Reading Notes: January 3rd, 2022

“Philosophical investigation at the beginning of the 20th century was dominated, in America as well as in England and Sweden, entirely by idealistic tendencies with a decidedly speculative trend….[The] thought, that all real objects are dependent on Consciousness, is a central theory in the idealistic philosophical system, which at the beginning of the 20th century set its stamp upon European and American philosophy. A reaction against this united idealistic front appears, however, during the first decade of the century almost simultaneously in England as well as in America and in Sweden. We cannot here enter into a more detailed exposition of the background to this reaction, but its connection with the expansion of the natural sciences can be mentioned. In these anti-idealistic philosophers a contact with the exact sciences can often be traced, which was entirely foreign to the contemporaneous idealistic thinkers.” (Boman, Criticism and Construction in the Philosophy of the American New Realism, 11-12) 

“In the book The New Realism a fair amount of space is devoted to an exposition of seven common false conclusions. These are not attributed to any particular philosophical author but are considered as some typical examples of false inferences and oversights which explicitly or implicitly have entered into mainly idealistic theories. Among the false conclusions enumerated, one, the so-called “argument from the ego-centric predicament”, occupies an outstanding position. In the polemics of the neo-realists against idealism the untenability of this argument is of central importance, and Spaulding considers the solution of the predicament as nothing less than “the central doctrine of Realism”. The origin of the discussion about the predicament, which won considerable notice in contemporaneous debate, derives, however, not from the exposition in The New Realism but from a paper by Perry. He was the first to expose and discuss the problem, and seems to have been the first who coined the expression “the ego-centric predicament”. Harlow declares Perry’s paper “the most important and most permanent single study” deriving from the neo-realistic school, and this opinion is certainly fitting...” (Boman, Criticism and Construction in the Philosophy of the American New Realism, 23) 

“Perry…defines what he means by the term ontological idealism [and] states that it is “a theory to the effect that T necessarily stands in the relation Rc to an E, or that the relationship Rc(E) is indispensable to T”. A predicament arises, however, when an attempt is made to prove this theory. Every attempt encounters the difficulty arising from the impossibility of examining “the precise nature of the modification of T by Rc(E)”. The elimination of Rc(E) during the course of the investigation is not possible, since every kind of investigation implies that the object stands in relation Rc to a subject. This constitutes for Perry the significance of the ego-centric predicament. According to him, this predicament cannot be an argument for idealism—it proves, on the whole, nothing except the impossibility of using a certain method….It is not correct to use the method of agreement without simultaneous support from the method of difference, but the latter is not available in this case.” (Boman, Criticism and Construction in the Philosophy of the American New Realism, 23-26) 

“The theory that the perception relation modifies the thing seems to contain the notion that in a certain sense something exists which, placed in the relation Rc(E), either modifies one or several of its properties or obtains a new property which is not identical with Rc(E). In a certain sense the perception relation can then be said to define the object of perception. A more exact formulation of such a theory meets with difficulties mainly from the claim that what exists unperceived must be different from and yet in some sense identical with what exists and is perceived. This difficulty might perhaps be partly avoided by bearing in mind that there must exist a property G of such a nature that if A is perceived then A has the property G and if A is not perceived then A does not have the property G.” (Boman, Criticism and Construction in the Philosophy of the American New Realism, 30-31) 

“[Mill] says in his book A System of Logic that according to [the method of agreement and difference] we must examine “a variety of instances in which A occurred, and found them to agree in containing A,” and afterwards examine “a variety of instances in which A does not occur, and find them agree in not containing A”.” (Boman, Criticism and Construction in the Philosophy of the American New Realism, 39) 

“[It] is hardly possible to say that [Perry] has succeeded in refuting an argument which is frequently used by the idealists. In all likelihood no historical philosopher has used an inductive conclusion of the kind which we have exposed above, as an argument for an idealistic point of view. The main reason for this not being the case is certainly the fact that [the] proposition (X)[(X is a thing) ⊃ (X is perceived)] is too weak to correspond to any accepted idealistic theory.” (Boman, Criticism and Construction in the Philosophy of the American New Realism, 41) 

