mental in character) cannot be simultaneous with the “content” of M (i.e., a state that was not exhaustively non-mental in character)—on pain of contradiction. M must be “later than” Pn because, ex hypothesi, if the “content” of M was simultaneous with (or in any way overlapped with) the “content” of Pn, the time of the first-ever mental state would also be a time when the world was exhausted by solely non-mental states; and this, of course, is contradictory. Therefore, the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M are not simultaneous, but instead are in relations of “earlier than” and “later than” to each other. However, since the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant, it follows that between Pn and M there was another instant, X, distinct from both Pn and M and whose “content” separates the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M in time. This prompts us to ask the Materialist more questions:

Question (iv): Is the “content” of X a non-mental state or a mental state?

The Materialist must answer question (iv) by declaring the “content” of X to be a non-mental state. Since he must hold that the “content” of X is a non-mental state, we can represent X as Pn+1. Now, if the Materialist asserted the “content” of X to be a mental state, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about the “content” of M being the first-ever mental state because the “content” of X would have preceded the “content” of M in time.

However, if the Materialist answers question (iv) by declaring the “content” of Pn+1 (i.e., X) to be a non-mental state, then he either contradicts his answer to question (i) or his explanation becomes muddled in arbitrariness. Indeed, since the “content” of Pn+1 is “later than” the “content” of Pn in time, between the “content” of Pn—the supposed sufficient condition for the occurrence of the “content” of M—and the “content” of M, there would have been the occurrence of the purely non-mental “content” of Pn+1. However, if the identified “content” of the non-mental instant Pn was genuinely sufficient to produce the “content” of M, then the Materialist’s explanation stumbles into a difficulty.

If the occurrence of the intervening non-mental “content” of Pn+1 between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M matters causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, this would contradict the sufficiency of the “content” of Pn—rendering the “content” of Pn insufficient to be the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, if the occurrence of the intervening non-mental “content” of Pn+1 between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M does not matter causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, then this makes the timing of the occurrence of the “content” of M arbitrary and inexplicable. Moreover, if the “content” of Pn was sufficient to be the “cause” of the “content” of M, this leads us to ask why the “content” of Pn+1—a “content” that, ex hypothesi, lacked the “special properties” necessary and sufficient for it to be the “cause” of the “content” of M—occurred between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M.

In order to avoid introducing arbitrariness and inexplicability into his explanation of the “first breath” of mentality, the Materialist must revise his answer to question (i). He must now hold that the “content” of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., Pn)—was the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Question (v): What was it about the “content” of Pn+1 that made it the non-mental state—rather than any preceding non-mental state (e.g., the “content” of Pn)—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

On pain of inconsistency, the Materialist must answer question (v) by asserting that the “content” of Pn+1 possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from the “content” of all prior non-mental instants), and that its possession of these “special properties” made the “content” of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., Pn)—the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Question (vi): What were the “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn+1 and absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants (e.g., the “content” of Pn), that made the “content” of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn)—the “cause” of the “content” of M?

The Materialist is forced by his own hand to answer question (vi) by positing a bunch of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of the “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn+1 (i.e., features present in the “content” of Pn+1 but absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants) that made the “content” of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn)—the “cause” of the “content” of M.

Now, the Materialist cannot, on pain of contradiction, supply us with the same list of “special properties” that he provided in his answer to question (iii). If, in response to question (vi), the Materialist simply regurgitated his answer to question (iii), then, ex hypothesi, the “special properties” of the “content” of Pn+1 would have been present in the “content” of an earlier non-mental instant (i.e., the “content” of Pn)—thereby contradicting the Materialist’s answer to question (v). Moreover, the Materialist cannot simply provide his answer to question (iii) in response to question (vi) because he himself has admitted, by implication, that the properties of the “content” of Pn were not of such a nature as to make the “content” of Pn the cause of the “content” of M. Let’s symbolize the Materialist’s revision of these “special properties” as C’.

However, another problem arises. In the same way the “content” of Pn had to be earlier in the time-series than the “content” of M, so too must the “content” of Pn+1 be earlier in the time-series than the “content” of M. If this were not so, and the “content” of Pn+1 was simultaneous with the “content” of M, there would be a moment in time when there was mentality present in a world that, ex hypothesi, was exhausted by non-mentality—and this, of course, is a contradiction. And, as we have seen, since the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant, it follows that between Pn+1 and M, there was another instant, X’, distinct from both Pn+1 and M and whose “content” separated the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of M in time. This prompts us to ask the Materialist more questions:

Question (vii): Is the “content” of X’ a non-mental state or a mental state?

In answer to question (vii), the Materialist must, of course, respond by declaring the “content” of X’, to be a non-mental state. Since the “content” of X’ is a non-mental state, we can represent X’ as Pn+2.

Now, if the Materialist asserted the “content” of X’ to be a mental state, then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about the “content” of M being the first-ever mental state because the “content” of X’ would have preceded the “content” of M in time.

However, if the Materialist answers question (iv) by declaring the “content” of X’ to be a non-mental state, then he either contradicts his answers to questions (v) and (vi), or his explanation becomes muddled in arbitrariness. Indeed, since the “content” of Pn+2 is “later than” the “content” of Pn+1 in time, then between the “content” of Pn+1—the supposed sufficient condition for the occurrence of the “content” of M—and the “content” of M, there would have been the occurrence of a the purely non-mental “content” of Pn+2. However, if the identified “content” of the non-mental instant Pn+1 was genuinely sufficient to produce the “content” of M, then the Materialist’s explanation stumbles into a difficulty.

If the occurrence of the intervening non-mental “content” of Pn+2 between the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of M matters causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, this would contradict the sufficiency of the “content” of Pn+1—rendering the “content” of Pn+1 insufficient to be the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, if the occurrence of the intervening non-mental “content” of Pn+2 between the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of M does not matter causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, then this makes the timing of the occurrence of the “content” of M arbitrary and inexplicable. Moreover, if the “content” of Pn+1 was sufficient to be the “cause” of the “content” of M, this leads us to ask why the “content” of Pn+2—a “content” that, ex hypothesi, lacked the “special properties” necessary and sufficient for it to be the “cause” of the “content” of M—occurred between the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of M.

