Reading Notes: April 28th, 2022

“One class of meta-theoretic questions that has figured prominently in the philosophy of cognitive science concern how best to characterize the foundational assumptions of the cognitive sciences….One very widely held view, for example, is that the information processing that goes on in the brain depends on the presence of mental representations, and that cognitive processes are, in some sense, computational processes….Another example of a foundational assumption that has received considerable attention in the philosophy of cognitive science is what we might call the mechanistic assumption. According to this very widely held view, the mind is indeed a mechanism of some sort—roughly speaking, a physical device decomposable into functionally specifiable subparts. Moreover, given this assumption, a central goal for cognitive science is to characterize the nature of this mechanism, or to provide an account of our cognitive architecture….A third broad class of issues in the philosophy of cognitive science concerns the clarification and explication of core theoretical concepts….For example, the notions of cognition, computation, representation, and consciousness have all been the subject of efforts at conceptual clarification…” (Samuels, “Introduction: Philosophy and Cognitive Science” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, 10) 

“First, a common misconception must be put to rest. It is true, as many youngsters learn in school, that objects absorb some wavelengths of light and reflect the rest and that the colors we perceive “in” objects relate to the wavelengths of the reflected light. But color is not actually a property of light or of objects that reflect light. It is a sensation that arises within the brain.” (Goldsmith, “What Birds See” in Scientific American, 70) 

“Such representations need not share properties with the things they represent. The mental representation of redness need not be red, any more than the word ‘red’ or the numeral that denotes red in a painting-by-numbers kit.” (Frankish, What if your Consciousness is an Illusion Created by your Brain?, 5) 

“Of course, [Illusionism requires] that the representations themselves don’t have phenomenal properties. But, as I noted, representations needn’t possess the properties they represent. Representations of redness needn’t be red, and representations of phenomenal properties needn’t be phenomenal.” (Frankish, What if your Consciousness is an Illusion Created by your Brain?, 10)