Reading Notes: April 5th, 2022

“In order to know that such and such a thing lies within my experience, it is not necessary to know anything about my nervous system: those who have never learned physiology, and are unaware that they possess nerves, are quite competent to know that this or that comes within their experience. It may be—I have no wish either to affirm of deny it—that the things which I experience have some relation to my nervous system which other things do not have; but if so, this must be a late scientific discovery, built up on masses of observation as to the connections of the object of consciousness with the nervous system and with the physical object.” (Russell, On the Nature of Acquaintance, 184) 

“Our first objection derives from Descartes, who deployed a similar argument in support of strong dualism. It runs as follows: (1) I may be completely certain of my own experiences, when I have them. (2) I cannot have the same degree of certainty about the existence of any physical state, including my own brain-states. (C) So (by Leibniz’s Law) my conscious experiences aren’t in fact identical to brain states. Although both the premises in this argument are true, the argument itself commits a fallacy, and is invalid. For as we noted in Chapter 3:1, Leibniz’s Law only operates in contexts which aren’t intentional. It is obvious that the context reacted by the phrase “X is certain that…” is an intentional one. For example, the police may be certain that Mr. Hyde is the murderer, while they have no inkling that Dr. Jekyll is the murderer, despite the fact that Jekyll and Hyde are one and the same man. Oedipus may be certain that Jocasta loves him without believing that his mother loves him, despite the fact that Jocasta is his mother. So, from the fact that I have complete certainty about my own conscious states without having certainty about my own brain-states, it doesn’t follow that my conscious states aren’t brain states. For just as one and the same woman may be presented to Oedipus in two different guises—as Jocasta, and as his mother—so perhaps one and the same brain state may be presented to me under two different aspects: in a third-person way (as a brain-state), and via the qualitative feel of what it is like to be in that state.” (Carruthers, The Nature of the Mind: An Introduction, 67-68) [Underlining is mine]

Note: all of the examples which Carruthers gives in his (supposed) reductio of the “Cartesian Certainty” argument (e.g. Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, and Jocasta and Oedipus’ mother) are all instances of particular “Objects-of-Consciousness” being “masked.” Not one of Carruthers’ examples are examples of the “Consciousness-of-Objects” being masked—the very subject-matter at issue! In short, Carruthers’ has not in any way shown the argument to be invalid. On the contrary, it is Carruthers’ argument that is invalid! Carruthers mistakenly infers that the “Consciousness-of-Objects” is susceptible to being “masked” based upon the fact that certain “Objects-of-Consciousness” are susceptible to being masked—and such a move is invalid. Thus, Carruthers’ “diffusion” of the “Cartesian Certainty” argument has itself been “diffused.”