In order to avoid introducing arbitrariness and inexplicability into his explanation of the “first breath” of mentality, the Materialist must revise his answer to question (i). He must now hold that the “content” of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., Pn+1)—was the “cause” of the “content” of M.

In doing so, the Materialist must also revise his answer to question (v) and question (vi). He must assert that the “content” of Pn+2 possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics absent from the “content” of all prior non-mental instants) and that its possession of these “special properties” made the “content” of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn or the “content” of Pn+1)—the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, this is possible only insofar as the Materialist specifies the “special properties” of the “content” of Pn+2. Just as before, the Materialist must list a set of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of the “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn+2 (i.e., features present in the “content” of Pn+2 but absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants) that made the “content” of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn or the “content” of Pn+1)—the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, the Materialist cannot, on pain of contradiction, supply us with the same list of “special properties” that he provided in his original answer to question (vi). If the Materialist did so, then the “special properties” of the “content” of Pn+2 would have been present in the “content” of an earlier non-mental instant (i.e., the “content” of Pn+1); however, he himself has admitted, by implication, that the properties of the “content” of Pn+1 were not of such a nature as to make the “content” of Pn+1 the cause of the “content” of M. Ergo, the Materialist must supply us with a new set of properties that were allegedly present in the “content” of Pn+2, and made the “content” of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M. Let’s symbolize the Materialist’s revision of these “special properties” as C’’.

However, the problem has only been aggravated. As we’ve seen before, the continuity of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant; ergo, it follows that between Pn+2 and M there was another instant, X’’, distinct from both Pn+2 and M and whose “content” separates the “content” of Pn+2 and the “content” of M in time. This prompts us to ask the Materialist another question:

Question (viii): Is the “content” of X’’ a non-mental state or a mental state?

The Materialist must answer question (viii) by declaring the “content” of X’’ to be a non-mental state. Since the “content” of X’’ is non-mental, we can represent X’’ as Pn+3. And we know where this will lead us. The Materialist is trapped in a vicious regress; inconsistencies in the Materialist’s responses require that he continually revise his answers ad infinitum. He is unable to consistently identify the non-mental instant whose “content” allegedly gave birth to the “content” of the first-ever mental instant, M, and he is unable to consistently specify the identity of the alleged “special properties” present in the “content” of this non-mental instant that would have made it—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the cause of the “content” of the first-ever mental instant, M.

With every step the Materialist takes towards his first-ever mental state, he is forced to take one step back—he is forever barred from receiving his final reward. The Materialist fails to harmonize the “first breath” of mentality within an asphyxiatingly barren, non-mental world.

Objections to the Original Argument (with Replies)

Issue 1: “It is not clear to me why Pn must have a last instant. An event could occur over an open or half-open interval of time. If t is the time index of the first mental event, then Pn could be an event that occurs on [m, t) for any m < t. In this case there is neither overlap, nor intermediate causes.”

Reply to Issue 1: I have now revised the essay so that it makes a clearer distinction between positions in time and the “contents” that are isochronal to those positions in time. The “content” of an instant Pn is the state (i.e., the non-mental state) that obtains at Pn. By reframing the argument in terms of instants and their “contents,” rather than in terms of intervals and the boundaries of said intervals (e.g., their “first” and “last” instants, if they have a “first” or “last” instant), I think the revised argument avoids the objection that you bring up in “Issue 1.”

Issue 2: I also don't see why the existence of a moment in time between Pn and M implies that [the “content” of] Pn is not the cause of [the “content” of] M. If we identify special properties of [the “content” of] Pn that justify its being the cause of [the “content” of] M, it does not follow that every state between [the “content” of] Pn and [the “content” of] M also has those properties. It seems to me that you have introduced an additional assumption about the nature of causality, that one state can be the cause of another if and only if there is no state between them.

Reply to Issue 2: The second version of the argument does not depend on the assumption that a causal relation can only obtain between “temporally adjacent” “contents.” As mentioned above (in the second version of the argument), as soon as we acknowledge there being a purely non-mental instant (Pn+1) with its own distinct “content” (i.e., the “content” of Pn+1) intervening between the purely non-mental instant Pn and the first-ever mental instant M, we can reasonably ask whether we need to revise our list of “special properties” that we took to be responsible for the “coming into existence” of the “content” of M. For consider, if we assume that the “content” of Pn was the “cause” of the “content” of M, then we have a right to ask what “special properties” were present in the “content” of Pn and absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants that made the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, our only reason for supposing the “content” of Pn to be the cause of the “content” of M was based upon our supposed identification of some properties of Pn as being the “special properties” responsible for its giving rise to the “content” of M. And, by implication, the “content” of Pn had these properties whereas and the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants lacked them. If it turns out that the “content” of Pn+1 intervenes between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M, then our ordinary causal reasoning prompts us to reconsider if the properties of the “content” of Pn which we took to be the “special properties” were in fact the “special properties” responsible for giving rise to the “content” of M, or if we had instead only misidentified those properties as being the “special properties.”

Moreover, if we try and double down on our original assertion that those properties identified in the “content” of Pn were in fact the “special properties,” then we are left with no good reason for why the “content” of M didn’t occur before the “content” of Pn+1 occurred rather than after the “content” of Pn+1 occurred (i.e., why there was a “delay” even though the all the conditions were already present (only to vanish with the occurrence of the “content” of Pn+1)). However, if there was nothing about the intermediary “contents” (in addition to the “special properties” of the “content” of Pn) such that the occurrence of these intermediary “contents” were necessary for the occurrence of the “content” at time M, then we are left with a puzzle as to why the “content” of time M occurred earlier than some of the intermediary “contents” rather than before some of them. Moreover, this means that if the “content” of M could not occur unless the some of the intermediary “contents” occurred, then the occurrence of some of the intermediary “contents” were necessary to the occurrence of the “content” of M; yet if these were necessary to the occurrence of the “content” of M, then it would not be the case that the “content” of Pn was the necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of the “content” at M—thereby conflicting with the assumption that none of the intermediary “contents” mattered causally in the occurrence of the “content” of M. We can illustrate this by means of another argument:

Premise 1: Materialism posits that at some finite point, there occurred the first-ever mental state (i.e., the “content” of instant M), preceded solely by non-mental states.

