Reading Notes: April 18th, 2022

“[McTaggart’s Studies in Hegelian Cosmology] possesses a combination of merits, which is as rare as it is valuable. Mr. McTaggart attempts to prove to us directly that the whole universe is of a certain kind; and he defines with must unusual clearness both what his conclusion is and what are the premises and arguments by which he holds it to be proved….Mr. McTaggart’s reasoning is inferior to none in ability; his fundamental premises are not arbitrary; his conclusions are definite; and he leaves us in no doubt as to the precise nature of the evidence which he has to offer for them. I know of no philosophical work which combines these merits in an equal degree….Mr. McTaggart considers Hegel to have discovered the greater part of the arguments on which his conclusions rests, and to have said nothing inconsistent with those conclusions…..On what grounds, then, does Mr. McTaggart base [his] important conclusions? In the first place, he considers it to have been proved by Hegel’s Logic, or capable of being proved on similar lines, that the whole universe is of such a nature that it is in each of its parts, besides being the whole of which they are parts, and that this can only be the case if the whole is “not only in the individuals, but also for the individuals”: it is in this way that Mr. McTaggart interprets the undoubted Hegelian doctrine that the universe must combine perfect unity with perfect differentiation….But even if it were proved that the universe is a whole, which is not only in but for each of its parts, what is the exact meaning of this assertion? And does it follow that these parts are conscious persons like ourselves?....The data which Mr. McTaggart gives us are the following: (1) He considers himself to have proved that we, as conscious persons, are parts of a whole, which is both in and for each of us. For two persons to be conscious each both of himself and of the other, is, he holds, for each to be a part of such a whole. The validity of this doctrine I shall consider presently: what I propose to discuss now is its relation to two other assertions of Mr. McTaggart’s. (2) He admits “the possibility of the existence of other ways in which the whole might be for the part—ways at present unimaginable by us” (p. 20). And (3) he tries to exclude this possibility by arguing that “our selves have characteristics which they could not have, unless they were some of the fundamental differentiations of reality” (pp. 21-26).” (Moore, Review of McTaggart’s “Studies in Hegelian Cosmology”, 177-181) [Underlining is mine]

“Mr. McTaggart entirely misconceives the nature of consciousness. Even if he could prove strictly that the relation, which he holds to be exemplified in consciousness, fully expresses the nature of reality, we must still maintain that this relation is not exemplified in consciousness. Mr. McTaggart’s theory is, that when I know my friend, he is simultaneously both inside and outside my mind: this, he thinks, is the relation in which consciousness always stands to its object. It is owing to this that a universe of conscious selves, each of which knew all about the others, would conform to his “category”: such a universe would be a whole which not only contained all its parts, but was itself contained in each of them. This contradiction (for it certainly seems to be one) might of itself be thought sufficient to condemn the theory of knowledge from which it follows; but let us examine a little further into the account which Mr. McTaggart gives of that theory. He first identifies my friend inside me with my “representation,” “reproduction,” or “image” of my friend; and since he insists besides on distinguishing between this image and the original (p. 21), it would at first seem that my one friend, when I know him, becomes necessarily two, one inside me the other outside. But later on, it appears Mr. McTaggart prefers to say that it is one and the same friend, who is both inside and outside me. This again seems a flat contradiction; but, waving that objection, let us consider whether it is a true and necessary account of the relation of consciousness to its object. Consciousness of a thing does not, I presume, mean nothing but having that thing both inside and outside my mind. Even though it be true that this relation of the thing to me is involved in my consciousness of it, something else is surely involved too—something quite unique, which we all of us recognize, and which is what we mainly think of when we talk of knowing. I do not know that Mr. McTaggart would dispute this; at all events, it is true. And I think perhaps the falsity of Mr. McTaggart’s view can be most convincingly exhibited by showing that when he says that that of which I am conscious is both inside and outside my mind, he is compelled either to define this unique thing which we mainly mean by our consciousness of a thing as meaning in every case both itself and something else (a definition which combines the merit of self-contradiction with that of circularity), or else to deny its existence altogether. Which horn of this dilemma Mr. McTaggart is compelled to take he again does not allow us to decide: it depends whether the inside and outside objects, or (to take the second alternative which he gives us) the inside and outside aspects of one and the same object, which he maintains to be necessary to consciousness, are themselves to be regarded, one or both of them, as objects of consciousness; or whether neither is so. His language will support either alternative, and both are equally fatal to his theory.”  (Moore, Review of McTaggart’s “Studies in Hegelian Cosmology”, 185-186) [Underlining is mine]

“It is commonly supposed, as it was by Berkeley, to be obvious to direct inspection that what I know is always in my mind; whereas the only thing which really is thus obvious, is that my consciousness of the thing is so. The history of philosophy exhibits a uniform inability to distinguish between that of which I am conscious and my consciousness of it—an inability which has found a monument in the word “idea” which regularly stands for both.” (Moore, Review of McTaggart’s “Studies in Hegelian Cosmology”, 187) [Underlining is mine]

“[McTaggart’s Studies in Hegelian Cosmology] has the merit of being an excellent reductio ad absurdum of all attempts to construct what Mr. McTaggart would call an “Idealism,” i.e., any philosophy which maintains that the universe is wholly “spiritual” and perfectly good. It is qualified to perform this useful service by the fact that, whereas its arguments are quite as good as any that are commonly offered, they and their premises are stated in so exceptionally clear a form that their complete impotence may be easily exposed.” (Moore, Review of McTaggart’s “Studies in Hegelian Cosmology”, 188) [Underlining is mine]