“Perry’s argumentation seems to be irrelevant also from an entirely different point of view. According to the rules of formal logic, it is quite correct to use [the] proposition “Of A1, A2, A3,…An, it is true that they have the property of existing as well as that of being perceived” as the only premise for the conclusion that all things are known, i.e. the Method of Agreement provides a sufficient ground for the inductive generalization.” (Boman, Criticism and Construction in the Philosophy of the American New Realism, 41) 

“The contradiction [that Idealism commits itself to] which Moore has in mind is of a kind which, according to him, enters into many idealistic theories, and which consists in both denying and asserting that the sensed and the sensation, e.g. yellow and the sensation of yellow, are two different entities….The first proposition can in this connection be expressed as asserting tat perception is something distinct from its object, i.e. “the perception of A ≠ A”. If maintaining the other proposition at the same time will lead to a contradiction, this proposition must contain the notion that “the perception of A = A”….The aim of Moore’s investigation is, in fact, to show by an analysis of the concept of sensation, that a perception of A cannot be identical with A. Thereby he believes that he has either refuted a fundamental argument for idealism, or idealism itself…. [The New Realists] stresse[d] the importance of maintaining the distinction between perception and the perceived. The failure of certain philosophers to do so has, according to [them], given rise to idealistic theories.” (Boman, Criticism and Construction in the Philosophy of the American New Realism, 49-52) 

“A perception [is] necessarily a perception of something and this something cannot be one with the perception…If I suspend the difference between the perception and the content of perception, then I suspend perception itself.” (Phalen, A Criticism of Subjectivism in its Various Forms with Special Reference to Transcendental Philosophy, 128) 

“If A is independent of B, then A must be definable, if at all in terms other than B.” (Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, 319) 

“Now what is the application of this to the question of the dependence of things on knowledge? It shows, in the first place, that the content of things is in no case made up of relations beyond themselves. So the content of a thing cannot be made up of its relation to consciousness. Of course, the consciousness of a thing is made up of the thing and its relation to consciousness.  But then thing then contributes its own nature to the conscious complex, and does not derive it therefrom. If A is in relation to consciousness, then consciousness-of-A is constituted in part of A, but A itself is not constituted of consciousness.” (Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, 319) 

“[W]hether the relation of a thing to consciousness is a relation of dependence or not, is an empirical question. It is necessary to examine the relation, and see.” (Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, 319) [Underlining and Italics are mine]

“Consciousness is different from its object….The idealist…fails to see that they are distinct, that they are two, at all….In other words, the object of [perception] is not the [perception] itself. In order that a [perception] shall be an object [of perception], it is necessary to introduce yet another [perception]…which is not at all essential to the meaning of the [former perception itself].” (Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, 319) 

“The theory of Physical Realism as brought forward by Case affords an admirable orientation of the study of English realism….Physical Realism is the doctrine that the immediate data of sense are physical and not psychical. The immediate object is the nervous system itself sensibly affected by external objects. The sensible object is neither identical with the external object which causes it nor with the internal operation of consciousness which apprehends it; it is neither the physical object without nor a psychical object within; it is within, but physical. The results of physical science, it is held, establish the fact that the sensible object is internal, a modification of the nervous system due to its sensible affection from external causes….There is no rupture of physical continuity, no transformation from physical to psychical.” (McClure, A Study of the Realistic Movement in Contemporary Philosophy, 13-14) 

“So far as [perceptions] go, consciousness is that in respect to which they are all alike. [Perceptions] differ only in respect to [their percepta].” (McClure, A Study of the Realistic Movement in Contemporary Philosophy, 14) 

“The analysis of perception begun by Mr. G.E. Moore, [consists] in the separation of the [perception] into the object of which we are conscious, and the consciousness of the object….Any experience whatever which may be termed mental experience is characterized by a fundamental distinction between what is experienced and the act of experiencing. In all mental experience there is this polarization, the two poles representing fundamental distinctions of every experience….The something experienced is always other than the mind which experiences it. It may be variously termed a thing, an object, a [perceptum]…Experience differs only with reference to the [perceptum]….Such are the two elements present in every experience.” (McClure, A Study of the Realistic Movement in Contemporary Philosophy, 14) 

“To “identify” a term means…to establish one property which determines the term without ambiguity.” (McClure, A Study of the Realistic Movement in Contemporary Philosophy, 14)