Premise 2: Any causal explanation for the emergence of a first mental state (i.e., the “content” of instant M) from purely non-mental states (i.e., the “content” of non-mental instants) requires identifying specific non-mental conditions sufficient to produce mentality.

Premise 3: If an identified “content” of a non-mental instant Pn is asserted to be genuinely sufficient, then the occurrence of intervening purely non-mental “content” of instants Pn+1, Pn+2,… between Pn and M either:

(a) Contradicts the supposed sufficiency of the “content” of Pn, if those intermediates matter causally.

(b) Makes the timing of the occurrence of the “content” of M arbitrary and inexplicable, if those intermediates are causally irrelevant.

Premise 4: Both horns—causal contradiction or explanatory arbitrariness—are unacceptable to a coherent causal account. But if the Materialist cannot provide a coherent causal account, then he cannot adequately explain the causal origin of the first-ever mental state from purely non-mental states.

Conclusion: Therefore, the Materialist cannot adequately explain the causal origin of the first-ever mental state from purely non-mental states.

Issue 3: I also think it is possible for Pn and M to share a boundary point t. You argue that this is impossible because it would imply that, at time t, the world contained mental properties (because M is a mental event), but also was exhausted up to and including time t by non-mental events (because Pn is non-mental and contains t). But it does not necessarily follow that because an event has a property that each moment comprising the event has that property. For example, a physical object can have the property of being liquid, and be exhaustively comprised of subatomic particles, yet none of the subatomic particles are liquid. So too the materialist can coherently claim that the instants of time comprising a mental event do not have the property of mentality, but their agglomeration does have that property.

Reply to Issue 3: This objection does not apply to the revised version of the argument. This new version is framed in argument in terms of instants and their “contents,” rather than in terms of intervals and the boundaries of said intervals (e.g., their “first” and “last” instants, if they have a “first” or “last” instant).

Issue 4: I also think, perhaps most importantly, that the materialist simply does not have to agree that there is a first mental event. Because mentality is not metaphysically fundamental in the materialist theory, they don't even need to specify clear boundaries on the concept of “mental,” which could function rather like the notion of a species of animal, where there is a gradient of descent with no clear first member.

Reply to Issue 4: It seems that by denying that there was a “first-ever mental event” you either wade into some form of panpsychism (wherein there was never an instant whose “content” was solely “non-mental” (i.e., that “mentality” featured in the “content” of every past instant in some degree)), or you end up shifting the problem by introducing some form of “proto-mental continuum” (which, ultimately, seems to slip into some form of panpsychism again). Either way, the Materialist cannot give up the position that there was a point in time where the universe was solely non-mental—and it is precisely this position that generates the puzzle.

Inconsistencies in Keith Frankish’s Case Against Panpsychism (Part I)

I’m not a Panpsychist, or, rather, I’m not a Panpsychist in any contemporary sense of the term. Nevertheless, Panpsychism has a rich and rigorous history. It deserves to be taken very seriously. With that being said, I stumbled across an article written by the Illusionist philosopher, Keith Frankish—an article that criticizes Panpsychism severely. I wanted to come to Panpsychism’s defense. I also wanted to examine several inconsistencies in Frankish’s own arguments against Panpsychism.    

“Panpsychism’s popularity stems from the fact that it promises to solve two deep problems simultaneously. The first is the famous “hard problem” of consciousness. How does the brain produce conscious experience? How can neurons firing give rise to experiences of color, sound, taste, pain and so on? In principle, scientists could map my brain processes in complete detail but, it seems, they could never detect my experiences themselves—the way colors look, pain feels and so on: the phenomenal properties of the brain states involved. Somehow, it seems, brain processes acquire a subjective aspect, which is invisible to science. How can we possibly explain this?” (Frankish, Why Panpsychism is Probably Wrong, 1)

Keith Frankish insists that colors, sounds, tastes, and pains are real, and that our experiences of colors, sounds, tastes, and pains are also real (he simply qualifies this by saying that we mischaracterize our experiences (or objects of those experiences) as having properties which they don’t actually instantiate but only “seem” to). If we take the above passage at face value, then Frankish seems to be suggesting that my experience of a color, sound, taste, or pain is the way in which the color, sound, taste, or pain looks, sounds, tastes, or feels to me. Or, to simplify, “my-experience-of-a-color” is “the-way-in-which-the-color-looks-to-me,” “my-experience-of-a-pain” is “the-way-in-which-the-pain-feels-to-me,” and so on. 

Frankish goes on to say that the ways in which colors, sounds, tastes, and pains look, sound, taste, and feel to me are “phenomenal properties.” For example, he says, “the way colors look, pain feels and so on: the phenomenal properties of the brain states involved,” (Why Panpsychism is Probably Wrong) “It seems obvious that phenomenal properties, such as the feel of pain,” (Panpsychism and the Depsychologization of Consciousness), etc. To Frankish, “phenomenal properties…seem completely inaccessible to science. They are wholly subjective features, which simply do not show up on the scientific radar.” (Panpsychism and the Depsychologization of Consciousness). Now, if “phenomenal properties” were real, and were instantiated in the world, then what would these “wholly subjective features” be properties of? Frankish states that these “phenomenal properties” (if they were indeed instantiated in the world) appear to be properties of the brain states involved in our experiences of colors, sounds, tastes, pains, and so on (Why Panpsychism is Probably Wrong).

Confusion ensues. If “my-experience-of-a-color” is just “the-way-in-which-the-color-looks-to-me,” and “the-way-in-which-the-color-looks-to-me” is a “phenomenal property,” then we are faced with several inconsistencies.

(I) Frankish denies that “phenomenal properties” are “real” and instantiated in the world. Since Frankish holds that “my-experience-of-a-color” is just “the-way-in-which-the-color-looks-to-me” (cf. “my experiences themselves—the way colors look, pain feels and so on...” (Why Panpsychism is Probably Wrong)), and that “the-way-in-which-the-color-looks-to-me” are “phenomenal properties” (cf. “the way colors look, pain feels and so on: the phenomenal properties…” (Why Panpsychism is Probably Wrong)), it follows that Frankish is committed to the unreality of my experiences of colors, sounds, tastes, and pains. However, this conflicts with his insistence that “our lives are filled with conscious experiences—episodes of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, and of having bodily sensations of various kinds” and that these experiences are indeed real (Cf. The Demystification of Consciousness). 

