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Modern Materialism holds that mental
states are nothing “over and above” physical states; mentality is but a
delicate, rare, and ephemeral form of physicality. Old Materialism made an
error that Modern Materialism has since corrected; it blundered by declaring a
priori that (i) all physical states are non-mental in nature and that (ii) all
mental states are non-physical in nature. Despite this categorical difference
between mental states (i.e., non-physical states) and physical states (i.e.,
non-mental states), Old Materialism went on to assert that every mental state
located in the series of past, present, and future mental states is the
causally-generated “effect,” or the epiphenomenal “by-product,” of a
corresponding non-mental state located in the series of past, present, and
future non-mental states. Thus, each mental state is causally dependent upon a
particular non-mental state located in the total series of non-mental states. Although
the total series of mental states was not itself conceived by these Old
Materialists as being a “segment” of the total series of non-mental states, it
was nevertheless made subordinate to it. While the thread of mental states
lacked self-sufficiency, the chain of physical states (i.e., the
totality of past, present, and future non-mental states—or the chain of non-mental states ordered in relations of “earlier
than” and “later than”) constituted an independent series—resting on
nothing other than itself. The Old Materialists recognized the difficulties in
their position (e.g., the relationship between the two series), and
failed to build an explanatory bridge that could intelligibly, and non-arbitrarily,
unite “cause” with “effect.” Modern Materialism, by contrast, rejects the Old
Materialist’s dogmatism and refuses to declare a priori that (i) every physical
state is non-mental in nature, and that (ii) every mental state is non-physical
in nature. Instead of maintaining that the thread of mental states is populated
by non-physical, causally-generated “effects” or epiphenomenal “by-products” of
an “independent” series that is exhausted by non-mental states, Modern
Materialism, by contrast, holds that when a mental state occurs, this
occurrence is identical to a particular physical state located in the total
series of physical states. Thus, mental states are no longer viewed as “residual
excrescences” that supervene upon the “shock of atoms” in the physical order;
they are no longer granted a unique series of their own. On the contrary,
mental states just are physical states. This is Modern Materialism.
Now, like any other physical
state, the first-ever mental state (i.e., the “content” of the
first-ever mental instant, M) would have been the effect of a preceding
physical state, and this prior physical state would have been a non-mental
state (i.e., the “content” of a non-mental instant)—but Modern
Materialism assures us that there are no difficulties inherent in such a
transition. By assimilating mental states into the physical order by way of “identity,”
the Modern Materialist has advanced further than any of his predecessors: he
has taken a step forward towards explaining the “first breath” of mentality.
Let’s examine the Materialist’s
account in detail. The Materialist postulates two temporally-distinct instants:
(i) a definite instant, M, whose “content” was the first-ever mental state, and
(ii) a definite instant, Pn, whose “content” was a non-mental state that
preceded the “content” of the first-ever mental instant in time. Let’s offer a
brief sketch of the nature of the time-series by specifying some of its
properties:
“A series is continuous when any term
divides the whole series unambiguously into two mutually exclusive parts which
between them comprise all the terms of the series, and when every term which so
divides the series is itself a term of that series. From this second condition
it obviously follows that a number of intermediate terms can always be inserted
between any two terms whatever of a continuous series; no term of the series
has a next term….The whole series of real numbers is continuous [because] every
member of the number-series divides it into two classes, so that every number
of one is less than every number of the other, and every number which thus
divides the series is itself a term of the number-series....From the continuity
of the series of real numbers it follows that any other series which
corresponds point for point with the terms of the number series will be
continuous. Now one such series is that of the [time series]. Every moment of
time divides the whole series of moments into two mutually exclusive classes,
the moments before itself and the moments which are not before itself. And
whatever thus divides the time-series is itself a moment in that series.” (Taylor,
Elements of Metaphysics, 171-172)
Thus, it follows from time’s
continuity that no two instants in the time-series ever “touch.” When this fact
and the Materialist’s proposed connection between the “content” of Pn and the “content”
of M are brought into focus, we find that the “content” of Pn and the “content”
of M cannot temporally overlap—i.e., the first-ever mental state (i.e.,
the “content” of instant M) and the non-mental state (i.e., the “content”
of instant Pn) had to be not only not simultaneous with each other, but also
had to be in a relation of “earlier than” and “later than” to each other.
