An Outline of Some of the “Theoretical Virtues” of My Idealism

I was asked to give a list of “theoretical virtues” present in the Absolute Idealism which I hold to. I usually despise doing things like this—namely because I find such lists to be reductive and incapable of capturing the substance and detail of a way of understanding the world. But I digress. This list is by no means exhaustive.

Let E represent Experience, and let X represent a raincheck for whatever the Materialist decides to postulate as “fundamental.” Feel free to substitute X with “matter and motion,” “space-time,” “one-dimensional strings,” “something-I-know-not-what,” or whatever else may be fashionable as of late.

We are certain, and can empirically verify, that E, as a certain determinable, manifesting itself in certain determinate forms, exists as a concrete and actual fact.

The concrete and actual existence of manifestations of E is neither an ad hoc assumption, nor a mere hypothesis.

The concrete and actual existence of these manifestations can neither be denied, nor doubted, without contradiction.

We are neither certain, nor can we empirically encounter or verify, that X, as a certain determinable, either manifests itself in certain forms independently of any and all manifestations of E.

Any X that manifests itself in certain forms independently of any and all manifestations of E, is a hypothetical abstraction which exists ens rationis, and cannot be shown to exist in concrete actuality (on pain of committing the fallacy of vicious abstraction).

All conceivable instances of X,  manifesting themselves in certain forms independently of any and all manifestations of E, have their semantic and conceptual content exhausted by facts “internal to” states of affairs wherein E manifests itself in certain forms.

All possible and actual concrete existences that we (including physical scientists) ever empirically encounter, and can conceive of, have their semantic and conceptual contents exhausted by facts “internal to” states of affairs wherein E manifests itself in certain forms.

All possible and actual instances of causality that we (including physical scientists) have empirically encountered, and can even conceive of, consist are exhausted by instances “internal to” states of affairs wherein E manifests itself in certain forms.

Any attempt to genuinely explain the existence or emergence of manifestations of E by X, as a “higher determinable,” of which manifestations of E are specifications, falls prey to at least one, or more, of the following three issues that an explanation must avoid in order to be a genuine explanation: (i) Assuming the presence at the start of the explanation of the very fact needing to be explained; (ii) Resulting in a viciously circular explanation; (iii) Resulting in a vicious infinite regress of explanation.