(II) Furthermore, Frankish, being an Identity Theorist, is committed to the view that “my-experience-of-a-color” is identical to a process in my brain. However, Frankish asserts that “phenomenal properties” (if they were instantiated in the world) would be properties of the brain states involved in our experiences of colors, sounds, tastes, pains, and so on. (cf. “the way colors look, pain feels and so on: the phenomenal properties of the brain states involved.” (Why Panpsychism is Probably Wrong)) This is a manifest contradiction. Let me illustrate this. If “my-experience-of-a-color” is identical to “the-way-in-which-the-color-looks-to-me,” and “the-way-in-which-the-color-looks-to-me” is a “phenomenal property,” then it cannot be the case that the “phenomenal property” is a property of the brain processes involved in “my-experience-of-a-color.” Indeed, “my-experience-of-a-color” is ex hypothesi identical to that very brain process. A property (“phenomenal” or “non-phenomenal”) of the brain process cannot be identical to the brain process of which it is a property—an adjective cannot have itself as its own substantive!

A Question Concerning Bernard Lonergan’s “Questions for Intelligence” and “Questions for Reflection”

According to Bernard Lonergan, “questions fall into two main classes. There are “questions for reflection,” and they may be met by answering ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. There are “questions for intelligence,” and they may not be met by answering ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.” (Lonergan, Insight, 271-272) A “question for intelligence” asks ‘What?’, ‘Why?’, ‘How?’, and ‘What for?’. A “question for reflection” asks “whether our answers to the previous type of question are true or false, certain or only probable.” (Lonergan, Reality, Myth, Symbol, 1) With this distinction in mind, we can proceed by asking whether the following question is itself a “question for reflection” or a “question for intelligence”:

“Is the answer to this question, ‘No’?”

The above question is a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ question, and so it appears to be a “question for reflection” and not a “question for intelligence.” Indeed, as Lonergan says, it is incoherent to answer a “question for intelligence” with a mere ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. By contrast, “questions for reflection” are those questions which are met by answering ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. Indeed, “questions for reflection” can only be answered with ‘Yes’ or ‘No’; they involve phrases like, “Is it so?” and “Is it probably so?”. However, if we declare the question, “Is the answer to this question, ‘No’?” to be a “question for reflection,” we find that it cannot be met by answering ‘Yes’ or ‘No’—on pain of contradiction—and this contradicts our assertion that such a question is a “question for reflection.” We can illustrate this by examining the question in detail: 

“Is the answer to this question, ‘No’?”

If the answer to the question is ‘Yes’, then the answer to the question is ‘No’. But if the answer to the question is ‘No’, then the answer to the question is ‘Yes’. Since the question, “Is the answer to this question, ‘No’?”, cannot be met by ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ without contradiction, it follows that it is not a “question for reflection.” If it is objected that a question cannot refer to itself, we can reply that there are many questions that refer to themselves and are perfectly meaningful. Take, for example, the following question.

“Is the answer to this question, ‘Yes’?”

The above question is a “question for reflection” that not only references itself, but also can be answered without contradiction—it can be met by a simple ‘Yes’. We can also illustrate the same paradox that we outlined above by invoking two distinct questions rather than just one:

“Is the answer to the following question, ‘No’?”

“Is the answer to the preceding question, ‘Yes’?”

Let’s label the top question with the letter, A, and let’s label the bottom question with the letter, B. On the one hand, if the answer to A is ‘Yes’, then the answer to B must be ‘No’; however, if the answer to B is ‘No’, then the answer to A must be ‘No’—and this contradicts the original answer to A as being ‘Yes’. On the other hand, if the answer to A is ‘No’, then the answer to B must be ‘Yes’; however, if the answer to B is ‘Yes’, then the answer to A must be ‘Yes’—and this contradicts the original answer to A as being ‘No’. If it is objected that A and B are not “questions for reflection” at all since each has its meaning only in relation to the other, we can provide an instance of two more questions: 

“Is the answer to the following question, ‘Yes?”

“Is the answer to the preceding question, ‘Yes’?”

The above questions have their respective meanings only in relation to the other and can be answered without contradiction—both can be met by a simple ‘Yes’.

Reading Notes: October 16th, 2024

“Reason is to be examined, but how? It is to be rationally examined, to be known; this is, however, only possible by means of rational thought; it is impossible in any other way, and consequently a demand is made which cancels itself. If we are not to begin philosophical speculation without having attained rationally to a knowledge of reason, no beginning can be made at all, for in getting to know anything in the philosophical sense, we comprehend it rationally; we are, it seems, to give up attempting this, since the very thing we have to do is first of all to know reason. This is just the demand which was made by that Gascon who would not go into the water until he could swim. It is impossible to make any preliminary examination of rational activity without being rational.” (Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 53)

“I form ideas, I have perceptions, and here there is a certain definite content, as, for instance, this house, and so on. They are my perceptions, they present themselves to me. I could not, however, present them to myself if I did not grasp this particular content in myself, and if I had not posited it in a simple, ideal manner in myself. Ideality means that this definite external existence, these conditions of space, of time, and matter, this separateness of parts, is done away with in something higher; in that I know this external existence, these forms of it are not ideas which are mutually exclusive, but are comprehended, grasped together in me in a simple manner.” (Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 84)

“What was there before this time?—[in] the other of time (not another time, but eternity, the thought of time)? In this, the question [itself] is suspended (aufgehoben), since it refers to another time. But in this way, eternity itself is in time, it is a “before” of time. Thus it is itself a past, it was, was absolutely, is no longer. Time is the pure concept—the intuited (angeschaute) empty self in its movement, like space in its rest. Before there is a filled time, time is nothing. Its fulfilment is that which is actual, returned into itself out of empty time. Its view of itself is what time is—the nonobjective. But if we speak of [a time] “before” the world, of time without something to fill it, [we already have] the thought of time, thinking itself, reflected in itself. It is necessary to go beyond this time, every period – but into the thought of time. The former [i.e., speaking about what was “before” the world] is the bad infinity, that never arrives at the thought from which it goes forward.” (Hegel, The Philosophy of Spirit, Pt. III, C.)