Indeed, if the “content” of Pn was simultaneous with the “content” of M, then
we would have a contradiction on our hands: there would be a moment in time
when there was mentality present in a world that, ex hypothesi, was
exhausted by non-mentality. In light of this, we must ask the Materialist
several questions:
Question (i): Was the “content” of
Pn—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of
the “content” of M?
The Materialist’s theory
requires that he answer question (i) in the affirmative. And so, in response to
question (i), the Materialist declares the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content”
of any preceding non-mental instant—to be the “cause” of the “content” of M.
Question (ii): What was it about the “content”
of Pn that made it the non-mental state—rather than any preceding non-mental
state—the “cause” of the “content” of M?
On pain of inconsistency, the
Materialist must respond to question (ii) by asserting that the “content” of Pn
was a non-mental state that possessed certain “special properties” (i.e.,
a set of characteristics absent from all prior non-mental states), and that its
possession of these “special properties” made the “content” of Pn—rather than
the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of
M.
Question (iii): What were the “special
properties” present in the “content” of Pn and absent from the “content” of all
preceding non-mental instants, that made the “content” of Pn–rather than the “content”
of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content” of M?
In reply to question (iii), the
Materialist will likely posit a bunch of features that allegedly capture the
essence or identity of these “special properties.” Let’s symbolize the identity
of these “special properties” present in the “content” of Pn—but absent from
all the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants—as C.
At first glance, all seems fine
and well; however, there is a puzzle lurking beneath the surface: a puzzle
involving (i) the continuous nature of the time-series, (ii) the Materialist’s
identification of the “content” of Pn—rather than the “content” of any of the
other non-mental instant—as being the possessor of the aforementioned “special
properties,” and (iii) the Materialist’s identification of what these “special
properties” actually are. Let’s explore this latent puzzle in the Materialist’s
theory.
As we have noted above, the “content”
of Pn (i.e., a state exhaustively non-mental in character) cannot be
simultaneous with the “content” of M (i.e., a state that was not
exhaustively non-mental in character)—on pain of contradiction. M must be “later
than” Pn because, ex hypothesi, if the “content” of M was simultaneous with (or
in any way overlapped with) the “content” of Pn, the time of the first-ever
mental state would also be a time when the world was exhausted by solely
non-mental states; and this, of course, is contradictory. Therefore, the “content”
of Pn and the “content” of M are not simultaneous, but instead are in relations
of “earlier than” and “later than” to each other. However, since the continuity
of time implies that between any two instants in the time-series there is an
intermediate instant, it follows that between Pn and M there was another
instant, X, distinct from both Pn and M and whose “content” separates the “content”
of Pn and the “content” of M in time. This prompts us to ask the Materialist
more questions:
Question (iv): Is the “content” of X a
non-mental state or a mental state?
The Materialist must answer
question (iv) by declaring the “content” of X to be a non-mental state. Since he
must hold that the “content” of X is a non-mental state, we can represent X as
Pn+1. Now, if the Materialist asserted the “content” of X to be a mental state,
then he would have fallen into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been
mistaken about the “content” of M being the first-ever mental state because the
“content” of X would have preceded the “content” of M in time.
However, if the Materialist
answers question (iv) by declaring the “content” of Pn+1 (i.e., X)
to be a non-mental state, then he either contradicts his answer to question
(i) or his explanation becomes muddled in arbitrariness. Indeed, since the “content”
of Pn+1 is “later than” the “content” of Pn in time, between the “content” of Pn—the supposed sufficient
condition for the occurrence of the “content” of M—and the “content” of
M, there would have been the occurrence of the purely non-mental “content” of
Pn+1. However, if the identified “content” of the non-mental instant Pn was
genuinely sufficient to produce the “content” of M, then the Materialist’s explanation
stumbles into a difficulty.
