A Defense of Ayn Rand’s Objectivism

A couple of weeks ago, an article was published concerning the place of consciousness in the Objectivist metaphysic. As far as I can ascertain, the article was written with the supplementary intention of rebutting my investigations into Objectivism. While reading the article, I stumbled across several mistakes that not only misrepresent, but also clash with, the very weltanschauung that the author had hoped to explain and defend. The following post is an attempt to set right those mistakes.

“In Objectivism, an entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents. An entity is a specific, concrete, and indivisible thing that possesses a distinct identity and exists independently of the observer’s consciousness. Entities can be either physical or abstract, and they can range in size and complexity from subatomic particles to entire galaxies. An entity can be anything that exists, whether it is a material object or an abstract concept, such as a mathematical equation or a moral principle. Objectivism holds that entities are not simply subjective creations of the human mind but rather are objective, existing independently of human consciousness.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity)

The above passage is, allegedly, the Objectivist answer to the question, “What is an entity?”. Unfortunately, the passage ends up (unintentionally) misrepresenting the Objectivist view in several significant respects. Furthermore, the answer is inconsistent with what is written later on in the article. To save on space, and to eliminate tedious repetition, I’ll examine each line individually and supply passages from Objectivist literature to substantiate my remarks.

“In Objectivism, an entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity)

Objectivism does not hold that “an entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents.” Such a view would contradict many crucial aspects of the Objectivist metaphysic. I’ll attempt to illustrate this as clearly as possible:

Suppose for a brief moment, that Objectivism did in fact maintain that “an entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents.” How would this tally with the rest of the Objectivist metaphysic? Well, if an entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents, it necessarily follows that any existent which can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents is itself an entity. Now, according to Objectivism, any particular action or attribute of an entity, and any particular relationship between entities, is itself an existent—an existent which can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents (this includes the entity which performs said action, the entity which has said attribute, and the entity which stands in said relationship, etc.). However, if, as we have supposed, “an entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents,” it would follow that any particular action or attribute of an entity, and any particular relationship between entities, would itself be an entity—a conclusion which the Objectivist metaphysic explicitly rejects and repudiates. 

According to Ayn Rand, “an existent is a concrete. “Existent” is a very convenient term in that it subsumes entities and attributes and actions and even mental events. They exist.” (ITOE, 208) When asked whether relationships are existents, Rand replies, “Yes—everything that exists on which you can focus, anything which you can isolate [is an existent], whether it is an entity, a relationship, an action, or an attribute.” (ITOE, 208) Now that we have understood the Objectivist view of existents, it is important to point out that not all existents are entities, even though all entities are existents. For Rand, “an entity is that which you perceive and which can exist by itself.  Characteristics, qualities, attributes, actions, relationships, do not exist by themselves…attributes and actions cannot exist apart from the entity [which has them].” (ITOE, 265)

We have seen that Objectivism holds characteristics of entities, qualities of entities, attributes of entities, actions of entities, and relationships between entities, to all be existents. We have also seen that although a particular quality, attribute, or action of an entity, and a particular relationship between entities, is an existent—an existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents—said existent is not itself an entity. On the contrary, as Rand herself says, unlike entities, “characteristics, qualities, attributes, actions, relationships, do not exist by themselves.” (ITOE, 265) And so, the very first sentence of the article mischaracterizes Objectivism; it is not the case that “an entity is existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents.” Let’s continue. 

“An entity is a specific, concrete, and indivisible thing that possesses a distinct identity and exists independently of the observer’s consciousness. Entities can be either physical or abstract, and they can range in size and complexity from subatomic particles to entire galaxies. An entity can be anything that exists, whether it is a material object or an abstract concept, such as a mathematical equation or a moral principle. Objectivism holds that entities are not simply subjective creations of the human mind but rather are objective, existing independently of human consciousness.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity)

To say that an entity “can be anything that exists, whether it is a material object or an abstract concept,” would mean that not only material objects, mathematical equations, and moral principles would be entities, but also that feelings, sensations, emotions, valuations, and mental images (i.e., imaginata) are entities. Indeed, feelings, sensations, emotions, valuations, and mental images all exist—they are all existents; ergo, if an entity “can be anything that exists,” (cf. “An entity is any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents.”) it necessarily follows that feelings, sensations, emotions, valuations, and mental images are all entities. However, if feelings, sensations, emotions, valuations, and mental images are all entities, then they would be self-contained, primary existents. Furthermore, since the article asserts that Objectivism maintains that entities “exist independently of any observer’s consciousness”, the logical conclusion that the article would be committed to is that feelings, sensations, emotions, valuations, and mental images all “exist independently of any observer’s consciousness”. And yet, such a conclusion is at odds with the Objectivist position. 