“Earlier, Hegel establishes that a being is determinate in not being another. Thus, it appears to have its being for another. But Hegel goes on to contrast this sort of finite being, which is merely the negation of another, to one which possesses its determinate character in virtue of its internal self-differentiation. In other words, rather than being what it is merely in contrast to others, it is what it is in virtue of contrasts (or distinctions) within itself. Being-for-self is ‘the infinite determinacy that contains distinction within itself as sublated’….In being-for-self, Hegel is anticipating…the Concept, or concrete universal—or, more simply, the whole: a being which is absolute because it subsumes all finite determinations within itself, and thus does not derive its being from its opposition to anything outside itself.” (Magee, The Hegel Dictionary, 46-47)

Reading Notes: October 14th, 2024

“The animating life of Spirit brings us first into contact with the free infinity capable within its own external and determinate existence of remaining constant to the inner principle of unity, and, in the act of expression, still reflected back upon its ideal substance. To Spirit consequently is it alone permitted to impress the hall-mark of its infinity and free self-recurrence on its external expression, even though by such expression it enters the realm of narrow boundaries. At the same time we may observe that Spirit, too, is only free and infinite in so far as it truly apprehends its universality, and deliberately posits for itself and accepts those ends which are adequate to its own notion.” (Hegel, The Philosophy of Fine Art, Vol. I, 211)

“To the ordinary consciousness of everyday life the object of perception, no doubt, breaks away from mind, as though our thought stood in opposition to Nature, which receives from us a validity equal at least to the consciousness which perceives it. But in this way of looking at Nature and the conscious subject as two neighbors set over against one another in territories equally self-subsistent it is only the finite and limited mind, not that which it is as an infinite substance and in its notional truth, which is apprehended. Nature is not thus to be set over against absolute Mind, either as conjoint with a sphere of the Real of equal worth, or as an independent boundary thereto. Rather the aspect which Nature appears to hold in this respect is that which mind or spirit itself sets up, and of which it becomes the product as a Nature in which limit and boundary are themselves determining constituents. In fact, Mind in its absolute or infinite substance can only be apprehended as this free activity, which is manifested in self-development through differentiation. This object, this other, through which such differentiation proceeds, is regarded in such opposition as Nature, but as the object of intelligence it is quite as much indebted to Mind for the free gift and fulness of its own essential substance. We must therefore conceive Nature as herself containing in potency the absolute Idea. She is that Idea in apparent shape, which mind, in its synthetic power, posits as the object opposed to self. She is so far a product, a creation. The truth of Nature therefore is simply the determination by mind of its own substance, its ideality and power of determination, through a process which no doubt begins with a separation of itself into two factors which apparently negate each other, but which, by the very activity of such negation and separation, passes beyond the contradiction it implies to a unity which heals the fracture. Instead of finding ourselves opposed to a limit and a barrier we have a totality in which the parts which opposed each other are fused together by the free universality of mind. This ideality, in other words this infinite power of determination, is that which constitutes the profound notion of Mind’s subjectivity.” (Hegel, The Philosophy of Fine Art, Vol. I, 126-127)

“Mind grasps its finiteness as the negation of its own essential substance, and is aware of its infinity. And this essential truth of the finite mind is the absolute Mind or Spirit. In this form of self-consciousness mind is merely actualized as absolute negativity. The elements of finitude which it confronts is apprehended as such and annulled. In this, the highest sphere of its activity, mind becomes the object of volition. The Absolute itself becomes the object of mind. Spirit, as self-consciousness, differentiates itself as the knowing subject from the absolute Spirit as the object of knowledge. Mind in this latter sense, in contradistinction from mind which has not overcome the conditions of finite perception, may therefore be defined as a finite mind in possession of the principle of differentiation from its true object. In the higher and more speculative consideration of truth, however, it is the absolute mind itself, which, in order to unfold explicitly, the knowledge of itself, essentially becomes a principle of differentiation to itself, and thereby posits the finitude of mind, within which it becomes for itself absolute object of the knowledge of itself.” (Hegel, The Philosophy of Fine Art, Vol. I, 128-129)

“In the emotional life the Soul finds its true expression as Soul. For soul the mere juxtaposition of limbs have no real truth, and in the presence of its subjective ideality the purely spatial multiplicity of external configuration ceases to exist. Such a manifold, with its unique differentiations, its organic articulation of parts is no doubt presupposed; but when and in so far as the soul expresses itself through such in feeling the more inward unity ever-present to life asserts itself equally as the dissolution of all absolute independence between physical parts, which reveal now not merely their materia, but also that wave of animation which fuses all in their soul.” (Hegel, The Philosophy of Fine Art, Vol. I, 174-175)

“We must, indeed, think of [Experience] as having life in itself and therefore as differentiating itself from itself; but this differentiation is held within the limit of its unity, it is a separation of movements which are separated only as they are united.” (Caird, Metaphysic, 87)

The Structure of Experience: A Hegelian Reading of Leibniz’s Mill

In §17 of The Monadology, there is an elegant, notorious, and, to my dismay, all too often misunderstood, gedankenexperiment—Leibniz’s Mill:

“It must be confessed, however, that Perception, and that which depends upon it, are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is to say, by figures and motions. Supposing that there were a machine whose structure produced thought, sensation, and perception, we could conceive of it as increased in size with the same proportions until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would into a mill. Now, on going into it he would find only pieces working upon one another, but never would he find anything to explain Perception. It is accordingly in the simple substance, and not in the composite nor in a machine that the Perception is to be sought. Furthermore, there is nothing besides perceptions and their changes to be found in the simple substance. And it is in these alone that all the internal activities of the simple substances can consist.” (Leibniz, The Monadology, §17)

To better understand Leibniz’s Mill, let’s consult the previous sections of The Monadology where Leibniz emphasizes the fact that the “self-differentiated” structure of Experience (i.e., “perception”) is a “multiplicity-in-unity”—it is “internally-differentiated.”