If the occurrence of the intervening
non-mental “content” of Pn+1 between the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M
matters causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, this would contradict
the sufficiency of the “content” of Pn—rendering
the “content” of Pn insufficient to be the “cause” of the “content” of M.
However, if the occurrence of the intervening non-mental “content” of Pn+1 between
the “content” of Pn and the “content” of M does not matter causally to the
occurrence of the “content” of M, then this makes the timing of the occurrence
of the “content” of M arbitrary and inexplicable. Moreover, if the “content” of Pn was sufficient to be the “cause”
of the “content” of M, this leads us to ask why the “content” of Pn+1—a “content”
that, ex hypothesi, lacked the “special properties” necessary and sufficient
for it to be the “cause” of the “content” of M—occurred between the “content”
of Pn and the “content” of M.
In order to avoid introducing arbitrariness and
inexplicability into his explanation of the “first breath” of mentality, the Materialist
must revise his answer to question (i). He must now hold that the “content”
of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g.,
Pn)—was the “cause” of the “content” of M.
Question (v): What was it about the “content”
of Pn+1 that made it the non-mental state—rather than any preceding non-mental
state (e.g., the “content” of Pn)—the “cause” of the “content” of M?
On pain of inconsistency, the
Materialist must answer question (v) by asserting that the “content” of Pn+1
possessed certain “special properties” (i.e., a set of characteristics
absent from the “content” of all prior non-mental instants), and that its
possession of these “special properties” made the “content” of Pn+1—rather than
the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g., Pn)—the “cause”
of the “content” of M.
Question (vi): What were the “special
properties” present in the “content” of Pn+1 and absent from the “content” of
all preceding non-mental instants (e.g., the “content” of Pn), that made
the “content” of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental
instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn)—the “cause” of the “content” of M?
The Materialist is forced by
his own hand to answer question (vi) by positing a bunch of features that
allegedly capture the essence or identity of the “special properties” present
in the “content” of Pn+1 (i.e., features present in the “content” of
Pn+1 but absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants) that
made the “content” of Pn+1—rather than the “content” of any preceding
non-mental instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn)—the “cause” of the “content”
of M.
Now, the Materialist cannot, on
pain of contradiction, supply us with the same list of “special properties” that
he provided in his answer to question (iii). If, in response to question (vi),
the Materialist simply regurgitated his answer to question (iii), then, ex
hypothesi, the “special properties” of the “content” of Pn+1 would have been
present in the “content” of an earlier non-mental instant (i.e., the “content”
of Pn)—thereby contradicting the Materialist’s answer to question (v).
Moreover, the Materialist cannot simply provide his answer to question (iii) in
response to question (vi) because he himself has admitted, by implication, that
the properties of the “content” of Pn were not of such a nature as to make the
“content” of Pn the cause of the “content” of M. Let’s symbolize the
Materialist’s revision of these “special properties” as C’.
However, another problem
arises. In the same way the “content” of Pn had to be earlier in the
time-series than the “content” of M, so too must the “content” of Pn+1 be
earlier in the time-series than the “content” of M. If this were not so, and
the “content” of Pn+1 was simultaneous with the “content” of M, there
would be a moment in time when there was mentality present in a world that, ex
hypothesi, was exhausted by non-mentality—and this, of course, is a
contradiction. And, as we have seen, since the continuity of time implies that
between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant,
it follows that between Pn+1 and M, there was another instant, X’, distinct from
both Pn+1 and M and whose “content” separated the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content”
of M in time. This prompts us to ask the Materialist more questions:
Question (vii): Is the “content” of X’ a
non-mental state or a mental state?
