Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Qualities

It is frequently maintained that the secondary and tertiary qualities that appear to saturate the world of Experience are nothing more than residual excrescences supervening on the “extended.” This view gains its support by an appeal to the relativity of the world’s apparent qualitative characteristics in contrast to the alleged constancy and permanence of the world’s quantitative determinations. This is the view of Materialism. The Materialist places the “real” nature and essence of the world in the latter species of characteristics, whilst relegating the former to the realm of “unreality” and “appearance.”

Materialism proceeds in the following way:

The colors, textures, odors, sounds, temperatures, and tastes—all of which being qualities that we perceive objects as having—fluctuate and change in relation to the states of our sense organs and nervous systems. However, these Objects would have incompatible characteristics at the same time if all the colors, textures, odors, sounds, temperatures, and tastes that we perceived them as having were actual properties of said objects. Therefore, it follows, on pain of contradiction, that objects do not possess the colors, textures, odors, sounds, temperatures, and tastes which we perceive them as having (i.e., secondary, and tertiary qualities)—rather, they only “appear” to have them. Indeed, objects are really destitute of color,  texture,  odor, sound, warmth, roughness, smoothness, taste, and so on; they are neither painful nor pleasant, neither small nor large, neither swift nor slow.

However, if secondary and tertiary qualities neither inhere in, nor in any way constitute the “real” nature of objects, then what are these wandering “adjectives” really qualifying? After all, I find myself immersed in a presentational-continuum of secondary and tertiary qualities and, qualities qua qualities must be the “real” qualities of some “substantive”—they cannot be “adjectives” that “really” have themselves as their own “substantives.”

Furthermore, the objects of our dreams feel smooth or rough, they are seen as red or blue, we may feel that they resist our effort and will, they may be felt as heavy or light, we find them as being pleasant or unpleasant, they are taken to be agreeable or disagreeable, etc. However, it is clear that these dream-objects do not enter into those relations with my sense organs that objects of my waking-life must enter into for their “apparent” secondary and “apparent” tertiary qualities to come into being. Indeed, the “apparent” secondary and “apparent” tertiary qualities that I perceive dream-objects as having must really qualify them. For, when I dream, I may touch the smooth surface of an apple, taste its sweetness, observe its rounded shape and color; however, said apple would not in any way be impinging upon those “real” sense organs of my waking-life. On the other hand, if I am asleep under an apple tree, an apple (i.e., an apple existing in the world that I encounter in my waking-life) may fall from the tree and impinge upon my sense organs, but such an impingement would not result in said apple suddenly possessing an “apparent” redness, “apparent” smoothness, “apparent” roundness, etc., either for me, or for anyone else.

Suppose the Materialist suggests that these “apparent” secondary and “apparent” tertiary qualities latently “slumber” within our nervous systems, and that whenever we perceive objects (both in our dream-life and waking-life) it is actually our nervous systems that possess the “apparent” secondary and “apparent” tertiary qualities that we perceive the objects in our dream-life and waking-life as having. This cannot be the case. After all, according to the Materialist, our nervous systems are themselves objects, and neither secondary qualities nor tertiary qualities either inhere in, or in any way constitute them. Let’s illustrate the dilemma that would ensue. Take, for instance, a sense organ, such as an eye. For the Materialist, an eye, E1, like any other object, does not possess qualities (neither secondary nor tertiary), but only “appears” to possess qualities when it enters into a special relation with either (i) a mirror—itself an object, or (ii) another eye, E2—itself being another object. However, since (i) and (ii) are both objects, the Materialist is forced to maintain that neither (i) nor (ii) possess qualities—they only “appear” to possess qualities when they enter into special relations with either E1—itself an object, or another eye, E3—itself being another object. So too is the case for our nervous systems. A part of a nervous system, N1, is itself an object, so N1 does not possess qualities—it only “appears” to possess qualities when it enters into a special relation with another part of itself (or another nervous system), N2, which is itself destitute of qualities, and only “appears” to possess qualities when it enters into a special relation with either N1 or another part of itself (or another nervous system), N3; and so on, and so on, ad infinitum.  

Now, we saw that the Materialist condemns secondary qualities and tertiary qualities to the realm of “appearance” on the basis of their alleged impermanence and relativity to our sense organs and nervous systems. The Materialist then goes on to place the “reality” of the objects—i.e., their “inherent” properties—in spatial and quantitative characteristics. For, according to the Materialist, the extended and quantitative is unwavering in its permanence—it is the reliable, and palpable kernel of every object, irrespective of our nervous systems, our sense organs, and our Experience. The Materialist maintains that he arrives at this result by means of argument and empirical evidence. However, is their line of reasoning even valid? There are several objections which can be made against it.

Every object that we distinguish and isolate within the sphere of Experience is always presented to us as indissolubly infused with “apparent” primary qualities, “apparent” secondary qualities, and “apparent” tertiary qualities. Examples of the latter two kinds of “apparent” qualities include redness, hardness, smoothness, roundedness, and fragrance; painfulness, pleasantness, bitterness, calmness, soothing, tranquility, and so on. And it is clear that none of these “apparent” secondary and “apparent” tertiary qualities have any “real,” independent being apart from Experience. Now, while it is indeed the case that an object’s “apparent” tertiary qualities are abstractly distinguishable from its “apparent” secondary qualities and “apparent” primary qualities, it is an invalid and fallacious move to go on to say that because it’s “apparent” primary qualities, “apparent” secondary qualities, and “apparent” tertiary qualities are distinguishable in thought, they are therefore separate, independent, and externally related existences in Reality. For example, if, within condition X, it is the case that a, b, and c always accompany each other, it is obviously fallacious to infer from this that without condition X, it would still be the case that a, b, and c would accompany each other just as they did when condition X obtained; and, further, it would also be fallacious to infer that without condition X or c or b, it would still be the case that a would continue to exist in the same manner as it did when condition X obtained and when both b and c were present.

