Reading Notes: May 11th, 2022

“Physiology teaches us that all perception is first produced in the brain, and connects with external objects, that is to say, here, placed outside the body by a number of intermediaries. For example, when we look at an object, its inverted image is produced on the retina. But, this image does not exist for ourselves, it exists only for the physician who can look at the retina from the outside using a device. The surface of the retina on which this occurs is connected with our perception by the optic nerve, and is also separated from it by the length of the nerve. That which reaches up to our perception is neither an object outside, nor its image, nor any other direct action on its part. It is only the affections of the optic nerve itself….But what those conditions are, what happens in the nerve when excited by the light beam, we know nothing about, and if we can get it somewhere, it will be “outside” and not by introspection….Now, let us look at the very facts of perception. We discover the following: We immediately see objects outside our body and we see nothing more. My inkwell is before my eyes. From it, so they say, emanate light waves, vibrations of ether, by millions every second; these vibrations fuse through the transparent cornea, the lens, the liquid of my eye to the retina, excite the surface of the optic nerve and thereby impress the molecules thereof with a movement, a vibration of sort, through which occurs our perception. Very good; but as regards the object I find no trace of it at all; I only see the inkwell and nothing more. We ask a child, a farmer, a person of the people, if they know something of the light waves, images of the retina, molecular movements of the optic nerve and the brain; they know absolutely nothing, but they see the bodies themselves as well or better than the physiologist. It is, therefore, clear that what we see as a body is only our own visual impressions.” (Spir, Thought and Reality, 83-84) 

“What we showed for the sense of sight, can be applied in the same manner for the sense of touch. Here is, on this subject, an experience. We swipe in different directions the tip of the tongue over the surface of the palate. Thus, a clear picture will emerge of the entire configuration of this surface, absolutely as if it were seen with the eyes, regardless of the color. We feel its resistance, the polish, all the little inequalities, such as large protrusions and recesses; in a word, it is perceived immediately. Where does this perception originate? Obviously from our own impressions of touch provided by the tongue, not only because, in fact, there is nothing more there, but because there cannot be anything more, as shown by the simple reflection that follows.” (Spir, Thought and Reality, 84-85) 

“The organ of perception of the palate, which allows to explore it, is the tongue. The action of the palate on my consciousness must, to get there, take the road through the tongue. And in effect, while I do not touch my mouth with my tongue, I do not perceive it. Now the question is whether we perceive anything of what happens in the tongue? Obviously not. Not only is it impossible to perceive or feel the molecular movements produced in the nerves that cross the tongue and all its special movements of perception, but we still see that by the contact of the tongue with other objects we do not become aware of the tongue itself, yet it lets us immediately know either the palate or the jaws, the teeth and whatever it can touch in the oral cavity. We can compare the tip of the tongue to these clear lenses that are themselves invisible and make other items plain. It is still evident, as we have shown in the case of sight that our perception of these objects can contain nothing but our sensations of touch and movement. When we ask a physiologist why the tongue is particularly suitable for the perception of other objects, he answers: Because it is very flexible, mobile, and its tip is provided with an infinite number of papillae and tactile nerves. But, as we immediately know nothing of the tongue itself and its features by perceiving other objects, we must first translate in psychological terms this physiological explanation and give it its true meaning. The mobility of the tongue and its rich tactile nerves mean, psychologically speaking, an abundance of sensations of touch and movement, which makes possible a more delicate differentiation and combination of these sensations.” (Spir, Thought and Reality, 85-86) 

“Physiology teaches that all perception is through the sense organs and each organ of sense is only capable of a specific excitation, that is to say, peculiar to it, which is always the same, however different be the objects which act on the organ. The optical sense, for example, provides only light or color sensations, be it pinched or hit, affected by light waves or electricity. The acoustic nerve, similarly, gives only acoustic sensations whenever it is excited, and so of others. Most diverse stimuli acting on the same sense organ always give the same impressions, and, conversely, the same excitement, for example, electricity, acting on different organs, produces different impressions, that is those specific to each sense organ. Physiology thus recognizes that our feelings are actually separated from external things, they are totally different, and they are entirely incommensurable with them. The facts of perception prove, on the contrary, that we immediately perceive external objects, that we see and touch the bodies of our experience, that we feel them and taste them, that we are in direct contact with them, and we know nothing of the circumstances that make possible this perception. It follows, with evidence, that what we know as the body, or bodies, is nothing other than our own sensations. Once granted that what we know as bodies is only our sensations, it immediately follows that we conceive the given objects as unconditioned. When, for example, I see my own sensation of color as a quality of a thing in space, I attribute to it then, in thought, a support, a substance, which gives it an independent existence. What would it mean to ascribe to this thought of support, yet another support as foundation or motivation? This would be the equivalent to Hindu cosmology, in which the land is supported by an elephant, itself supported by a turtle, which itself is supported by who knows what.” (Spir, Thought and Reality, 88-89) 

