Reading Notes: October 7th, 2024

“When we compare [Dr. George Galloway’s The Philosophy of Religion] with those of the previous generation; with Martineau or the Cairds, for example, we become conscious of a change of spirit. It might be expressed by saying that the philosophy of religion has become more objective. The whole problem is not now comprised in the development of a speculative theory of religion; the philosopher feels himself compelled to approach the central problem of validity through an independent study of the empirical data. Thus Dr. Galloway devotes at least half his book to the discussion of the historical development of religion and the psychology of the religious consciousness. This increased “objectivity” undoubtedly involves a certain loss of artistic unity, and it also makes very large demands on the learning of a writer; as Dr. Galloway modestly remarks, “it is too much to expect that the religious philosopher can personally traverse this broad territory and make himself acquainted with all its various features.” Yet this new attitude has obvious compensations from the point of view of the reader; we may learn with confidence facts and tendencies from a writer whose philosophical opinions may be unacceptable….When Dr. Galloway comes to work out his view of the universe we find clear indications that he has felt the influence of the reaction against Absolutism. With William James he protests against the “Block Universe;” with the New Realists he denies that Idealism can explain the concrete facts of experience. I think that he does not always do justice to the views of Absolute Idealism; probably Mr. Bradley’s recent volume of essays was published too late to be made use of.” (Matthews, Review of George Galloways “The Philosophy of Religion” (1914), 116-118)

“The external world is the object that acts on man’s organs of sense, and in the internal sense-centres of the cortex of the brain these impressions are subjectively transformed into presentations. The thought-centres, or association centres, of the cortex (whether or no one distinguishes them from the sense-centres) are the real organs of the mind that unite these presentations into conclusions. The two methods of forming these conclusions—induction and deduction, the formation of arguments and concepts, thought and consciousness—make up together the cerebral function we call reason.” (Haeckel, The Wonders of Life: A Popular Study of Biological Philosophy, 4)

“Among the censures which the academic metaphysicians, especially in Germany, have passed on my Riddle of the Universe, the heaviest is perhaps the charge that I know nothing whatever about the theory of knowledge. The charge is correct to this extent, that I do not understand the current dualistic theory of knowledge which is based on Kant’s metaphysics; I cannot understand how their introspective psychological methods—disdaining all physiological, histological, or phylogenetic foundations can satisfy the demands of “pure reason.” My monistic theory of knowledge is assuredly very different from this. It is firmly and thoroughly based on the splendid advances of modern physiology, histology, and phylogeny—on the remarkable results of these empirical sciences in the last forty years, which are entirely ignored by the prevailing system of metaphysics.” (Haeckel, The Wonders of Life: A Popular Study of Biological Philosophy, 11-12)

“As an old medical maxim runs, Pathologia physiologiam illustrat—the science of disease throws light on the sound organism.” (Haeckel, The Wonders of Life: A Popular Study of Biological Philosophy, 40)