In answer to question (vii),
the Materialist must, of course, respond by declaring the “content” of X’, to
be a non-mental state. Since the “content” of X’ is a non-mental state, we can
represent X’ as Pn+2.
Now, if the Materialist
asserted the “content” of X’ to be a mental state, then he would have fallen
into inconsistency; indeed, he would have been mistaken about the “content” of
M being the first-ever mental state because the “content” of X’ would have
preceded the “content” of M in time.
However, if the Materialist
answers question (iv) by declaring the “content” of X’ to be a non-mental
state, then he either contradicts his answers to questions (v) and (vi), or his
explanation becomes muddled in arbitrariness. Indeed, since the “content” of
Pn+2 is “later than” the “content” of Pn+1 in time, then between the “content” of
Pn+1—the supposed sufficient condition for the occurrence of the “content” of M—and
the “content” of M, there would have been the occurrence of a the purely
non-mental “content” of Pn+2. However, if the identified “content” of the
non-mental instant Pn+1 was genuinely sufficient to produce the “content” of M,
then the Materialist’s explanation stumbles into a difficulty.
If the occurrence of the intervening
non-mental “content” of Pn+2 between the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of
M matters causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, this would
contradict the sufficiency of the “content” of Pn+1—rendering the “content” of Pn+1 insufficient to be the
“cause” of the “content” of M. However, if the occurrence of the intervening non-mental
“content” of Pn+2 between the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of M does not
matter causally to the occurrence of the “content” of M, then this makes the
timing of the occurrence of the “content” of M arbitrary and inexplicable. Moreover, if the “content” of Pn+1
was sufficient to be the “cause” of the “content” of M, this leads us to ask
why the “content” of Pn+2—a “content” that, ex hypothesi, lacked the “special
properties” necessary and sufficient for it to be the “cause” of the “content”
of M—occurred between the “content” of Pn+1 and the “content” of M.
In order to avoid introducing arbitrariness
and inexplicability into his explanation of the “first breath” of mentality,
the Materialist must revise his answer to question (i). He must now hold that
the “content” of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental
instant (e.g., Pn+1)—was the “cause” of the “content” of M.
In doing so, the Materialist
must also revise his answer to question (v) and question (vi). He must assert
that the “content” of Pn+2 possessed certain “special properties” (i.e.,
a set of characteristics absent from the “content” of all prior non-mental
instants) and that its possession of these “special properties” made the “content”
of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant (e.g.,
the “content” of Pn or the “content” of Pn+1)—the “cause” of the “content” of
M. However, this is possible only insofar as the Materialist specifies the “special
properties” of the “content” of Pn+2. Just as before, the Materialist must list
a set of features that allegedly capture the essence or identity of the “special
properties” present in the “content” of Pn+2 (i.e., features present in
the “content” of Pn+2 but absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental
instants) that made the “content” of Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any
preceding non-mental instant (e.g., the “content” of Pn or the “content”
of Pn+1)—the “cause” of the “content” of M. However, the Materialist cannot, on
pain of contradiction, supply us with the same list of “special properties” that
he provided in his original answer to question (vi). If the Materialist did so,
then the “special properties” of the “content” of Pn+2 would have been present
in the “content” of an earlier non-mental instant (i.e., the “content” of
Pn+1); however, he himself has admitted, by implication, that the properties of
the “content” of Pn+1 were not of such a nature as to make the “content” of
Pn+1 the cause of the “content” of M. Ergo, the Materialist must supply us with a new set of properties that
were allegedly present in the “content” of Pn+2, and made the “content” of
Pn+2—rather than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of
the “content” of M. Let’s symbolize the Materialist’s revision of these “special
properties” as C’’.
However, the problem has only
been aggravated. As we’ve seen before, the continuity of time implies that
between any two instants in the time-series there is an intermediate instant;
ergo, it follows that between Pn+2 and M there was another instant, X’’,
distinct from both Pn+2 and M and whose “content” separates the “content” of
Pn+2 and the “content” of M in time. This prompts us to ask the Materialist
another question:
Question (viii): Is the “content” of X’’ a
non-mental state or a mental state?