According to Objectivism, feelings, sensations, emotions, valuations, and mental images do not “exist independent of any observer’s consciousness”; indeed, they are what Rand calls “mental concretes” or “mental entities”. It is absolutely crucial to understand the difference between an entity and a mental entity (i.e., a mental concrete or mental unit). Firstly, it is important to note what Rand means by the expression “mental entities” (or “mental concretes” and “mental units”). Rand’s concept of a “mental entity” refers neither to my consciousness, nor to anyone else’s consciousness; rather, the concept of “mental entity” refers to existents that have no existence apart from, or independent of, my consciousness, or anyone else’s consciousness. The following brief back-and-forth dialogue from ITOE best illustrates Rand’s views as to the differences between an entity and a mental entity:

AR: The referents of the concept “concept” are other concepts.  For instance, let’s say you form the concepts “table,” “chair,” “man,” and a few other concepts of perceptually given concretes.  Then at a certain level you can form the concept of “concept,” the concretes of which are all your other specific, earlier-formed concepts. 

Prof. D: But they aren’t concretes, though. 

AR: They are mental concretes.  You are now discussing an integration of mental entities.  The referents of the concept of “concept” are all the concepts which you have learned [and will ever learn]. 

Prof. D: Then a mental entity is a concrete?  

AR: As a mental entity, yes.  It is a concrete in relation to the wider abstraction which is the concept of “concept.” Take another, similar case: the concept of “emotion.” What are its concretes? The various emotions which you observe introspectively, which you are able to conceptualize.  You would form the concepts “love,” “hate,” “anger,” “fear,” and then you arrive at the concept “emotion,” the units of which will be these various emotions that you have identified. 

Prof. D: I misunderstood, then, something that Professor B said. I thought that he was maintaining that these weren’t really concretes, not even concretes with holes in them so to speak—not even vague concretes.  

Prof. B: No, that was the content of the concept.  The concept as a mental entity would have measurements; it would be a certain mental product.  

AR: A mental entity standing for a certain number of concretes—a concept—is not the same as the concretes in vague form.  Because some schools of philosophy did hold just that—that a concept is a memory of a concrete, only very vague.  You see a concept is not a vague concrete, it is a mental entity—which means an entity of a different kind, bearing a certain specific relationship to the physical concretes.  

Prof. D: But metaphysically, though, the concept is a concrete; it’s a mental entity. You have a concept of “emotion.” The referents are these various mental entities, this particular emotion and that particular one. And then the concept of “emotion” itself is a mental entity in actual being.   

AR: Yes, you can call it that.   

Prof. D: So metaphysically, not epistemologically, all we have here are concretes.   

AR: If you mean: does such a thing as the concept of “emotion” in a mind really exist? Yes, it exists—mentally. And only mentally.  

Prof. E: Would it be fair to say that a concept qua concept is not a concrete but an integration of concretes, but qua existent it is a concrete integration, a specific mental entity in a particular mind?  

AR: That’s right. But I kept saying, incidentally, that we can call them “mental entities” only metaphorically or for convenience. It is a “something.” For instance, before you have a certain concept, that particular something doesn’t exist in your mind. When you have formed the concept of “concept,” that is a mental something; it isn’t a nothing. But anything pertaining to the content of a mind always has to be treated metaphysically not as a separate existent, but only with this precondition, in effect: that it is a mental state, a mental concrete, a mental something. Actually, “mental something” is the nearest to an exact identification. Because “entity” does imply a physical thing. Nevertheless, since “something” is too vague a term, one can use the word “entity,” but only to say that it is a mental something as distinguished from other mental somethings (or from nothing). But it isn’t an entity in the primary, Aristotelian sense in which a primary substance exists. We have to agree here on the terminology, because we are dealing with a very difficult subject for which no clear definitions have been established. I personally would like to have a new word for it, but I am against neologisms. Therefore, I think the term “mental unit” or “mental entity” can be used, provided we understand by that: “a mental something.” (ITOE, 156-159)

Now that we have clarified and explained Rand’s distinction between entities and mental entities, we can continue with our analysis of the article. 