“To be clearer on this point, we must first ask the question: What external things do we properly talk about, when we want to explain the knowledge of external things? Do we talk of unknown things, different from the bodies of our own experience and simply assumed? But, we obviously have no knowledge of such things, and it is naturally not necessary to explain a knowledge that does not exist. Do we mean by external things bodies of our experience? But, knowledge of these bodies could not be acquired by induction, since it is an immediate perception. Our sensations are not, as we are used to believe, mere signs of external objects but these external objects themselves. We see, touch, hear, smell and taste, not mere signs, but objects, bodies; the world bodies are present to us, not in an abstract thought, but in intuition itself. No doubt much of our knowledge of the bodies is obtained by reasoning, but that reasoning is based ultimately on immediate perceptions of bodies. If we did not immediately perceive the bodies themselves, we could not think about them, because the reasoning cannot make something from nothing. One cannot, therefore, claim that our knowledge of bodies is due primitively to an induction.” (Spir, Thought and Reality, 97-98) 

“When a body is at the same time red, round, soft, heavy and hard, the body is not in itself red, sweet, round or heavy, rather the body is red in relation to sight, mild in relation to taste, heavy relative to the mess of the earth, etc. The plurality of qualities in a body is produced and conditioned by relations with other things. A body, for example, if there were no light or seeing eye, might still be heavy and hard, but it would not be red or colored in any way, nor visible. If we imagined a world where attraction or gravitation no longer reign, the body might have a figure, a color, etc., but it would be weightless. It is the same with all the qualities of bodies. If we isolate in our thought a body from all other objects we find no longer in it the basis of a plurality of qualities. For, all we distinguish in a body, are only the various manners it has in relation to our perception and other bodies.” (Spir, Thought and Reality, 155-156)

“By the expression “outside world” two things can be understood: (1) Either the bodies we in fact perceive, see, feel, touch, etc. (2) Or “external” things that are not themselves perceived—quite different, therefore, from the bodies of our experience, and unknowable—but, by hypothesis, produce our sensations. What makes it especially easy to mistake about our issue is that we confuse an “external world,” purely hypothetical and imaginary, with one which is actually perceived; although we willingly recognize, in general, that a truly “external world” cannot itself be perceived….Since the bodies [are] independent “external” objects, and, therefore, quite different from our sensations, the first step of logical thought is not to give to bodies any of the qualities given to the sensation. It is here that begins a truly scientific theory of bodies. They cannot be in themselves either colored or bright, hot or cold, sweet or bitter; they have really no sensible quality. But, since all real qualities are given in our sensations, the bodies themselves are without qualities. They are left with no other specific character other than being in space, filling space and acting on one another. But, the property of filling a space, of being extended, is logically contradictory. For, what is extended is present both at different points of space and there is an immediate contradiction in the thought that one same real thing be present simultaneously in different points in space. The essence of extension, in effect, resolves, if we look at it closely, in pure externalities, that is to say, a nothingness. What is extended is composed, but, nonetheless, composed of nothing, since all its parts—small as they can be supposed—are themselves extended and divisible to infinity and still composed. Bodies, therefore, have no “inside” because all bodies can be parted in the middle and then what was “inside” is put “outside,” becomes a pure surface, and so on to infinity.” (Spir, Thought and Reality, 359-360) 

“The bodies are not the causes of sensations, but their essence precisely consists in the sensations. The bodies are only one way of representing sensations, as a manner for them to appear. What distinguishes in general bodies from sensations is their existence, their extension, in space. The fundamental concept of bodies is unquestionably that of something extended that resists. But sensations, as such, cannot be in space, have extension, precisely because they are not bodies. Hence, the intuition of space could never be derived solely from simple sensations and their relations. All the qualities of the bodies that are linked with their extent are not, in fact, of the nature of sensations and must let the bodies appear as something quite different from sensations. But, the extent could obviously not come from outside our knowledge, because nothing that comes from the outside can communicate with us but through our sensations. The extension, therefore, is added to the sensations by some internal reason.” (Spir, Thought and Reality, 397) 

“For, the essence of the extension…consists in that everything is juxtaposed side-by-side and in such a manner that the different points are thought to be independent of one another.” (Spir, Thought and Reality, 402) 

“Here are the reasons why an inner connection between bodies is absolutely inconceivable: What unites two bodies together must obviously be in each one of them simultaneously. A body, A, cannot be bonded to a body, B, without, at the same time, B to be bounded to A—without their common link being thus simultaneously in one and in the other. But, as the bodies are surrounded by space on all sides, the space between them—it is obvious that what binds the two bodies and is simultaneously in both—necessarily fills also the space between them. For, from one body to another, there is absolutely no other road than the space between them. But, a link between bodies which is in the interval itself is also corporeal, extended, and thus purely external. Likewise, two cities are connected by a railroad or by telegraph. There is here, obviously, no inner power of a body that produces changes in another body, but it is, as we see, the only connection between bodies that has, generally, a conceivable sense. Because, bodies, as we have already shown, have no interior and, therefore, cannot be linked together internally.” (Spir, Thought and Reality, 413) 

“Is there not an immediate contradiction in affirming that we are part or a function of the “outside world?” If we were, there would be for us no outside world. Or, on the contrary, would not the parts of the brain be as corporeal as the other organs, would they not be parts of an “external” world” only in relation to us? But, the materials that currently form our brain come first from the “outside” as food and are then separated from the body through excretion. It is thus seen that in any case, Materialism is nonsense.” (Spir, Thought and Reality, 477-478)