“Now besides this principle of change there must also be in the Monad a manifoldness which changes. This manifoldness constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and the variety of the simple substances….This manifoldness must involve multiplicity in the unity or in that which is simple….The passing condition which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unity, or in the simple substance, is nothing else than what is called Perception….We, ourselves, experience a multiplicity in a simple substance, when we find that the most trifling thought of which we are conscious involves a variety in the object.” (Leibniz, The Monadology, §12-§16)

Before continuing, it is necessary to sketch the nature of Experience and Matter. Now, there is an important likeness between Experience and Matter: both are “self-differentiated.” However, there are distinctive characteristics peculiar to Experience and Matter’s respective “self-differentiations.” Experience must be conceived as a particular unity-of-the-manifold. Indeed, as F.H. Bradley once put it, Experience is “a unity of the manifold in which the externality of the manifold has utterly ceased.” Experience is exhaustively self-differentiated “into-itself” (i.e.., “Partes intra partes”), whereas Matter is exhaustively self-differentiated “out-of-itself” (i.e.., “Partes extra partes”). Hegel elegantly presents a concise illustration of this in his Introduction to the Philosophy of History and Philosophy of Mind:

“The nature of Spirit [i.e., Experience] may be understood by a glance at its direct opposite—Matter. As the essence of Matter is Gravity, so, on the other hand, we may affirm that the substance, the essence of Spirit is Freedom….Matter possesses gravity in virtue of its tendency toward a central point. It is essentially composite; consisting of parts that exclude each other. It seeks its Unity; and therefore exhibits itself as self-destructive, as verging toward its opposite [an indivisible point]. If it could attain this, it would be Matter no longer, it would have perished. It strives after the realization of its Idea; for in Unity it exists ideally. Spirit, on the contrary, may be defined as that which has its center in itself. It has not a unity outside itself, but has already found it; it exists in and with itself. Matter has its essence out of itself; Spirit is self-contained existence….This self-contained existence of Spirit is none other than self-consciousness—consciousness of one’s own being. Two things must be distinguished in consciousness; first, the fact that I know; secondly, what I know. In self-consciousness these are merged in one; for Spirit knows itself. It involves an appreciation of its own nature, as also an energy enabling it to realize itself; to make itself actually that which it is potentially.” (Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, 18)

“Mind is…pure activity…not abstractly simple but, in its simplicity, at the same time a distinguishing of itself from itself…an essence which is truly actual only through the specific forms of its necessary self-manifestation.” (Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §378)

“[Mind] immanently differentiates itself and returns out of its differences into unity with itself.” (Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §379)

“[Mind] in spite of its simplicity is distinguished within itself; for the ‘I’ sets itself over against itself, makes itself its own object and returns from this difference…into unity with itself. This being-with-itself of the ‘I’ in its difference from itself is the ‘I’s infinitude or ideality.” (Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §381)

“Already in finite mind, ideality has the meaning of a movement returning into its beginning, by which mind, moving onward from its undifferentiated stage, its first position, to an Other, to the negation of that position, and by means of this negation of this negation returning to itself, demonstrates itself to be absolute negativity, infinite self-affirmation…” (Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §381)

“The substance of mind is freedom, i.e., the absence of dependence on an Other, the relating of self to self. Mind...attains actuality not by fleeing from the Other but by overcoming it. Mind can step out of its abstract, self-existent universality...[and] can posit within itself a determinate, actual difference, something other than the simple, “I,” and hence a negative; and this relation to the Other is...necessary, because it is through the Other and by the triumph over it, that mind...returns to itself out of its otherness...[and comes to be] the self-differentiating universal which in its difference is at home with itself and for itself. The Other...therefore also belongs to the nature of mind....In the Other, therefore, mind manifests only itself, its own nature; but this consists in self-manifestation. The manifestation of itself to itself is therefore itself the content of mind and not, as it were, only a form externally added to the content....In mind, therefore, form and content are identical with each other….[Mind] as such only is, in so far as it manifests itself to itself.” (Hegel, The Philosophy of Mind, §382-§383) 

Echoing Hegel, the British Idealist philosopher Edward Caird writes:

“We must, indeed, think of [Experience] as having life in itself and therefore as differentiating itself from itself; but this differentiation is held within the limit of its unity, it is a separation of movements which are separated only as they are united.” (Caird, Metaphysic, 434)

Whereas Experience “has its center in itself,” Matter, by contrast, has its center “out of itself.” For, Matter is exhausted by the reciprocal exclusion and repulsion of its composite parts. All parts of Matter exemplify nothing other than flatness, out-spreadedness, and side-by-sidedness. Matter is never at home with itself; indeed, Matter is neither “transparent-to-itself,” nor does it return “into-itself” or “into-its-parts.” Matter is “opaque-to-itself.” Indeed, Matter is “simple” in all of its dimensions: the entirety of its character is determined by what lies “outside” it. 

Gyrating patterns of physical particles are, therefore, in toto, pervaded by a self-othering “side-by-sidedness.” Indeed, these events quâ “material happenings” (i.e., processes that “outspread” and “diffuse” themselves across an extended, spatio-temporal manifold) are what they are only insofar as their “unfoldings” are repulsions “out-of-themselves”—no one of these “repulsions” either being, or having, a “moment of return” (i.e., a differentiation or phase wherein there is an “overreaching,” “including,” or “enveloping” of the distinction between “itself” and its “other” within “itself”). For any such “material happening”—regardless of its peculiar kind or character—there is neither an “interpenetration,” nor a “mutual-inclusion,” of its manifold differentiations or phases; on the contrary, we only find its differentiations or phases “withdrawing-towards-Others” (i.e., “passing-out-of-themselves” at the expense of their own self-identity). However, these “Others”—the “beyonds” towards which the differentiations or phases of a “material happening” seek to “withdraw”—are themselves repulsions “out-of-themselves”—prolonging the monotony ad infinitum. 

The only spatial “representation” that might help us illustrate (pictorially) the “Partes intra partes” character of Experience would be a torus undergoing “hyperspace rotation” (i.e., rotating in a poloidal direction). Such a torus would be simultaneously “rotating-out-of-itself” and “rotating-into-itself, “moving-away-from-itself” and “moving-into-itself,” and “diffusing-itself-out-of-itself” and “infusing-itself-into-itself.” It is important to note that it is impossible for a physical object to undergo “hyperspace rotation” in a three-dimensional space without tearing itself apart. Here is an animation that represents what I have in mind:

Now, in order to grasp how the nature of Experience is analogous to a torus engaging in “hyperspace rotation,” we ought to replace the “spatial language” used in our illustration (i.e., the spatial language used in specifying directions of rotation) with expressions that best represent different modes of “differentiation.” Thus, we should understand Experience in its “Unity” as having been represented by the torus as a whole. Now, as mentioned above, Experience is exhaustively self-differentiated. We should understand Experience’s “exhaustive self-differentiation” (or Experience in its “Manyness”) as having been represented by the torus “rotating-out-of-itself.” However, Experience is not a mere “Many;” on the contrary, it is also a “One.” Thus, Experience is not merely “exhaustively self-differentiated,” rather Experience is exhaustively self-differentiated to, through, and for, itself (i.e., A manner or mode of differentiation that is a “differentiation-into-self”). We should understand Experience’s “exhaustive self-differentiation to, through, and for, itself” as having been represented by the torus “rotating-into-itself.”