The next section of the article was written as an answer to the question, “Is Consciousness an Entity?”. The author’s answer is puzzling, to say the least, in that it clashes with the (alleged) Objectivist positions outlined in the previous section:

“In Objectivism, consciousness is not considered to be an entity in and of itself. Rather, consciousness is a faculty of the human mind (specific ability or capacity of the mind) that allows us to perceive and understand reality. According to Objectivist philosophy, consciousness is the means by which we identify and integrate sensory information from the world around us, and it is the foundation of our ability to reason and think abstractly. Objectivism holds that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of human nature and that it is distinct from the physical world. However, consciousness is not considered to be a separate entity or force that exists independently of the human mind. Rather, it is an attribute of the mind, which is itself a product of the physical processes that occur in the brain.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity)

As I said above, this answer to the question, “Is Consciousness an Entity?”, is puzzling. If we compare the two sections, one finds that the author’s answer to the question, “Is Consciousness an Entity?”, must be wrong if his answer to the question, “What is an Entity?”, is true, and vice versa. I’ll attempt to illustrate this as explicitly as possible:

According to the author, Objectivism is committed to the position that (a) an entity is “any existent that can be perceived, identified, and distinguished from other existents;” (b) an entity “can be either physical or abstract…”; and (c) an entity “can be anything that exists, whether it is a material object or an abstract concept…”. Now, the author also maintains that Objectivism is committed to the position that “consciousness is not considered to be an entity in and of itself…[rather,] it is a faculty of the human mind (specific ability or capacity of the mind)…[and] is not considered to be a separate entity or force that exists independently of the human mind. Rather, it is an attribute of the mind, which is a product of the physical processes that occur in the brain.” There is a clear inconsistency here. When taken together, positions (a), (b), and (c), entail that Objectivism is committed to consciousness being an entity; however, the author tries to block this necessary conclusion by maintaining that Objectivism does not hold that consciousness is an entity, but is instead an “attribute of the mind, which is itself a product of the physical processes that occur in the brain.” This attempt at delaying the inevitable only introduces more inconsistencies into an already inconsistent article.

“Objectivism holds that consciousness…is an attribute of the mind, which is itself a product of the physical processes that occur in the brain.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity)

This line is interesting for a couple of reasons. Firstly, it is important to note that Rand frequently used the terms “consciousness” and “mind” interchangeably. Here are several examples:

“His vision, his strength, his courage came from his own spirit. A man’s spirit, however, is his self. That entity which is his consciousness. To think, to feel, to judge, to act are functions of the ego.” (For the New Intellectual (FNI), 90)

“A man’s mind is an attribute of his self, of that entity within him which is his consciousness. That entity can be called spirit. It can be called soul. It remains—no matter what its origin—a man’s self. His “I”. His ego.” (The Journals of Ayn Rand  (JAR), 237) 

“Your consciousness is that which you know—and are alone to know—by direct perception. It is that indivisible unit where knowledge and being are one, it is your “I”, it is the self which distinguishes you from all else in the universe. No consciousness can perceive another consciousness, only the results of its actions in material form, since only matter is an object of perception, and consciousness is the subject, perceivable by its nature only to itself. To perceive the consciousness, the “I”, of another would mean to become that other “I”—a contradiction in terms; to speak of souls perceiving one another is a denial of your “I”, of perception, of consciousness, of matter. The “I” is the irreducible unit of life.” (JAR, 571) 

“That which you call your soul or spirit is your consciousness, the life-keeper of your body. Your body is a machine, your consciousness—your mind—is its driver…” (JAR, 571) 

“Man’s consciousness is not material—but neither is it an element opposed to matter. It is the element by which man controls matter—but the two are part of one entity and one universe—man cannot change matter, he can control it only by understanding it and shaping it to his purpose. (The distinction between “entity” and “action”—between noun and verb. The essence of being.) Man’s soul or spirit is his consciousness—here, now, on earth. The ruling element, the control, the free-will element of his consciousness is his reason. The rest—his emotions, his memory, his desires, his instincts—all are determined by his thinking, by the kind of conclusions he has made and the kind of premises he has accepted. The man of spirit is the man of the mind. He is the man who is not the slave, but the ruler of matter. He is the man who makes it possible for mankind to survive. He is the creative man. The morality of the mind—to be true to truth. The great courage, integrity and responsibility that it requires. The only cardinal sin is the denial or suspension of one’s reason—the refusal to face reality, identify it and make rational connections. No man can go against his own mind—and that is why he cannot submit to force. The greatest field where this morality is needed and expressed is the field of material production. All material production is an achievement of the spirit—of the mind. Every human creation has to start in the mind and be given form in matter—whether it’s a work of art or a commercial gadget. Every spiritual value of man has to be expressed in material form or action. What is a virtue, if man does not practice it or act upon it? The great courage and virtue of the producers.” (JAR, 530)  

