Thursday, August 1, 2024

Reading Notes: August 1st, 2024

“Representationalism is the view that phenomenal characters somehow reduce to representational properties….A state has a representational property when, to put it intuitively, it has a meaning or somehow stands in some process for something else, such as an object, or a ‘proposition’—a putative fact. Standard philosophical theories consequently take representational states to involve a relation between a subject and a ‘content’—what is meant—via an attitude or the relation borne to that meaning….A representational property of a representational state may thus be characterized as a pair composed of an attitude and a content. Representational states have correctness, or satisfaction conditions, partly determined by the correctness conditions for their contents.” (Hellie, Consciousness and Representationalism, 1-2)

“Externalist accounts of representation offer another type of sufficient condition for having representational content. Although these accounts differ significantly from one another, each holds that a mental item has representational content in virtue of its bearing an interesting, robust relation to the environment. Dretske, for example, holds that a mental item (such as a perceptual experience) represents such-and-such if that item functions primarily to indicate the presence in the environment of such-and-such.” (Biggs, The Scrambler: An Argument Against Representationalism, 229)

“If neutral water is coloured, for example, and so simply possesses this quality, is simply in this condition, it would be sentient if it were not only for us or as a matter of possibility that it differed from the condition, but it were at the same time to distinguish itself from itself as being so determined. Differently expressed: the genus color only exists as blue, or as a certain specific color; in that it is blue, it remains the genus color.; But if the color as color, i.e., not as blue but at the same time as color, persisted in opposition to itself as blue color—if the difference between its universality and its particularity were not simply for us bit existed within itself, it would be sensation of blue.” (Hegel, Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Vol. I, 123)

“The non-sentient subject is exhausted in its properties, Hegel seems to be claiming; it makes no distinction between itself and its properties, although we do. The sentient being, however, retains for itself an identity over against its particular properties, it makes a distinction between itself and its properties.” (DeVries, Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity, 58)


Saturday, July 13, 2024

Reading Notes: July 13th, 2024

“The only thinker within the early Cartesian School who called in question the doctrine of representative perception was Arnauld. In his Traite des Vraies et Des Fausses Idees, which was written as a criticism of Malebranche’s Recherche de la Verite, he states in the most definite manner that there is no direct evidence of the existence of subjective states, acting as intermediaries between mind and matter, and that the sole (and on his view insufficient) ground for their assumption is (as we have already seen in the Chapter on Descartes’ problem) the local difference between object known and the brain through which it is known….Even the ground that objects cannot be known directly, since they are material and therefore wholly different from the immaterial mind, reduces to this one ground. For it is because the mind is unextended, that, even though it be locally present to a body, it still remains external to it. As Malebranche remarks, though the mind were to issue out of the body in order to visit the sun, being unextended, it could not contain that star within itself, and would therefore, even though it got inside it, still remain as external to it as one body is to another.” (Kemp Smith, Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy, 115-116)

“Sense and imagination are, therefore, [in Descartes philosophy] related to thought in the same way that figure and motion are related to extension, that is, as modes to their common attribute.” (Kemp Smith, Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy, 127)

“In [self-consciousness] we have experience of a unity that is capable of maintaining itself throughout the variety of its states, and of an activity that progressively unfolds that unity in the realisation of desire. Further, within the unity of each perception there is always involved a multiplicity, infinitely complex.” (Kemp Smith, Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy, 167)

“Materialism has on its side a formidable array of arguments from facts. It can point to certain and undeniable and invariable sequences of cause and effect. All sorts of disturbances and alterations of consciousness arise when poisons are introduced into the blood, from the excitement or stupor of intoxication to the profound coma of Bright’s disease. Again, my brain processes slacken down, and I pass into the unconsciousness of dreamless sleep. They are interfered with by the rupture of a blood vessel, and, either special departments of my consciousness are interfered with, or I lose consciousness altogether, or for so long as the interference lasts, that is to say, according to the extent and persistence of the lesion. My brain processes cease altogether, and—the inference seems too obvious to state. And yet the extreme conclusion does not follow unless materialism can show that physical processes give rise to consciousness in the first place. If they cannot, there will be no need to infer that their ceasing must cause its extinction.” (Sinclair, A Defense of Idealism, 76-77)