We are thus able to see how Experience is a Unity of Oneness and Manyness—an identity-in-difference. Spirit (i.e., Experience) is, in J.N. Findlay’s picturesque words, “the mover, the moved, and the motion.” As Experience unfolds and inwardly differentiates itself into Subjectivity and Objectivity, it simultaneously enfolds the products of this “self-fissuring” (i.e., Subject and Object) back into a Unity with itself. Subjectivity is Experience-in-its-Manyness as it “flows” or “converges” into Experience-in-its-Oneness; and Objectivity is Experience-in-its-Oneness as it “diffuses” or “differentiates-itself-out-of-itself” into Experience-in-its-Manyness. This diastolic and systolic process of “self-fissuring” and “self-reconciliation” constitutes the life of Experience. 

With that being said, I’ll conclude this brief essay by presenting my own adaptation of Leibniz’s Mill:

If we were to take infinitely many coplanar geometrical figures of various determinable shapes and sizes, and have them expand, contract, and move about for an infinite time, we can rest assured that no transformation, redistribution, pattern, or collision of said figures will ever yield a new figure with “cubical content”—a figure that not only exhibits a new dimension, but also envelops those aforementioned plane geometrical figures. Indeed, all qualitative changes and transformations in those figures—and patterns thereof—will always be determinate manifestations of a generic character—or determinable—that had hitherto manifested itself in another determinate form. If, after an indefinite period of time, a change in the arrangement of those coplanar geometrical figures resulted in the manifestation of a new figure exhibiting “cubical content” and enveloping those aforementioned coplanar geometrical figures that gave rise to it, then said manifestation would be the manifestation of a new determinable that was itself “inclusive of” the former determinable, without itself being “included under it” as a determinate manifestation of said determinable. Such an incoherent and disparate breach of continuity is paralleled in the idea that—at some point in time—Experience was “birthed” by transformations and redistributions in Matter.

With this Hegelian reading of Leibniz’s Mill, we are left with a powerful and compelling illustration of the fact that qualitative changes and alterations in the structure and arrangement of material objects as such (e.g., transformations such as dilations, expansions, translations, rotations, reflections, etc.) cannot account for what would be the manifestation of a new determinable (hitherto unmanifested) that (i) exhibits an “internally-differentiated” structure (i.e., Or, to use Hegel’s words, is such that it “is distinguished within itself and returns from this difference into unity with itself”), and (ii) is “inclusive of” the mere material objects that are alleged to have given rise to it. This new determinable would be none other than Experience (i.e., Hegel’s Spirit).

Reading Notes: October 7th, 2024

“When we compare [Dr. George Galloway’s The Philosophy of Religion] with those of the previous generation; with Martineau or the Cairds, for example, we become conscious of a change of spirit. It might be expressed by saying that the philosophy of religion has become more objective. The whole problem is not now comprised in the development of a speculative theory of religion; the philosopher feels himself compelled to approach the central problem of validity through an independent study of the empirical data. Thus Dr. Galloway devotes at least half his book to the discussion of the historical development of religion and the psychology of the religious consciousness. This increased “objectivity” undoubtedly involves a certain loss of artistic unity, and it also makes very large demands on the learning of a writer; as Dr. Galloway modestly remarks, “it is too much to expect that the religious philosopher can personally traverse this broad territory and make himself acquainted with all its various features.” Yet this new attitude has obvious compensations from the point of view of the reader; we may learn with confidence facts and tendencies from a writer whose philosophical opinions may be unacceptable….When Dr. Galloway comes to work out his view of the universe we find clear indications that he has felt the influence of the reaction against Absolutism. With William James he protests against the “Block Universe;” with the New Realists he denies that Idealism can explain the concrete facts of experience. I think that he does not always do justice to the views of Absolute Idealism; probably Mr. Bradley’s recent volume of essays was published too late to be made use of.” (Matthews, Review of George Galloways “The Philosophy of Religion” (1914), 116-118)

“The external world is the object that acts on man’s organs of sense, and in the internal sense-centres of the cortex of the brain these impressions are subjectively transformed into presentations. The thought-centres, or association centres, of the cortex (whether or no one distinguishes them from the sense-centres) are the real organs of the mind that unite these presentations into conclusions. The two methods of forming these conclusions—induction and deduction, the formation of arguments and concepts, thought and consciousness—make up together the cerebral function we call reason.” (Haeckel, The Wonders of Life: A Popular Study of Biological Philosophy, 4)

“Among the censures which the academic metaphysicians, especially in Germany, have passed on my Riddle of the Universe, the heaviest is perhaps the charge that I know nothing whatever about the theory of knowledge. The charge is correct to this extent, that I do not understand the current dualistic theory of knowledge which is based on Kant’s metaphysics; I cannot understand how their introspective psychological methods—disdaining all physiological, histological, or phylogenetic foundations can satisfy the demands of “pure reason.” My monistic theory of knowledge is assuredly very different from this. It is firmly and thoroughly based on the splendid advances of modern physiology, histology, and phylogeny—on the remarkable results of these empirical sciences in the last forty years, which are entirely ignored by the prevailing system of metaphysics.” (Haeckel, The Wonders of Life: A Popular Study of Biological Philosophy, 11-12)

“As an old medical maxim runs, Pathologia physiologiam illustrat—the science of disease throws light on the sound organism.” (Haeckel, The Wonders of Life: A Popular Study of Biological Philosophy, 40)