“I have stated explicitly (both in The Fountainhead and in Atlas Shrugged) that a man’s self is his consciousness and that the center and motor of his consciousness is his mind. I have discussed, illustrated and proved this point from every relevant aspect known to me. How am I to reconcile that with paragraph 6 of your note, particularly with the words: “some center of their lives, which is NOT THEMSELVES?” Since you rejected, without stating your reasons, the total of my view of what is man’s self—how could I tell what meaning you were assigning to the words “self” and “selfish” in your note?...This is an example of my conflict with modern philosophy: I am incapable of switching the definitions of my concepts to fit each separate occasion and of letting them mean one thing when I use them, but another when Bertrand Russell uses them, and a third when you use them. I am incapable of reading a paper such as your note, by the method of dropping or forgetting all definitions and then, without reference or commitment to any definition, using wide, fundamental concepts…while simultaneously regarding this usage as “non-definitional”.” (The Letters of Ayn Rand (LAR), 535-536) [Her caps and italics, not mine] 

“Man’s soul or spirit is his consciousness; the motor of his consciousness is reason; deprive him of freedom, i.e., the right to use his mind—and what is left of him is only a physical body, ready to be manipulated by the strings of any tribe.” (Rand, “Requiem for Man (Part III),” The Objectivist, Sept 1967)

“First of all, there is no ineffable mystic soul. If we use the term “soul”—and there’s nothing against it—we use it to designate an aspect of man’s consciousness. Similarly, the term “mind” designates an aspect of consciousness, the conceptual faculty.” (Peikoff, Understanding Objectivism, Lecture Nine, “Objectivism Versus Rationalism and Empiricism,” 260) [In this passage, Peikoff refers to one’s mind as being an aspect (or attribute) of one’s consciousness, rather than one’s consciousness being an aspect (or attribute) of one’s mind.] 

Secondly, Rand was very cautious and precise when it came to the relationship between one’s consciousness/mind and one’s brain. For one thing, she never maintained that consciousness or mind is a “product of the physical processes that occur in the brain” [my italics]. Furthermore, she denied that consciousness/mind was material. (cf. “Man’s consciousness is not material...”, etc.).

The next two sections, “Do Faculties have an Identity” and “Can a Faculty have an Attribute and an Identity,” are relatively straightforward. However, there are some lines which are rather opaque:  

“Consciousness (active): The faculty of awareness, perception, and identification of sensory information.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity) 

“Perception (passive): The faculty of recognizing and identifying sensory input from the external world.” (PZH, Consciousness has an Identity)

The author says that these two faculties (i.e., Consciousness (active) and Perception (passive), etc.) are “not interchangeable or reducible to one another…they are not simply different expressions of the same underlying capacity.” Now, the term “active” in the first line presumably alludes to Rand’s view of the faculty of consciousness as being “epistemologically active” and “metaphysically passive” (cf., “Consciousness is metaphysically passive, but epistemologically active.”). However, the term “passive” in the second line is puzzling. Is the author saying that the faculty of perception is “epistemologically passive” or “metaphysically passive”? More peculiar is the fact that the description of the faculty of consciousness (active) and the description of the faculty of perception (passive) are nearly identical! If they are not identical, but describe two different faculties, then the question that arises is: In what sense (i.e., the metaphysical sense, as opposed to the epistemological sense) is the former faculty “active” and the latter faculty “passive”?

With respect to the question, “Can a faculty have an attribute and an identity?”, it appears that only the latter half of the question is answered. The author does not say whether or not a faculty can have attributes—he only says that a faculty is an attribute, which doesn’t answer the question he set up for himself.

My response to the article has already exceeded its intended length, so I’ll continue my analysis of the article in another essay. The remaining sections of the article include: “Does Consciousness have an Identity Conflict with How Kant Viewed Consciousness,” “What is Intellectual Determinism,” and “What is the Objectivist [Critique] of Kant’s Epistemology.”