Friday, July 12, 2024

Reading Notes: July 12th, 2024

“The ignorant physicist sometimes says, “We know that there is matter. Why need we go further to an unknown something called mind?” But his very assertion is self-destructive. It implies the priority of the something knowing to the something known. He has not been able to assert matter without postulating mind. You not only can not prove matter, you can not define it, without implying the existence of mind.” (Krauth, The Strength and Weaknesses of Idealism, 294)

“The murder of matter is the suicide of mind.” (Krauth, The Strength and Weaknesses of Idealism, 301)

“No purely physiological investigation can explain the phenomena of consciousness….How it is that molecular changes in the brain cells coincide with modifications of consciousness; how, for instance, the vibrations of light falling on the retina excite the modification of consciousness termed a visual sensation, is a problem which cannot be solved. We may succeed in determining the exact nature of the molecular changes which occur in the brain cells when a sensation is experienced, but this will not bring us one whit nearer the explanation of the ultimate nature of that which constitutes the sensation. One is objective and the other subjective, and neither can be expressed in terms of the other. We cannot say that they are identical, or even that the one passes into the other; but only, as Laycock expresses it, that the two are correlated, or, with Bain, that the physical changes and the psychical modifications are the objective and subjective sides of a ‘double-faced unity’….The physiological activity of the brain is not, however, altogether co-extensive with its psychological functions. The brain as an organ of motion and sensation, or presentative consciousness, is a single organ composed of two halves; the brain as an organ of ideation, or re-presentative consciousness, is a dual organ, each hemisphere complete in itself. When one hemisphere is removed or destroyed by disease, motion and sensation are abolished unilaterally, but mental operations are still capable of being carried on in their completeness through the agency of the one hemisphere. The individual who is paralyzed as to sensation and motion by disease of the opposite side of the brain (say the right), is not paralyzed mentally, for he can still feel and will and think, and intelligently comprehend with the one hemisphere. If these functions are not carried on with the same vigour as before, they at least do not appear to suffer in respect of completeness.” (Ferrier, The Functions of the Brain, 256-257) 

“Davidson’s account of subjectivity (or ‘the subjective’) as first-person authority is, we believe, a cause of a philosopher simply being blind to subjectivity as a question in its own right. His point is that once we get rid of the idea of subjectivity as a ‘parade of objects before the mind’ (the Cartesian idea), all that remains is privacy and asymmetry, and these can be explained as a mere side effect of natural language in our minds. Whereas Davidson officially intends to account for ‘the subjective’, and in investigating the possibility of truth and objective knowledge for beings such as ourselves, sets out relating the objective, the intersubjective and the subjective, the fact is, his whole approach rests on the priority of a third-person perspective, and takes behavioural evidence as touchstone (even considering that the appeal to the intersubjective in his last writings aims at taking distance from Quinean-like behaviorism, itself undoubtably an even more radically third-personal approach). Still, Davidson’s overall view of subjectivity as first-person authority in linguistic creatures amounts to an elimination of subjectivity and a trivialization of the problem of self-knowledge.” (Miguens and Preyer, Are There Blindspots in Thinking About Consciousness and Subjectivity?, 13)

“Nature teaches me by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am besides so intimately conjoined, and, as it were, intermixed with it, that my mind and body compose a certain unity. For if this were not the case I should not feel pain when my body is hurt, seeing I am merely a thinking thing, but should perceive the wound by the understanding alone, just as a pilot perceives by sight that part of his vessel is damaged.” (Descartes, Meditations, VI, 336)

Thursday, July 11, 2024

Reading Notes: July 11th, 2024

“If any system, whether under the influence of other objects or not, has been quiescent for a finite time it can only be through the action of external objects and not through its own nature that it ceases to be quiescent. Such a system will neither change its qualities nor move as a whole or in parts, nor cease to exist as a whole or in parts unless it is forced to do so by changes in objects external to it.” (Broad, Perception, Physics, and Reality: An Enquiry into the Information that Physical Science Can Supply About the Real, 85-86)

“The continuity of space is defined mathematically as an infinite series of points or positions, and therefore as absolutely discrete, and the infinity of the series is defined by the negation of contact. No member is next another and between any two points there is another. So also with the continuity of time the instants are points and the process succession, and the compactness of a period consists in no two instants being next one another so as to exclude an intervening instant.” (Carr, Symposium: The Quantum Theory: How Far Does it Modify the Mathematical, the Physical and the Psychological Concepts of Continuity?, 48-49)