The Materialist must answer
question (viii) by declaring the “content” of X’’ to be a non-mental state.
Since the “content” of X’’ is non-mental, we can represent X’’ as Pn+3. And we
know where this will lead us. The Materialist is trapped in a vicious regress;
inconsistencies in the Materialist’s responses require that he continually
revise his answers ad infinitum. He is unable to consistently identify the
non-mental instant whose “content” allegedly gave birth to the “content” of the
first-ever mental instant, M, and he is unable to consistently specify the
identity of the alleged “special properties” present in the “content” of this
non-mental instant that would have made it—rather than the “content” of any
preceding non-mental instant—the cause of the “content” of the first-ever
mental instant, M.
With every step the Materialist
takes towards his first-ever mental state, he is forced to take one step
back—he is forever barred from receiving his final reward. The Materialist
fails to harmonize the “first breath” of mentality within an asphyxiatingly
barren, non-mental world.
Objections to the Original Argument (with Replies)
Issue 1: “It is not clear to me
why Pn must have a last instant. An event could occur over an open or half-open
interval of time. If t is the time index of the first mental event, then Pn
could be an event that occurs on [m, t) for any m < t. In this case there is
neither overlap, nor intermediate causes.”
Reply to Issue 1: I have now
revised the essay so that it makes a clearer distinction between positions in
time and the “contents” that are isochronal to those positions in time. The “content”
of an instant Pn is the state (i.e., the non-mental state) that obtains
at Pn. By reframing the argument in terms of instants and their “contents,”
rather than in terms of intervals and the boundaries of said intervals (e.g.,
their “first” and “last” instants, if they have a “first” or “last” instant), I
think the revised argument avoids the objection that you bring up in “Issue 1.”
Issue 2: I also don't see why
the existence of a moment in time between Pn and M implies that [the “content”
of] Pn is not the cause of [the “content” of] M. If we identify special
properties of [the “content” of] Pn that justify its being the cause of [the
“content” of] M, it does not follow that every state between [the “content” of]
Pn and [the “content” of] M also has those properties. It seems to me that you
have introduced an additional assumption about the nature of causality, that
one state can be the cause of another if and only if there is no state between
them.
Reply to Issue 2: The second
version of the argument does not depend on the assumption that a causal relation
can only obtain between “temporally adjacent” “contents.” As mentioned above
(in the second version of the argument), as soon as we acknowledge there being
a purely non-mental instant (Pn+1) with its own distinct “content”
(i.e., the “content” of Pn+1) intervening between the purely non-mental
instant Pn and the first-ever mental instant M, we can reasonably ask whether
we need to revise our list of “special properties” that we took to be
responsible for the “coming into existence” of the “content” of M. For
consider, if we assume that the “content” of Pn was the “cause” of the “content”
of M, then we have a right to ask what “special properties” were present in the
“content” of Pn and absent from the “content” of all preceding non-mental
instants that made the “content” of Pn—rather
than the “content” of any preceding non-mental instant—the “cause” of the “content”
of M. However, our only reason for supposing the “content” of Pn to be
the cause of the “content” of M was based upon our supposed identification of
some properties of Pn as being the “special properties” responsible for its
giving rise to the “content” of M. And, by implication, the “content” of Pn had
these properties whereas and the “content” of all preceding non-mental instants
lacked them. If it turns out that the “content” of Pn+1 intervenes between the
“content” of Pn and the “content” of M, then our ordinary causal reasoning
prompts us to reconsider if the properties of the “content” of Pn which we took
to be the “special properties” were in fact the “special properties” responsible
for giving rise to the “content” of M, or if we had instead only misidentified
those properties as being the “special properties.”
