An Outline of Some of the “Theoretical Virtues” of My Idealism

I was asked to give a list of “theoretical virtues” present in the Absolute Idealism which I hold to. I usually despise doing things like this—namely because I find such lists to be reductive and incapable of capturing the substance and detail of a way of understanding the world. But I digress. This list is by no means exhaustive.

Let E represent Experience, and let X represent a raincheck for whatever the Materialist decides to postulate as “fundamental.” Feel free to substitute X with “matter and motion,” “space-time,” “one-dimensional strings,” “something-I-know-not-what,” or whatever else may be fashionable as of late.

We are certain, and can empirically verify, that E, as a certain determinable, manifesting itself in certain determinate forms, exists as a concrete and actual fact.

The concrete and actual existence of manifestations of E is neither an ad hoc assumption, nor a mere hypothesis.

The concrete and actual existence of these manifestations can neither be denied, nor doubted, without contradiction.

We are neither certain, nor can we empirically encounter or verify, that X, as a certain determinable, either manifests itself in certain forms independently of any and all manifestations of E.

Any X that manifests itself in certain forms independently of any and all manifestations of E, is a hypothetical abstraction which exists ens rationis, and cannot be shown to exist in concrete actuality (on pain of committing the fallacy of vicious abstraction).

All conceivable instances of X,  manifesting themselves in certain forms independently of any and all manifestations of E, have their semantic and conceptual content exhausted by facts “internal to” states of affairs wherein E manifests itself in certain forms.

All possible and actual concrete existences that we (including physical scientists) ever empirically encounter, and can conceive of, have their semantic and conceptual contents exhausted by facts “internal to” states of affairs wherein E manifests itself in certain forms.

All possible and actual instances of causality that we (including physical scientists) have empirically encountered, and can even conceive of, consist are exhausted by instances “internal to” states of affairs wherein E manifests itself in certain forms.

Any attempt to genuinely explain the existence or emergence of manifestations of E by X, as a “higher determinable,” of which manifestations of E are specifications, falls prey to at least one, or more, of the following three issues that an explanation must avoid in order to be a genuine explanation: (i) Assuming the presence at the start of the explanation of the very fact needing to be explained; (ii) Resulting in a viciously circular explanation; (iii) Resulting in a vicious infinite regress of explanation.

My Adaptation of Nick Thomas-Brown’s Argument for Idealism

P1) If, at a given time, a true proposition about every Object, at all times, is known relative to one or more Subjects, then every Object, at all times, is of such a nature as to be knowable relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time.

P2) If every Object, at all times, is of such a nature as to be knowable relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time, then no Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, is of such a nature as to be unknowable relative to one or more Subjects, at all times.

“Let us call something, X, “relatively” unknown when some but not all people fail to know propositional truths about X. Furthermore, we will call X “absolutely” unknown if, and only if, nobody knows any propositional truths concerning X. Now, it is clear that relative unknowns exist. Most people know nothing about the Cynic philosopher Hipparchia, but those who study ancient Greek philosophy surely know of her. Thus, Hipparchia is unknown relative to certain people at certain times. Suppose someone, A, does not know about Hipparchia at a time T. Given this, Hipparchia is unknown relative to A at T. It would, then, be a contradiction for A to know of Hipparchia at T. Hence, once it is admitted that Hipparchia is not known by A at T, it follows that she cannot be known by A at T. So, we can reasonably support the following epistemic theorem: whatever is unknown relative to someone at a certain time, is unknowable relative to her at that time. But, suppose that instead of being relatively unknown, Hipparchia is absolutely unknown. In other words, let us consider that Hipparchia is not known by anyone at any time. We might observe that this can be restated as the following: Hipparchia is unknown relative to any person at any given time. When combined with our discovered theorem, we can infer from this that Hipparchia is unknowable relative to any person at any time. Thus, we have reached a second epistemic theorem: whatever is absolutely unknown, is unknowable by anyone whatsoever.” (Thomas-Brown, Idealism and the Known Unknown, 3) 

C1) Therefore, if at a given time, a true proposition about every Object, at all times, is known relative to one or more Subjects, then no Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, is of such a nature as to be unknowable relative to one or more Subjects, at all times. [From P1 and P2]

P3) If no Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, is of such a nature as to be unknowable relative to one or more Subjects, at all times, then every Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, depends upon its being known relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time.

“Granted our two theorems, we can move to demonstrate that nothing absolutely unknown ever exists. We know as certainly as we can that any given entity is either square or not square, for this is an instance of the law of excluded middle. In grasping this universal truth, we know a truth concerning all things past, present, or future. If an absolute unknown existed, we would have some knowledge of it by way of such universal truths. But, it is a contradiction for an absolute unknown to be known by someone or other. Hence, if we are to have knowledge of universal truths at any time, there can never exist absolute unknowns. Yet, we do, of course, possess such knowledge; and, thus, no absolute unknowns exist, past, present, or future. Whatever exists or comes to exist is, therefore, known by someone or other at some time or other. In other words, to be is to be known and existence implies knowledge. Once we understand that something’s existence entails its being known, we can further see that its existence depends on its being known. However, the presence of knowledge presupposes that of a knower. Hence, the existence of a given object depends on there being an intelligent self or selves.” (Thomas-Brown, Idealism and the Known Unknown, 3-4)

C2) Therefore, if at a given time, a true proposition about every Object, at all times, is known relative to one or more Subjects, then every Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, depends upon its being known relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time. [From C1 and P3]

P4) At a given time, a true proposition about every Object, at all times, is known relative to one or more Subjects.

C3) Therefore, every Object that exists, has existed, or will exist, depends upon its being known relative to one or more Subjects, at a given time. [From C2 and P4]

All credit for the original version of this particular argument goes to Nick Thomas-Brown. Thomas-Brown published the argument in a 2019 paper titled “Idealism and the Known Unknown.”