Again, is extension really a property of any object? Extension manifests itself to us only in sight and touch; however, on the Materialist’s view, this extension (i.e., extension-as-seen, extension-as-felt) is none other than an object’s “apparent” extension—and apart from the object’s entrance into certain relations with our sense organs and nervous system, this “apparent” extension doesn’t exist. But, based upon the facts that we have hitherto considered, how can the Materialist validly infer that the “apparent” spatial characteristics—which come to us as inseparably one with “apparent” secondary and “apparent” tertiary qualities—be properties inherent in objects? After all, we have no miraculous a priori intuition of objects as being “really” extended.

On the one hand, it is clear that the “apparent” extension of objects cannot itself be the “real” extension that the Materialist claims. This can be demonstrated in the following way. Whenever we go to sight and touch, we are met with a presentational-continuum of secondary qualities infused with primary qualities. In sight, we encounter “outspreaded” color—differentiated into diverse hues, varying in brightness and intensity; and, in touch, we discover sensations of texture and resistance—exhibiting a certain degree of hardness, smoothness, warmth. These primary and secondary qualities beheld in sight and touch are always infused with tertiary qualities. And, as we have seen above, the Materialist holds that neither secondary nor tertiary qualities are properties of objects. Furthermore, since an object’s “apparent” extension is always infused with “apparent” redness, “apparent” hardness, “apparent” smoothness, “apparent” roundedness, “apparent” pleasantness, “apparent” calmness, etc., the Materialist cannot take this “apparent” extension as something “real” and independently of this “fusion”—on pain of committing a fallacious inference. As we said above: 

If, within condition X, it is the case that a, b, and c always accompany each other, it is obviously fallacious to infer from this that without condition X, it would still be the case that a, b, and c would accompany each other just as they did when condition X obtained; and, further, it would also be fallacious to infer that without condition X or c or b, it would still be the case that a would continue to exist in the same manner as it did when condition X obtained and when both b and c were present.

On the other hand, since the Materialist holds that the “apparent” qualities of objects depend for their existence upon said objects entering into special relations with our sense organs, it immediately follows that the “apparent” spatial characteristics of objects likewise depend for their existence upon said objects entering into special relations with our sense organs. In fact, the Materialist commits himself to the “real” properties of objects being sheltered behind a veil of “appearances”—the “real” properties remaining forever “unbeheld” by us. For, if the “real” spatial characteristics of objects were themselves the object’s “apparent” spatial characteristics, then objects’ “real” spatial characteristics would depend for their existence upon the aforementioned objects entering into special relations with our sense organs—said organs (themselves being objects) having their “real” spatial characteristics only upon their entrance into special relations with other sense organs, and so on, ad infinitum. Furthermore, it is fallacious to infer from an object’s “apparent” spatial characteristics to said object “really” possessing spatial characteristics. Therefore, in order for the Materialist to solidify a foundation for his theory, he must find an object which not merely “appears” to possess spatial characteristics, but “really” does possess spatial characteristics. However, such an endeavor is impossible on the Materialist’s own theory.

As we said above, according to the Materialist’s own theory, the “apparent” qualitative and “apparent” spatial characteristics of objects all depend for their existence upon said objects’ entrance into certain special relations with our sense organs, A. However, this prompts another question. We are forced to ask the Materialist whether or not our sense organs, A, (i.e., the ground of objects’ “apparent” qualitative and “apparent” spatial characteristics) are themselves spatially extended. The Materialist now encounters a dilemma. If he says yes, then he must hold that the real spatial characteristics of any object are identical to its “apparent” spatial characteristics—for, as we have seen above, it is fallacious to infer from an object’s “apparent” spatial characteristics to said object “really” possessing spatial characteristics. Since the Materialist is forced to concede that the real spatial characteristics of any object are identical to its “apparent” spatial characteristics, he lands into a deeper inconsistency. Our sense organs, A, are themselves objects (and, according to the Materialist, really have spatial characteristics), and so A’s real spatial characteristics (i.e., its “apparent” spatial characteristics) have no existence apart from A entering into special relations with our sense organs, B. However, if A’s real spatial characteristics have no existence apart from A’s entrance into a special relation with our sense organs, B, we must ask whether or not B (i.e., those sense organs which are the ground of A’s real spatial characteristics) really has spatial characteristics. We soon find that B, like all other objects, suffers the same fate as A. Since our sense organs, B, are themselves objects, the Materialist is forced to say that B’s real spatial characteristics have no existence apart from B’s entrance into special relations with our sense organs, C, and so on, ad infinitum.

In short, the Materialist must say, and yet cannot say, that objects really have spatial characteristics. On the one hand, if the Materialist says that objects really have spatial characteristics, then he could only do so by venturing into inconsistency by an invalid inference based upon the “apparent” qualitative and “apparent” spatial characteristics of objects that he himself has condemned as not being properties of objects. On the other hand, if the Materialist maintains that the real spatial characteristics of any object are identical to its “apparent” spatial characteristics, then he lands into a vicious regress.