Moreover, if we try and double down on our original
assertion that those properties identified in the “content” of Pn were in fact
the “special properties,” then we are left with no good reason for why the “content”
of M didn’t occur before the “content” of Pn+1 occurred rather than after
the “content” of Pn+1 occurred (i.e., why there was a “delay” even
though the all the conditions were already present (only to vanish with the
occurrence of the “content” of Pn+1)). However, if there was nothing about the
intermediary “contents” (in addition to the “special properties” of the “content”
of Pn) such that the occurrence of these intermediary “contents” were necessary
for the occurrence of the “content” at time M, then we are left with a puzzle
as to why the “content” of time M occurred earlier than some of
the intermediary “contents” rather than before some of them. Moreover,
this means that if the “content” of M could not occur unless the some of
the intermediary “contents” occurred, then the occurrence of some of the
intermediary “contents” were necessary to the occurrence of the “content”
of M; yet if these were necessary to the occurrence of the “content” of M, then
it would not be the case that the “content” of Pn was the necessary and
sufficient condition for the occurrence of the “content” at M—thereby conflicting with the
assumption that none of the intermediary “contents” mattered causally in the
occurrence of the “content” of M. We can illustrate this by means of
another argument:
Premise 1: Materialism posits that at some finite point, there occurred the first-ever mental state (i.e., the “content” of instant M), preceded solely by non-mental states.
Premise 2: Any causal explanation for the emergence of a first mental state (i.e., the “content” of instant M) from purely non-mental states (i.e., the “content” of non-mental instants) requires identifying specific non-mental conditions sufficient to produce mentality.
Premise 3: If an identified “content” of a non-mental instant Pn is genuinely sufficient, then the occurrence of intervening purely non-mental “content” of instants Pn+1, Pn+2,… between Pn and M either:
(a) Contradicts the sufficiency of the “content” of Pn, if those intermediates matter causally.
(b) Makes the timing of the occurrence of the “content” of M arbitrary and inexplicable, if those intermediates are causally irrelevant.
Premise 4: Both horns—causal contradiction or explanatory arbitrariness—are unacceptable to a coherent causal account. But if the Materialist cannot provide a coherent causal account, then he cannot adequately explain the causal origin of the first-ever mental state from purely non-mental states.
Conclusion: Therefore, the Materialist cannot adequately explain the causal origin of the first-ever mental state from purely non-mental states.
Issue 3: I also think it is
possible for Pn and M to share a boundary point t. You argue that this is
impossible because it would imply that, at time t, the world contained mental
properties (because M is a mental event), but also was exhausted up to and
including time t by non-mental events (because Pn is non-mental and contains
t). But it does not necessarily follow that because an event has a property
that each moment comprising the event has that property. For example, a
physical object can have the property of being liquid, and be exhaustively
comprised of subatomic particles, yet none of the subatomic particles are
liquid. So too the materialist can coherently claim that the instants of time
comprising a mental event do not have the property of mentality, but their
agglomeration does have that property.
Reply to Issue 3: This
objection does not apply to the revised version of the argument. This new
version is framed in argument in terms of instants and their “contents,”
rather than in terms of intervals and the boundaries of said intervals (e.g.,
their “first” and “last” instants, if they have a “first” or “last” instant).
Issue 4: I also think, perhaps
most importantly, that the materialist simply does not have to agree that there
is a first mental event. Because mentality is not metaphysically fundamental in
the materialist theory, they don't even need to specify clear boundaries on the
concept of “mental,” which could function rather like the notion of a
species of animal, where there is a gradient of descent with no clear first
member.
Reply to Issue 4: It seems that by denying that there was a “first-ever mental event” you either wade into some form of panpsychism (wherein there was never an instant whose “content” was solely “non-mental” (i.e., that “mentality” featured in the “content” of every past instant in some degree)), or you end up shifting the problem by introducing some form of “proto-mental continuum” (which, ultimately, seems to slip into some form of panpsychism again). Either way, the Materialist cannot give up the position that there was a point in time where the universe was solely non-mental—and it is precisely this position that generates the puzzle.