Reading Notes: October 3rd, 2024

“What is implied in [the unity of mind]? It is clear that whatever else it implies, it at least involves the interconnexion of different cognitions, feelings, and conations with each other as entering into a complex unity of an altogether unique kind….[At] any rate, there is a complex mental life—a mind-complex….We must then analyze the mind-complex, so as to determine wherein its unity consists, and what is and is not included in the unity of the manifold. We have first to note that there are two sides to our mental life, distinct though inseparable, which are broadly distinguishable as (1) knowledge of objects, and (2) interest in them. In discussing the unity of the mind-complex, it is necessary for the sake of clearness to deal first with cognitive unity and then with unity of interest. (For reasons which will appear as we proceed, it would be impossible to reverse this order).” (Stout, God & Nature, 264-265)

“What is the unity of knowledge?....Unity of knowledge is identical with knowledge of unity. [Unity of knowledge] is actual or potentially present if and so far as items in any way diverse are or can be known or thought of as in any way connected or related, or as partial features or aspects of any kind of whole….If such relations [between diverse items] are not actually known or thought of, yet, in so far as it is possible that they may be so, the cognitive unity is potential. On the other hand, where distinct items are severally apprehended but without any cognisance, actual or potential, of relation between them, there is no cognitive unity….[This analysis must be expanded to] account for cognitive unity, actual or potential, as coextensive with the unity of the individual “I” or “self”….We have, then, still to account for cognitive unity as necessarily pervading and connecting, potentially or actually, all stages and phases in the life-history of an individual [mind-complex]….We can do this only in one way. There must be for the knowing individual [mind-complex], one all-inclusive object, comprehending all other objects—whether particular or universal, actual, possible or impossible—as its partial and essentially incomplete features and aspects. It follows that whatever else the individual knows he must in some measure and degree, however rudimentary, be cognisant of the universe in its unity. But how? In very different ways and degrees, varying with the special conditions of individual existence and stages of mental development; different for us…and for the cat watching a mouse-hole. Yet the cat’s knowledge, just as much as ours, presupposes the unity of the universe; otherwise it could never go beyond the content of its own immediate experience, and could not even know this.” (Stout, God & Nature, 265-267)

“Cognitive unity includes not only what is commonly called knowledge, but also what is commonly called ignorance. This would be impossible if the ignorance consisted in the absolute absence of all cognitive relation between the [mind-complex] and what it is ignorant of. But this is not so. We may indeed, by straining the use of language, say that a stone is absolutely ignorant in this sense. It is so because it is also incapable of knowledge. The stone does not know what is happening at the center of the earth; neither do I. But the stone’s ignorance, if we may use the word at all, is essentially different from mine. What I say that I am ignorant of, I at least know as being unknown to me, and as connected with what I do know. In this sense my ignorance has an object, and the stone’s has none. In this sense it is equally true to say that the stone is ignorant of everything, and that it is ignorant of nothing. But if I said that I was ignorant of nothing, I could only mean that I know everything. Now we have seen that the cognitive unity of the individual [mind-complex], as pervading, potentially or actually, all phases of his life-history, implies the unity of the universe as the form of all his knowledge. But if this be so, all ignorance on the part of an individual knower must be of the relative type, and not at all comparable with the nescience of a stone. He must at least refer to what he is ignorant of as belonging to the domain of the unknown, and as connected with what he otherwise knows. Thus his cognitive unity will include both his knowledge and his ignorance.” (Stout, God & Nature, 267-268)

“[The fact that cognitive unity includes knowledge and ignorance becomes] plain enough when we consider the mental attitude of questioning or inquiring, of seeking to know what we do not know already. When we raise a question, we do not, indeed, know what the answer is. None the less, in the very act of questioning, we define what it is that we are ignorant of. We define it as related in a more or less determinate way to what is presupposed in the question itself. What is thus presupposed is apprehended as essentially incomplete, and the answer is apprehended as what is required to complete it. But if knowledge of the unknown, as such, is implied in the ignorance which takes shape in actual questions, it must also be implied in the ignorance which does not. It is implied in the mere possibility of asking questions, so far as this depends on the nature of the object, and not on the subjective interest or other special conditions of individual existence. There must be a field for inquiry offered to the cognitive subject—a field apprehended as unknown, an object therefore of relative and not absolute ignorance. But what we know and what, in this relative sense, we do not know, constitute together one universe of being, which is the correlate and counterpart of the unity of knowledge….The unity of knowledge is essential to the unity and identity of every cognitive individual….[and] consists throughout in apprehension of relation and connexion, it embraces the field of what we call ignorance, and is essentially correlated with the unity of the universe.” (Stout, God & Nature, 268-271)

Reading Notes: September 23rd, 2024

“Reality or real, Mr. Bradley maintains, cannot be a predicate because Reality is the subject in all judgment, and thus the ideal content of the judgment is ipso facto by judging pronounced real. This view forms a remarkable contrast with Lotze’s saying, “In fact, however, real is an adjectival or predicative conception,” and has, I should imagine, been formulated partly by way of criticism on the latter. We must remember that Mr. Bradley’s reality is not simply presentation, but is the systematic whole with which we come in contact through presentation. It appears to follow from this that Reality owes something to the judgment which analyzes it, besides lending something to that judgment. It gives a good name, but receives solid cash. Reality is for us such as our judgments have made it and maintain it. Our consciousness may be regarded as a permanent judgment, which is constantly, with more or less wakefulness, predicating the detailed content which is our ideally constructed world, as an interpretation and extension of the present perception and general self-feeling in which we from time to time find our contact with reality.” (Bosanquet, Knowledge and Reality, 45-46)

“We have noticed that for Bradley the identity of a quality is what it is by virtue of the relations by which it is differentiated. Since any quality is that quality, rather than this one, by virtue of its relations, it will be clear that any alterations in those differentiations ipso facto is an alteration in the quality they differentiate. For those differentiations contribute to constitute the identity of that quality. We have noticed also that the character of a relation is what it is by virtue of the qualities which it differentiates. The infinite process of quality and relation is reciprocal. Qualities are determined to be what they are by the relations which differentiate them. And relations are determined to be the differentiations they are by the qualities they differentiate. Consequently, any alteration in those qualities ipso facto alters those relations.” (Church, An Analysis of Resemblance, 46-47)

“If an alleged being were not distinct from something or other, it would not be distinct from anything else. Hence, “it” would be nothing at all. To be determinate is to be this being rather than that being. A being that were not this rather than that would be no being. That is why to be determinate is equivalent to to be.” (Church, An Analysis of Resemblance, 66)